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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the idea of partnership in contemporary aid policy and 
practice. Drawing on a multi-disciplinary body of literature that is broadly 
„constructivist‟ in orientation, and using the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, the health Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) and 
the health sector in Zambia as case studies, the research uniquely explores 
how (and why) the idea of partnership is a pervasive feature in aid policy, 
and how this relates to and shapes local practice, including the practice of 
politics that this enjoins.  
 
Drawing on textual analysis of policy documents and on qualitative field 
research conducted in Zambia between November 2008 and July 2009, the 
thesis provides a number of important and novel insights. Firstly, it shows 
how the idea of partnership began its contemporary life in the socio-political 
relations of aid institutions and in the context of an aid crisis in the 1990s. 
Secondly, it shows how the idea travelled ideationally and geographically, 
through an elite network of aid agency actors (cf. Mosse, 2007), eventually 
becoming an expected and symbolic motif of aid policy. Thirdly, the thesis 
suggests why partnership remains a pervasive policy idea; featuring in 
SWAp and Global Fund policy because it symbolically conceals the 
existence of different perspectives about the right relations of health and 
developmental governance. Fourthly, and at the same time, the thesis shows 
how partnership is dominantly constructed in aid policy in a depoliticised 
way – as a technical and economic way to organise action – due to the 
prevailing power of donor governments and aid agencies in the socio-
political processes that produce aid policy and the context of inequality in 
which aid is governed. Finally, the thesis shows how the depoliticisation of 
policy is „unravelled‟ in the health sector in Zambia as partnership is 
translated, in and through the politics of collaboration, contestation, and 
compromise (Mosse, 2007, p.2, 2005a p.645; Rossi, 2006; Bending and 
Rosendo, 2006). This shapes, contorts and constrains local health 
governance in diverse and unexpected ways. 
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Chapter One:  
Why partnership? 
 
 
 
Partnership is a pervasive idea in contemporary policy debates about aid and 
international development, and is frequently invoked to describe and justify a 
range of practices, organisations and relationships. It not only appears in the 
official texts of bilateral and multilateral development agencies, but is also 
evident in the written documents of almost every actor who receives aid, be it 
national governments or various local, regional or international organisations. 
As Kent Buse and Andrew Harmer (2009, p.245) have remarked: „The rise of 
partnership has been meteoric: in the late 1980s... [it was] a nascent 
experiment... now [partnership is] part of mainstream discourse and a dominant 
model for cooperation in a complex world‟. Given its widespread use, it seems 
as though partnership is accepted, relatively unquestioningly, as the right aid 
policy and development practice. To borrow the words of Pierre Bourdieu 
(1977, pp. 164, 168), it is as though partnership is doxa – a component in the 
„universe of the undiscussed‟; a taken-for-granted, natural and self-evident way 
to do or rather to govern aid and international development.  
 
Yet why is partnership such a pervasive feature in contemporary aid policy? 
What does the idea actually mean in different policy contexts? How does this 
affect the local practices of development that such policy is expected to 
generate or legitimise (cf. Mosse and Lewis, 2006, p.9)? And moreover, what 
does this tell us about the practice of politics? Despite widespread official 
commitment to partnership, these are questions that have received only limited 
critical attention in the existing literature. While many academic works and 
Overview 
 Introduces the research topic: the politics of the idea of 
partnership in contemporary aid policy and practice  
 Explains why focusing on the idea of partnership is an important 
topic for academic inquiry  
 Sets out the substantive research question and discusses how it is 
answered in the chapters that follow 
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indeed grey literature refer at least in some way to partnership, few theorise or 
problematise it directly, or in any depth. For example, there is little 
consideration of how or why partnership appears in policy, or how it is 
received and applied in specific settings. As a consequence, partnership has 
been described as „one of the most over-used and under-scrutinized words in 
the development lexicon‟ (Harrison, 2002, p.589).  
 
The central concern of this thesis is to start to fill this intellectual space by 
exploring the idea of partnership in detail and moreover, in so doing, to 
challenge and „denaturalise‟ it; that is to say, to make this familiar idea strange 
(cf. Maclancey, 2002, p.7). The thesis attempts to unpack the idea of 
partnership by questioning how and why it has come to feature and be framed 
in aid policy; what it means and how it is understood; and how it shapes, 
enables, contorts and / or constrains local socio-political action. Essentially, it 
looks at what the idea of partnership is and what it does in both aid policy and 
practice. The substantive research question can be summarised as follows: 
 
 Why is the idea of partnership a pervasive feature in contemporary 
aid policy and how does this relate to and shape local practice, 
including the practice of politics that this enjoins? 
 
In order to answer this substantive question however, the thesis must also 
address a number of associated theoretical puzzles, namely:  
 
 In what ways do we understand aid policy?  
 In what ways do we understand what partnership means as a 
component of aid policy? 
 And, how can we conceptualise the relationship between what 
partnership means in aid policy and how it shapes practice?  
 
In other words, the research must develop an understanding of what partnership, 
policy and also practice are before the intellectual journey can begin. It must 
also have an understanding of what the relationship between policy and 
practice is. While these issues are considered in the context of a literature 
review in Chapter Two, it is useful to briefly consider them in this opening 
chapter, so as to fully introduce the topic.  
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Understanding policy, practice and the idea of partnership 
 
There are many different ways in which policy, practice and the idea of 
partnership can be understood. While accepting that what follows is something 
of a simplification, existing literature has tended to approach the topic in one of 
two broadly counter-posing ways: from a pragmatic-instrumental perspective, 
and from a more critical position.
1
  
 
Partnership in pragmatic-instrumental literature 
 
The first perspective treats the idea of partnership as an inherently progressive 
and morally-sound policy intention, which should be implemented and, 
moreover, be implementable in practice. It is understood as being about 
realising equality, trust and / or mutuality in development relationships, and, 
moreover, to be about ensuring that recipients of aid in poorer countries, 
especially recipient governments, are empowered as agents of their own 
effective development (see Brinkerhoff, 2002; Maxwell and Riddell, 1998; 
Conway et al., 2006; Tennyson and Wilde, 2000).  
 
The need to create more equal and synergistic relationships has been a 
recurrent issue in the history of international development aid, with persistent 
charges of ineffectiveness, imperialism and neo-colonialism directed towards 
western donor agencies (Baaz, 2005, p.6; Abrahamsen, 2004, p.1455). These 
criticisms became particularly acute during the 1980s however, due to the 
conditions that were attached to much multilateral and bilateral aid in order to 
induce recipient governments to enact a series of structural reforms that aid 
agency actors saw as necessary for development (defined somewhat narrowly 
here as market-based economic growth). This aid conditionality was not only 
attacked for being an undue and coercive form of external governance 
intervention that undermined local ownership of development, but also for its 
                                                 
1
  This classification builds on the literature categorisations on partnership of Ian 
MacDonald (2005) who identifies critical-pragmatic and structuralist 
accounts of partnership; Rita Abrahamsen (2004) who identifies positive and 
critical accounts of partnership; and David Mosse (2004, 2005a) and Mosse 
and David Lewis (2006) who categorise the literature on international 
development policy more generally into instrumental and critical perspectives. 
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failure to effectively generate the intended neoliberal result of economic 
growth (Abrahamsen, 2004; Crewe and Harrison, 1998).  
 
From a pragmatic-instrumental perspective, working in partnership is 
understood as the right way to rectify this situation. It is not only promoted as a 
way to return power, influence and leadership to recipient country actors – 
transforming a donor-driven and paternalistic relationship into one of equality – 
but also as a way of ensuring complex development challenges are met and of 
securing aid effectiveness (Abrahamsen, 2004). In consequence, pragmatic-
instrumental literature is concerned to assess the extent to which these policy 
intentions can be, or have been, achieved, and, where there are issues, to 
suggest ways in which these can be overcome (Mosse, 2004). Here then, the 
relationship between partnership in aid policy and in practice is understood in 
simple and instrumental, means-ends terms (Mosse and Lewis, 2006); it is 
about having clear partnership intentions (equality and mutuality) and about 
linearly generating these as outcomes in practice.  
 
While pragmatic-instrumental literature often highlights the existence of 
various gaps between intention and outcome – noting, for example, that the 
inherently unequal nature of aid relationships (where one partner has resources 
and the other does not) complicates the successful achievement of partnership 
in practice (see Maxwell and Riddell, 1998; Abrahamsen, 2004) – it tends to be 
assumed that these can be bridged through the creation of appropriate 
incentives for engagement, good institutional design, and / or the „tweaking‟ 
and improvement of management tools, procedures and techniques (cf. 
Guljarani, 2009, p.7). There are questions however, as to whether the 
relationship between aid policy and practice is as linear and instrumental as this 
literature seems to suggest. And whether there are actually a multiplicity of 
political values, interests and assumptions that underpin the idea of partnership 
in aid policy; not one shared or common goal. There is little intellectual space 
in this literature for the broader political and economic environment in which 
partnership policy and practice are situated, or for any consideration of 
unintended and potentially contradictory socio-political effects that might result 
from partnership in practice, such as relations of power that might 
unexpectedly be promoted or entrenched between those who are included, or 
indeed excluded, from being a development partner (Cardini, 2006, p.396; 
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Mosse, 2005a; Long, 2001). There is also little consideration of the way in 
which partnership incentives or aid management procedures may be 
differentially received, interpreted and enacted by actors involved in aid and 
development. In short, pragmatic-instrumental literature diverts conceptual 
attention away from these issues, and thus from the social and political life of 
the idea of partnership in policy and practice (cf. Mosse, 2004). 
 
Partnership in critical literature 
 
The second critical approach is much more politically aware, and is imbued 
with greater scepticism about the underlying ideational premise and socio-
political effects of partnership in aid policy and practice. It challenges the 
above-mentioned view in various ways; either from a critical-ideological 
position or from a critical-governmentality perspective.  
 
Critical-ideological literature 
 
Critical-ideological literature tends to see partnership as a political slogan or 
„tactic‟ that conceals other motives (Baaz, 2005, p.7; for examples of this 
literature see Crawford, 2003 or Fowler, 2002). Partnership is not seen to be 
„for real‟; it is not about equality or the transfer of power to actors in poorer 
countries (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.1456). Rather, it is understood as a rhetorical 
„disguise‟ or misrepresentation, which simply rebrands old-style paternalistic 
intentions of donor agencies and nullifies opposition to their dominant interests: 
namely economic integration and the embedding of global capitalism 
(Crawford, 2003; Abrahamsen, 2004; McDonald, 2005; Baaz, 2005). Here then, 
the policy and practice of partnership is seen as a neo-colonial and, moreover, a 
neoliberal project of governance, through which dominant western actors 
continue to promote their economic interests and to control poorer countries; 
thereby perpetuating their dependent development (Matlosa, 2002; Crawford, 
2003).  
 
While this critical-ideological approach offers important insights into the way 
in which the idea of partnership may embed and reflect the interests of 
particularly donor agencies, it attributes too much coherence to the policy and 
practice of partnership as a successful project of neoliberal governance; relying 
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on claims about donor „power over‟ poorer countries, which are poorly 
substantiated (Watts, 2001 in Mosse, 2005b, p.13). Not only are intentions 
more unclear, contradictory and inconsistently expressed within and between 
aid donors (Mosse, 2005a; Eyben and Leon, 2005; Gardner, 1997; Oliver de 
Sardan, 2005), but also their practices are often more contested, complicated 
and „dirtier‟ than this literature suggests (cf. Harrison, 2010). While donor 
agencies may, and indeed often do, dominate aid and development 
relationships, they cannot completely determine the course of events, and thus 
monolithically control partnership in practice (Crewe and Harrison, 1998).  
 
Critical-ideological literature then, overlooks „the collaboration and 
complicity‟ of marginalised actors in development, and the possibility that they 
may translate, consume, appropriate and remanufacture (what may well be) 
rhetorical partnership „disguises‟ for their own benefit (Mosse and Lewis, 2006, 
p.4, Rushton, 2008; Rossi, 2006; Orlandini, 2003). All this is not to suggest 
that the interests of donors or neoliberal thinking have no influence over the 
way in which the idea of partnership appears in aid policy and local practice 
and, indeed, the later chapters of this thesis will demonstrate this. The point is 
however, that there is less ideational coherence than critical-ideological 
literature suggests (Baaz, 2005, pp.7-9). 
 
Critical-governmentality literature 
 
A different critical understanding is put forward in literature that is written 
from a critical-governmentality perspective. Inspired by Michel Foucault, this 
work understands the policy and practice of partnership as a distinct form of 
governing rationality, which operates through subtle, complex and productive 
workings of power; empowers yet restrains local action in poorer countries; 
and also serves to technically depoliticise the governance of development 
(Abrahamsen, 2004; Gould, 2005b; Li, 2007; Mosse, 2005a).  Indeed, drawing 
on Foucault‟s notion of „government‟ as „the conduct of conduct‟, this 
literature tends to see partnership as a liberal attempt (by western authorities 
and agencies) to shape, improve, and therefore govern the conduct (or 
behaviour) of actors in poorer countries „from a distance‟ through more or less 
calculated means (Li 2007 p.5; Dean, 2009, p.18). It operates by educating and 
(re)configuring habits, aspirations and desires, and, in so doing, produces 
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modern and self-disciplined citizens by enlisting them as responsible agents of 
their own liberal development (Larner and Butler, 2004; Abrahamsen, 2004).  
 
Indeed, through promises of inclusion and donor cooperation, and the 
deployment of a series of calculated managerial partnership technologies (such 
as aid contracts, Memorandums of Understanding, auditing, and monitoring 
and evaluation) the policy and practice of partnership is seen as a way to 
voluntarily (rather than coercively) enlist and educate aid-recipient actors „to 
do as they ought‟; that is, to act responsibly and thus reform their behaviour 
according to accepted liberal standards (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.1463; cf. Li, 
2007). In so doing, this literature therefore provides the insight that, while these 
calculated partnership technologies may come across as technical tools for 
regulating the „conduct of conduct‟, they reflect a fundamentally political and, 
moreover, a liberal rationality that pervades the aid and development arena.  
 
A similar point is made by James Ferguson (1990) in his seminal work on 
development processes in Lesotho. While Ferguson (1990) does not address the 
idea of partnership directly, he does show how the technical rendering of aid 
and development interventions in order to regulate the conduct of others 
routinely converts problems into apolitical issues for which there are technical 
solutions. While Ferguson (1990) argues that these technical interventions 
mostly fail in their own terms (they do not achieve the results that were 
intended), he indicates that they have regular „instrumental‟ and „ideological‟ 
effects, namely and respectively: the entrenchment of bureaucratic state power, 
wherein more power relations are referred through state channels; and 
depoliticisation, the projection of a representation of economic and social life 
which denies politics (Ferguson, 1990, p.xiv-xv, p.256, p.273-274).  
 
Although Ferguson‟s (1990) work and critical-governmentality literature more 
broadly offers important insights for this research – including, for example: the 
way in which the idea of partnership may reflect particular, liberal modes of 
thinking; how calculated „partnership‟ technologies and techniques may be 
employed to induce particular forms of conduct; and how the technical 
rendering of aid policy interventions operate as an „anti-politics machine‟ 
whisking „political realities out of sight‟ (cf. Ferguson, 1990, p.xv) – it also has 
limitations. Perhaps most importantly, this literature understands partnership in 
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policy and partnership in practice as one and the same: as an expression of a 
particular rationality and also its effect. As a result, there is a lack of conceptual 
space for agency and human reflexivity, and thus limited consideration as to 
whether dominant rationalities can be challenged, transformed or resisted at 
particular historical moments or in particular contexts (Mosse, 2005b, p.14; Li, 
2007). It remains to be seen whether liberal partnership rationalities are as 
internalised by, or as constitutive of, actors in poorer countries as this literature 
seems to suggest. And whether instead, the calculated and depoliticised 
partnership technologies mentioned above may actually be translated, 
manipulated and perhaps even symbolically performed by reflexive actors in 
specific contexts. These are clearly important topics to consider and are 
returned to in the later chapters of this thesis.  
 
The later chapters seek to address these issues and the other limitations 
highlighted above by drawing on an alternative analytical framework, namely 
critical-constructivism. While critical-constructivism is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Two, it is necessary to briefly explain it here, so as to be clear 
about the way in which it has shaped the substantive arguments of the thesis. 
 
An introduction to critical-constructivism 
 
A critical-constructivist approach to the policy and practice of partnership 
offers a way forward and „middle-ground‟ (cf. Adler, 1997) between the 
critical-ideological and critical-governmentality literature described above. 
While sharing this literature‟s scepticism about the underlying premise of the 
idea of partnership and its socio-political effects (as well as a desire to 
challenge the pragmatic-instrumental view), this analytical approach differs 
because it seeks to restore notions of complexity and agency to, and the 
importance of ideational factors in, analyses of partnership (cf. Hay, 2002, 
p.201-202).  
 
Ontologically, core assumptions are: 1) that social and political phenomena and 
their meanings are inherently complex; 2) that actors are inherently social; and 
3) that it is not possible to understand socio-political life, including the idea of 
partnership in aid policy and practice, without recourse to the ideas that actors 
hold, their interests and to the context in which they find themselves (Reus-
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Smit, 2009, p.217; Hacking, 1999, p.11; Hay, 2002, p.254; Long and van der 
Ploeg, p.65; Hay, 2002, p.208). By extension, epistemologically, it is assumed 
that it is only possible to understand and generate knowledge about the politics 
of partnership in aid policy and practice if we consider and interpret the 
meanings, beliefs, preferences and actions of the actors who are involved, and 
assess how these have been shaped by the broader context in which they find 
themselves (Hacking, 1999; Hay, 2002; Long and van der Ploeg, 1994). 
 
In consequence, in order to answer the substantive research question outlined 
above, this thesis aims to: 1) consider how ideational factors and the interests, 
of actors, as well as broader structures, are implicated in processes of „mutual 
creation and reproduction‟ of the meaning idea of partnership; 2) assess and 
interpret how actors‟ understandings of partnership and their social interactions 
may be shaped and constrained by their histories and wider structures of 
knowledge and power; and 3) consider how actors may themselves reproduce 
or transform these broader structures through their application of partnership in 
aid policy and practice (cf. Hay, 2002; Barnett, 2002, p.101). It seeks to draw 
attention then, to how the meaning of the idea of partnership is produced, 
contested and legitimised in both aid policy and social practice, in and through 
broader relations of power (Mosse, 2005b, p.15 quoting Soederberg, 2003, 
p.14); where aid policy is understood here and in the forthcoming chapters of 
the thesis as written doctrine, texts or official representation, and practice as 
courses of action (or inaction), understandings, and experiences (cf. Jenkins, 
2007).  
 
By being sensitive to complexity and agency, the thesis seeks to reveal 
fractures and points of divergence in partnership policy (as texts) and practice 
(as action). And therefore, as suggested in the introductory paragraphs above, 
to destabilise what appears to be the idea of partnership‟s fixed and monolithic 
status in the world of aid and international development. In short, it aims to 
reveal the constructed nature of the meaning of partnership, and to show that 
the established order of things could, and indeed should, be different (cf. Hay, 
2002, p.138, p.202; Hacking, 1999).  
 
Importantly, given the above-mentioned assumption of complexity, the 
ambition of critical-constructivism and therefore of this current research is not 
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to generate hypotheses or universal theoretical principles about the politics of 
partnership because such parsimonious explanations do not reflect what is a 
complex reality (Yanow, 2009a). Theory in this research is less about 
developing or testing models that predict how and why partnership is pervasive 
in aid policy and relates to action, and more about sensitising and guiding an 
empirical, in-depth and interpretive analysis of the topic, and the identification 
of broad explanatory themes (Hay, 2002, pp.46-47; see Chapters Two and 
Three). Indeed, the objective „is not illumination of a theory but the 
illumination of the real world or worlds [of partnership in policy and practice]‟ 
(Poku, 1998, p.39 italics added). Before turning to discuss how critical-
constructivist insights have informed an analysis of the topic, it is necessary to 
be more clear however, about which real worlds of partnership have been 
studied in the research and why. 
 
The real worlds for exploring the idea of partnership 
 
A number of case studies of the real worlds of partnership are used in this 
research. The overall case (cf. Sundewall, 2009) is of course the idea of 
partnership itself. Two policy and practice couplets are however, also used in 
order to allow a comparative and in-depth analysis of how and why the idea is 
pervasive in aid policy, and how and why it relates to and shapes local practice. 
The official texts of the Global Fund to Fight to AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria
2
 and the health Sector-wide Approach (SWAp)
3
 were selected as 
suitable policy cases, and the Zambian health sector was chosen as an 
exemplary arena in which to explore how such policy relates to and shapes 
practice (where policy and practice are, as indicated above, seen as 
texts/representation and action/experiences respectively). The Global Fund, 
                                                 
2
  The Global Fund to Fight to AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is an 
international organisation based in Geneva, which provides aid, in the form of 
grants, to address HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Grants go primarily to 
low income countries that have a high burden of the three diseases. The Global 
Fund does not currently have staff or offices in any of the countries it gives 
funding to; rather, it operates from its Geneva headquarters and relies on local 
organisations and management systems to coordinate action. More detail is 
provided in Chapters Five and Six. 
3
  Sector-wide approaches or SWAps are a specific way of managing aid and 
also sectoral development in low income countries. This approach emerged in 
the 1990s and has been used in relation to agriculture and education, but 
particularly health. SWAps tend to involve the use of particular forums for 
dialogue between actors involved in health and also specific systems for 
allocating and managing resources. More detail is provided in Chapters Seven 
and Eight. 
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SWAp and Zambian health sector are all introduced in more detail in later 
chapters of the thesis (along with the specific methods that were used to 
generate insights about them). It is, however, perhaps useful to introduce them 
here and to justify why they were selected. 
 
Although the idea of partnership is evident in much contemporary aid policy, it 
is particularly a feature of aid policy for health; appearing in a range of the 
official texts or programmatic titles of international donors, governments and 
civic actors, and describing or justifying different aspects of their operations 
and health management practices (Buse and Harmer, 2004, 2009). The idea of 
partnership appears, for example, in various policy texts about health Sector-
Wide Approaches (SWAps), which were widely promoted in the late-1990s by 
the likes of the World Health Organisation (WHO), World Bank and various 
bilateral agencies as a new model for coordinating health sector development in 
poorer countries, including the delivery and management of aid. SWAps are 
now a feature of national health policy in more than twenty countries globally, 
including Bangladesh, Ghana, Mozambique and Zambia (see Foster, 2000) and 
a common feature to all is a focus on partnership (see Chapter Seven). 
Similarly, when the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was 
established in early 2002 as an entirely new organisation in the world of aid, it 
was set up under the rubric of the idea of partnership (see Chapter Five). 
Indeed, with a purpose to „attract, manage and disburse additional resources‟ 
for its three target diseases in „countries in need‟, the decision-making about 
grants that it provides, the operation of the country-level structures that it 
supports, and the management and oversight of the health programmes that it 
funds, are all officially to be governed on the basis of partnership (Global Fund, 
2002, p.1; see also Chapter Five).   
 
While the idea of partnership also features in a range of other health aid-related 
initiatives and, perhaps most recently, has been reflected in the name of the 
International Health Partnership (IHP) which was launched in 2007 (see IHP+, 
2011), academically, SWAp and Global Fund aid policy provide what Alan 
Bryman (2008, p.56) calls „exemplifying cases‟ for this research. They are not 
necessarily unusual or extreme, but provide a useful intellectual context in 
which to locate an analysis of the idea of partnership and thus to answer the 
research question.  
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Relatedly, the health arena in Zambia – a low-income and landlocked country 
in central Southern Africa – is also a highly suitable exemplifying case to 
explore partnership in practice (cf. Bryman, 2008, p.56). Most particularly 
because both the Global Fund and SWAp mechanisms have been in operation 
in relation to health for an extended period of time – the SWAp since the late-
1990s and the Global Fund since its inception in 2002. Both are also an 
important focus of health-related action in Zambia due to the considerable and 
increasing volume of aid monies that are channelled through Global Fund and 
SWAp structures (Chansa et al., 2008; MoH Zambia, 2009a, 2009b). In early 
2011, more than US$ 1,018 million had been committed to Zambia by the 
Global Fund alone, growing from nothing in 2002 (see Table 5 in Chapter Six). 
Furthermore, Zambia is a useful case study context for this research because 
the Zambian Ministry of Health refers to the idea of partnership in its policy 
texts (MoH Zambia, 2006), and so also do many donor agencies (DGIS, 2004; 
NZAID, 2006; Schleimann et al., 2003) and civic actors (Thandizani, 2011; 
ZNAN, 2011). In consequence, the Zambian health sector provides an 
insightful setting for unpacking partnership and for making this pervasive and 
familiar idea strange (cf. Maclancey, 2002; see above).  
 
Critical-constructivist insights about partnership: Social construction, 
multiple translations, contestation and depoliticisation 
 
As indicated in the discussion above, in order to take forward the investigation 
of how and why the idea of partnership features in Global Fund and SWAp 
policy and how this relates to and shapes action in the health sector in Zambia, 
this research embeds a critical-constructivist analytical framework. More 
specifically, constructivist insights from a range of academic disciplines, 
including interpretive public policy, international relations (IR) and 
development ethnography / critical anthropology have been drawn upon to 
inform and guide the analysis. Although it is perhaps uncommon to trespass 
across traditional disciplinary boundaries in this way, the common 
constructivist fabric that courses through them makes this pursuit legitimate. It 
has therefore been fruitful to look widely to inform the study.    
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While the thesis certainly draws on a range of literature, it takes particular 
inspiration from the „entangled social logics‟ or „interactionist‟ perspective of 
development ethnography / critical anthropology (see Long, 2001; Mosse, 
2005a; Oliver de Sardan, 2005). Although more is said about this in Chapter 
Two, as David Mosse and David Lewis (2006, p.9) summarise, this particular 
body of literature provides insight into the way in which the meanings of ideas 
are produced and negotiated by actors within the structured context in which 
they are located, and how processes and interactions may have different 
significance for those who are involved. Drawing on this literature in particular 
then, this thesis offers a range of new insights into why the idea of partnership 
is a pervasive feature in contemporary aid policy, and how this relates to and 
shapes local practice in Zambia, including the practice of politics that this 
enjoins.  
 
Firstly, it draws attention to the way in which aid policy and the practice of 
partnership are embedded in both international and Zambian politics, and to the 
way in which the meaning and ubiquity of the idea of partnership is constructed 
socially, in and through relations of power (Mosse, 2004; 2005a). It illustrates 
how the meaning of partnership and its use in aid policy of the Global Fund 
and about SWAps is shaped by the values and interests of, as well as the 
confrontations between, a diverse range of actors – including aid donors like 
the World Bank, key individuals within the Zambian Ministry of Health, and 
also a diversity of NGOs. It also shows that, more often than not, policy texts 
about partnership reflect an uncomfortable and political compromise. 
 
Secondly, and in contrast to the extant works discussed above, the thesis 
demonstrates that, despite its apparent pervasiveness, there is actually no single 
meaning or understanding of the idea of partnership in aid policy; nor in local 
practice in health in Zambia. Indeed, much like other political ideas such as 
poverty and participation, it shows that there is no discrete or authentic way in 
which the meaning of partnership is or can be is defined (Freeden, 1998, p.53; 
Long, 2004, p.27). Rather, it is produced in specific contexts through socio-
political processes of interaction. This is not to say that the range of possible 
meanings for partnership is infinite. Whilst there is no single meaning for 
partnership, the thesis shows that it does have, to borrow the words of Michael 
Freeden (1998, p.53), certain „ineliminable‟ features, in that it is always about 
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relationships and the organisation of action. Indeed, in all of the literature and 
empirical material that is discussed in this research, the idea refers, at least in 
some way, to these broad themes. Given that partnership is essentially about 
relationships and the way in which action is coordinated, guided and steered, at 
its core then, the idea of partnership is about who, how and why different actors 
are involved in aid, health and development; in other words, it is about 
relations of governance. 
 
Thirdly, and importantly, the thesis shows that, although there is no single 
understanding of the idea of partnership, this does not preclude the existence of 
dominant meanings. While the chapters that follow certainly show that there 
are multiple and contested meanings for partnership in both SWAp and Global 
Fund aid policy, which reflects the contradictory beliefs and assumptions of 
different actors about relations of governance, they also show how the agency 
of actors, both at the international level and in the health sector in Zambia, is 
constrained by wider „paradigms of thought‟ and power relations, which serves 
to privilege certain representations of partnership over others (Atkinson, 1999, 
p.59). Indeed, as implicitly suggested in the discussion above, the thesis draws 
attention to the way in which the idea of partnership tends to be dominantly 
represented within contemporary aid policy as an objective, technical and win-
win way to organise action for development (Buse and Harmer, 2004). That is 
to say, it tends to be constructed in a depoliticised way; devoid of any overt 
reference to the ideas, values, beliefs and assumptions that underpin it about 
who should be involved in health and development governance. The thesis 
considers how and why this might be the case; and also how such 
depoliticisation relates to and shapes health-related action in Zambia. It 
discusses whether the dominantly depoliticised way in which partnership is 
framed in Global Fund and SWAp policy limits and constrains conceptual 
debate about who, how and why different actors are involved in aid, health and 
development? Whether this narrows the scope for political engagement in 
socio-political practice in the health sector? And whether this supports or 
destroys the possibility of challenging existing relations of governance? 
 
Finally, and drawing on the work of David Mosse (2004, 2005a) in particular, 
the thesis shows how depoliticised policy schemes of partnership governance 
cannot simply be imposed locally. Indeed, the chapters that follow reveal how 
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the depoliticisation of partnership in aid policy is „unravelled‟ (cf. Mosse, 2007 
p.2) in the health sector in Zambia as it is translated, in and through the politics 
of collaboration, contestation and (feigned) compliance; and how this shapes, 
contorts and constrains local health governance in diverse and unexpected ways 
(Mosse, 2005a; Rossi, 2006; Li, 2007). 
 
Chapter Structure 
 
Having provided a brief introduction to this thesis, it is useful to set out the 
structure and broad content of the forthcoming chapters, so as to provide a clear 
overview of how the research question is answered. As indicated above, the 
next chapter of the thesis (Chapter Two) reviews existing literature on the idea 
of partnership in policy and practice. It builds on the high-level discussion 
above, and more fully introduces and justifies the critical-constructivist 
approach of the research. This is a somewhat detailed and lengthy chapter, and 
has been included by virtue of the lack of existing work on partnership. 
 
Chapter Three sets out the methodological strategy that was used to inform the 
substantive research question. It explains that a qualitative research strategy 
was employed and describes the research design and research methods in some 
detail. It argues that a qualitative research strategy was appropriate for 
exploring how and why partnership features in contemporary aid policy and 
shapes practice because it fits the underpinning ontological and epistemological 
orientation of the research.  
 
Chapter Four is the first substantive and empirically-grounded chapter about 
the idea of partnership in contemporary aid policy. It situates partnership in 
historical context, tracing the idea‟s history, and puts forward an explanation as 
to how and why, at some point during the 1990s, it seems to have risen to 
prominence. A number of important factors are implicated here, but most 
significant is an apparent crisis in the legitimacy of aid following the ending of 
the Cold War, during which the need for, and governance of, aid was 
questioned by a variety of different actors. The chapter shows how the rise of 
partnership was a means to re-legitimise aid, how its incorporation into key 
policy texts was designed to enrol powerful aid critics (particularly neoliberal 
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actors in the US), and how it eventually became a type of expected symbolic 
motif of aid policy, by which any new initiative was to be decorated and judged. 
 
Having set out this background, the thesis moves on to the policy and practice 
chapter couplets referred to above. Chapters Five and Six explore the policy 
and practice of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 
Chapter Five considers why the Global Fund was established under the 
governing rubric of partnership, and discusses how a series of different factors, 
including, for example, political contests between G8 actors and activist NGOs 
over why more resources were needed for AIDS, TB and malaria and how aid-
related action should be governed, shaped the way in which the idea is framed 
in the Fund‟s official texts. Through its analysis of partnership, this chapter 
(and also Chapter Seven) provide new insight into the complexity of, and 
conflicts that shape, global health politics, and how the governance of global 
health, while porous to the views of a diverse set of actors, is actually 
dominated by an elite coalition of largely donors. These actors promote 
particular depoliticised (technical and economic) arguments about partnership, 
and the way aid and health should be governed.  
 
The second part of the Global Fund couplet of chapters (Chapter Six) considers 
how the Fund‟s official policy of partnership relates to and shapes action when 
it is set to work in Zambia. It shows how the depoliticisation of partnership is 
translated, consumed and remanufactured (cf. Orlandini, 2003; Rushton, 2008) 
by different actors in Zambia and how the managerial techniques that 
partnership policy legitimises are reconfiguring the political landscape and 
governance of health in the country; not only shifting who is included and 
excluded from accessing resources, but also entrenching already-existing 
„etiquettes of hierarchy‟ (cf. Green, 2003, p.135), and closing down 
opportunities for open and deliberative debate.  
 
Chapters Seven and Eight explore the idea of partnership in the policy and 
practice of health SWAps. Chapter Seven starts by discussing how and why 
partnership features in SWAp policy. It shows how a number of different 
factors, yet most particularly efforts by the World Bank to respond to criticisms 
of its neoliberal thinking, were influential here. The chapter shows how the 
Bank‟s efforts, and the politics surrounding this, resulted in the idea of 
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partnership being framed in a dominantly depoliticised way in SWAp policy 
and how this reflects the inherently unequal way in which aid policy processes 
are governed. Chapter Eight moves on to consider how the idea of partnership 
in official SWAp policy relates to and shapes action in the health sector in 
Zambia. In so doing, this chapter demonstrates the highly political nature of the 
SWAp partnership in practice, yet shows how this politics is strategically, 
necessarily, and routinely concealed in public arenas by government, aid 
agency and also civic actors. This is a means to demonstrate compliance with 
depoliticised policy models of partnership and to sell the Zambian health sector 
in what is a competitive global marketplace for aid (cf. Mosse, 2005a; Rushton, 
2008). 
 
The final chapter (Chapter Nine) draws together the arguments of the preceding 
chapters into a summative conclusion, reflecting in particular on how the 
dominantly depoliticised way in which partnership appears in contemporary aid 
policy, relates to and shapes local action and governing practice in the health 
arena in Zambia. It considers the wider significance of the research, both 
academically and practically, and where a future research agenda aligned to 
this study might begin.  
 
A brief note about critical-constructivism: The significance of an 
interpretive epistemology  
 
Before we move on to these substantive chapters, it is important to briefly draw 
attention to the interpretative epistemology that the research embeds, because it 
affects the way in which arguments about the idea of partnership are asserted in 
the thesis. The research is not a scientific and positivist work. As a 
consequence, the substantive arguments are not presented as a form of 
objective truth or facts. Instead, they represent one particular understanding of 
the politics of partnership, and moreover an understanding that is shaped by the 
author‟s own ways of thinking and doing. Following Dvora Yanow (1997) then, 
the chapters that follow are presented with „passionate humility‟; that is to say, 
with conviction, but with „an acknowledgement of the possibility that one 
might be wrong‟ (Yanow, 2009b, p.587). It is hoped that this humility 
demonstrates academic openness, and can be a driver for further research, 
questioning and critique.  
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Overview 
 Explores, probes and problematises how the idea of partnership, 
as a component of contemporary aid policy and local practice, 
has been understood and explained in existing literature from a 
range of disciplines 
 Details the limitations of and gaps in existing academic work 
 Sets out and justifies the critical-constructivist analytical 
framework for this research 
Chapter Two 
The idea of partnership in aid policy and practice: 
A review of existing literature  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Having provided an introductory background and justification for exploring 
why and how partnership features in contemporary aid policy and practice in 
the last chapter, this current chapter seeks to review what is known about the 
topic in more detail, so as to provide a comprehensive starting point for the rest 
of the thesis. Although, as indicated in Chapter One, the idea of partnership is a 
relatively under-explored component of aid policy and practice, which goes 
some way towards justifying the focus of the research on the topic, a limited 
number of existing studies spread across a range of academic disciplines, from 
international political economy (IPE), international relations (IR), development 
ethnography / critical anthropology, and development studies, have either 
focused explicitly on the idea (for example, Crawford, 2003; Abrahamsen, 
2004; Gould, 2005), or touch on it more tangentially (see Craig and Porter, 
2005, 2005, 2006). Given the lack of existing literature on the topic, this 
chapter seeks to bring together and review these disciplinary disparate works, 
drawing out different understandings of partnership, and of how we can 
conceptualise aid policy and practice. In so doing, the chapter seeks to build on 
the initial discussion in Chapter One and to further contribute to an 
understanding of the theoretical puzzles that arise from the thesis‟ substantive 
research question, namely: In what ways do we understand aid policy and what 
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partnership means as a component of this policy? And how can we 
conceptualise the relationship between what partnership means in aid policy 
and how it is practiced?  
 
The first sections of the chapter explore, probe and problematise how 
partnership has been understood and explained in existing literature; 
identifying a series of gaps and limitations. The final section moves on to detail 
the critical-constructivist framework of this research.  
 
As indicated in Chapter One, the chapter argues that the idea of partnership has 
generally been approached in two broadly counter-posing ways:
4
 firstly, from a 
pragmatic-instrumental perspective, in which it is understood as an inherently 
progressive policy intention that should be managed and moreover be 
manageable in practice; and secondly, from a more critical position, in which 
there is greater scepticism about the underlying premise and socio-political 
effects of partnership in policy and in practice. While the pragmatic-
instrumental perspective is representative of, what can perhaps be considered, 
mainstream literature on partnership by virtue of its prevalence, the more 
critical literature challenges the prevailing view; either from a critical-
ideological or critical-governmentality position (see also Chapter One). 
Although categorising the literature in these ways is clearly an over-
simplification, it serves as a useful discursive and ordering device, so that key 
insights of, and overlaps and fractures between, extant literature can be 
highlighted.   
 
While each of the above-noted literatures are detailed in the discussion that 
follows, the chapter censures pragmatic-instrumental literature for uncritically 
accepting aspects of official policy narratives, in which partnership is presented 
as a self-evidently progressive idea and inherent good. It argues that critical-
ideological and critical-governmentality works provide more productive lines 
of thought, yet nevertheless also have limitations (see Appendix One), which 
suggests the need for an alternative analytical framework. The chapter argues 
that a critical-constructivist approach offers a „middle-ground‟ (cf. Adler, 1997) 
                                                 
4
  As indicated in Chapter One, this classification builds on the literature 
categorisations on partnership of Ian MacDonald (2005); Rita Abrahamsen 
(2004); David Mosse (2005a) and Mosse and Lewis (2006); see the footnote in 
Chapter One for more details.  
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here, transcending some of the limitations of the critical works. Building on the 
arguments of Chapter One, the chapter explains how such a framework 
provides the basis for a valuable analysis of why the idea of partnership has 
risen to prominence in contemporary aid policy, how and why partnership is 
framed in such texts, and how this relates to and shapes local action, and the 
practice of politics that this enjoins.  
 
A review of pragmatic-instrumental literature on partnership  
 
The first body of literature to be reviewed in this chapter is labelled here as 
pragmatic-instrumental and, as indicated above, represents the most prevalent 
or mainstream perspective on the idea of partnership. While there is some level 
of diversity in the analytical approach within this literature, it shares a number 
of similarities. Perhaps most importantly, these works tend to see partnership as 
a somewhat self-evidently progressive policy intention and practical mode of 
governance. It tends to uncritically accept specific definitions of partnership 
that are presented in official policy texts (MacDonald, 2005; Abrahamsen, 
2004; Martens, 2007): as the realisation of equality and mutuality in 
development relationships not only between donor- and recipient- governments 
of aid, but also between other actors in society (for example, business groups, 
consultants, non-governmental organisations and other civic actors) (see 
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1998; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Maxwell and Riddell, 1998). As a 
consequence, it tends to be promoted as the right way of governing aid and 
international development and, in turn, is usually concerned to understand and 
suggest how intentions can be realised (or implemented) in practice; through 
rational and manageable means (cf. Mosse, 2005a).  
 
In presenting partnership as a morally-sound policy intention, this literature 
draw on notions of equality and, more specifically, to the creation of more 
equal governing relationships between the donors and recipients of aid. The 
need to create more equal relationships has been a recurrent issue in the history 
of aid, with persistent charges of imperialism, neo-colonialism and undue 
intervention directed at the donor community (Abrahamsen, 2003, p.1454; 
Baaz, 2005, p.6; see also Chapter Four). It was not until the 1980s however, 
when stringent conditions were attached to aid (aid conditionality) in order to 
encourage recipient governments to make a series of structural reforms to the 
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way in which development processes were organised, that these accusations 
became increasingly widespread (see Chapter Four).
5
 As Emma Crewe and 
Elizabeth Harrison (1998, p.70) emphasise, the use of conditions was widely 
perceived as a way for aid donors to exert control over recipient countries and 
reflected an implicit acknowledgement of unequal relations of power; „We 
have the money, you want it, so you had better behave as we think correct‟. 
Such conditionality was widely criticised for being coercive and for promoting 
donor-driven models of development (Clarke, 2004, p.307).   
 
Given this history, the move towards the policy and practice of partnership 
tends to be explained in pragmatic-instrumental literature as a reflection of a 
moral concern to redress this unequal situation. Indeed, it is suggested that, 
through working in partnership, an unacceptable and paternalistic way of 
organising action will be transformed into one of equality, with recipient 
country partners empowered as agents of their own development. Simon 
Maxwell and Roger Riddell (1998, p.257) note, for example, that partnership is 
an „admirable commitment‟ given that it is founded on „mutual respect and 
maximum feasible equality in political power‟; a view that is broadly shared by 
Derick and Jennifer Brinkerhoff (2004, p.255) who argue that it is a policy 
intention of „great promise‟.   
 
Significantly however, the promise of partnership is not only perceived to come 
from its moral soundness, but also from its instrumental value, in that it brings 
together actors to deal with complex development challenges efficiently and 
effectively. As Jennifer Brinkerhoff (2002, p.7) explains, „The most obvious 
motivation for establishing a partnership is the desire to enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of development efforts‟. Existing actors, operating 
alone, are believed to lack the knowledge, practical tools and financial 
resources to solve global, national and local development problems in an era of 
globalisation (Tennyson and Wilde, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2002). Drawing on 
notions of inter-dependency and comparative advantage, pragmatic-
instrumental works argue that working in partnership is a „rational and highly 
appropriate response‟ here (Brinkerhoff, 2002, p.18). By bringing together a 
                                                 
5
  As noted in Chapter Four, the conditions for receiving aid were wide-ranging 
and included not only macro-economic changes, but also social sector reforms.  
In health, this included the implementation of user fees and accounting 
procedures; the maintenance of essential drugs lists; and the decentralization 
of services (Donaldson, 1994, p.5-6; Périn and Attaran, 2003, p.1216).    
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multi-sectoral assemblage of donors, governments, business groups, and other 
civic actors, issues can be overcome in an efficient and effective way. As 
Jennifer Brinkerhoff (2002, pp.3-4) explains: 
 
Partnership contributes to effectiveness by affording actors access to 
crucial resources… that would otherwise be inaccessible… Creativity 
may emerge from the assembling of diverse actors with different 
perspectives and expertise, resulting in efficiency improvements… [and] 
win-win solutions heretofore unimaginable.   
 
Here then, working in partnership will ensure that aid is effective because the 
resources that donors bring will, if used by a range of actors who have the right 
expertise, provide new and efficient opportunities to solve complex 
development challenges.  
 
A similar view is put forward by Tim Williamson et al. (2008, p.31) in a recent 
review paper on approaches to aid delivery. Williamson et al. (2008) argue that 
aid is often ineffective because of the way in which donor-driven agendas 
undermine local ownership of development efforts, including, for example, the 
institutional capacity of recipient governments to effectively prepare 
development policies, to allocate budgets, to deliver public services and to 
ensure domestic accountability. Partnership is promoted as a way to reverse 
this situation because working together and providing mutual support should 
act in reverse: it should support ownership, build institutional capacity, and 
support domestic accountability. Indeed, it is through partnership that a 
„vicious cycle of aid ineffectiveness‟ will be turned into a „virtuous‟ one 
(Williamson et al., 2008, pp.31-35). To this end, a number of specific aid 
modalities are advocated, including the SWAp and general budget support, 
which will support this intended partnership approach. 
 
Importantly, the idea of partnership is also envisioned as a common-sense 
„democratic development‟ (Kjaer, 2003 in Rein et al., 2008, p.7); a way of 
bridging so-called „participation gaps‟ that are believed to exist in current 
forms of governance (Martens, 2007, p.33). Interestingly however, it is the 
instrumental (rather than political) benefits of participation through partnership 
that are emphasised here. While it is noted, for example, that opening up aid 
and development to a multi-sectoral variety of actors will allow more inclusive 
forms of decision-making, the real benefit emphasised is that development 
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action is made more effective (Brinkerhoff, 2002, p.6; Kjaer, 2003 in Rein et 
al., 2008, p.7). In other words, participation through partnership is seen as a 
means to an end, and not an end in and of itself. Indeed, this emphasis on the 
instrumentality of partnership in policy and practice is common to mainstream 
literature. As Jens Martens (2007, p.32) indicates, it often seems as if there is 
„no alternative‟ to this apparently solution-oriented, efficient and accountable 
mode of governance. 
 
Although it should be clear from the discussion above that the idea of 
partnership is generally perceived as an inherent good in pragmatic-
instrumental literature, it is perhaps important to highlight that this does not 
preclude some level of critical reflection. While partnership is invariably 
regarded as the right policy, a common conclusion is that it is inherently 
difficult to implement in practice. As Simon Maxwell and Roger Riddell (1998, 
p.258) note, „the road to greater partnership is littered with potential pit-falls‟. 
In other words then, there are certain gaps between policy intention and 
outcome or results. Because the policy of partnership is seen in broadly 
positive terms however, this literature tends to be reformist in orientation. It 
focuses on the extent to which practice can be brought more fully into line with 
partnership intentions (as equality or mutuality); that is to say, the ways in 
which it can be made „more effective‟ in practice (Martens, 2007, p.9).  
 
Invariably in this literature, the ingredients for a successful partnership are 
highlighted; a series of gaps are identified between policy and practice; and a 
recipe for future success is proposed, in the form of a series of 
recommendations. A range of conditions for success tend to be put forward, 
which include for example: that time needs to be taken to build and strengthen 
organizational relationships; that the right skills and capacity to administer the 
policy of partnership are required; and that practices must be built on good 
communication, trust and reciprocity (see, for example, Druce and Harmer, 
2006; Conway et al. 2006; Morse and McNamara, 2008).   
 
The paper by Maxwell and Riddell (1998) provides a good example of this. 
Maxwell and Riddell (1998, p.257) argue that there are different degrees of 
partnership in practice – both weak and strong – due to unequal relations of 
power between actors in development. While „strong‟ partnership is 
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characterised by equality, as well as mutual rights and obligations, and should 
be reflected in jointly agreed country programmes and guaranteed financial 
flows, they argue that a much „weaker‟ form is likely to be found in practice 
(Maxwell and Riddell, 1998, p.258, p.264). As Maxwell and Riddell (1998, 
p.258, p.264) explain, a strong partnership requires a high level of formal 
reciprocity or „contractuality‟: a „partnership contract‟ must be jointly drawn up 
by the donors and recipients of aid, in which the terms of engagement, 
reciprocal commitments and compliance procedures are set out. Because aid 
donors however, could lose control over the way in which aid funds are used, 
they are likely to take the lead in drawing up these partnership „criteria‟, with 
the resultant risk that the views and „ownership‟ of aid recipients will be 
undermined (Maxwell and Riddell, 1998, p.264). Without the joint 
establishment of mutual rights and obligations, they argue that the policy and 
practice of partnership slips back into conditionality, as reflected by the 
following statement:  
 
We know how best to achieve development. We know how you should 
alleviate poverty. Either you accept the approaches which we think are 
right for you or you will not qualify for a long-term partnership with us. 
If you do not accept our view of development, then we will not provide 
you with aid (Maxwell and Riddell, 1998, p.264).   
 
In other words, inequalities in relations of power mean that dominant actors 
could impose their views and thus control the practice of partnership; a view 
that is broadly shared by Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2004, p.255), who note 
that power imbalances can „inhibit the mutuality needed for partnership work‟, 
which prohibits the raising of new ideas or the proposal of new approaches.   
 
While the existence of unequal power relations in the practice of partnership is 
clearly a key point, and highlights the importance of reflecting on power in any 
analysis of this kind, there is an implicit assumption in the paper by Maxwell 
and Riddell (1998), and indeed in pragmatic-instrumental literature more 
generally, that this type of implementation problem can be addressed; through 
the creation of appropriate incentives for engagement, good institutional design 
and / or good management. Maxwell and Riddell (1998) appear to suggest, for 
example, that the formalisation of partnership into aid contracts can redress 
power imbalances and ensure the „mutual accountability‟ that is achieved. 
Similarly, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2004, p.255) indicate that changes can 
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be made to operational management procedures of donor agencies in order to 
improve the „goal-setting and collaborative interactions that make partnerships 
work effectively‟. In other words, it is implicitly assumed that it is possible to 
„tweak and improve‟ procedures and processes – that is, to apply the right tools, 
techniques, targets and incentives (Guljarani, 2009, p.7) – in order to make 
partnership work accountably and effectively.  
 
This perspective is problematic because there is only limited consideration of 
how and whether relationships are important here; and how and whether wider 
political-economic or historic-contextual factors may be fundamental and 
deeply embedded structural constraints to partnership in practice. Where these 
factors are acknowledged they are rendered as „technical impediments‟ that can 
be managed and overcome (cf. Guljarani, 2009).   
 
This criticism is perhaps related to the way in which policy and practice, and 
the relationship between them, is conceptualised in pragmatic-instrumental 
literature. Here, policy and practice are understood respectively as intention 
and outcome, and as being causally-related through simple, linear and 
discretely manageable processes, so as to achieve partnership results (cf. Mosse, 
2005a; Long, 2001, p.33). Indeed, it seems to be assumed that if a series of 
appropriate activities are sequenced and followed correctly, in a logical order, 
partnership will be implemented effectively; see, for example, the partnership 
design cycle outlined in Figure 1 or the „causality map‟ for partnership general 
budget support expressed in IDD and Associates (2006).   
 
As noted above, this understanding of policy and practice not only nullifies the 
significance of the broader political and economic environment, along with the 
significance of relationships and interactions between different actors, but also 
diverts conceptual attention away from unexpected and potentially „complex 
and contradictory‟ effects of partnership in practice, including for example: 
relations of power that partnership practice might unintentionally promote or 
entrench, and thus ongoing and active transformations in the relations of 
governance between the various actors who may be included or, indeed, 
excluded from implementation (Cardini, 2006, p.396). Whether intended or not, 
Norman Long (2001, p.33) indicates, for example, that the representation of 
policy intentions and their implementation in this way tends to have a powerful 
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legitimising effect for „experts‟ in the world of aid and development, for it is 
only those who understand the various technical and logical stages of 
implementation that can fully be engaged in practice. Here, technical experts 
are implicitly conferred with an important role in diagnosing partnership 
problems, identifying the ways in which partnership can be made more 
effective, and in subsequently designing or managing partnership procedures in 
practice, in accordance with the explicated chains of cause and effect (Long, 
2001). 
 
Figure 1. A partnership design cycle (from Rochlin et al. 2008, p.34). 
 
 
Interestingly, this pragmatic-instrumental literature seems to use insights from 
rational choice institutionalism in order to devise managerialist solutions to the 
practice of partnership. Robert Axelrod (2001), for example, specifically 
applies game theory (the Prisoner‟s Dilemma) to specify the „conditions‟ 
necessary to sustain effective and accountable partnership practice. A number 
of issues are identified, including: that in setting up a partnership there must be 
clear obligations, prompt feedback and institutionalised reciprocity (the 
„contractuality‟ that Maxwell and Riddell (1998) refer to above). In the practice 
of monitoring and evaluating partnership, Axelrod (2001) suggests that 
accounting standards should be promoted to allow timely feedback on the 
performance of partners; the fulfilment of obligations could be certified; and 
procedures or sanctions should be in place if obligations are not met. 
Interestingly, as the later chapters of this thesis will show, many of these 
technical tools have been put in place to monitor the implementation of the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and the health sector-
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wide approach (SWAp) in Zambia, which both attest, at least in official policy 
narratives, to embody the idea of partnership. 
 
While formal tools, managerial techniques, and the institutional design of 
partnership can, and indeed does, structure the governing relationship between 
different actors in various ways and their related action, this perspective is 
problematic because it is politically naïve. As argued above, such technical 
mechanisms do not and cannot address deeper structural and contextual 
challenges, and a presumed ability to be able to do so is perhaps reflective of 
the apolitical and managerialist perspective on partnership that this literature 
adopts, in which management tools and techniques are seen as neutral, 
objective and rational fixes to fundamentally political problems (Guljarani, 
2009). At the same time, and to borrow the words of Glyn Williams (2004, 
p.573), there is also a „relative silence‟ in this literature on the political beliefs, 
values and assumptions that not only affect the practice of partnership, but also 
underpin policy intentions.   
 
An example of the failure to consider the political significance of the values 
and ideas that might underpin partnership is found in the work of Kenneth 
Abbott (2008, p.38-41), who uses insights from rational choice institutionalism 
to explore the „partnership-promoting‟ Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPS) of the World Bank and the partnering activities of the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria. Abbott (2008, p.41) appears to conclude, 
quite positively, that „the Fund and Bank use their economic leverage to reach 
into the domestic societies of client countries, empower and encourage societal 
actors to participate in national politics and governance, communicate norms 
and expectations of participation, and blunt government resistance‟. In other 
words, partnership unproblematically „teaches‟ the recipients of aid norms of 
participation, „communicating its appropriateness and legitimacy‟ (Abbott, 
2008, p.38). While this process of political socialisation is interpreted in a 
relatively positive and apolitical light in Abbott‟s (2008) work, a more critical 
appraisal of this statement suggests that the policy and practice of partnership 
sustains a paternalistic approach to development, in which the recipients of aid 
are educated about the right liberal way in which to govern and be governed; 
that is to say, it encourages the internalisation of specific liberal ideas, values 
and norms (cf. Cooke, 2001; Abrahamsen, 2004). As we will see a little later in 
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the chapter, when critical-governmentality literature is reviewed, this actually 
suggests that partnership is an inherently political undertaking and, moreover, 
is a way to try and shape the conduct of poorer nations.  
 
As the next section of this chapter will now show, this and many of the issues 
discussed above are confronted in the more critical literature on partnership. 
Indeed, rather than understanding the policy and practice of partnership as an 
inherently positive and apolitical undertaking, critical literature questions this 
neutrality and, moreover, argues that partnership is actually highly political. It 
is to this critical literature that this chapter now turns.  
 
Critical-ideological literature: Political economy, (neo)liberalism and 
external imposition? 
 
Critical literature about the policy and practice of partnership challenges the 
view discussed above; either from a critical-ideological or a critical-
governmentality perspective. While these literatures are separated-out here for 
discursive clarity, as the forthcoming discussion will now show, they are far 
from mutually exclusive and make a number of resonant political points.  
 
Much of the literature that is categorised here as critical-ideological is 
associated with the academic field of IPE, neo-Marxist or dependency theory 
schools of thoughts. It is labelled as critical-ideological here because it tends to 
link the idea of partnership, in some way, to relatively coherent political 
ideologies. Indeed, the failure of partnership as a component of aid policy and 
practice tends to be taken as self-evident in this work because of its ideological 
linkage (Mosse, 2005a, p.4). It has, for example, been interpreted as a 
rhetorical „disguise‟ – a purposeful ideological screen designed to nullify 
opposition to dominant (donor) interests, notably the wider penetration of neo-
liberalism and the embedding of global capitalism (Crawford, 2003; Fowler, 
2002; see also reviews in Abrahamsen, 2004, p.1454; Baaz, 2005, p.7) – or as 
an apolitical catchword that legitimises the „inclusive‟ liberal ideology of donor 
organisations (Craig and Porter, 2003; 2005; 2006).   
 
The former (ideological screen) perspective is exemplified in the work of Alan 
Fowler (2002, p.248-249) who argues that partnership is „a terminological 
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Trojan Horse‟, whose initial appearance as an inclusive, open and all-
embracing policy doctrine is a distraction that not only conditions political 
debates to the exclusion of alternatives, but also legitimises the deeper 
penetration of foreign economic concerns into domestic choices and processes; 
one effect of which is to turn the accountability of aid recipients „on its head‟, 
so that they are more accountable to powerful external actors than to their own 
civic constituents (Abugre, 1999, p.18 in Fowler, 2002, p.249). This is broadly 
shared by Gordon Crawford (2003), who argues that while the idea of 
partnership as expressed in aid policy implies equality in power relations 
between donors and recipients, this is not actually intended, nor achieved in 
practice.  
 
Drawing on an empirical analysis of the 'Partnership for Governance Reform' 
in Indonesia, a type of governance sector-wide approach (SWAp), Crawford 
(2003, p.156) argues for example that partnership is an instrumental policy 
rhetoric; a useful disguise for international agencies, like the World Bank and 
UNDP, to pursue their own reform agenda – economic liberalisation – and thus 
„the opening up of the Indonesian economy to market interests‟. This serves to 
conceal their continued exercise of power over Indonesian actors. Indeed, 
Crawford (2003) argues that aid donors have „successfully‟ embedded their 
neoliberal ideas by keeping items off, and people away from, decision-making 
agendas if they do not support their neoliberal economic interests. In so doing, 
it is argued that the policy rhetoric of partnership not only secures the wider 
penetration of global capitalism, but also accords aid donors greater legitimacy; 
free from the criticism that previous structural adjustment policies attracted 
(Crawford, 2003, p.157). 
 
In contrast, the latter perspective is exemplified in the work of Craig and Porter 
(2003; 2005; 2006). While Craig and Porter (2003, p.54) do not discuss the 
idea of partnership at any length,
6
 they argue that partnership functions as an 
„inclusive‟ liberal policy catchword; part of a „Third Way‟ re-morphing of 
more overtly neo-liberal modes of governance that have been embedded in aid 
policy in the past; and in particular during the structural adjustment era. As 
                                                 
6
  Unfortunately, like much of the literature that is currently available, Craig and 
Porter (2003, 2005 and 2006) refer to the idea of partnership in passing; they 
do not consider or theorise about it in any detail. While this observation 
certainly supports the intellectual focus of this research on partnership, it 
limits the number of sources that are available for review in this chapter.   
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Craig and Porter (2006, p.11) explain, structural adjustment policies were 
characteristic of „conservative neoliberalism‟, which is concerned to „get the 
state out of markets, deregulate and privatize, [and to] reduce social and 
bureaucratic spending‟. Inclusive liberalism is a hybrid of this; it retains 
conservative macroeconomic and pro-market tendencies, but adds „positive 
liberal‟ approaches that focus on inclusion and consensus (Craig and Porter, 
2006). In other words, inclusive liberal ideology, and its policy expression as 
partnership, purports to include everyone (including multinational companies, 
consultants government officials, NGOs and the poor) and thus to empower 
actors who were previously marginalised in global, national and local 
governance. Importantly however, as Craig and Porter (2003, p.54) argue, there 
is an implicit ordering of priorities that conflicts with these apparent ideals; it is 
macroeconomic concerns and global economic integration first, followed by 
inclusive participation and empowerment.   
 
Interestingly, Craig and Porter (2003; 2005) draw attention to the legitimating 
role that the idea of partnership serves for specific actors and specific practices 
of aid. Drawing on an assessment of the practices associated with PRSPs, 
which the World Bank promotes as an expression of its „partnership‟ approach 
to development, they indicate that NGOs and „civil society groups‟ are 
routinely invoked as legitimate, „proxy representatives‟ for „the poor‟ (Craig 
and Porter, 2003, p.54). Moreover, because specific practices of partnership 
associated with PRSPs (including consultation forums and multi-sectoral 
meetings) are presented as legitimate proxies for more formal and statutory 
forms of participation, aid policies, and aid donors more generally, are supplied 
with a „badge of legitimacy‟ (Craig and Porter, 2005, p.240). Craig and Porter 
(2005) argue that these practices end up limiting political contest and 
discursive challenge given that in a partnership issues are to be addressed 
consensually.
7
   
 
                                                 
7
  This point resonates with the work of Chantal Mouffe (2005) who suggests 
that „consensual‟ politics is symptomatic of a broader „post-political‟ liberal 
vision of the world that has emerged since the end of the Cold War, in which 
conflict and confrontation are believed to be a thing of the past and that 
consensus can be reached through dialogue that is „beyond politics‟. Mouffe 
(2005) cautions against this liberal „consensus‟ political model as „not only 
[being] conceptually mistaken… [but] also fraught with political dangers‟.   
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In this way, the practice of partnership is seen to undermine democratic 
development by moving political decision-making away from formal state 
institutions and into spaces that are populated by various non-elected actors, 
who „all claim to represent‟ a broader public good (Kjaer, 2003 in Rein et al, 
2008, p.7). More specifically, and as Jens Martens (2007, p.49) puts it, the 
practice of partnership „implicitly devalue[s] the role of governments, 
parliaments and intergovernmental organisations, and overvalue[s] the political 
status of private [and other societal] actors‟ who become involved in organising 
action: „whether or not partnerships actually lead to democratisation... depends 
entirely on who selects the participants, how transparent the partnership is, how 
representative its composition is, and how accountable the partners are to their 
own constituency‟ (Martens, 2007, p.49). Importantly, these observations 
conflict with the assertion, in selected examples of the pragmatic-instrumental 
literature described above, that partnership fills participation gaps or 
„democratic deficits‟ in previously existing modes of governance. These are 
clearly significant points, yet ultimately they can only be explored empirically; 
that is to say, through the consideration of specific examples of partnership in 
practice. 
 
The work of Craig and Porter (2003) also makes another significant 
contribution to understanding the policy and practice of partnership. They 
indicate that partnership tends to be framed in policy in technical and apolitical 
terms, which conceals the „inclusive liberal‟ framework that, they suggest, 
underpins it (Craig and Porter, 2003, p.54). As Craig and Porter (2004; 2003, 
p.60-61) argue, this apparent depoliticisation is achieved in policy through the 
use of a persuasive, management „tool box‟ language, and the use of a range of 
management and measurement techniques, such as audit and legal compliance 
instruments, which are actually disciplinary practices. Importantly, they 
indicate that such apolitical framing is common to the activities of aid 
organisations, whose role requires the presentation of policy remedies in these 
terms (Craig and Porter, 2003, p.58).  
 
This depoliticisation of the policy of partnership is significant because of the 
implications that it has for local action, and the practice of politics that this 
enjoins; not only does it obscure the prevailing relations of power between 
different actors, which may be highly unequal and hierarchical, but it also 
33 
 
limits the number of options available to local actors, given that debates around 
local action and governance tend to occur in technical terms (Craig and Porter, 
2003, p.53, p.60, p.66). As Craig and Porter (2004, p.413) summarise: „In 
short, the whole inclusive rubric seems to reinforce a triumph of the technical 
and consensual over the political and contested‟. Significantly, these points 
about depoliticisation clearly resonate with the earlier criticisms that were 
made about the way in which pragmatic-instrumental literature presents 
partnership in apolitical terms and, moreover, support the insights and 
arguments of the critical-constructivist approach that is advocated and 
explained a little later in this chapter.  
 
While the work of Craig and Porter (2003, 2005, 2006) and Crawford (2003) 
have somewhat necessarily been simplified and condensed in the confines of 
this discussion, it is clear that there are both differences and similarities 
between these works. Perhaps most importantly, although the idea of 
partnership is understood as a facet of liberal ideology, Crawford (2003) links 
the idea of partnership to neoliberalism, whilst Craig and Porter (2003, 2004, 
and 2006) associate it with a rather more inclusive form of liberal thought. 
While this certainly highlights the significance of liberal thinking to the way in 
which the idea of partnership is understood and practiced, it also seems 
apparent from this brief discussion that partnership can actually be understood 
in different ways and therefore that it actually has multiple meanings; a point 
that this critical-ideological literature fails to fully capture.      
 
Indeed, critical-ideological literature can be criticised for tending to suggest 
that there is a degree of coherence to the way in which partnership is framed 
and understood as a component of aid policy and local practice, which does not 
appear to be borne out upon closer analysis. As other studies show, there are 
often fractures, contradictions and inconsistencies in the way in which aid 
policy ideas are presented and in the way in which they are practised (see 
Mosse, 2005; 2005; Eyben and Leon, 2005; Crewe and Harrison, 1998; 
Gardner, 1997). This is not to suggest that liberal thinking has no influence 
over the way in which partnership is framed in aid policy and practice, rather 
that the underlying thinking is less ideologically coherent than this literature 
seems to suggest. Reflecting on Crawford‟s (2003) work in particular, Maria 
Eriksson Baaz (2005, p.7-9) argues that to suggest that the policy of partnership 
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is not intended and actually a coherent „tactic‟ to conceal neoliberal intent is 
„too simple‟; while the world of aid and development is „increasingly 
homogenized, it is still too diversified and heterogeneous to harbour [such] a 
coordinated conspiracy‟ (Baaz, 2005, p.8). Significantly, David Mosse (2005b, 
p.28) suggests that policy coherence is actually „after the fact‟; the product of 
socio-political negotiations in particular contexts, and is reliant upon the 
practice of politics that depoliticised development policy frameworks so often 
deny.   
 
Critical-ideological literature can also be criticised for a number of other 
reasons. In particular, it is perhaps „too quick to impute an economic function‟ 
to the policy and practice of aid institutions and, relatedly, for assuming that 
the policy and practice of partnership serves the „objective‟ economic interests 
of dominant „external‟ donor actors (cf. Ferguson, 1990, p.14). This type of 
approach tends to occupy itself with the notion of interests; with identifying 
their configuration in any given situation and with attributing events, structures 
and also power, rather straightforwardly, to this (Ferguson, 1990, p.16). While 
not denying that the interests of donor agencies are important in aid and 
development arenas, and may shape the way in which partnership is framed in 
policy and shapes its practice, it is not sufficient to equate these with economic 
factors, nor to „simply read off‟ political outcomes from them, as if one is the 
„direct effect‟ of the other (Ferguson, 1990, p.16). To do so would suggest that 
the interests and intentions of aid agencies become reality through a simple, 
linear and mechanistic process of implementation, which is not so different 
from the way in which mainstream pragmatic-instrumental literature 
conceptualises policy and practice (Baaz, 2005, p.8).  
 
While donor intentions about relations of governance may well be inscribed in 
the policy idea of partnership „they may not simply be accepted or replicated‟ 
by others (Cooper and Packard, 1997 p.23). Moreover, while particular 
practices might appear to be the result of the power of dominant actors, these 
actors do not and cannot consciously determine or control the course of events 
(Crewe and Harrison, 1998, p.88-89). As Ferguson (1990, p.13 italics in 
original) argues, „one ought to be interested enough to look and see how this 
control is effected‟; that is to say, to look inside the mysterious „black box‟ 
between policy and practice.   
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Although Crawford (2003) does appear to try and do so by reflecting on 
processes associated with the governance SWAp in Indonesia, the overarching 
conclusion is that partnership (as economic liberalisation) is successfully 
imposed on developing countries by external agencies. Indeed, as Crawford 
(20903, p.155) summarises, „despite efforts to create the impression of 
Indonesian control... [it] remains externally driven, shaped and influenced by 
international agencies‟. In other words, there is a more or less scripted or linear 
translation of donor agency intentions from policy into practice, and power 
therefore operates here, through the singular, external and intentional force of 
western aid agencies (Mosse and Lewis, 2006, p.9; Brigg, 2002, p.422, 424). 
This leaves little room for the agency of Indonesian actors, who are relegated to 
a position of passivity and subordination.   
 
Interestingly, in a response piece to Crawford‟s (2003) article, Andi 
Mallarangeng and Peter van Tuijl (2004) draw out a number of these criticisms, 
producing an alternative account of the Indonesian partnership in practice. In 
doing so, they indicate that local actors are not „mystified‟ or controlled by aid 
agencies; instead, action is characterised by an ongoing series of contests and 
negotiations between a range of different actors over ways to organise 
processes of reform, which are mediated by historical relationships and 
unexpected events (Mallarangeng and Van Tuijl, 2004, p.929, 931). As 
Mallarangeng and Van Tuijl (2004, p.929) argue, this is not to say that aid 
agencies do not have particular strategies, attempt to exercise power or support 
„what they see‟ as neoliberal priorities, but the interests of donors do not 
converge to the extent that Crawford (2003) implies; „let alone to a consensus 
about strategy that would allow donors to use the Partnership as a joint cover-
up [for economic liberalisation]‟. Instead, they highlight that local action, and 
the practice of politics that it enjoins, is situated in rather more „complex and 
transnational settings‟, characterised by shifting alliances and the blurring of 
boundaries between the international and domestic:  
 
„To situate the Partnership in a one-dimensional North-South, donor-
recipient dichotomy is too narrow. It assumes a single antithesis 
between the international and the Indonesian side, as well as 
homogeneity within each side, respectively, which is over simplistic‟ 
(Mallarangeng and van Tuijl, 2004, pp.927-928).   
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Emergent critical-ideological works 
 
There is body of emergent critical-ideological literature that is more sensitive 
to these latter criticisms about the complex and interpenetrated relationships of 
actors who are involved in aid policy and local development practice. In 
seminal contributions to this field, Graham Harrison (2001a, 2004) argues that 
it is increasingly difficult to identify clear boundaries between international and 
domestic actors, noting that these boundaries have been rendered so „porous‟ 
that, rather than conceptualising donors as a „strong external force on the state, 
it would be more useful to conceive of donors as part of the state itself‟ 
(Harrison, 2001a, p.661, p.669). While Harrison does not focus explicitly on 
the idea of partnership, he does indicate that the idea is implicated in the 
deepening of this process of „mutual assimilation‟, as its practice, intentionally 
or unintentionally, legitimises the role of aid agencies in the development 
policy arenas of those who receive aid (Harrison, 2001a; Gould, 2005a).   
 
A recently published book „The Politics of Aid: African strategies for dealing 
with donors‟ edited by Lindsay Whitfield (2009), reflects on Harrison‟s (2001, 
2004) work and also seeks to address many of the criticisms noted above. More 
specifically, it seeks to address, what Lindsay Whitfield and Alastair Fraser 
(2009b, p.27-28) call the relative „neglect‟ of the agential strategies that 
African governments in particular pursue in the aid and development domain. 
Casting aid relations as „negotiation‟ rather than simply „external imposition‟, 
the various chapters attempt to draw attention to the entanglement of different 
actors and to the way in which African governments strategize, bargain and 
collaborate with aid donors over aid policy and in local practice (Whitfield and 
Fraser, 2009a). Alastair Fraser (2009) explains, for example, how African 
governments have adopted „non-implementation‟ strategies or have undertaken 
„stroke of pen‟ reforms that are quickly reversed once aid funds are released, in 
order to avert the discipline and control of aid agencies. Moreover, Whitfield 
and Fraser (2009b, p.28) illustrate how African governments have strategically 
supported particular policies in order to create or maintain an international 
reputation as a „good partner‟ or as an African „success story‟, so as to either 
secure popular support, access funds or „oil‟ the patronage networks of ruling 
elites; and thus entrench existing relations of power.   
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A brief discussion about literature on neo-patrimonialism 
 
This latter point about patronage provides an important intellectual link to a 
substantial body of critical-ideological literature within the field of African 
political studies that focuses on neo-patrimonialism. This literature argues that 
African elites tend to cohere networks of support through hybrid regimes of 
political practice, within which patrimonial practices (patron-client relations, 
the personalisation of decision-making, a culture of deference to the „Big Man‟, 
informal rules, corruption as a political logic and so on) coexist with elements 
of a Weberian rational-legal system (formal rules and procedures) (van de 
Walle 2001, pp. 51-2; Erdmann and Engel, 2006, p.17). It tends to argue that 
features inherent to African political systems and political culture (often 
interpreted as failings) lead to the capturing of aid policy ideas, like 
partnership, for the benefit of ruling elites.   
 
As Whitfield and Fraser (2009a, pp.9-11) indicate, while the literature on neo-
patrimonialism draws attention to the importance of understanding the socio-
political context within which aid policy is made and practiced, it is, in some 
senses, a direct corollary of the critical-ideological literature that was criticised 
above, in that it tends to misrepresent the complexity and messiness of 
experience within and between African countries. Conversely however, rather 
than over-emphasizing the role of western aid agencies in pursuing their own 
agenda, this neo-patrimonial literature tends instead to over-emphasise the 
ability of African elites to manipulate aid policy for their own (personal and 
economic) gain. It thus fails to capture the creativity of African actors more 
broadly and their capacity to counter neo-patrimonial forms of political 
manipulation (Meagher, 2006).   
 
While Whitfield and Fraser (2009b) attempt to redress these limitations by 
focusing on the twin concepts of „negotiation‟ and „actor entanglement‟, and by 
drawing attention to recipient agency, socio-political context and donor-
recipient government interaction in their edited work on aid policy, the 
analytical framework that Whitfield and Fraser (2009) set out tends to give the 
impression that the interests and preferences of „donors‟ and „recipients‟ are 
materially given and relatively fixed, a priori to social interaction; which works 
to maintain a separation between recipient and donor identities and interests. It 
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precludes the possibility that these may be transformed and reflexively 
questioned by those same actors during negotiation. While actors in 
development arenas can often be associated with particular social groups, to 
assume fixed divisions between them and a lack of self-reflexivity results in an 
incomplete understanding of the way human agency may shape the policy and 
practice of partnership. It is important to be aware how relationships and 
boundaries between apparently different actors may well be bridged, 
transformed and blurred, in and through the practice of politics (Crewe and 
Harrison, 1998, p.19).   
 
Consequently, while the above-mentioned works and critical-ideological 
literature more broadly are highly significant to this current research, raising a 
number of important conceptual points, it is argued that the policy and practice 
of partnership should be conceptualised as a more complex socio-political 
process. The final section explains how a critical-constructivist approach seeks 
to capture this sociality. Before turning to discuss this approach however, 
critical-governmentality literature will first be reviewed. 
 
Critical-governmentality literature: (Neo)liberal governing mentalities and 
the calculated deployment of managerial partnership techniques 
 
Taking intellectual inspiration from the work of Michel Foucault, critical-
governmentality literature draws on Foucauldian notions of governmentality to 
offer insight into how the policy and practice of partnership can be considered 
as a distinct liberal form of governing rationality; how it involves the subtle, 
complex and productive workings of power (both freedom and restraint); and 
how it serves to technically depoliticise governance and development 
(Abrahamsen, 2004; Gould, 2005b; Li, 2007). Before examining the 
substantive content of this literature however, it is perhaps useful to first 
consider what is meant by governmentality.  
 
Although the concept has been understood and applied in a variety of different 
ways, essentially governmentality refers to „how we think about governing‟; 
that is to say, the rationality of modern liberal „government‟ – where 
government is understood broadly here in Foucauldian terms as „the conduct of 
conduct‟ (Dean, 2009, p.17, p.24). In other words, it refers to the attempt by 
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different authorities and agencies to shape and improve human conduct 
(behaviour) from afar, through more or less calculated means (Li 2007 p.5; 
Dean, 2009, p.18). Indeed, as Tania Murray Li (2007, p.5) explains, „the 
conduct of conduct‟ is concerned with inducing the reform and improvement of 
well-being, health, and longevity of human populations. It is distinct from 
coercion or discipline as it does not seek to reform behaviour through detailed 
supervision (it is not possible to achieve population well-being by coercing and 
regulating every individual). Instead, governmentality as „the conduct of 
conduct‟ operates „at a distance‟ through the education of desires, and by 
„configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs‟ so that they „will do as they ought‟ 
(Scott, 1995 in Li, 2007 p.5 italics in original). It does this through calculated 
and technical means, which constitute new and improved subjects; these are not 
only the objects of improvement, but also the subjects that do the improving 
themselves (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.1459; Li, 2007, p.5). As a consequence, 
while governmentality entails a mode of power and rule, it simultaneously 
affords individual actors a degree of (liberal) freedom, autonomy and 
responsibility for their decisions and actions about their self- improvement and 
reform (Abrahamsen, p.1459, p.1463; Dean, 2009. p.23). 
 
Importantly, and as Li (2007, p.6) indicates, the notion of „calculation‟ is 
central to the analytic of governmentality because „the conduct of conduct‟ 
requires that the „right manner‟ is defined; distinct „finalities‟ are prioritised; 
and that specified tactics are used to achieve intended results. In turn, such 
calculation requires that processes and actors to be governed must be 
characterised in technical (rather than political) terms because „only then can 
specific interventions [to achieve results] be devised‟ (Li, 2007, p.6). Indeed, 
this technical and moreover apolitical rendering of action is seen as central to 
governmentality, yet it is not seen to be „invented ab initio‟ by any one actor or 
their political ideology (as suggested above); rather, it draws upon, and is 
situated within, collective systems of knowledge and discursive practice; and is 
thus „pulled together from an existing repertoire, a matter of habit, accretion 
and bricolage‟ (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.1459; Li, 2007, p.6).  
  
In a seminal article, Rita Abrahamsen (2004) draws on this notion of 
governmentality to understand the idea of partnership as a component of aid 
policy and practice. While Abrahamsen (2004, p.1459) is careful not to over-
40 
 
state its analytic potential, emphasising for example that insights from other 
literature on partnership is useful, she argues that governmentality provides a 
new way for thinking about the policy and practice of partnership.  
Abrahamsen (2004, p.1459-60) indicates that partnership can be seen as a form 
of modern liberal governmentality, and thus as the calculated, technical and 
distant „conduct of the conduct‟ of poorer nations. In the same way as above, it 
works by educating the desires of aid-recipient countries and by (re)configuring 
their habits, aspirations and beliefs. In so doing, it produces modern, self-
disciplined populations and citizens by enlisting them as responsible agents of 
their own liberal development.  
 
Indeed, as Abrahamsen (2004, p.1462) explains, partnership operates through 
promises of inclusion and cooperation by donor agencies. In principle donors 
are willing to enter into partnership with all poorer countries; the onus however, 
is „on them to prove that they are committed, responsible and willing to govern 
themselves wisely‟ (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.1461). Resources will only be 
provided if they can show they are self-disciplined enough to exercise their 
agency responsibly: that is to say, by constituting themselves in ways that are 
consistent with the norms of liberal governance. To this end, a number of 
calculated technical interventions or „partnership technologies‟ are deployed, 
including aid contracts (such as Memorandums of Understanding), auditing, 
and monitoring and evaluation (M&E), which are intended to voluntarily 
(rather than coercively) enlist, educate, and thus produce recipient actors who 
are agents of their own liberal reform (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.1463; see also 
Larner and Butler, 2004). Indeed, it is through these partnership technologies 
that poorer countries are proffered the voluntary opportunity to learn to act, 
manage and practice their freedom responsibly. As such then, these technical 
partnership interventions are simultaneously empowering and disciplinary 
because they allow a degree of freedom, but also regulate behaviour and 
conduct (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.1462). 
 
In contrast to the works critiqued above, here, policy and practice tend to be 
seen as one and the same; they are simultaneously intention and outcome. The 
idea of partnership is both the liberal art of governing and its effect (cf. Larner, 
2009). Moreover, rather than being a disguise or intentional misrepresentation 
of neo-liberal ideology, which operates through control or domination, the idea 
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of partnership is situated here within a much broader way of thinking about and 
acting upon the world; it is part of a wider political rationality or „regime of 
truth‟ that „to govern less is to govern better‟, and operates through a more 
productive (consensual) power that is voluntary and coercive, exclusionary and 
inclusionary „at the same time‟ (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.1460, p.1462, p.1464, 
p.1459). It is not donor agencies who coercively discipline and „withhold aid‟ 
from recipients, rather poorer nations must „live up to the [liberal] principles 
that merit co-operation‟; a failure to meet these norms for inclusion in a 
partnership can be cast as the ill-discipline of „incapable agents‟, who have not 
lived up to their responsibilities (Abrahamsen, 2004, p.1464).   
 
Importantly, while the managerial partnership technologies (contracts, MoUs, 
M&E and so on) referred to above might appear as calculated technical tools 
for regulating the „conduct of conduct‟ – a point that resonates with aspects of 
the foregoing discussion about the apolitical way in which partnership is 
presented in aid policy – this critical-governmentality literature clearly 
demonstrates that they reflect a fundamentally political and moreover liberal 
rationality that pervades the international development arena.    
 
Interestingly, drawing on similar notions of governmentality and calculated 
technical interventions, James Ferguson (1990) shows in his seminal work on 
development processes in Lesotho how this now standardized rationality or 
„discourse‟ which is embedded in the aid and development „apparatus‟ 
routinely and necessarily converts and constructs problems into technical 
issues, for which there are technical interventions and solutions. Of 
significance here, while Ferguson (1990) argues that these interventions mostly 
fail in their own terms, they do not achieve the results that were intended, they 
actually have regular „instrumental‟ and „ideological‟ effects (Ferguson, 1990, 
p.xiv, p.256). Instrumentally, bureaucratic state power is expanded and 
entrenched, wherein more relations of power are referred through state 
channels (Ferguson, 1990, p.273-274). Ideologically, the effect is 
depoliticisation, which Ferguson (1990, p.xiv-xv) describes as „the projection 
of a representation of economic and social life which denies “politics”‟. As 
Ferguson (1990) argues, these effects are not the result of any particular kind of 
intention or conspiracy, rather they are the work of governmentality as an „anti-
42 
 
politics machine‟.8 In other words then, and of relevance to our understanding 
of partnership, Abrahamsen‟s (2004) and Ferguson‟s (1990, p.xv) work 
together suggest that the idea of partnership may itself operate as a 
depoliticising governmentality machine that whisks politics „out of sight‟. 
 
While critical-governmentality literature certainly offers, what Mosse (2005b, 
p.14) calls, „a productive line of thought‟ it also has limitations. Perhaps most 
importantly, there is a lack of theoretical space for human agency (Mosse, 
2005b, p.14). While the possibility of agency is not discounted entirely (see 
Rose et al., 2006), there is little suggestion as to whether, how, or when 
prevailing mentalities or relatively „taken for granted‟ theories, ideas and 
philosophies (cf. Dean, 2009, p.25) might be challenged, transformed or 
resisted at particular moments in time, or in particular contexts (Li, 2007). 
There are questions as to whether liberal partnership mentality is actually 
internalised and as constitutive of poorer countries as suggested above. Could a 
liberal partnership mentality, for example, be translated, appropriated and, 
perhaps even symbolically performed by reflexive actors in local practice?  
 
This critical-governmentality literature tends to overestimate the capacity to 
which it is possible to embed liberal governing mentalities (Mosse, 2005b, p.14; 
Li, 2007; Larner, 2009). As Li (1999, p.314) succinctly explains, it „provides a 
better guide to the project of rule than it does to an understanding of how [or 
whether] rule is accomplished‟; it fails to consider what occurs when governing 
mentalities, and their associated techniques, tactics and routines, become 
entangled with the sociological processes that they would reform, improve and 
regulate (Li, 2007, p.27). In other words, by condensing the policy and practice 
of partnership into both cause and effect, this literature understates the 
significance of the messiness of local political practice; in particular, the role of 
contestation and how political conduct and context may be creatively and 
reflexively „invented‟ by different actors „from below‟ (Larner and Butler, 
2004, p.8).  
 
While not wanting to dismiss the literature on governmentality entirely, it is 
clear from the discussion above that it has limitations: there is an under-
                                                 
8
  As Ferguson (1990, p.256) argues, „it really does just happen to be the way 
things work out‟. 
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specification of a role for agency and a lack of attention to the relationship 
between the „project‟ of rule (invariably narrowly analysed empirically as that 
which is articulated in policy texts) and as to what happens in practice (cf. 
Larner, 2009; Li, 2007). Perhaps the most important contributions however are 
that: while power relations can be unequal and hierarchical, they are not always 
zero sum – all actors may be able to exert some kind of power; and also that 
there are prevailing liberal mentalities or logics of rule, which shape how the 
meaning of the idea of partnership is constructed as a component of aid policy 
and practice; and, moreover, tend to do so in a largely technical and 
depoliticised way that whisks politics „out of sight‟ (cf. Ferguson, 1990, p.xv). 
 
Interestingly, to overcome these criticisms, Li (2007, p.19) complements the 
use of the notion of governmentality with other insights – in particular, those 
from the work of Antonio Gramsci, which are alert to the way power relations 
are consciously produced and reproduced, how actors may mobilise to contest 
their circumstances and how creativity arises –  arguing that the „untidiness‟ 
introduced by using different theoretical traditions can be tolerated because of 
the conceptual tools that they offer for empirically-based analysis. This type of 
hybrid approach appears to be advocated by other political scholars who work 
broadly in the field of governmentality. Nikolas Rose et al. (2006, p.100) note, 
for example, that the notion of governmentality should be „regarded as part of 
an analytical toolbox, good for some purposes but not for others, and capable 
of being used in conjunction with other tools‟. A position that is broadly shared 
by Mitchell Dean (2009, p.13) who indicates that concepts used and produced 
in governmentality studies can be borrowed, modified and „mashed up‟ with 
others. As a consequence, insights from critical-governmentality literature can 
legitimately be used in this current research, in conjunction with its critical-
constructivist approach, so long as this is within the limits of intellectual 
consistency. It is to critical-constructivism that the chapter now turns.      
 
The outlines of a critical-constructivist approach to partnership 
 
As the preceding discussion has shown, while existing literature offers a 
number of important insights into how we can understand the idea of 
partnership as a component of aid policy and practice, it also has limitations 
(see Appendix One). This suggests the need for an alternative analytical 
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framework. Critical-constructivism offers a productive way forward here, 
providing something of a „middle-ground‟ (cf. Adler, 1997) between the 
critical-ideological and critical-governmentality literature described above. 
While sharing this literature‟s scepticism about the underlying premise of the 
idea of partnership and its socio-political effects (as well as a desire to 
challenge the pragmatic-instrumental view), this analytical approach differs 
because it seeks to restore notions of complexity and agency to, and the 
importance of ideational factors in, analyses of partnership, as the discussion 
below will now explain (cf. Hay, 2002, p.201-202). 
 
What is critical-constructivism? 
 
Critical-constructivism can be characterised and understood in relation to its 
normative and analytical commitments, which are explained by Ian Hacking 
(1999) (see also Hay, 2002, p.201). Hacking (1999) makes a number of 
pertinent observations about the nature of constructivist work, noting that it 
tends to assume the following: 
 
In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be 
inevitable (Hacking, 1999, p.12) 
X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is (Hacking, 1999, p.6). 
X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is 
not inevitable (Hacking, 1999, p.6). 
 
In other words, a critical-constructivist approach adopts a particular normative 
position about X (where X is an idea, concept, categorisation or so on) and 
therefore seeks, either implicitly or explicitly, to criticise and change something 
about the established order of things, with a view to highlighting alternative 
political possibilities (Hacking, 1999, p.7). 
 
In the context of this research, X can be substituted for the idea of partnership 
and, therefore, its normative position is typically critical-constructivist, 
because, as outlined in Chapter One, this research specifically seeks to make 
this familiar idea strange. Indeed, restating Hacking‟s observations, this project 
is underpinned by the view that: „In the present state of affairs, [the idea of 
partnership] is taken for granted; [the idea of partnership] appears to be 
inevitable‟; and, moreover, that „[the idea of partnership] as it is at present, is 
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not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable‟. 9  While this 
normative position clearly resonates with the critical-ideological and critical-
governmentality literature discussed above, in that it questions the underlying 
premise of partnership, a different analytical framework is advocated.  
 
Analytically, and as Hacking (1999, p.6) emphasises, critical-constructivism 
aims to draw more attention to the „contingent or open-ended nature of social 
and political processes‟ (Hay, 2002, p.201 italics in original). It seeks to 
illustrate that, although the idea of partnership appears to have a fixed and 
static place in the world of aid policy and local development practice, the 
constructed nature of partnership means that things could, and indeed should, 
be different (cf. Hay, 2002, p.138, p.202). Moreover, in so doing it seeks to 
restore notions of complexity and agency to, and the importance of ideational 
factors in, analyses and explanations of the policy and practice of partnership 
(cf. Hay, 2002, p.201-202).  
 
Given this analytical commitment to complexity, agency and ideas, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that a critical-constructivist approach reflects a 
fundamentally „relational ontology‟ (Carol Gilligan 1993, pp. 25-38 in Ruggie, 
1998, p.4). That is to say, it tends to assume that actors are inherently social, 
and that it is not possible to understand socio-political life (including aid policy 
and the practices that it is expected to generate or legitimise), without recourse 
to the ideas that actors hold and to the context in which they find themselves 
(Reus-Smit, 2009, p.217; Hacking, 1999, p.11; Hay, 2002, p.254; Long and van 
der Ploeg, p.65; Hay, 2002, p.208). Like the related academic tradition of 
critical theory,
10
 it is sceptical of the view that actors are „atomistic egoists‟, 
whose interests and identities are materially given and fixed (Reus-Smit, 2009, 
p.217) and that structures affect political outcomes in a deterministic, linear or 
mechanistic way (Long and Van der Ploeg, 1994, p.63). Instead, a critical-
constructivist approach seeks to show the mutually constitutive or dialectical 
                                                 
9
  Reflecting on Hacking‟s (1999, pp.19-20) six „grades‟ of constructivism, the 
research resembles an „unmasking‟ constructivism as the intention is to „strip 
[partnership] of a false appeal or authority‟. While the arguments presented in 
later Chapters also embody elements of more „rebellious‟ or „revolutionary‟ 
constructivism, they are, perhaps, more restrained than these labels would 
suggest (and also, perhaps, more restrained than other aid and development 
critics might say that they ought to be). 
10
  Reus-Smith (2009, pp.218-219) notes that Critical Theory is, arguably, one (of 
many) precursors to constructivism as a broad theoretical tradition. 
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relationship between ideas and material factors and between structure and 
agency in any understanding of socio-political life (Reus-Smit, 2009, p.212; 
Hay, 2002), which fits the underlying assumption of complexity. In other 
words, and to borrow from Michael Barnett (2002, p.101), critical-
constructivism embodies: 
 
a bundle of social theoretic commitments and concerns, including the 
attempt to understand: how agents and structures are involved in a 
process of mutual creation and reproduction; how actors‟ interaction is 
constrained and shaped by that structure; and how this very interaction 
serves to either reproduce of transform that structure. 
 
Importantly, the underlying assumption of complexity has implications for the 
way in which theory is used in, and generated as part of, a critical-
constructivist research process. Given the assumption of complexity, the 
ambition of critical-constructivism is not to test or formulate general, 
predictive theories or hypotheses – in this instance, about the policy and 
practice of partnership – because such parsimonious explanations are not 
reflective of, what is assumed to be, a complex reality. Theory then, is less 
about developing or testing universal models, and more about sensitising, 
guiding and informing empirical exploration and the identification of broad 
explanatory themes (Hay, 2002, pp.46-47).  
 
Relatedly, in terms of research output the intention is to provide compelling 
and plausible interpretations of particular contexts (here, about the policy and 
practice of partnership) that are theoretically-informed, as opposed as to 
theoretically-predictive (Reus-Smith, 2009, p.226; Hay, 2002, p.46-47). 
Consequently, critical-constructivist research tends to result in „thickly-
described‟ (cf. Geertz, 1973) narratives, which seek to capture the complexity 
of not only the context under study, but also of the complexity of interactions 
between material and ideational factors, and between actors and structures 
(Hay, 2002, p.47). Rather than using theory then to predict or hypothesise 
about how the idea of partnership appears in aid policy and shapes local 
practice, including the practice of politics this enjoins, the aim of this research 
is to explore this empirically and in specific contexts, drawing on relevant 
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theoretical insights from other broadly critical-constructivist scholarship, or by 
reviewing other literature through a critical- constructivist lens.
11
  
 
As Chapter One and indeed the next chapter of this thesis explain, a number of 
different contexts were selected for this exploration: the partnership policy of 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, policy about Sector-
wide Approaches (SWAp) to aid and health sector development, and the health 
sector in Zambia. Before moving on to discuss how the empirical work was 
completed and the methodological strategy in more detail (in Chapter Three), it 
is first necessary to consider in more detail here how critical-constructivism 
can provide the basis for a productive analysis of how the idea of partnership as 
framed in aid policy relates to and shapes local practice, and the practice of 
politics that this enjoins. 
 
The significance of a critical-constructivist approach for an analysis of 
partnership in policy and practice 
 
As argued in the discussion above, while existing critical approaches provide a 
number of useful insights on the research topic, they tend to overstate the level 
of control of and homogeneity between donor agencies, and the static and fixed 
way in which the idea of partnership appears in aid policy and relates to local 
practice. Given its ambition to restore notions of complexity, agency, and the 
importance of ideational factors to analyses, a critical-constructivist approach 
aims instead to explicitly reveal the fractures and points of divergence in what 
might seem like a monolithic and unchanging world of aid and development, 
by drawing attention to how the meaning of policy ideas like partnership are 
produced, contested, legitimised and, perhaps even, strategically appropriated 
socially, in and through relations of power (Mosse, 2005b, p.15 quoting 
Soederberg, 2003, p.14).   
 
Work from the academic fields of critical public policy or interpretive policy 
analysis explores the complex and contested dynamics of policy and practice in 
                                                 
11
  Importantly, the critical-constructivist analytical framework advocated here 
should not be equated with constructivism in IR, most particularly because the 
IR literature over-emphasises the existence of norms or widely shared beliefs. 
While this research does not preclude the existence of common meanings for 
ideas like partnership, it takes a less essentialist position; and privileges the 
possibility that there are multiple meanings of partnership. 
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this way. It draws attention to the way in which policy and practice are 
embedded in politics and shaped by values; how written policy texts are 
politically produced and constructed; and are also received, contested and 
translated in practice, using concepts such as: discourse coalitions, epistemic 
communities or policy communities (groups of actor who share the same views, 
perspectives and understandings of a particular policy issue) (Hajer, 1995; 
Fischer, 2007); and street level bureaucrats (actors who may not have been 
involved in producing policy texts, but who are faced with doing something 
with it and who interpret and can substantially modify it in their local context, 
through their own views, values, assumptions and everyday routines) (Lipsky, 
1980). While much of this work focuses on public policy and practice, rather 
than aid policy and practice per se, many of these conceptual insights overlap 
with insights from constructivist work from the field of development 
ethnography / critical anthropology, which has focused more specifically on the 
latter. It is argued here that this latter work is particularly relevant to this 
research and it is therefore discussed in more detail below.  
 
Drawing on what Olivier de Sardan (2005, p.11) calls an „entangled social 
logics‟ or interactionist perspective, the development ethnography / critical 
anthropology literature draws on two overlapping theoretical traditions, both of 
which are constructivist in orientation: the „Manchester School‟ associated with 
the work of Norman Long (see, for example, Long, 2001; Long and Long, 
1994) and the „French tradition‟ associated with APAD (Association Euro-
Africaine pour l‟Anthropologie du Changement Social et du Développement) 
(see, for example, Olivier de Sardan, 1988, 2005).
12
 The work of Norman Long 
has been characterised as an „actor-oriented approach‟ and focuses on the 
social life of aid policy and practice; drawing attention to the way in which 
policy ideas (in written texts) are socio-politically produced, enter the „life-
worlds‟ of different actors, and how these actors shape, reshape, and devise 
ways of coping with the rules, conventions and resources that these policy 
ideas bring, in the constraints of the context within which they are situated 
(Long, 2001, p.14; Long and van der Ploeg, 1994, p.64) – which is similar to 
the „street-level bureaucrat‟ notion of Lipsky (1980) as noted above. As Long 
and Long (1992, p.35) emphasise, this approach deconstructs the notions of 
                                                 
12
  This translates as the Euro-African Association for the Anthropology of Social 
Change and Development. 
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policy and practice, so that they are seen for what they are – „an ongoing, 
socially constructed and negotiated process‟, not simply rational intentions and 
decision-making with expected outcomes, and its specified execution.  
 
In this way then, instead of understanding the idea of partnership in policy as 
part of a rationally-generated decision-making process, which results in 
practice in technical implementation (as suggested in the pragmatic-
instrumental literature), or as the scripted execution of neoliberal ideology (as 
suggested in certain critical-ideological approaches), a critical-constructivist 
approach explores partnership by looking at how the meaning of partnership is 
not only negotiated and produced in policy – understood here as authorised or 
official development texts – but is also produced, contested and legitimised in 
the messiness of local socio-political practice (Mosse and Lewis, 2006, p.9). 
While the approach does not preclude the existence of shared or coherent 
meanings for policy ideas like partnership, this is not assumed a priori (Long, 
2001); indeed, multiple meanings are assumed to be the norm. 
 
Importantly, while this analytical approach is labelled as „actor-oriented‟, it 
actually emphasises a dynamic understanding of the interplay between actors 
and the contexts within which they find themselves – between human agency 
and the broader structural environment – as indicated in the introductory 
discussion about critical-constructivism above.
13
 As David Mosse and David 
Lewis (2006, p.11) indicate, the labelling of the approach as actor-oriented 
reflects a conscious effort on the part of Norman Long to move away from the 
notion of external determination and the implicit characterisation of those who 
are affected by policy as passive receivers, or simply „resisters‟ of, intervention 
and therefore from, what Long and van der Ploeg (1994, p.62-64) regard to be, 
the „structuralism‟ of Marxist analytical approaches that were prevalent in the 
1990s.
14
 Rather, the intention is to show the interplay and mutually constitutive 
relationship between structure and agency and between material and ideational 
factors. In this way, Long and van der Ploeg (1994, p.64, p.66) argue that all 
actors are „knowledgeable‟ and „capable‟; they have the capacity to process 
information and their experiences, to strategise in their dealings, and to devise 
ways of coping, „even under the most extreme forms of coercion‟ (Long and 
                                                 
13
  And therefore does not fall into the intellectual trap of intentionalism.  
14
  Indeed, this approach was developed during the so-called „impasse‟ in 
theorising about international development (see Booth, 1994).   
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van der Ploeg, p.64, p.66). In other words, all actors are able to exercise some 
kind of power, even in the most highly unequal or hierarchical contexts (Long 
and van der Ploeg, 1994, p.66).
15
   
 
This is not to say that material and ideational structures are insignificant. 
Indeed, the „actor-oriented‟ approach draws attention to the way in which 
agency may be constrained and shaped by, for example, macro-processes or 
„larger frames of meaning‟, which Bourdieu might call habitus (Long and van 
der Ploeg, 1994, p.65), and which the critical-governmentality literatures might 
call „mentalities of rule‟. Rather, the point is that structures should not be 
considered as explanans – simply path-dependent determinants of outcomes 
(Long and van der Ploeg, 1994, p.77). It is the way in which these structures 
are produced and reproduced in and through different actors; the way in which 
struggles are played-out over the attribution of meanings to ideas like 
partnership and in action; and whose representations prevail, in what 
circumstances, and with what effects, that are important topics of investigation 
(Long and van der Ploeg, 1994, p.67); and indeed are important topics in this 
research about the policy, practice and politics of partnership. 
 
Understanding the idea of partnership in aid policy and aid practice 
 
Drawing on these theoretical insights, it seems clear that there is no single 
understanding of the idea of partnership in aid policy, nor in the practice of aid 
or the practice of politics that this enjoins. Indeed, much like other political 
ideas, such as poverty and participation, there is no discrete or authentic way in 
which to define the meaning of partnership (Freeden, 1998, p.53; Long, 2004, 
p.27); rather, the meaning of partnership is constructed in and through 
processes of socio-political interaction. This is not to say that the range of 
possible meanings for partnership is infinite. Whilst there is no single meaning, 
the idea does have, to borrow the words of Michael Freeden (1998, p.53), 
certain „ineliminable‟ features in that it always seems to be about relationships 
and the organisation of action.
16
 Indeed, in all of the literature and empirical 
material that is discussed in this research, it is argued that the idea of 
                                                 
15
  A point that resonates with Scott‟s (1985) notion of „weapons of the weak‟ 
and with Lipsky‟s (1980) „street-level bureaucrats‟ 
16
  Ineliminable feature should be taken to mean the feature(s) that are common to 
all usages of the term. 
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partnership refers, at least in some way, to these broad themes. Given that the 
idea of partnership is essentially about relationships and the way in which 
action is coordinated, guided and steered, at its core then partnership is about 
who is involved in the giving and receiving of aid, how and why; in other 
words, it is about relations of governance.   
 
Importantly, while there are multiple ways in which partnership may be 
understood as the relations of governance, as suggested in the discussion above, 
there may be dominant constructions, or rather dominant ways of framing the 
idea of partnership in policy (as texts) and in local practice (as action, 
experiences). As Atkinson (1999, p.59) explains, while there is no single 
meaning to the idea of partnership, its meaning is constructed in, and through, 
relations of power, which may privilege certain representations over others. 
Reflecting back on earlier discussions of the mainstream pragmatic-
instrumental literature, and also on the critical observations of Craig and Porter 
(2003) and Ferguson (1990) in particular, it seems apparent that the idea of 
partnership tends to be framed within contemporary aid policy (as texts) as an 
objective, technical and win-win way to organise action for development (Buse 
and Harmer, 2004, p.51). In other words, the meaning of the idea of partnership 
is constructed in a depoliticised way, devoid of any overt reference to the ideas, 
values, beliefs and assumptions that underpin it about who should be involved 
in development action, how and why.   
 
Understanding depoliticisation in policy (as texts) 
 
Yet how might we understand depoliticisation? Why does it occur? And how 
might this shape local practice and the practices of politics that this enjoins? 
While these are questions that are explored in the following chapters of this 
thesis, it is useful to consider briefly what existing constructivist literature 
might tell us about this here.  
 
There are a number of possible explanations for the apolitical construction of 
the idea of partnership in policy texts. It may for example be because actors 
involved in the production of aid policy are habitualised to producing 
depoliticised policy narratives; and therefore that it is something of a routine or 
normalised component of the socio-political processes through which aid 
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policy is produced (cf. Green, 2007). In other words, depoliticisation and the 
technical representation of policy ideas is structured through „dominant 
paradigms of thought‟ or a depoliticized „governing mentality‟. Indeed, in 
relation to this and in a similar line of reasoning, it could be because of the 
dominance of liberal, positivist and economic thinking, which shapes how 
actors understand and interpret the world, in which actors are assumed to be 
rational and autonomous individuals, rather than political and relational, and 
with this underpinning, see and present policy in technical terms.  
 
Alternatively, or perhaps even at the same time, the depoliticisation of aid 
policy may occur because it is something of a political necessity for those 
actors involved in its social production: that is, because their continued 
existence is dependent on being able to create a convincing technical policy 
representation that justifies how they can „intervene in‟ and „manufacture‟ 
development in practice (cf. Green, 2003). In short, to acknowledge the 
messiness of politics in practice would destroy a convincing and necessary 
policy argument. Indeed, as Maia Green (2003) explains, the overall purpose of 
aid policy is to support financial transfers with a view to justifying 
interventions and achieving carefully costed outcomes; as a result, aid policy is 
more like a political „marketing text‟ than a document which is produced to 
reflect on and embed socio-political and economic analyses (Green, 2003, 
p.129).  
 
Finally, and again perhaps even at the same time, the depoliticisation of aid 
policy, and thus of ideas like partnership which as argued above is 
fundamentally about relations of governance, could be a somewhat conscious 
and instrumental strategy to conceal dissonance about who, how and why 
different actors should be involved in the organisation of development action; 
and thus construct the „appearance‟ of consensus (cf. Cornwall and Brock, 
2005, p.13). In other words, and to borrow a concept from the literature on 
governmentality, depoliticisation may serve to disguise the contradictory 
assemblage of knowledge that is an inevitable part of the socio-political 
processes that produce aid policy, masking conflicts and placating different 
actors, facilitating the enrolment of their support (cf. Stone, 2002; Mosse, 
2005a). Interpreted in this way, potentially depoliticised policy framings of the 
idea of partnership serve an instrumental „political-symbolic function‟ (van 
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Gastel and Nuijten, 2005, p.101); they help to mobilise, win and retain the 
support of a range of actors around a particular governance agenda, who might 
have different interests, ideas, beliefs, and assumptions about who and how 
development action should be organised (cf. Mosse, 2004, pp. 650-651).  
 
Importantly however, while the idea of partnership may be framed in a 
technical and apolitical way in authorised policy texts, critical-constructivist 
literature provides the insight that divergent points of view may still be 
encoded within. As Mosse (2005a, p.15) notes, the process of aid policy-
making is characterised by negotiation and contestation over development 
meanings, and these political differences are frequently not resolved. As a 
consequence, political contest is often „embedded‟ in official policy texts 
(Mosse, 2005a, p.15). This suggests therefore that, while the idea of partnership 
may be framed in policy texts in a technical, depoliticised way, closer critical 
analysis is likely to reveal a set of divergent arguments, interests and points of 
view. Reflecting on the work of Mosse (2001, p.29), the idea of partnership 
may actually be particularly useful in this task of strategic concealment and 
consensus-building because it is „sufficiently ambiguous‟ to allow many 
different readings. Indeed, as van Gastel and Nuijten (2005, p.101) indicate, aid 
policy ideas like partnership can consciously be  made vague, since they have 
to be negotiated and discussed in different transnational sites and contexts; 
definitional precision is much more likely to result in disagreement over who, 
how and why different actors should be involved in development action.  
 
The relevance to local practice and the practice of politics that this enjoins 
 
Importantly, while the idea of partnership may be constructed to appear in a 
depoliticised way in official policy through socio-political processes (as 
indicated above), existing critical-constructivist work also provides the insight 
that this depoliticisation may not be a „secure accomplishment‟ in practice 
because policy is not linearly implemented (Li, 2007); and indeed it cannot be 
if partnership intentions are consciously kept vague (as suggested above). 
While the policy idea of partnership might encode particular contradictory 
ideas, beliefs and assumptions about relations of governance then, the meaning 
of partnership and therefore the implications as to how development action is 
organised are interpreted and translated in specific local contexts, through 
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complex and political social processes of collaboration, contestation and 
compromise (Mosse, 2005a; Rossi, 2006; Bending and Rosendo, 2006). As a 
result of these local processes of translation, there are likely to be „disjunctures‟ 
between policy (as texts) and practice (local action and experience), as the 
meaning of policy is worked out in the political messiness of local action 
(Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Li, 2007). 
 
Although the importance of official constructions of the idea of partnership in 
aid policy should not be over-stated, they may or may not have a „performative 
quality‟, in the sense that they provide a kind of structuring context or certain 
„boundaries‟ for action (Mosse, 2005a, p.232; Gains and Clarke, 2007, p.136; 
Green, 2007, p.145). Indeed, to borrow from Maia Green (2007, p.146), once 
produced, texts may have the „attributes of agency‟ and thus socio-political 
effects; conditioning, for example, what might be do-able and say-able in 
particular circumstances, events and development contexts. One possible 
structuring effect, and indeed one that is discussed in the forthcoming empirical 
chapters of this thesis, is highlighted by Andrea Cornwall and Karen Brock 
(2005, p.16). They indicate that policy ideas that shelter multiple meanings 
while, at the same time, giving the impression that there is little dissonance, can 
shield those actors who use it from attack. A potential effect of depoliticized 
policy ideas and their use in local practice then, is therefore discursive or 
deliberative closure (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p.16); and, in particular, in 
relation to partnership, closure about the nature of relationships and the way 
action is organized: in other words, about relations of governance.  
 
This is problematic because of the historic structural inequalities, social 
patterns of dominance (cf. Stone, 1989) and „etiquettes of hierarchy‟ (cf. 
Green, 2003, p.135) that invariably shape the relationship between actors who 
give and receive aid, and who shape local development practice. In short, it 
means that these inequalities and structures of dominance may be difficult 
(though certainly not impossible) to challenge and resist. This and the other 
insights from critical-constructivist literature discussed above are all 
considered in the forthcoming chapters of the thesis, as the idea of partnership 
is explored empirically in specific policy settings and practical contexts, 
namely: in the partnership policy of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, in policy about Sector-wide Approaches (SWAp) to 
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aid and health sector development, and in the socio-political practice of the 
health sector in Zambia. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The intention of this chapter has been to bring together and review existing 
literature on the idea of partnership in aid policy and practice from a range of 
different academic disciplines, so as to more fully understand what is already 
known about this topic. The chapter has argued that there is a limited body of 
scholarly work on the idea of partnership in relation to aid policy and practice, 
and that, while these works offer a number of important insights, there are also 
a number of gaps and limitations. Given these shortcomings, the chapter has 
argued that a critical-constructivist approach offers a potentially important way 
forward, and will help to offer new and original contributions.     
 
To be sure, the chapter has not argued that the product of a critical-
constructivist approach is superior to other works, nor that the insights from 
other literature should be discounted. Rather, it has been argued that this 
analytical framework offers an alternative mode of understanding the idea of 
partnership in contemporary aid policy and how it relates to and shapes local 
practice, which can provide complementary insights to existing academic work 
on the topic (and, moreover, is ontologically and epistemologically resonant 
with the position and views of the author). 
 
Having set out the theoretical fabric of the critical-constructivist analytical 
approach that is advocated in this research, the forthcoming chapters of this 
thesis will go on to explore why the idea of partnership has risen to prominence 
in contemporary aid policy, and how partnership, as framed within such policy, 
shapes, enables, contorts and / or constrains socio-political action; that is to say, 
how the global policy idea of partnership is experienced, translated, 
transformed and appropriated in local practice (Jenkins, 2007, p.34; Mosse, 
pp.940-941). Before doing so however, it is first necessary to outline the 
methodological strategy that was employed, including the modes of data 
generation and analysis, so that it is clear how the forthcoming arguments were 
conceived. It is to the methodology then, that the thesis now turns.   
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Overview 
 Sets out and explains the methodological research strategy  
 Outlines how the research strategy fits with a critical-
constructivist perspective  
 Discusses the overall research design and the specific methods 
that were used to generate data and insights into the idea of 
partnership 
 Explains how the analysis of the research data proceeded 
Chapter Three:  
The methodological strategy  
 
 
Introduction  
 
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on partnership and set out the key 
characteristics of the critical-constructivist perspective that this thesis embeds 
and reflects. The intention of this chapter is to build on the last by detailing the 
methodological strategy that was employed and to justify how it not only fits 
intellectually with critical-constructivism, but also helps to answer the 
substantive research question of the thesis, namely: Why is the idea of 
partnership a pervasive feature in contemporary aid policy and how does this 
relate to and shape local practice, including the practice of politics that this 
enjoins? 
 
The chapter starts by explaining the broad research strategy. It then moves on 
to discuss the research design in more detail, the specific methods that were 
used in order to generate data and insights into partnership, and how this was 
subsequently analyzed and interpreted. Essentially, the chapter argues that a 
qualitative research strategy was used because it is consistent with the 
ontological and epistemological basis of a critical-constructivist approach and 
the overall goals of the research. The chapter goes on to explain that a 
„collective case study‟ design was also fitting (cf. Creswell, 2007, p.74) 
because the research question has more than one component: it is not only 
concerned with „how and why‟ the idea of partnership features in policy, but 
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also how and why it shapes practice. Relatedly, the chapter argues that multiple 
research methods were needed in order to unpack partnership, with different 
techniques required for understanding policy, and understanding practice.  
 
Importantly, and as Alan Bryman (2008, p.392) indicates, qualitative research 
is often criticised for lacking transparency; that is, for failing to clearly outline 
what was done, how and why. In order to respond to this criticism, this chapter 
purposively aims to explicitly discuss the research strategy and the methods 
that were employed. It also aims to be clear about how the research data was 
analysed, so as to assist readers in evaluating the credibility of the arguments 
that follow (Yanow, 2006; Devine, 2002).   
 
The intellectual basis for a qualitative research strategy  
 
In all research studies, it is important for the methodological strategy to have a 
degree of intellectual fit with the ontological and epistemological 
underpinnings of the research. As detailed in Chapter Two, this study embeds a 
critical-constructivist perspective, and thus reflects a relational / constructivist 
ontology and an interpretive (rather than positivist) epistemology. The 
ontological orientation of the research can be considered as relational / 
constructivist because a core assumption is that social and political phenomena 
and their meanings are context- and time- dependent, and that the meaning of 
policy ideas, like partnership, are constructed, contested, legitimised and 
perhaps even strategically appropriated socially, in and through existing 
relations of power (see Chapter Two; Bryman, 2008; Hay, 2002; Mosse, 
2005b). By extension, epistemologically, it is assumed that it is only possible to 
understand and generate knowledge about socio-political life, including the 
policy and practice of partnership, if we consider and interpret the meanings, 
beliefs, preferences and actions of the actors who are involved, and appraise 
how these have been shaped by the broader context in which they find 
themselves (Hacking, 1999; Hay, 2002; Long and van der Ploeg, 1994). It is 
because of these ontological and epistemological commitments, that the study 
embeds a qualitative (rather than quantitative) research strategy; for qualitative 
research is widely accepted to be „good at capturing meaning, process and 
context‟ in this way (Devine, 2002, p.199).  
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Yet what actually is qualitative research? While there are certainly many 
different definitions and understandings, it is widely accepted that qualitative 
research has a number of key elements that give it a distinctive character 
(Snape and Spencer, 2008; see also Bryman, 2008). For the purpose of this 
study, and following Snape and Spencer (2008, pp.3-5), a qualitative research 
methodology can be understood as having the following characteristics: 
 
1) Aims to provide an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the idea 
of partnership in policy (texts) and practice (actions and experiences) 
by learning about the socio-political factors, perspectives and histories 
that have shaped its use and translation into policy and in practice; 
2) Focuses on specific, purposively selected cases of aid policy and 
practice, which are explored through methods that are flexible and 
sensitive to context, and generates data that is detailed, information-
rich and extensive (see below for more details); and 
3) Embeds a theoretically-informed analysis that is however, open to 
emergent concepts, and seeks to produce detailed narratives and 
„rounded understandings‟ about how and why partnership features in 
policy and in socio-political practice (see below for more detail).  
 
Having set out and explained the broad methodological strategy of the research, 
it is now necessary to outline the design of the research in more detail, and to 
describe and explain the specific research methods that were employed; that is 
to say, to outline the overall framework used for generating data and related 
insights on partnership, and to describe the specific techniques that fed into this 
(Bryman, 2008). The remaining sections of the chapter will attend to these 
issues. 
 
The research design: A ‘collective case study’17 
 
As with other research that has endeavoured to make sense of the ideas 
embedded within aid policy and practice (Buse, 1999a, 1999b; Sundewall, 
2009), this study adopted a case study design. Case studies involve the 
intensive and in-depth investigation of a specific research context, enable the 
                                                 
17
  As indicated in the main body of the text, the term „collective case study‟ is 
borrowed from John Creswell (2007, p.74). 
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capturing of a multiplicity of perspectives on a particular issue, and are 
invaluable where the research topic is complex and under-studied (Keen and 
Packwood, 1995; Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2007; Lewis, 2008). As argued in 
the earlier chapters of this thesis, the world of aid policy and practice is 
complex and messy, and the idea of partnership is also poorly understood in 
existing academic literature (see Chapter Two). A case study design was 
therefore particularly useful here, as it allowed a detailed exploration of this 
under-studied and complicated topic, and of the potentially multiple ways in 
which the idea of partnership is constructed, appropriated and contested. 
 
The overall case (cf. Sundewall, 2009) was an in-depth exploration of the idea 
of partnership. However, because the research question has two different 
components – 1) about understanding partnership in policy, and 2) about how 
and why it features in practice – an investigation of specific cases within the 
case was also necessary. Two policy and practice couplets were therefore 
selected in order to allow a comparative and in-depth interpretation of these 
topics. The official texts of the Global Fund to Fight to AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (hereafter Global Fund) and the health Sector-wide Approach (SWAp) 
were selected as suitable policy cases, and the Zambian health sector was 
chosen as an exemplary arena to explore how such policy relates to and shapes 
practice. In consequence then, the overall design of the research was actually 
what Creswell (2007, p.74) calls a „collective case study‟, within which a 
number of embedded cases were used to investigate the policy and practice of 
partnership.  
 
As indicated in the introductory chapter to this thesis, the Global Fund, SWAp 
and the Zambian health sector were chosen as suitable embedded cases within 
the case for a number of different reasons – both academic and practical. 
Although the idea of partnership is evident in much contemporary aid policy, it 
is particularly a feature of aid policy for health, having appeared in a range of 
the official texts of donors, governments and NGOs alike for many years: 
including health SWAPs in the late-1990s, Global Fund procedures at the turn 
of the twentieth century and more recently, in the texts (and titles) of a range of 
other Global Health Partnerships, including the International Health 
Partnership (IHP) which was launched in 2007 (see Buse and Harmer, 2009; 
IHP+, 2010). Academically then, Global Fund and SWAp policy provided, 
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what Bryman (2008, p.56) describes as, „exemplifying cases‟; they were not 
necessarily extreme or unusual, but provided a useful context in which to locate 
an analysis of the idea of partnership and thus to answer the research question.  
 
Relatedly, the Zambian health arena was a highly suitable „exemplifying case‟ 
(cf. Bryman, 2008, p.56) to explore practice (actions and experiences); most 
particularly because both Global Fund and SWAp mechanisms have been in 
operation in the country for an extended period of time (the SWAp since the 
1990s, and the Global Fund since its inception in 2002) (see also Chapter One). 
Importantly, Zambia was also a suitable case for studying partnership for 
logistical reasons; most particularly because the research was supported by a 
collaborative (CASE) partner – Harewelle International – that has satellite 
offices in Lusaka through PMTC (Zambia). In consequence, there was a ready-
made support network available whilst conducting the field research. Indeed, 
PMTC (Zambia) provided invaluable contextual advice and assistance in 
organising the fieldwork in Zambia, including providing office space in Lusaka.  
 
It is perhaps necessary to point out here that, although the CASE partner is 
well-connected into the aid environment in Zambia, it has limited involvement 
in health. Consequently, the company had limited influence over the conduct of 
the research process and / or over the analysis of data. Indeed, intellectual 
freedom was encouraged throughout. As a result then, it should be emphasised 
that the arguments in the chapters that follow are entirely the responsibility of 
the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Harewelle International / 
PMTC (Zambia). At the same time however, the involvement of the CASE 
partner has meant that the research was conducted with practical-relevance in 
mind. The concluding chapter therefore highlights how the research is relevant 
for practitioners (see Chapter Nine).  
 
As the study progressed, it also became apparent that it was important to 
understand and contextualise the idea of partnership in a broader, global aid 
policy context; that is to say, to consider and explore the broader socio-political 
context for the rise of partnership in policy and practice. In consequence, in 
addition to the collective case studies described above, a case study 
investigation of the global environment for contemporary aid policy was 
conducted, with the results of this presented in Chapter Four „The rise of the 
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idea of partnership in contemporary global aid policy‟. Indeed, to summarise, 
the collective case study design for this research involved:  
 
 A case study of the global context for aid and the rise of the idea of 
partnership in official policy (Chapter Four); 
 A couplet of cases focusing on how and why partnership features in 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria policy and how 
it shapes local practice in Zambia (Chapters Five and Six); 
 A couplet of cases focusing on how and why partnership features in 
SWAp policy and how this shapes practice in Zambia (Chapters Seven 
and Eight). 
 
As with other qualitative and case study-based research, the chapters which 
have been produced are characterised by thick description (cf. Geertz, 1973) 
and a detailed narrative in order to capture the complexity and multiplicity of 
perspectives about the politics of partnership in policy and practice.  
 
Details of the specific research methods  
 
Having argued that a qualitative research strategy and collective case study 
design was appropriate for this study, it is important to be clear about the 
specific methods that were used to generate data and insights about the idea of 
partnership. As various authors have indicated, there is no single, accepted way 
of doing qualitative research (Snape and Spencer, 2008; Stoker and Marsh, 
2002); rather, the methods should fit with the topic of investigation. Because 
the question for this research had two broad components – one about 
interpreting aid policy (as texts) and one about interpreting aid practice (actions 
and experiences), and is concerned with the relationship between the two – two 
different sets of methods were used. Qualitative research commonly uses 
multiple methods (see Devine, 2002), and the following section of this chapter 
will explain these in more detail.   
 
Interpreting policy: Critical textual analysis 
 
In order to understand why the idea of partnership has risen to prominence and 
how it is framed in aid policy, three different research methods were used. First, 
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academic literature on aid in general, and the Global Fund and health SWAps 
more specifically, was identified and analysed through a critical-constructivist 
lens, in order to critically consider how the dynamic interplay of different 
(f)actors (ideas, interests, relationships and the prevailing context) contributed 
to the rise, use and embedded meanings of the idea of partnership. Literature 
was located through standard academic search mechanisms, including using 
academic databases (including Pubmed and Cambridge Scientific Abstracts) 
and online search engines (such as Google Scholar).  
 
Second, and at the same time, official policy texts that mentioned the idea of 
partnership were identified by probing specialized aid- and donor- websites (for 
example, SDC-Health, 2010) and by contacting certain aid donors directly. 
These texts were then subjected to a critical „backward‟ analysis (cf. Mosse, 
2005a, p.15), which involved considering their political sociology. In other 
words, rather than reading policy documents and their references to the idea of 
partnership at face value, they were analysed and deconstructed by thinking 
about the social and political relations that produced them, and about the 
arguments, interests and divergent points of view that they might encode 
(Mosse, 2005a, p.15). In so doing, the following key questions were considered: 
When was the policy written? Who was the policy written by and for (the 
audience)? How was it produced (for example, by an elite group or through 
open deliberation)? What purpose was it supposed to serve / what was it 
supposed to accomplish? Whose voices or world views are embedded within, 
dominant or left out? And what was the broader context in which it was 
produced? (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004; Bryman, 2008; Jennings, 2010) 
 
Thirdly, and to supplement these two methods, various primary commentaries 
about aid, the Global Fund and SWAps were also collated and analysed (for 
example, press releases, media reports and interviews with policy-makers), in 
order to piece together and unpick the social and political processes, including 
the actors, ideas and interests, that contributed to the rise and pervasiveness of 
the idea of partnership in contemporary aid policy. Chapters Four, Five and 
Seven all draw on this type of interpretative analysis of source documentation 
to consider why the idea of partnership features in contemporary aid policy. 
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Interpreting practice: Qualitative fieldwork in the Zambian health arena 
 
In order to extend the research into the realm of current local practice (actions 
and experiences), qualitative field work was conducted in the health arena in 
Zambia, in order to understand and interpret how the idea of partnership is 
currently used and translated by those involved with Global Fund and health 
SWAp activities; thus providing a contrast between policy and practice 
(between textual representation and action).   
 
Fieldwork in Zambia 
 
The fieldwork in Zambia was conducted with an ethnographic sensibility. 
While it involved some degree of immersion (cf. Hodgson and Irving, 2007, 
p.197) in local Global Fund and SWAp settings; a commitment to what Merlijn 
van Hulst (2008) describes as „being there‟; and involved many of the methods 
that are associated with ethnographic work (including the writing of a field 
journal, the conduct of semi-structured interviews and participant observation),
 
it did not involve as much direct participation in local practice as an 
ethnography per se might demand.
18
 Many of the people who are involved with 
the Global Fund and SWAp in Zambia tend to be busy, senior or high-ranking 
officials in government ministries, donor agencies or NGOs, whose time is 
limited. Gaining day-to-day access to them on an ongoing basis was therefore 
difficult. In consequence, rather than being fully ethnographic, the field 
research relied instead on less participative methods whilst, at same time, 
taking every opportunity to be immersed in the local health setting where 
possible.  
 
Indeed, the overall aim of the field work was to spend a prolonged period of 
time engaged in the Zambian setting, so as to improve the validity of the 
findings. Importantly, this was not an attempt to improve validity in the sense 
that it provided time to verify or test the truthfulness of the findings (as in 
positivist studies). Rather, it allowed time to build up an understanding of the 
Zambian context, build relationships with participants, and unpick the 
complexity of the situation and diversity of perspectives (cf. Sundewall, 2009) 
                                                 
18
  While semi-structured interviews were a key method during the fieldwork, the 
qualitative research process in Zambia was certainly more than simply the 
generation of interview data (Yanow, 2009). 
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on partnership, so that the subsequent interpretation and argumentation was 
constructed from a broad and, moreover, credible basis (Bryman, 2008). 
 
Planning and logistics 
 
In terms of planning and logistics, the fieldwork was planned during the first 
year of the research, and was subsequently carried out in a series of visits to 
Zambia during the second and third year of study: 
 
1. Preliminary field visit 
An initial trip to Zambia took place in November to December 2008. 
The purpose of this visit was to establish relationships with actors in 
Zambia (including with the Ministry of Health, aid donors, NGOs and 
the University of Zambia); to apply for and secure the necessary ethical 
and Ministerial approvals for the research (see Appendices Two to 
Four); and to conduct a limited series of preliminary and in-depth 
interviews with relevant actors who were involved with either the 
Global Fund or the health SWAp. These interviews proved to be 
significant for a number of reasons: not only were they an opportunity 
to practice interviewing skills, but they were also an initial opportunity 
to explore the Zambian context in detail, to identify significant gaps in 
knowledge, to sharpen the research agenda, and to start identifying key 
issues relating to the practice of partnership (Bryman, 2008).  
 
2. Main field visit 
The main field visit took place from March to July 2009, during which 
much of the data collection took place and interpretive analysis started. 
As detailed below, multiple methods were used during the field 
research. The bulk of the work took place in Lusaka (the capital city), 
as this is where much Global Fund and health SWAp activity occurs. 
However, visits were also made to the Eastern, Central and Southern 
provinces in order to collect data from a broader constituency. The 
length and timing of the main fieldwork period was determined by the 
balancing of a number of different factors including: cost; practical 
considerations concerning access to key stakeholders at particular 
times; the timing of SWAp meetings; and the anticipated time that was 
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needed to develop relationships with and conduct an appropriate 
breadth of interview and observations in-country.   
 
Importantly, although this research is presented as an academic thesis, 
because it was funded through a collaborative (CASE) award between 
the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and Harewelle 
International (an international consultancy firm / development 
management company), the intention was always to feedback the 
findings to appropriate audiences involved in the world of aid. During 
the main field visit to Zambia therefore, emerging observations and 
issues were reported informally back to Harewelle International‟s local 
partner (PMTC Zambia), the Zambian Ministry of Health, the lead aid 
donor for health (the UK Department for International Development) 
and colleagues at the University of Zambia.  
 
3. Dissemination visit 
A third visit was made to Zambia in October 2010 after much of the 
interpretive analysis of the field research had been completed. The 
purpose of the visit was to feedback observations at a workshop in 
Lusaka, where the audience included Zambian academics and 
advocacy NGOs (Ministry of Health officials and aid donors were 
invited but did not attend). Although this was an important event, the 
dissemination of research should be an ongoing activity. Further events 
in Zambia are therefore planned and journal articles are being 
developed, so as to promote discussion about not only the politics of 
the idea of partnership, but also about the linkages between policy and 
practice. Elements of the couplet of chapters on the Global Fund 
(Chapters Five and Six) and Chapter Four have already been 
incorporated into a book chapter (Barnes and Brown, 2011a) and a 
peer-reviewed journal article (Barnes and Brown, 2011b) respectively.   
 
Fieldwork methods 
 
Multiple research methods were used during the fieldwork, as detailed below. 
The use of different methods was invaluable as it provided a variety of insights 
into socio-political practice in Zambia, which would not have been possible 
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using one method alone. Using different methods thus helped to challenge 
emerging perceptions about the idea of partnership, verify or complicate 
impressions about how policy relates to and shapes practice, and therefore 
helped to broaden the basis upon which the arguments in the forthcoming 
chapters were formed (Bryman, 2008; Manheim et al., 2006, p.334). In other 
words then, the use of multiple methods acted as a type of qualitative 
triangulation – a means to expose conflicts of views, and the complexity or 
divergent positions and interpretations about the practice of partnership. In 
some senses, this was a way to improve the validity of the findings; where 
validity here should be taken to mean how well the research captures and 
describes divergence and complexity, and whether it provides an authentic and 
convincing argument (Fochsen, 2007; Angen, 2000); rather than objective truth. 
The specific fieldwork methods used are now explained in more detail. 
 
Document Collection and Review 
A variety of paper and electronic documents were collected during the 
fieldwork in Zambia (to complement those that had already been compiled 
during desk-based research in the UK). Documentation was collected in a 
variety of different ways, including scheduled visits to the National Archive 
and to local libraries in Lusaka, and during interviews with research 
participants. Examples of paper and electronic documents collected included: 
aid agreements, meeting minutes and agendas, national and district-level plans, 
Global Fund and SWAp operating procedures, and various monitoring and 
evaluation reports (gathered from government, donors and NGOs alike).  These 
documents were reviewed to build up an interpreted picture of socio-political 
practice relating to the Global Fund and the health SWAp in Zambia, and how 
the idea of partnership is used and translated.  
 
„Being There‟: Observations, email trails, informal visits and discussion 
A range of observations were made during the research as a result of „being 
there‟ in Zambia (cf. Merlijn van Hulst, 2008). These ranged „from the formal 
to the casual‟ and were an important source of information and insight into the 
local socio-political setting (Sundewall, 2009, p.31; Bryman, 2008). Indeed, 
observations provided an opportunity to see if and how the idea of partnership 
is applied in practice, and to observe whether, and how, the behaviour of actors 
in SWAp and Global Fund settings relates to partnership in policy.  
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In terms of formal observations, throughout the field work, arrangements were 
made with the Ministry of Health to observe a number of different meetings, 
including coordination fora, donor meetings, discussion forums, and national 
health SWAp meetings. Unfortunately however, although such arrangements 
were made, some of these meetings were cancelled due to the changing socio-
political environment in Zambia at the time of the field research and, in 
particular, as a result of alleged corruption within the Ministry of Health (see 
Chapter Eight for more details).
19
 Despite this however, at least two key 
meetings were observed during the field work, including: 1) a national health 
Sector Advisory Group (SAG) meeting (2
nd
 April 2009) and 2) a national 
budget support Review Meeting (24
th
 June 2009). In line with Gold‟s (1958 
cited in Bryman 2008, p.410-411) typology, the mode of observation at these 
meetings was as a „complete observer‟; that is to say, there was little active 
interaction in dialogue and discussion. This observational method was 
particularly useful at the SAG meeting, providing highly relevant insights into 
how different actors use, apply and „enact‟ partnership in public settings 
(Cunliffe, 2009a; see Chapter Eight). 
 
Although there were difficulties in observing formal meetings, there were a 
number of more casual opportunities for observation during the fieldwork, 
which provided insight into the Global Fund and health SWAp in action. A 
positive relationship was built up with people within the Ministry of Health, 
and therefore many informal visits took place in order to touch base and 
observe office-based activity there for short periods. Observations were also 
possible while waiting in the corridors of donor, NGO and government 
buildings, to record a general sense of what was going on. A number of 
informal visits to local clinics, hospital departments and NGOs funded by the 
Global Fund were also organised, so as to observe how projects were run on a 
day-to-day basis. Importantly, it was also possible to observe SWAp processes 
in action electronically, by being included in email communications between 
the Ministry of Health, donors and NGOs in relation to the SWAp.  
 
                                                 
19
  Examples of key meetings that were cancelled included: International Health 
Partnership High Level Forum meeting on 30
th
 April 2009 and SWAp Policy 
Meeting on 28
th
 May 2009.    
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Because the fieldwork took place over an extended period of time, there were 
many opportunities to engage in unsolicited discussions with health workers, 
consultants, members of the local community, and even taxi drivers about the 
Global Fund and health SWAp, and in general conversations about health 
provision and donor-government relationships. After any such discussion, 
detailed notes and critical reflections were recorded in a field journal, as will 
now be discussed below. 
 
Field journal (including newspaper scrapbook) 
A detailed journal was maintained throughout the fieldwork process in order to 
capture impressions and interpretations of the discussions and observations 
noted above. The journal was also used to record daily events, personal 
reflections on the research process, and feelings about news reports and 
conversations, and to log emerging ideas about the way in which the policy 
idea of partnership relates to socio-political practice. This journal was used to 
inform later analysis (see below).  
 
A newspaper scrapbook was compiled as a component of the field journal in 
order to capture the progress of broader socio-political events in Zambia and 
general coverage of health and aid-related issues. This scrapbook was 
particularly useful for capturing media coverage (in May and June 2009) of 
alleged corruption in the Ministry of Health (see above and Chapter Eight), 
providing insights into donor-donor, donor-government and government-NGO 
relationships, which were reflected upon to assess how partnership policy 
relates to practice. Some of the issues that were raised in newspaper coverage, 
and in the field journal more generally, were followed-up in semi-structured 
interviews where possible. The interviewing process will now be explained in 
more detail below.  
 
Semi-structured interviews  
Interviewing those people who were (or had been) involved in or exposed to 
Global Fund or health SWAp processes was an important component of the 
field work in Zambia. The interviews were an opportunity to explore some of 
the themes that had been identified from existing literature on the topic of 
partnership (see Chapter Two), and also to explore how different people 
understood and experienced partnership in relation to the Global Fund and the 
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health SWAp, and to assess whether there was consensus or conflict. Overall, 
the idea of the interviews was to explore the idea of partnership and socio-
political practice from the interviewee‟s point of view, and to try and unfold the 
meaning and complexity of views and experiences (Kvale and Brinkman, 
2009).
 20
  
 
The overarching interviewing strategy was to speak with the broadest cross-
section of people involved in Global Fund and health SWAp activities as 
possible; where broadest here meant speaking to those with differing expertise, 
roles and organisational affiliations, and in different locations in Zambia, where 
practicable. This meant speaking with not only senior civil servants in the 
Ministry of Health, representatives of funding agencies, and implementing or 
advocacy NGOs, but also management consultants, University staff, journalists 
and front-line health workers. As indicated above, because much activity 
relating to the Global Fund and the health SWAp occurs in Lusaka, much of 
the interviewing took place there. Trips were however also organised to the 
Eastern, Southern and Central Provinces, to speak with Ministry officials, 
NGOs, and health workers there.    
 
Interviewees were identified through a combination of purposive selection and 
snowball sampling. As indicated by Bryman (2008, p.458) purposive sampling 
is „essentially strategic‟ and involves interviewing people who are relevant to 
the research question. Given that, in this case, the research question was about 
the way in which the idea of partnership in Global Fund and SWAp policy 
relates to and shapes socio-political practice in Zambia, a number of key 
individuals involved in the Global Fund and SWAp activities were identified 
through general investigative research into the health sector. A database of 
relevant participants was developed in the UK and then continually updated 
during the field work as new contacts were realized or suggested by others. As 
the interviewing progressed then, the identification of interviewees snowballed 
as new potential participants were referred by others. Importantly, new 
interviewees were also identified during the course of the fieldwork, as 
                                                 
20
  While the objective of the research was to generate new knowledge and to 
address identified gaps in existing scholarship on partnership (see Chapter 
Two), PhD research is also a training endeavour. The interviewing process 
was therefore an important opportunity to develop, what Steinar Kvale and 
Svend Brinkman (2009, p.99-100) call, interviewing „craftmanship‟; so as 
build the skills (and confidence) for a future academic career.  
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discussions opened new issues and avenues of thinking. In some cases, follow-
up interviews were also arranged with certain individuals where this was 
necessary. By using this process, a total of seventy interviews were conducted 
during the field work (see Appendix Five).
21
  
 
In terms of the way the interviews were conducted, it was recognised at the 
outset that there was no single right way to carry out an interview (Kvale and 
Brinkman, 2006). As Katie Willis (2010) indicates, not only should each 
interview suit the research topic, but also the person being interviewed, and the 
context within which the interview occurs. Therefore, while each interview 
used a topic guide 
22
 and was treated as an elite process – in the sense that 
interviewees were approached as experts about the topic at hand (Leech, 2002, 
p.663) – the questioning and conversation was tailored to each separate 
situation. A different interviewing strategy was therefore used to speak with 
Ministry officials, donor agency staff, local health officials, and NGOs. For 
example, for some of the more senior-ranking officials, a more structured 
interviewing style seemed to be expected and was thus appropriate. This was 
not however, always the case, with others directing the interview towards a 
more conversational style. Although preparations were therefore made for each 
interview, it was important to be flexible and constantly adapt the approach 
taken (sometimes even mid-way through the interview).  
 
Each interview lasted approximately one hour. Some were however, shortened 
due to the time constraints of interviewees, whilst others extended to two hours 
where an interviewee was particularly engaged in the topic. A decision was 
taken not to tape-record interviews, as this was judged to be intrusive for both 
                                                 
21
  It was difficult to know in advance how many interviews should be conducted: 
what is enough? Warren (2002, p.99 in Bryman, 2008 p. 462) notes that for a 
qualitative study to be published the minimum number of interviews is twenty 
to thirty. While this number was used as an indicator of the minimum 
acceptable, the aim was to reach some kind of subjectively-determined 
„saturation‟ point, at which no substantively new or relevant information 
emerged (Yanow, 2009, p.285). With each new interview however, there are 
always new issues that emerge; new questions that come to mind; and new 
suggestions as to other people to whom one could speak. In this study, 
interviews continued up to the end of the planned fieldwork period. However, 
ethical questions about who was being interviewed became increasingly 
pertinent, and so before each new interview a critical assessment was made as 
to whether it should take place. 
22
  This was an outline of topics to be covered in each interview, with examples 
of questions (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009, p.130). An example of the guide had 
been ethically reviewed.   
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the interviewer and interviewee (Woliver, 2002). Instead, written notes were 
taken during each interview. Care was taken to record certain important points 
accurately, where it was thought that they might be quoted in later academic 
arguments about partnership. The notes were transcribed into electronic format 
as soon as possible after each interview (usually on the same day), and general 
reflections were also recorded about the interview environment and process, so 
as to have a contextual record for future reference and to help understand and 
interpret the views of each interviewee (Woliver, 2002).  
 
In general, there were few problems in gaining access to speak with different 
actors involved with the Global Fund or the health SWAp. Although gaining 
access was a constant process of negotiation, a key gatekeeper at the Ministry 
of Health and a letter of approval from the Ministry of Health (see Appendix 
Four) certainly helped to secure interviews. There are however, limitations with 
any research method and problems were certainly encountered. Due to the 
highly-centralized system of control within the public health system in Zambia, 
and a political etiquette of hierarchy, it was sometimes difficult to speak with 
district and provincial health officials, despite having approval from Ministry 
of Health headquarters. This was resolved in some cases by asking a central 
contact to email (or telephone) through to a colleague in advance of an 
interview request. Due to political protocols and sensitivity in the civil service, 
access to speak with Ministry of Finance personnel was largely denied. 
 
Importantly, the difficulty in securing access to Ministry of Health officials at 
district and provincial level was particularly acute in the time immediately after 
alleged corruption was uncovered in the Ministry of Health (see above and 
Chapter Eight). Moreover, during interviews with government officials and 
certain donors at this time, there was a tangible sense of discomfort with the 
interviewing situation, and suspicion as to how the information would be used. 
Providing reassurance as to the academic nature of the study and emphasizing 
confidentiality was therefore paramount. Although the broader context 
certainly made interviewing in this immediate period difficult, it also provided 
a useful insight into the sensitivities that existed, and, in particular, in relation 
to SWAp processes. As immediate sensitivities dissipated, many subsequent 
interviewees actually seemed to share a more open and personal account of 
their experiences and understandings of partnership, which was an 
73 
 
unanticipated benefit to the study (reflections on this are built into the 
arguments of Chapter Eight).  
 
While Appendix Five gives further detail about the interviewees and provides 
an overview of the organisational affiliations of those involved, because of the 
changing socio-political environment in Zambia (as mentioned above) and the 
ongoing sensitivity around the way in which aid for health is managed and 
organised, the identities of interviewees (and / or their respective organisations) 
have not been disclosed in any of the arguments of the forthcoming chapters. 
While it is recognised that, for the reader, this means there is less contextual 
detail about the practice of partnership in Zambia, such anonymity and 
confidentiality was necessary so as not to cause harm to those who gave their 
time to be involved in the research (Kvale and Brinkman, 2009; Lewis, 2008).  
 
Analysis of practice: An iterative and ongoing process 
 
Analysis of the fieldwork on the Global Fund and SWAp in Zambia was an 
ongoing and iterative process, and proceeded by way of what Colin Hay (2002, 
p.47) calls „a dialogue‟ between theory and fieldwork data. Similar to the 
analysis of policy described above, it involved the building-up of a detailed 
interpretation of how partnership is used and translated, including the multiple 
and competing understandings of the idea. This involved the ongoing 
identification of plausible evidence from meeting observations, semi-structured 
interviews and field notes; the identification of emerging themes, conflicts, and 
competing understandings of partnership; the conduct of more interviews and 
observations to provide further critical insight; and the subsequent construction 
of a coherent explanation as to how the policy idea of partnership relates to and 
shapes socio-political action in Zambia (Lynch, 2006). The software package 
NVivo 8 was used within this process. However, this was simply to help 
interrogate, understand, identify themes within, and make connections between, 
the transcripts of interviewees and field-related notes (not to quantify the data 
in any way).  
 
To be clear, the analysis was both inductive and deductive in nature. While the 
entire research process was guided (deductively) by theoretical insights, and in 
particular the critical-constructivist insights highlighted in Chapter Two (and 
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helped, for example, to construct the interview topic guide), the arguments 
about the policy and practice of partnership were also built from the „bottom-
up‟ (Creswell, 2007); incorporating emergent ideas and reflections about the 
way partnership is, for example, appropriated and performed (see Chapters Six 
and Eight). To be sure, theory was not used to deductively test a model or 
hypothesis about partnership, but rather to sensitise, guide and inform empirical 
exploration and to help interpret field data, so as to capture and make sense of 
the complexity of partnership in practice.  
 
As indicated above, given the assumption of the complexity of partnership in 
practice, and also the complexity of interactions between material and 
ideational factors, and between actors and structures, the aim of the analytical 
process was to produce detailed narratives and „rounded understandings‟ about 
how and why partnership policy relates to and shapes socio-political practice 
(Hay, 2002, p.47). The product of the above analytical process is therefore two 
somewhat „thickly-described‟ (cf. Geertz, 1973) narratives about the Global 
Fund (Chapter Six) and the health SWAp (Chapter Eight) in Zambia.  
 
A note on researcher bias 
 
It is important in qualitative research to reflect critically upon and account for 
the position, views and values of the researcher, in order to help the reader 
understand how this has shaped the study (Creswell, 2007; Angen, 2000). 
Maureen Angen (2000) calls this „reflexivity‟ and indicates that it involves 
being clear about how the researcher‟s own background and understandings of 
the topic have shaped the research process, interpretations and argumentation. 
Importantly, such reflexivity should not be seen as a means to create 
„objectivity‟ from which the topic can be more fully addressed (to suggest so 
would be antithetical to the study‟s ontological and epistemological 
underpinnings), but rather as a way to show how the researcher has inter-
subjectively and co-creatively shaped the creation of knowledge (Angen, 2000, 
p.383). While it is not possible to be explicit here about all the factors that have 
influenced the researcher, research process and thus the construction of 
arguments about partnership, selected positional biases are now discussed 
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below (these points complement the critical discussion about the research 
process above).
23
  
 
Being „keen to “denaturalise” partnership‟  
As indicated in Chapter One, a key intention of the study was to „denaturalise‟ 
partnership so as to make this familiar idea strange, and to stimulate new 
questions and dialogue about its policy and practice (Gadamer, 1994 in Angen, 
2000). As a consequence, the research process started from the perspective that 
there was something inherently disturbing with the apparent hegemony of the 
idea, and from a normative view that the world of aid policy and practice can 
and, indeed, should be made more transparent, open, equitable and socially 
just. This perspective did not change throughout the course of the research, and 
the arguments in Chapters Four to Eight, and conclusions presented in Chapter 
Nine, reflect this normative view. 
 
Being an „outsider‟  
The exploration of the policy and practice of partnership in this study was 
carried out from an outsider‟s position (cf. Sundewall, 2009). At the same time 
however, every effort was made to consider how and why partnership features 
in policy and practice from an insider‟s perspective, by considering the social 
and political processes (including the ideas, interests and values) that were 
contributory factors. The exploration of practice in Zambia spanned an 
extended period of time, and involved the development of personal 
relationships with some interviewees who were involved with the Global Fund 
and / or SWAp. While this allowed trust to develop and discussion to be 
particularly frank and open with these people, it also meant that, over time, it 
was impossible to be as distanced from the interviewing and interpretive 
process as a „complete outsider‟ would be (Sundewall, 2009). The 
interpretations and arguments that follow are therefore shaped by a degree of 
empathy with the difficult and complex nature of the world of aid that many of 
those interviewed (including government, donors, and NGOs alike) have to 
navigate on a daily basis.  
 
 
                                                 
23
  The sub-headings here follow those used by Grethe Fochsen (2007). 
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Being a „young, female PhD student‟ 
As Jesper Sundewall (2009, p.38) indicates, many people who are based in the 
field offices of donor agencies, in senior government positions, in NGOs and 
who are involved in Global Fund and SWAp processes tend to have 
considerable experience of aid and health work. In Zambia, the work of such 
people is also embedded in a context that tends to be characterized by hierarchy 
based on age and gender (in which older generations and males are typically 
deferred to). As a consequence, conducting and interpreting fieldwork as a 
relatively young, female PhD student was, to borrow the words of Sundewall 
(2009, p.38), „both a challenge and an advantage‟. It was challenging because it 
was difficult to gain access to busy individuals, and to be taken seriously as an 
academic researcher. At the same time however, it was also advantageous 
because the perceived lack of experience and social ranking disarmed some 
(though not all) interviewees, and meant that they were relaxed and relatively 
open during discussions (Sundewall, 2009). At times, it also allowed the posing 
of naive questions, in order to explore taken-for granted views about the idea of 
partnership, and Global Fund and SWAp processes (Fochsen, 2007).  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has described and reflected upon the general methodological 
strategy that was used to inform the study‟s substantive research question. It 
has explained why a qualitative research strategy was employed and set out the 
research design and specific research methods in some detail. In summary, the 
chapter argued that a qualitative research strategy was appropriate for 
exploring how and why partnership features in contemporary aid policy and 
shapes practice because it fits the underpinning ontological and epistemological 
orientation of the research. The chapter also explained that a „collective case 
study‟ design (cf. Creswell, 2007, p.74) and a variety of qualitative methods 
were used because of the two differing components of the research question – 
different cases and methods were required to explore policy, and to explore 
practice.  
 
The remaining five chapters of the thesis are, together, the product of this 
methodological approach and collectively provide an answer to the question as 
to why partnership has risen to prominence and how this affects the practice of 
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aid, and the practice of politics that this enjoins. Indeed, the remaining chapters 
go on to critique how and why the policy idea of partnership has been produced 
and framed in the policy texts of the Global Fund and SWAps, and considers 
how this shapes, enables, contorts and constrains local socio-political action in 
Zambia. The next chapter starts this intellectual journey by situating the idea of 
partnership in historical context, and puts forward an explanation as to why, at 
some point in the 1990s, it rose to prominence. It is to this topic that the thesis 
now turns.  
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Overview 
 Situates the rise to prominence of the idea of partnership in 
contemporary aid policy in historical context 
 Discusses the (f)actors that were influential in the rise of the idea 
 Considers how these (f)actors help to explain how the idea of 
partnership comes to be used and framed within official texts 
 Provides an introduction to issues that forthcoming chapters of the 
thesis will probe and explore  
Chapter Four 
Historical context: The rise of the idea of 
partnership in contemporary aid policy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As argued in the introductory chapter to this thesis, the idea of partnership is 
currently a pervasive feature in contemporary aid policy. It not only appears in 
the official texts of many bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, but also in the 
written documents of many actors who receive aid, be it national governments 
or various different local, regional or international organisations. The idea of 
partnership has not, however, always been so prominent. Although it has 
certainly featured in aid policy before now – figuring, for example, in the plans 
of the Rockefeller Foundation‟s hookworm eradication campaign as early as 
1913 (Fosdick, 1989, p.34); 
24
 in the 1969 report of the World Bank-supported 
Pearson Commission on International Development; 
25 
and in the various Lomé 
Conventions (the first of which was signed in 1975) 
26
 – its use was somewhat 
sporadic. Indeed, it was not until sometime in the 1990s that the idea of 
                                                 
24
  The official aim of the campaign was to extend the control and treatment of 
hookworm to fifty-two countries across the world (Fosdick, 1952, p.50).  
Anne-Emanuelle Birn and Armando Solórzano (1999) argue that it had a 
number of other aims. 
25
  World Bank President, Robert McNamara, set up the Commission in 1968 to 
conduct a „grand assize‟ of aid and to re-articulate a strategy for aid based on a 
„convincing rationale‟ (World Bank, 2003). It is often referred to as the 
„Pearson Commission‟ because the Chair was Lester Pearson – a former 
Canadian Prime Minister and Nobel Peace Prize Winner.  
26
  The Lomé Conventions are aid and trade agreements between the European 
Union and EU-African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
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partnership seemed to stick; that is to say, it was not until this time that 
partnership began to be more widely articulated as a way to govern aid and 
international development. What then, might have contributed to the apparent 
rise in the use of the idea of partnership in contemporary aid policy? And how 
might these (f)actors help to explain how the idea of partnership is framed 
within these texts?   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to seek to answer these questions. It situates the 
rise of the idea of partnership in contemporary aid policy in historical 
perspective and puts forward an explanation as to why, during the 1990s, the 
idea appears to have started to rise to prominence. In so doing, the chapter 
seeks to contribute to the first aspect of this thesis‟ substantive research 
question as outlined in Chapter One, namely: „Why is the idea of partnership a 
pervasive feature in contemporary aid policy?‟  
 
Methodologically, the chapter draws on a range of secondary literature about 
the history of aid, including, for example, the work of Carol Lancaster (2007); 
Alastair Fraser (2009); and David Hulme (2007; 2009a). As explained in 
Chapter Three, this literature is analysed through a critical-constructivist lens, 
in order to understand how the interplay of different (f)actors (actors, their 
ideas, interests, relationships and wider structural environment) may have 
contributed to the rise of partnership. To complement this, the chapter also 
draws on a critical „backward‟ analysis (cf. Mosse, 2005a) of a range of aid-
related policies from the 1990s, including, for example: various World Bank 
Reports; the 1997 Department for International Development (DfID) White 
Paper; and also (and importantly as the chapter will go on to show) the 1996 
Strategy of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) „Shaping the 21st 
Century‟.27  
 
In line with the critical-constructivist approach of this research (as outlined in 
Chapter Two), the chapter argues that the rise of the idea of partnership in 
contemporary aid policy was the emergent outcome of a complex and 
                                                 
27
  As explained in Chapter Three, this involved considering the political 
sociology of policy texts; deconstructing them by thinking about the social and 
power relations that produced them, and the arguments, interests and divergent 
views they encode (Mosse, 2005a, p.15). 
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historically-mediated, socio-relational process. That is to say, it was the 
product of the dynamic interaction between a range of differently related actors, 
and also therefore of the interplay between their ideas, interests and the 
prevailing political and economic context within which they found themselves 
(Hacking, 1999, p.11; Hay, 2002, p.208, p.254; Long and van der Ploeg, 1994 
p.65). More specifically, and borrowing from Alastair Fraser and Lindsay 
Whitfield (2009), it is argued that the idea of partnership rose to prominence in 
the midst of an apparent crisis in the legitimacy of the international system of 
aid, during which the need for, and governance of, aid was questioned by a 
variety of different actors.  
 
As the chapter explains, the crisis was not only influenced by the ending of the 
Cold War, which removed a key perceived rationale for many donor 
governments to give aid – that of strategic advantage – but also by macro-
economic problems in many aid-giving nations, and growing anxiety on the 
part of many bilateral and multilateral donors about the effectiveness of aid 
(Lancaster, 2007; Fraser, 2009; Fraser and Whitfield, 2009; Hulme, 2009a). It 
was in the context of this crisis that a select group of representatives from 
bilateral aid agencies, who were members of the DAC of the OECD, met with 
concerns about the future of aid (Hulme, 2009a). Through a series of relatively 
closed negotiations, a number of policies were produced, which not only 
clearly restated the case for aid (Hulme, 2009a; de Renzio and Mulley, 2006), 
but also, and of particular significance here, invoked the idea of partnership.   
 
While the idea of partnership was certainly not a new invention of the DAC 
policy-makers, it appears to have been strategically useful at that particular 
moment in time due to its malleability; its propensity to be easily reframed in a 
number of different ways and thus to be interpreted in different ways by 
different people (Cornwall, 2008). Indeed, it is argued that this pliability was 
particularly useful for the DAC policy actors because it allowed the idea to 
serve as a „bridge‟ between the multiple and competing perspectives of 
different actors (cf. Mosse, 2005a) at the time, about the need for and 
governance of aid. The incorporation of the idea of partnership into the DAC 
policy texts is thus interpreted as a bid, on the part of the DAC actors, to sell 
the need for aid to a diverse potential constituency of support (cf. Mosse, 2005a, 
pp.34-36) at a time when they believed that enthusiasm for it was lagging. As 
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the chapter goes on to show, the way in which partnership was framed in the 
DAC policy texts is ambiguous and generally positive-sounding, which seems 
to be an attempt to generate this community of support. A broadly neo-liberal 
economic version of partnership does however appear to dominate, which 
perhaps reflects the power of actors from particular bilateral aid agencies, most 
notably the United States, United Kingdom and Japan, and also the World 
Bank in the shaping of the DAC policy texts, and thus the somewhat 
exclusionary nature of the policy process.  
 
Importantly, while the chapter emphasises that the idea of partnership was not a 
new invention of the DAC policy actors, it is argued that their particular way of 
framing and reusing the idea in the context of an apparent crisis was influential 
in propelling it to prominence in aid policy, though not in any linear or 
deterministic way. Indeed, while the DAC actors may have consciously 
intended the 1996 Strategy document, with its guiding notion of partnership, to 
have widespread appeal, a number of rather more chance events (cf. Keeley 
and Scoones, 2003, p.34) influenced the more widespread adoption of the idea. 
In particular, and as the chapter goes on illustrate, the idea of partnership 
resonated with (and arguably borrowed aspects of) the prevailing official 
position of the World Bank at the time, and also, for example, with that of the 
Department for International Department (DfID), which was newly established 
in 1997 following the election of the New Labour government in the UK. It 
was thus unexpectedly (and enthusiastically) taken up and marketed by these 
two influential actors. While partnership is certainly framed in different ways 
in the official texts of the Bank and DfID – which seems to reflect differences 
in their negotiated positions about how aid is, and should be, governed – it is 
argued that their articulation of partnership was influential in exposing other 
actors to the idea and marked the start of, what Maia Green (2007, p.142) calls, 
its „acceptance‟ into the „cognitive architecture of intelligibility‟ of a wide 
range of different agents involved in aid. Indeed, it is argued that by the late 
1990s, partnership had become a type of expected or symbolic norm of 
contemporary policy about aid; a necessary ideational motif by which any aid 
policy initiative was to be decorated and judged.   
 
Before discussing this normalisation of the idea of partnership however, the 
chapter must first consider, in more detail, how the historical environment for 
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aid and the dynamic interaction of various different (f)actors shaped the rise of 
the idea, and so it is to this topic that the chapter will shortly turn. A short 
caveat is, however, first required: the narrative that follows should not be taken 
as a definitive account of the rise of the idea of partnership, nor, therefore, as a 
specification of mechanisms of direct causality; rather, it should be read as a 
„contingent and partial‟ representation (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998, p.272) of 
those (f)actors that have, here, been judged as important and influential. It is 
hoped that, in so doing, the thesis‟ intention to „thickly describe‟ (cf. Geertz, 
1973), recognise and emphasise the complexity of global aid policy and local 
practice is not undermined, and thus that an appropriate balance between 
generalisation and detail has been achieved.  
 
From the Cold War to the 1990s: Changes to the prevailing climate for aid 
 
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the idea of partnership appears 
to have risen to prominence in aid policy at some point during the 1990s; a 
period that is, not insignificantly, often understood as a time of „great changes‟ 
in the world (Lancaster, 2007, p.44). Perhaps most notably, the ending of the 
Cold War – which was marked somewhat definitively by the collapse of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 and the breakdown of 
previously socialist regimes in Eastern Europe (Lancaster, 2007) – served to 
reshape many facets of the international political and economic system and, in 
consequence, transformed the prevailing climate for the policy and practice of 
aid. Indeed, as the discussion below will now show, a relatively stable climate 
for aid during the Cold War shifted to one of apparent crisis in the 1990s, 
which seems to have created ideal conditions for the rise of the idea of 
partnership.   
 
During the Cold War: A stable ideational framework for aid 
 
During the Cold War, perceived tension and rivalry between broadly liberal 
capitalist and communist countries (and between the United States and Soviet 
Union in particular) provided a relatively stable ideational framework (cf. 
Klotz and Lynch, 2007) for the policy and practice of aid. While there were 
certainly many different political and economic events, and shifts in actor-
relationships during this time, which modified the environment for aid (see 
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Fraser, 2009), the persistence of perceived hostilities meant that, at a macro-
level, one important factor remained relatively constant over time: policy elites 
within donor governments, on both sides of the ideological divide, believed 
that there was a clear need for aid (Lancaster, 2007; Fraser, 2009; Degnbol-
Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2005).   
 
Indeed, not only was aid seen as a necessary way to procure the support of 
potential allies in poorer countries, who may have been tempted to align 
themselves with the rival ideological bloc, but it was also seen as a means to 
demonstrate the superiority of, and thus to advance, favoured models of 
political and economic governance (Hulme, 2009a; Fraser, 2009; Westad, 
2005). This is not to suggest that there were no other perceived needs for aid 
during the Cold War – rationales for aid-giving certainly varied from country to 
country and from actor to actor over time (see Degnbol-Martinussen and 
Engberg-Pedersen, 2005; Fraser, 2009). Rather, what is argued here is that a 
prevailing, and indeed influential, view, in and amongst key policy elites in the 
highest tiers of many donor governments, was that aid was needed to gain 
strategic advantage (Lancaster, 2007; Fraser and Whitfield, 2009; Degnbol-
Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2005). 
 
As Fraser (2009) argues, the collapse of the colonial world order between 1945 
and 1966 was certainly a significant factor here. As many newly independent 
nations emerged from colonial rule, often expressing an explicitly socialist 
ideology,
28
 they appear to have been considered as legitimate sites for the 
strategic use of aid, and thus became important political spaces within which 
the ideological battles of the Cold War played out (see Westad, 2005). In many 
liberalist capitalist countries – the United States in particular, but also many 
countries in Western Europe and also Japan
29
 – key policy elites (including 
Heads of State) often saw aid as a means to buy the support of potential allies 
in ex-colonial countries, and to advance models of liberal democracy combined 
with capitalism (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2005; Westad, 
                                                 
28
  Examples include Julius Nyerere‟s socialist-oriented ujamaa perspective in 
Tanzania and, arguably, Kenneth Kaunda‟s humanism in Zambia. 
29
  Grant (1998, p.58) notes that Japan‟s aid during the Cold War „often 
complemented Washington‟s [US] efforts to reward strategic allies and punish 
Moscow‟s clients‟. 
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2005; Stokke, 1989).
30
 Indeed, something of a prevailing view appears to have 
been that aid could not only be used to stimulate market-based economic 
growth and poverty reduction in these poorer nations, thereby preventing them 
„from seeking solutions in Communism‟ (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p.5), but 
that it could also, and simultaneously, help to secure the continued expansion 
of capitalist development more broadly (Westad, 2005). Indeed, this norm 
appears to have infused – though certainly did not entirely dictate (Woods, 
2000) – the policy and practice of many of the bilateral aid agencies from 
liberalist capitalist countries and also the international financial institutions 
(IFIs) (the World Bank and IMF). As Odd Arne Westad (2005, p.153) argues in 
relation to the latter, the IFIs tended to favour „those countries that chose a 
market-oriented and open economy over those that did not, and as a result 
provided loans primarily to anti-Communist regimes and those in which 
Western investments already existed‟.31   
 
In contrast to this, many policy elites in richer socialist countries often saw aid 
as a way to advance various socialist aspirations, including, for example, the 
demise of transnational corporations, collectivisation or the establishment of 
central economic planning (Lawson, 1988).
32
Playing on the historic 
sensibilities of many post-colonial governments, some socialist donors tended 
to portray themselves as the „natural anti-imperialist ally‟ of poorer nations and, 
at various different times, offered aid for economic stability (arguably with 
limited success) or to support highly visible, government-led infrastructure 
projects (Fraser, 2009, p.49; Lancaster, 2007; Lawson, 1988).
 33
 In some cases, 
the Soviet Union also attempted to use aid to bolster radical factions in order to 
increase support for socialist modes of governance (Fraser, 2009; Lancaster, 
2007).   
                                                 
30
  For example, as Odd Arne Westad (2005, p.156) argues, the 1961 US Foreign 
Assistance Act was „explicitly intended to use aid to fight the Cold War‟ in ex-
colonial countries; President Kennedy claimed in presenting the Act to 
Congress that: „…new nations need help for a special reason. Without 
exception they are under Communist pressure… [American aid would show 
that] economic growth and political democracy can develop hand in hand‟. 
31
  A perspective that is shared by Ngaire Woods (2000, p.146) who notes that the 
Cold War „heavily influenced [though did not completely control] World Bank 
lending throughout the period 1948-1990‟. 
32
  The Soviet Union and also China were „major‟ socialist donors, although 
various Eastern European countries also provided aid (see Lawson, 1988). In 
terms of the „policy elites‟ who articulated this perspective, the Soviet leaders 
Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev would be examples. 
33
  Examples include the Aswan Dam in Egypt (financed by the Soviet Union) 
and the Tanzania-Zambia railway (financed by China).   
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All this is not to suggest that the perspectives, relationships with, and actions of, 
various different actors in recipient countries did not matter; they were 
certainly not passive and, indeed, manipulated, negotiated and thus 
considerably shaped the way in which aid was used during this time (see Fraser, 
2009; Fraser and Whitfield, 2009). Rather, what the above discussion serves to 
illustrate is that, throughout much of the Cold War, the policy and practice of 
aid had a continuous constituency of support where it mattered – in the highest 
echelons of decision-making in many donor governments.
34
 It appeared then, 
that those actors who were involved in the giving of aid would have a relatively 
safe and secure future. This situation changed however when the Cold War 
came to an end. As the next section of this chapter will now go on to show, a 
relatively stable climate for aid shifted to one of apparent crisis and, as we shall 
see, provided fertile ideational ground for the rise of the idea of partnership.  
 
The end of the Cold War: From a climate of stability to a climate of crisis  
 
The prevailing climate for aid shifted relatively quickly as the Cold War came 
to an end in the early 1990s. While the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
and the breakdown of previously socialist regimes in Eastern Europe lead to the 
somewhat automatic, and complete, disappearance of a whole group of aid 
donors (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2005), those bilateral 
and multilateral aid agencies that were left faced at least three inter-related 
problems; which, for clarity, are discussed separately below. 
 
1) The elimination of the Cold War strategic need for aid  
 
Firstly, the ending of the Cold War eliminated what had been one of the main 
perceived reasons for donor governments to give aid – that of strategic 
advantage (Fraser and Whitfield, 2009). As a consequence, the perceived need 
for aid-giving lessened in and amongst key policy elites in many donor 
governments, the United States in particular; with some actors even suggesting 
that there was no longer any role for aid in a post-Cold War era (Riddell, 2007; 
                                                 
34
  Indeed, even as perceptions of Cold War rivalry seemed waned during the 
1980s, Cumming (1996) notes that UK aid still had an „anti-Communist bias‟ - 
successive Thatcher governments refused to support liberation movements or 
Marxist governments in Ethiopia, Cuba, Vietnam and El Salvador.   
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Nijman, 1998).
35
 Since such policy elites had been an important constituency of 
support for aid (as indicated above), their apparent loss of interest in aid-giving 
meant that many bilateral and multilateral aid agency actors were suddenly at 
risk of losing their political relevance, status and legitimacy; in other words, 
and to borrow from Martha Finnemore (1996, p.x italics added), they were at 
risk of losing their „place in the world‟ in the post-Cold War era. 
 
While there was arguably now more „political space‟ for other perceived needs, 
and for other purposes, for aid (Lancaster, 2007, p.45; de Renzio and Mulley, 
2006), there does not appear to have been much clarity in the early 1990s, on 
the part of either bilateral or multilateral agencies at the time, as to what these 
other purposes should be; and so little basis upon which to advocate for 
renewed levels of support. As Lancaster (2007, p.241 italics added) recounts 
from her experience as deputy administrator of USAID in the early 1990s „the 
end of the Cold War rationale caused a search for other, compelling purposes 
for foreign aid... we consciously sought to redefine our mission… in order to 
garner maximum relevance and support‟. Fraser and Whitfield (2009, p.77 
italics added) argue that many development practitioners suggested that aid 
should now have a „clear focus on economic development‟, but, as the section 
below will now show, this presented many aid agency actors with a second 
pressing problem: reflecting on historical experience, they were uncertain as to 
whether aid was an effective way to drive economic growth (Fraser and 
Whitfield, 2009).   
 
2) Anxiety about the effectiveness of aid 
 
As already mentioned above, throughout the Cold War, a prevailing norm in 
many of the bilateral aid agencies from liberalist capitalist countries and also 
multilateral agencies, like the World Bank, was that aid could be used to drive 
market-based economic development (and poverty reduction) in poorer 
countries, thereby demonstrating the superiority of liberal capitalist models of 
governance. In the 1980s in particular, a specifically neoliberal model of 
political and economic governance had been pursued by many (though 
                                                 
35
  US Senator, Patrick Leahy, argued in 1992 that aid was „exhausted 
intellectually, conceptually, and politically. It has no widely understood and 
agreed set of goals, it lacks coherence and vision‟ (Leahy, 1992 in Nijman, 
1998, p.29).   
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certainly not all) aid agencies, led by the World Bank and IMF (Fraser, 2009; 
Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2005).
36
 Indeed, dubbed the 
„decade of structural adjustment‟ by de Renzio and Mulley (2006, p.2), a 
considerable proportion of the aid that was provided during this time was 
enmeshed in the (more or less coherent) neoliberal belief that: „if governments 
retreated from the economic sphere, and allowed market forces to operate 
freely, they would spur [economic] growth, and in turn reduce poverty‟ (de 
Renzio and Mulley, 2006, p.2).
37
  
 
More specifically, aid was seen as a means to buy a series of structural reforms 
that aid agency actors believed were necessary to bring about economic growth, 
which meant that a number of conditions were attached to loans that were 
provided by the World Bank and IMF, and to related balance-of-payments 
support from a number of bilateral aid agencies (de Renzio and Mulley, 2006). 
These conditions specified the reforms that recipient governments were 
expected to implement in exchange for aid, and included, for example: 
currency devaluation; the elimination of subsidies on basic goods and food 
supplies; the reduction of public sector expenditure; the introduction of user 
fees for social services (including health services); the privatisation of publicly 
owned enterprises; and many more measures aimed at promoting a shift to a 
market economy (and perhaps market society) (de Renzio and Mulley, 2006, 
p.2; Riddell, 2007; Robb, 2005; Eyben, 2006a).   
 
Although this neoliberal approach to aid had been pursued with some level of 
conviction by the World Bank, IMF and some bilateral aid agencies (see Fraser, 
2009; Harrison, 2010), Fraser and Whitfield (2009) argue that, by the mid-
1990s, there was „widespread acceptance‟ (including amongst aid agencies 
themselves) that it had not only been ineffective in driving economic growth, 
but had also entailed considerable social costs. While there were of course 
dissenting voices, it was widely acknowledged that the economic performance 
of many countries (measured by GDP per capita) that had received adjustment 
                                                 
36
  As Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2005) indicate, the UN 
system (excluding the Bretton Woods institutions), the Nordic countries, 
Holland and Canada can be considered „partial exceptions‟. The Nordic aid 
agencies, in particular, had a more „socially-oriented‟ focus, but the stand-
alone „projects‟ they funded ended up within an overall neoliberal framework. 
37
  In 1982, for example, it was claimed in World Bank policy that „economic 
growth is the ultimate remedy for rural poverty‟ (World Bank, 1982 in Wood, 
1986, p.231 italics added). 
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loans, and those in sub-Saharan Africa in particular, had been disappointingly 
low,
38
 and that many official social indicators of development (again, in Sub-
Saharan Africa in particular) were either poor or getting progressively worse 
(Mkandawire and Soludo, 1998; Fraser and Whitfield, 2009; Lancaster, 2007; 
de Renzio and Mulley, 2006).
39 
 Indeed, as de Renzio and Mulley (2006, p.2) 
argue, by the mid-1990s, many aid agency actors had come to accept an earlier 
assertion, made by various left-leaning critics of aid (see Cornia et al, 1987; 
Pinstrup-Andersen, 1988), that structural adjustment had not only failed to 
drive long-term economic growth, but had resulted in social injustice and harm.  
 
Importantly the reason why this was the case was however, more vigorously 
disputed; with the World Bank claiming, for example, in a 1994 report that the 
lack of economic growth was a result of the „incomplete‟ or „lack of‟ 
implementation of structural reforms by recipient governments (World Bank, 
1994). In other words, that it was the result of faulty governance within 
recipient countries, rather than the conditions that had been prescribed or the 
way in which aid agencies themselves were involved in the governance of aid 
(this point will be explored in more detail in the context of Chapter Seven, 
when we explore the way the Bank shaped the production of policy about 
health SWAps).  
 
Nevertheless, despite such disputes, by the mid-1990s, there does seem to have 
been some level of sensitivity, in and amongst many aid agencies (including 
within the World Bank), to criticisms about the way in which they related to 
recipient actors; and, in particular, in relation to their use of conditionality and 
stand-alone aid projects.  Around this time, aid conditionality and projects were, 
for example, criticised by various different academics and NGOs for being 
ineffective and, moreover, unjust ways to organise aid relationships because 
they were both intrusive and coercive – in other words, they conveyed the idea 
that „donors know best‟ – and were thus symptomatic of the paternalistic, neo-
                                                 
38
  Ross Hammond (1993) suggests, for example, that a 1992 „leaked‟ draft 
review of Bank operations in Africa entitled „Why Structural Adjustment has 
not Succeeded in Sub-Saharan Africa‟ concluded that adjustment lending had 
not significantly affected economic growth or inflation and had actually 
contributed to a drop in investment. 
39
  In Zambia for example, the country case study for this research, at the height 
of the implementation of the structural programme between 1980 and 1984, 
hospital deaths of infants under one due to malnutrition rose from 2.4% to 
5.7%, and from 38.0% to 62.2% for children aged one to four (Kanji and 
Manji, 1991 in WHO/SIDA 1996, p.13). 
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colonial and therefore unequal way in which aid was governed (Crewe and 
Harrison, 1998, p.70; Clarke, 2004). Apparently reflecting on such criticisms, 
the World Bank not only acknowledged in a leaked 1992 study that its staff 
often „aren't open to hearing what the country has to say‟ (Wapenhans, 1992 in 
Chatterjee, 1994), but also in a later report that „home-grown‟ programmes 
might be more effective (World Bank, 1995 in Fraser and Whitfield, 2009). In 
other words, aid agencies like the World Bank appeared to be showing some 
level of concern about the possible weaknesses in their own schemes of 
governing aid (Fraser, 2009; Hammond, 1993).  
 
To emphasise then, by the mid-1990s there were generalised feelings of 
disappointment, anxiety, and uncertainty, in and amongst many aid agency 
actors, as to the overall effectiveness of aid (Michel, 2005; Fraser, 2009). As a 
result, and to emphasise a point that has already been made above, they did not 
seem to have a firm basis upon which to re-justify the need for aid, nor to 
advocate for renewed levels of political support. This appears to have become 
something of a critical issue given the third problem that aid agencies faced in 
the aftermath of the Cold War: a sharp decline in their aid budgets.    
 
3) A decline in aid agency budgets 
 
The budgets of many aid agencies declined relatively quickly after the Cold 
War came to a definitive end in 1991. Indeed, with only a few exceptions, 
40
 
and as illustrated in Figure 2, total levels of aid (as a share of gross national 
income) started to decline in 1992 and continued to do so until 2000 (Hulme, 
2009). In terms of the relative speed of the decline, it is estimated, for example, 
that in 1994 alone the total aid budget (from governments who were members 
of the DAC) fell by almost 6% (Watkins, 1996, p.517).   
 
While the problems recounted above – 1) the elimination of the strategic need 
for aid and 2) anxiety about the effectiveness of aid – certainly seemed to open 
                                                 
40
  ODA provided by Finland, Switzerland and Ireland are cases in point 
(Hopkins, 2000).  For example, contributions from Irish aid rose from 0.16 to 
0.31 as a percentage of GNI between 1992 and 1996 (see OECD statistics on 
this, available from http://stats.oecd.org).  Unfortunately, there is little room to 
explore why contributions from these bilateral donors increased during this 
period, whilst the contributions of many other DAC donors declined, although 
their relative „isolation‟ from Cold War politics is certainly a factor. 
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the way for these reductions in aid, budget cuts were also further encouraged 
by unanticipated problems in the economies of many donor countries in the 
early 1990s and also by criticisms from actors on the right of the political 
spectrum, who tended to argue that aid was a type of government welfare 
subsidy, which encouraged a culture of dependence, inefficiency and passivity, 
and that international market forces should be allowed to prevail (Degnbol-
Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2005, p.23; Baaz, 2005; Watkins, 1995, 
p.520). In the US in particular, significant federal fiscal deficits and vocal 
criticisms about aid from prominent Republican (New Right) senators in 
Congress (for example Newt Gingrich and Jesse Helms), led the first Bush and 
then Clinton administrations to cut aid budgets considerably (Hulme, 2009a; 
Watkins, 1996; Lancaster, 2007).
41
 It is estimated, for example, that between 
1992 and 1997 the US aid budget fell in real terms by half (Riddell, 2007). 
These cuts not only affected US bilateral aid, which was largely provided 
through USAID, but also contributions to multilateral aid agencies like the 
World Bank (Watkins, 1996). Indeed, multilaterals were certainly not spared 
from the spectre of cuts; with noticeable declines between 1992 and 1997 (see 
Figure 2).   
 
These budget cuts certainly seemed to consolidate the disappointment, 
disorientation, and anxiety (cf. Fraser, 2009) that many aid agency actors 
appear to have been experiencing in the wake of the ending of the Cold War (as 
indicated above). In 1996, the UK Minister for Overseas Development (Lady 
Chalker) is, for example, reported to have indicated that she was „more than 
disappointed‟ by the UK government‟s spending plans for aid, which for 1995-
1996 envisaged a 5% cut in bilateral support to Africa (Watkins, 1996; 
Economist, 1996).
42
 Given the significant reductions to the USAID budget 
around this time, Hulme (2009, p.13) describes the organisation as a somewhat 
„demoralised‟ agency. Furthermore, there was also reportedly some level of 
„confusion and demoralization‟ among World Bank staff (Hammond, 1993, 
p.16) and many Ministers of International Development or equivalent (that is, 
the politicians who head bilateral aid agencies and often engage with the 
                                                 
41
  Jesse Helms and Newt Gingrich were vocal members of an informal „anti-aid‟ 
lobby in the US. Jesse Helms once stated in a Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee meeting: „I do not support foreign aid… it is incomprehensible to 
me how a nation which is $.49 trillion in debt can continue to spend nearly 
$14 billion annually on foreign aid‟ (Jesse Helms in Watkins, 1995, p.519). 
42
  This was around $26m in real terms (Watkins, 1996). 
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multilaterals in various ways) were also reportedly dissatisfied with what they 
felt was their increasing „marginalisation‟ (Hulme, 2009). 
 
Figure 2. Overseas development aid (ODA) from DAC countries as a % of gross 
national income (GNI), 1970-2004 
 
Therefore, a combined result of the three problems mentioned above, and in 
stark contrast to the Cold War era, was that aid agencies were not only losing 
their constituency of support where it mattered – in the highest echelons of 
decision-making in many donor governments – but were also losing their 
budgets, their political status and their legitimacy. In consequence, and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, many actors involved in the giving of aid were concerned about 
their future (Hulme, 2009). Indeed, the Chair of the DAC at the time, Jim 
Michel, seems to have reflected these sentiments when he suggested in 1995 
that 'the entire development assistance project may be in jeopardy' (Watkins, 
1996, p.517).  In short then, and as Fraser and Whitfield (2009 p.77) argue, aid 
agency actors „desperately needed a new story‟; to construct a new and 
compelling policy narrative that would re-animate widespread support for, and 
so re-legitimise the practice of aid. As the next section of this chapter will now 
go on to show, it is here that the idea of partnership starts to become highly 
significant.   
 
The DAC respond strategically to the apparent crisis in aid 
 
When representatives of the DAC of the OECD met at their various meetings 
in 1994 (including aid ministers, bilateral aid agency heads and senior advisers), 
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the above-mentioned problems, and the need for a new and compelling policy 
narrative, appear to have been focal points for their discussions. As the DAC 
Chair, Jim Michel (2005 italics added) recounts: 
 
A recurrent theme of DAC deliberations that year was the relationship 
between aid volume and perceptions of aid effectiveness… There 
emerged a consensus that the DAC should disseminate a brief 
statement… to the effect that development was a worthy and attainable 
goal… and that efficiently administered development assistance… was a 
vital component of success. 
 
In other words, the DAC policy actors decided to take a strategic response to 
the apparent crisis in aid, and to use a brief statement as a basis upon which to 
argue that development was the goal to which everyone should strive in a post-
Cold War era, and, moreover, that aid would ensure that it was achieved.  As a 
consequence, and through a series of (what were) relatively closed negotiations 
between the DAC Secretariat and representatives of member states, such a 
statement was produced and, of particular significance here, articulated the idea 
of partnership.   
 
Indeed, clearly appearing in the title of the document – „Development 
Partnerships in the New Global Context‟ – partnership seems to have been 
intended as something of a guiding notion for the DAC‟s argument about the 
future need for aid, although there was little explanation of, or reference to, the 
idea throughout (see DAC/OED, 1995). In fact, as a markedly brief two-page 
text, there was little substance to it at all; it did not narrate a coherent story 
about the importance of aid and was instead comprised of a list of seven 
(somewhat impenetrably termed) „strategic orientations‟ for the future 
(DAC/OECD, 1995). This narrative was however soon to be revised, and the 
idea of partnership was to take centre-stage.     
 
Revising the narrative: The rise of the idea of partnership 
 
Although the above-mentioned statement on „Development Partnerships‟ was 
taken to, and subsequently approved at, the DAC‟s annual High-Level Meeting 
at the Chateau de la Muette (France) on 3-4 May 1995, it does not seem to have 
been considered to be enough to avert the apparent crisis that many of the aid 
agency actors who were present were facing. As Hulme (2009a, p.13) indicates, 
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the statement „…did little to change the mood of the meeting‟, which had been 
far from optimistic; many participants had spoken vocally about their concerns 
about „aid fatigue‟ and also about a perceived lack of political and public 
support. Although the meeting appears to have ended on a note of 
disappointment, a rather „serendipitous‟ interaction between DAC actors from 
the US (Colin Bradford) and Netherlands (Jan Pronk), and the Chair of the 
DAC (Jim Michel) led to the establishment of an elite Groupe de Réflexion 
(Hulme, 2009a), comprised largely of Ministers of International Development 
and bilateral aid agency heads, and tasked with developing a more coherent 
narrative that would sell aid to a broad constituency of support (Bradford, 2006, 
p.2 in Gabay, 2009).  
 
Indeed, as Hulme (2009a, p.14 italics added) argues, the Groupe wanted to 
„come up with something that would appeal to politicians [in donor countries], 
would be understood and supported by OECD publics and would contain a 
vision of the future that would mobilise action‟. In other words then, they 
wanted to construct a convincing and persuasive story about aid, which would 
enrol the support of a range of different actors who may have competing 
perspectives about the future „need‟ for and role of aid in the post-Cold War era 
(cf. Mosse, 2005a).   
 
And so it was here, in the Groupe‟s production of this revised narrative about 
aid, entitled „Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-
operation‟ (see DAC/OECD, 1996), that the idea of partnership came to have a 
central role. Indeed, cited throughout the text, partnership comes across as the 
„master‟ concept (cf. Mosse, 2005a); the guiding idea in, what Riddell (2007, 
p.41) calls, this „manifesto for the reinvention of aid‟. But how and why did the 
idea of partnership come to be framed in such a central way in the production 
of the „Shaping the 21st Century‟ text? And how did this influence its 
subsequent rise to prominence? It is to these questions that the chapter now 
turns.  
 
Why partnership?  
 
There are a number of possible reasons why the DAC Groupe came to use 
partnership as the central idea in their revised narrative about aid. The idea had, 
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of course, already been articulated in the previous brief statement, and 
continuing to use it would surely lend some level of consistency and therefore, 
perhaps, legitimacy to the DAC‟s arguments about the future need for aid. In 
fact, as the discussion below will now show, it is argued that the Groupe came 
to (re)use the idea of partnership precisely because it had a previous, and also 
more recent, history in the international system of aid – this not only meant that 
it was an idea to which many actors had (perhaps somewhat unconsciously) 
been exposed, but that it was also an idea that could be strategically and 
usefully borrowed to meet their own perceived needs. 
 
Exposure to the idea of partnership 
 
The idea of partnership was certainly not a new invention of the DAC policy 
actors. As already mentioned above, the idea had featured in a number of aid 
policies much earlier in the history of aid, including, for example, in the oft-
cited 1969 Pearson Commission Report (see Pearson, 1969) and in the texts of 
various different non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the 1970s (Fowler, 
2002). Rather more recently, the idea of partnership had also been sporadically 
mentioned in the discussions at, and Declarations emanating from, various UN 
Summits (see Table 1), which had been held in the early 1990s as part of the 
aforementioned search for compelling new purposes for aid following the 
ending of the Cold War. These prior uses of the idea of partnership in aid 
policy could help to explain why it was incorporated into the first and then 
revised DAC texts – in short, it was an idea to which many actors involved in 
aid, including that of the DAC, would have been exposed. In consequence, it 
may have leaked into their general field of consciousness and thus have been 
incorporated into the revised narrative through a relatively unconscious and 
unquestioned process of recollection.   
 
The DAC strategically borrows and reuses the idea of partnership 
 
At the same time however, it is also possible that rather more strategic actions 
of the elite Groupe influenced how and why partnership came to feature in the 
DAC‟s revised narrative. It seems, for example, that partnership may have been 
strategically borrowed from influential actors who had recently used it, and 
then reused to meet the DAC‟s own perceived needs. Appearing to borrow an 
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idea would have been useful for the DAC at this time of crisis because of the 
social work of enrolment that it can perform (cf. Mosse, 2005a, p.34); in short, 
because it is difficult for an actor to disagree with something that seems like 
their own idea, it helps to secure their support. From which actors then, might 
the Groupe have borrowed the idea of partnership?  
 
The Groupe certainly seems to have actively sought to use ideas from the UN 
Summits that were held in the early 1990s. As Hulme (2009a, p.14) indicates, 
the Groupe asked staff from the DAC Secretariat to review and summarise the 
Declarations that had been agreed at these Summits, pulling them together into 
„something more coherent‟;43 a process that was, presumably, carried out in an 
attempt to secure the backing of the UN, and also the various different NGOs 
and developing country Heads of State who had attended the meetings. As 
indicated in Table 1, and of significance here, the idea of partnership had 
featured in the Rio, Cairo and Copenhagen Declarations and so it seems then, 
that through this process of strategically sifting through, and borrowing from, 
UN documentation, partnership came to be a focus for the Groupe‟s drafts 
(Hulme, 2009a).     
 
It also seems likely that the elite Groupe were induced to borrow the idea of 
partnership from another (key) part of the multilateral system of the UN: the 
World Bank. As indicated in Table 1, the World Bank had used the idea of 
partnership in a select number of policies in and around 1994 and 1995, the 
time at which the DAC was producing its new narrative about aid. Interestingly, 
and as argued above, both the World Bank and the DAC were facing a crisis 
around this time, and so they both needed a new story that would increase their 
constituency of support. As the representatives of the DAC met at their various 
meetings in 1994 to discuss how to produce this new story about aid (as 
described above), the World Bank, it seems, had already set about on a similar 
process. Indeed, seemingly prompted into action by the 50
th
 anniversary of the 
meeting at Bretton Woods that established the Bank (and the associated 
(critical) „50 Years is Enough‟ campaign, see Development GAP, 1994), the 
Bank developed and published a „vision statement‟ in July 1994 entitled 
„Learning from the Past, Embracing the Future‟, which not only marketed the 
                                                 
43
  As Hulme (2009a, p.14) indicates, the Groupe delegate for Denmark (Paul 
Nielson) suggested that the DAC‟s new framework for aid „must encompass 
recommendations from... the UN conferences‟. 
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Bank‟s prior „achievements‟ or „experience‟ in the governance of aid 
(selectively leaving out any criticisms of the Bank‟s operations), but also 
outlined its role in a „changing‟ post-Cold War era; and, of particular relevance 
here, identified partnership as one of six „guiding principles for the future‟ (cf. 
Kapur et al., 1997; World Bank, 1994). 
44
   
 
Although the significance of the idea of partnership to this policy should not be 
over-emphasised (it was, after all, only one of six future principles for the 
Bank‟s operations), it was a clearly identifiable and constituent theme. While it 
was not entirely clear what the Bank meant when it referred to the idea of 
partnership (something that is, as we shall see, common to many other policies 
that refer to the idea), it does seem to have been used to refer somehow to the 
intended nature of the Bank‟s future relationships with other actors involved in 
the international system of aid, and thus as a way to respond to criticisms about 
the effectiveness and propriety of the way the Bank‟s aid relationships were 
governed (as discussed above). In other words then, the Bank used the idea of 
partnership as part of a bid to enhance its own constituency of support at this 
time of apparent crisis.  
 
Given that the Bank‟s vision statement was produced at around the time the 
DAC was seeking to produce a new narrative about aid, and the fact that World 
Bank representatives are often involved as observers in DAC processes 
(including the DAC Groupe), it is perhaps unsurprising that partnership came 
to feature in the „Shaping the 21st Century‟ text – social connections between 
the DAC and the World Bank facilitate the sharing of such ideas. Moreover, 
because the Bank is generally perceived to be an influential actor in the 
international system of aid, it is likely that this will have induced the DAC 
Groupe to borrow the idea of partnership in order to secure the Bank‟s support. 
Given that the DAC policy actors were apparently under some pressure at this 
time of crisis to come up with a new narrative about aid, borrowing the idea of 
partnership may actually have been perceived as a particularly attractive option 
(cf. Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). 
 
                                                 
44
  Apparently following this up, the Bank changed its logo in 1995 to refer to 
itself as a partner (Kapur et al., 1997, p.373).  
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Table 1. Examples of aid-related policy texts produced during the 1990s in which the 
idea of partnership features (prepared by the author using the sources noted in the 
table). 
 
 
 
Importantly however, while it seems that the World Bank may have established 
some kind of precedent for using the idea of partnership in global aid policy at 
this particular moment in time, and was therefore influential in the DAC 
Groupe‟s use of the idea, it was not simply transferred or copied into the 
„Shaping the 21st Century‟ text. Rather than using the idea of partnership to 
respond to one specific criticism (as the Bank appeared to do), the DAC 
Groupe reformulated and reframed the idea into a much more coherent and 
generalised narrative about the need for aid in a post-Cold War era; 
strategically (re)using it in order to meet all of their perceived needs – namely, 
1992  
 Rio Summit Declaration on Environment and Development (UN, 1992) 
1993  
 UNDP and Organisations of Civil Society: Building Sustainable Partnerships 
(UNDP, 1993) 
1994  
 Summary of the Programme of Action from the International Conference on 
Population and Development (UN, 1994) 
  Learning from the Past, Embracing the Future (World Bank, 1994a) 
  The World Bank: A Global Partnership for Development (World Bank, 
1994b) 
1995  
 Report of the World Summit for Social Development (UN, 1995) 
 New Partnership Initiative: Core Report (USAID, 1995) 
 Development Partnerships in the New Global Context (DAC/OECD, 1995) 
1996  
 Shaping the 21st Century  (DAC/OECD, 1996) 
1997  
 World Development Report „The State in a Changing World‟ (World Bank, 
1997) 
 Eliminating world poverty: a challenge for the 21st century (DfID, 1997) 
  Partnership Africa: Proposals for a New Swedish Policy towards Sub-
Saharan Africa (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997) 
  The Rights of the Poor – Our Common Responsibility (Swedish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1997) 
 A guide to sector-wide approaches for health development (Cassels, 1997) 
1998 
 Partnership for development: proposed actions for the World Bank (World 
Bank, 1998).  
 Comprehensive Development Framework (see World Bank, 2010a) 
1999 
 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Initiative (see World Bank, 2010b) 
2000  
 Danida Strategy „Partnership 2000‟ (Danida, 2000) 
 Millennium Development Goals (see UNDP, 2010) 
2005 
 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness  
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and as already indicated above, to coherently demonstrate the need for aid; to 
persuade (donor) politicians (and OECD publics) that spending on aid was 
justified in the context of fiscal deficits; to respond to academic and NGO 
criticisms about the effectiveness of aid; and thus to enrol a broad constituency 
of support. The idea of partnership was particularly significant here because of 
its inherent malleability; that is, its propensity to be framed in a number of 
different ways. Indeed, as an ambiguous and pliable idea, which has no single 
or accepted meaning, it could be „easily reframed to meet almost any demand 
[that the DAC] made of it‟ (Cornwall, 2008, p.269). Selected examples from 
the „Shaping the 21st Century‟ text are included below in order to illustrate this 
point.   
 
1) Demonstrating the need for aid  
 
The DAC Groupe used the idea of partnership to construct a persuasive 
argument about the need for aid in a post-Cold War era. The narrative argued, 
for example, that the world faced a number of „new challenges‟ at this „time of 
global change‟ (DAC/OECD, 1996, p.5), and proposed the idea of partnership 
as the solution. More specifically, a number of clear „goals‟ were identified 
(apparently drawn from the UN Summits), which, it was suggested, could only 
be achieved by working in partnership. As the DAC policy stated „We are 
proposing a global development partnership effort through which we can 
achieve together… ambitious but realisable goals‟ (DAC/OECD, 1996, p.2). 
 
Significantly, aid agency actors were framed as important „partners‟ in this 
global „effort‟, with the aid that they provided presented as a „crucial 
contribution‟ (DAC/OECD, 1996, p.13). Indeed, it was argued that the 
„challenges ahead‟ meant that there was not only a „compelling need‟ for aid 
(DAC/OECD, 1996, p.6) – it could „make a real difference in achieving the 
[development] goals‟ (DAC/OECD, 1996, p.2 italics added) – but also that it 
„must‟ be delivered through partnership; as the policy stated: „we are convinced 
that a partnership approach is the way to meet the varied and complex 
challenges that we face‟ (DAC/OECD, 1996, p.14 italics added).   
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2) Responding to criticisms about the effectiveness of aid 
 
At the same time, the idea of partnership was also framed as a way to solve 
various criticisms about the effectiveness of aid and aid agency operations. It 
was, for example, suggested that aid agencies had „learnt‟ a number of 
fundamental lessons from the past, and now knew that „partnership‟ was the 
„key‟ to aid effectiveness: „We have learned that development assistance will 
only work where there is a shared commitment of all the partners‟ 
(DAC/OECD, 1996, p.1). It was, however, unclear exactly who was considered 
to be a partner in relation to aid. 
 
More specifically, partnership seemed to be presented as an effective way to 
respond to criticisms (that had for example been raised by left-leaning NGOs 
and academics, and also some recipient governments) about the way in which 
aid had previously been organised, including accusations that conditionality 
and stand-alone projects were coercive, paternalistic and therefore reflected 
unequal relations of governance (see the discussion above). As the narrative 
stated:  
 
In a partnership, development co-operation does not try to do things for 
developing countries and their people, but with them… Paternalistic 
approaches have no place in this framework. In a true partnership, local 
actors should progressively take the lead while external partners back 
their efforts to assume greater responsibility for their own development 
(DAC/OECD, 1996, p.13 italics added). 
 
In summary then, this particular reading of the narrative seems to give the 
impression that partnership is about transforming aid (and also power) 
relationships in a positive and socially just way; with a paternalistic way of 
organising action transformed into a relationship of equality, with recipient 
country partners empowered as agents of their own development. In other 
words, partnership is about solidarity and collective action; an ends for 
organising action. 
 
Importantly however, while the meaning of the idea of partnership can 
certainly be read in this way, partnership was described in a sufficiently 
ambiguous way to allow other interpretations. In particular, rather than 
partnership being about responding to criticisms about the relationships 
through which aid agencies give aid, partnership could also, and 
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simultaneously, be understood as a way to respond to critical perspectives 
about the behaviour of those actors (particularly governments) who receive aid; 
and, above all, the vocal criticisms of those actors on the right of the political 
spectrum (including the anti-aid lobby in the US and various actors within the 
World Bank) who were arguing around the early- to mid-1990s that aid 
encouraged a culture of dependence, inefficiency and corruption, and that 
institutional reform and market-economic governance should be encouraged 
(see above). In contrast to the reading above then, it was possible to also 
interpret the DAC‟s idea of partnership as about changing recipient behaviour 
and reforming recipient institutions; and therefore that partnership was a means 
to encourage the market economic values, motivations and relationships that 
certain (elite) actors believed were necessary to ensure that recipients of aid 
(and governments in particular) would actively take „greater responsibility for 
their own development‟ (DAC/OECD, 1996, p.13).  
 
In other words then, the idea of partnership served in the DAC narrative as a 
way to balance or bridge at least two competing perspectives (cf. Mosse, 2005a) 
about the governance of aid: on the one hand, the neo-liberal views that right-
leaning actors espoused about the connection between aid, welfare and 
dependence, and, on the other hand, what can perhaps be characterised as the 
social justice views of left-leaning actors about aid, solidarity and global 
inequality. To emphasise, ambiguity about what the idea of partnership meant 
was it seems essential, because it allowed the DAC to create a narrative that 
actors with different interests and perspectives could „read themselves into‟, 
thereby increasing the chance that they would back this new policy (Stone, 
2002; Mosse, 2005a). The corollary of all this however, is that the DAC 
narrative contained various tensions and contradictions, which ultimately 
reflected unresolved debates between different actors about the way in which 
aid should be organised and governed.  
 
3) Partnership as a way to achieve economic development   
 
Indeed, another example of a tension or debate that was built into the DAC 
narrative comes from the clearly paradoxical way in the idea of partnership is 
framed in different parts of the text. On the one hand, partnership is presented 
as a way for recipients of aid to be responsible for their own development, 
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which seems to imply that these actors should be able to choose their own goals. 
However, in a different part of the narrative, partnership is presented as a way 
to achieve a rather more specific series of goals, the most important of which is 
presented as „economic well-being‟ (DAC/OECD, 1996, p.2). In short then, it 
seems that the DAC narrative is saying that: „in a partnership, partners are free 
to “choose” their own path to development, so long as they “choose” to 
prioritise economic growth‟ (King, 1998).   
 
The dominance of economic framings of the idea of partnership is highly 
significant here, because it provides an insight into the social and power 
relations between the members of the DAC Groupe who were involved in 
producing the „Shaping the 21st Century text‟. In short, the economic framing 
of the idea suggests that the negotiation of the DAC policy text may not have 
occurred between equals. Rather, it perhaps reflects: 1) the dominance of 
economists within the formal DAC Groupe,
45
 who tend, by virtue of their 
intellectual training, to prioritise economic issues over social or environmental 
concerns (though this, of course, is something of a generalisation); 2) the 
relative power of Ministerial and bureaucrat members of the Groupe from the 
US and also UK, who Hulme (2009a) argues were keen, because of the 
orientation of their sponsor governments, for economic growth to be the focus 
of the new narrative; and 3) the perceived need to satisfy the New Right (anti-
aid) politicians in the US, who were strongly in favour of promoting market-
based growth as the provider of welfare (rather than aid), and who had 
considerable influence over the allocation of aid budgets in the US, and, more 
generally, over budgets in the multilateral system of aid. In consequence, 
partnership as a means to achieve economic development was apparently 
prioritised.  
   
In summary then, it seems clear that by using the malleable and ambiguous 
idea of partnership, the DAC policy actors constructed what looked like a 
coherent and convincing policy narrative about the need for and governance of 
                                                 
45
  Many of the DAC Groupe had trained as economists: for example, Colin 
Bradford (US) was Chief Economist at USAID between 1994-1998 and Jan 
Pronk (Netherlands) also had economics training. Other members had links to 
the World Bank – John Vereker (UK) had worked there under President 
McNamara from 1969 to 1972 – an organisation that is characteristically 
(though not exclusively) an economic institution. As Hulme (2009a) indicates, 
in the UK at the time, many economists were also advisors to the Overseas 
Development Administration (which subsequently became DfID).  
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aid, but which also built in a series of necessary tensions and contradictions in 
a bid to secure the endorsement of a range of different actors who had opposing 
views about the need for aid in a post-Cold War era (cf. Mosse, 2005a). Indeed, 
it is argued that these specific features of the DAC narrative were particularly 
significant in the subsequent rise to prominence of the idea of partnership. In 
contrast to the way in which partnership had featured in aid policy in the past, it 
became the „master‟ concept (cf. Mosse, 2005a); the guiding idea around which 
a persuasive and coherent policy „story‟ about aid was constructed.  
 
Using the idea of partnership in this way seems to have been influential in 
contributing to the idea of partnership‟s subsequent rise to prominence after the 
publication of the DAC narrative because of the level of exposure that it 
provided. In short, any actor that read or happened across the DAC document 
would find partnership difficult to miss (and perhaps difficult to critique) and 
they could easily „read themselves into‟ the narrative that had been constructed 
(Stone, 2002). However, as the next sections of this chapter will soon go on to 
show, while the particular way in which the narrative about partnership was 
constructed certainly seems to have been influential in its subsequent rise to 
prominence, the more widespread adoption of the idea did not occur in any 
linear or deterministic way.   
 
A brief comment on the role and influence of recipient country actors 
 
Before going on to consider how the idea of partnership rose to prominence 
after the publication of the DAC Strategy, it is perhaps important here to make 
a brief comment on the influence of recipient country actors in the above-
described process because there has been little mention of their role so far. This 
is mostly because it is difficult to pinpoint how such actors were involved; and, 
indeed, it is tempting to argue that they had only limited involvement in or 
influence over the process. The development of the DAC Strategy does not, for 
example, appear to have been in response to any overt demand from recipient 
actors – although their criticisms of (and resistance to) structural adjustment 
policies were certainly influential. The apparent internal crisis for aid agencies 
appears to have been more influential.   
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While the role of actors in recipient countries should certainly not be 
completely written out of this narrative about the rise of the idea of partnership 
in contemporary aid policy – many recipient actors were certainly involved in 
the UN Summits that were mentioned above; were apparently consulted as part 
of the Groupe de Réflexion‟s work through their representation at conferences 
in the Hague and Okinawa (Hulme, 2009a) and certainly now draw on the idea 
of partnership as part of their own policy and practice (in various different 
ways and, as later chapters of this thesis will argue, for various different 
reasons) – what the above discussion suggests, and indeed should be 
emphasised however, is that the rise to prominence of the idea of partnership in 
global aid policy was initially the negotiated product of a somewhat elite 
coalition of international actors who were predominantly on the giving, rather 
than the receiving side of aid. In other words, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
idea of partnership appears to have been borrowed and (re)used in a context of 
international inequality.   
 
Influential (f)actors in partnership’s subsequent rise to prominence 
 
The preceding discussion has set out those (f)actors that appear to have shaped 
the initial use of the idea of partnership in contemporary policy about aid, and 
has also considered how these (f)actors help to explain how partnership came 
to be framed within a particularly important text – the DAC‟s „Shaping the 21st 
Century‟ narrative. The next section of this chapter will now address one final 
and related issue, namely: What might have contributed to partnership‟s 
subsequent rise to prominence?   
 
Although, as noted above, the coherent construction of the DAC‟s narrative 
about partnership was probably important in the more widespread adoption of 
the idea, its rise to prominence certainly did not occur in any linear or 
deterministic way. Indeed, while the DAC may have consciously intended the 
document, with its guiding idea of partnership, to have widespread appeal, it 
does not appear to have been immediately taken up. As Hulme (2009a) argues, 
although the policy was „successful‟ in attracting considerable media attention 
in the US and UK following its launch in May 1996, and was somewhat 
consciously marketed by the DAC at several OECD Ministerial events and G7 
meetings, there was little response from a number of actors – the UK and US 
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governments did not immediately, or enthusiastically, support the policy or 
adopt partnership into their aid policies, and nor did the IMF, and it „received 
little or no recognition‟ by governments and NGOs in countries that received 
aid (Hulme, 2009, p.17). Indeed, as Hulme (2009a, p.17, p.18 italics added) 
argues, and in support of the point made above, it seems that the policy „barely 
registered‟ with these actors because it was perceived as a document that had 
been „produced entirely by rich countries‟. 
 
A threshold level of exposure to the idea of partnership is reached: The 
role of the World Bank and DfID  
 
Perhaps more instrumental in the widespread adoption of the idea was the way 
in which partnership seemed to resonate with the prevailing official position of 
the World Bank at the time and also, for example, with that of the Department 
for International Development (DfID), which was newly established in 1997 
following the election of the New Labour government in the UK. Indeed, as the 
discussion below will now briefly show, these two actors seem to have been 
influential in increasing the exposure of other actors who are involved in aid to 
the idea. 
 
1) Resonance with the World Bank’s official policy position  
 
Although it was argued above that the World Bank had an influential role in the 
way  the idea of partnership was incorporated into the „Shaping the 21st 
Century‟ text, it does not seem as though the idea was taken up on any grand 
scale by the Bank until after the launch of the DAC narrative in 1996. A crude 
comparison of the Bank‟s World Development Reports46 (WDR) from around 
this time illustrates for example that, in 1997, the year following the release of 
the DAC narrative, the text was littered with the idea of partnership, which is in 
stark contrast to the 1996 WDR that hardly features the idea. Although the 
reasons why the Bank appears to have so enthusiastically taken up the idea of 
partnership in its aid policy texts in 1997 cannot be considered in full here, it 
seems that the idea resonated with the Bank‟s evolving perspective about 
political and economic governance at the time, which emphasised the need for 
                                                 
46
  The WDRs are taken here to be an „official‟ expression of the Bank‟s evolving 
views about aid and development (Sindzingre, 2004) 
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state reform „in a changing world‟ (World Bank, 1997). In short, the Bank 
emphasised that state institutions had been ineffective (read: irresponsible) in 
the past and needed to be reformed in order to promote market-based economic 
growth and liberal democracy. Indeed, it seems to have been easy for the Bank 
to enmesh the idea of partnership in this prevailing liberal capitalist perspective. 
As the World Bank argued:  
 
...every state [needs to be] a more credible, effective partner in its 
country‟s development (World Bank, 1997 italics added). 
 
Governments are more effective when they listen to businesses and 
citizens and work in partnership with them in deciding and 
implementing policy (World Bank, 1997 italics added). 
 
And so, from the Bank‟s initial use of the idea of partnership in and around 
1994 and 1995 to refer to the reform of the Bank‟s relationships in the 
international system of aid (as argued above), the idea of partnership was 
reformulated to refer to the reform of government relationships with „the 
market‟ and „civil society‟. There may of course be other explanations. 
However, what does certainly seem clear is that, when an actor like the World 
Bank starts to vigorously and pervasively use an idea like partnership, as it did 
in and after 1997, this increases the exposure of the idea to many other agents 
involved in aid. As we will now see, this exposure appears to have been further 
encouraged by the unanticipated and somewhat enthusiastic adoption of the 
„Shaping the 21st Century‟ text by DfID. 
 
2) DfID adopts and sells partnership to a constituency of support 
 
DfID was created as a new UK government department in 1997 following the 
rise to power of the New Labour government of Tony Blair. The role of the 
department was to oversee the UK‟s aid programme; a job that had previously 
been the responsibility of the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) 
under the remit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). As newly 
autonomous body from the FCO, and headed by a new Secretary of State for 
International Development – Clare Short – there was something of a pressing 
need to develop a clear and compelling policy mandate, which would provide a 
focus for DfID and consolidate its role, both in the UK and internationally 
(Hulme, 2009; Short, 2004). Indeed, as Hulme (2009, p.23) argues, Clare Short 
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began to look for „a device‟ that would help deliver this and it seems that she 
found it, somewhat serendipitously, in the form of the „Shaping the 21st 
Century‟ text, due to an exchange with a senior official at the UN. As Short 
(2004, pp.53-54 italics added) recounts:  
 
It was Richard Jolly (now Sir Richard), formerly of Unicef, who pointed 
me to the report of the Development Committee of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), entitled „Shaping the 
21
st
 Century‟... [it] drew the international system together to work in 
partnership to deliver clear targets in each country... I decided I would 
work to make this the framework for our development efforts. 
 
Given this admission, it is perhaps unsurprising that the idea of partnership was 
subsequently incorporated into DfID‟s first White Paper in 1997 and that, in 
this official policy, it was argued that the provision of aid „...is about creating 
partnerships with developing countries and their peoples‟ (DfID, 1997, p.5). 
Indeed, as with the „Shaping the 21st Century‟ text, partnership comes across as 
something of a guiding policy idea.   
 
What is significant here however, for our understanding of why partnership has 
risen to prominence, is how Short subsequently tried to consciously use this 
White Paper to influence some of the biggest donor players involved in the 
world of aid (including the G8, IMF and EU), as well as the UK public, UK 
government peers and African and Asian Heads of State (Short, 2004; Hulme, 
2009a; 2007). While this process of marketing the UK‟s aid policy may not 
always have been a complete success (see Hulme, 2007), it seems likely that, in 
the process, the idea of partnership was effectively sold to a range of other 
actors involved in aid (though not perhaps in a purposeful way) and that, 
ultimately, the efforts of Short and the DfID were influential in further 
exposing others to the idea.   
 
The late 1990s: The idea of partnership becomes an aid policy norm 
 
Indeed, once the DAC Strategy had been published in 1996, and both the 
World Bank and DfID had started to enthusiastically incorporate the idea of 
partnership into their aid policies, it seems as though some kind of threshold 
level of exposure was reached, from which point on a wealth of other policies 
were produced which incorporated the idea (see Table 1). In the present day, it 
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seems that almost all aid agencies and recipient actors incorporate the idea 
somewhere in their policy texts. The late-1990s then, seemed to mark the start 
of, what Maia Green (2007, p.142) calls, the „acceptance‟ of the idea of 
partnership into the „cognitive architecture of intelligibility‟ of a wide range of 
different agents involved in aid.  
 
In other words, and to summarise the discussion above, it became a relatively 
habitualised and expected standard of contemporary policy about aid; a 
normalised component of the social processes through which aid policy is 
made, and thus a necessary ideational and symbolic motif by which any aid 
initiative was to be decorated and judged. Indeed, as a desk officer from the 
Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) who is involved in 
producing various aid policies noted in a recent interview with Andrea 
Cornwall (2009, p.7): „It‟s in the backbone of every desk officer that you need 
to talk about... partnership somewhere‟.   
 
Qualifying normalisation: The appearance of consensus 
 
This discussion about the apparent normalisation of the idea of partnership 
could give the impression that partnership is now used or applied in aid policy 
and practice through, more or less, unconscious acts. While it is certainly likely 
that there is an element of routine in relation to current usages of the idea, this 
may not be the whole story. Actors are, after all, reflexive beings and there will 
always be rather more conscious or strategic reasons to use an idea, which may 
co-exist alongside more unconscious or structural ones. While this issue will be 
explored in more detail in later chapters of this thesis, it is perhaps useful to 
highlight one potentially important reason why the idea of partnership may 
now be so pervasive in contemporary policy (and practice) in relation to aid, 
and that is because of the „apparent‟ consensus that using it constructs (cf. 
Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p.13).  
 
In short, and as was mentioned in passing in the discussion above, if actors 
refer to the same idea, it gives the impression or appearance that „everyone is in 
agreement‟ – that is, that there is a consensus (a single and unified perspective) 
about the way in which the international system of aid is, and should be, 
governed, even when there may in fact be multiple and competing perspectives 
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about this. Crucially then, when the idea of partnership is referred to in this 
chapter as an ideational motif or policy norm, this should not be taken to mean 
that „everyone is in agreement‟ because different actors may interpret the 
meaning of partnership in different ways. To emphasise, while there may be 
shared uses of the idea of partnership, this does not necessarily mean that there 
are shared meanings.    
 
The effect of consensus: Contesting the idea of partnership? 
 
Significantly however, the apparent consensus that the widespread use of 
partnership tends to construct means that it is not an idea that is easy to contest. 
As Cornwall and Brock (2005, p.16) indicate, because partnership can shelter 
multiple meanings while, at the same time, giving the impression that there is 
little dissonance, this can „shield‟ those actors who use it from „attack‟. A 
potential effect of the rise to prominence of the idea of partnership is therefore 
discursive or deliberative closure (cf. Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p.16) about 
the nature of relationships and the way action is organised; in other words, 
about the way the world of aid is governed.  This is problematic because of the 
dominance of certain actors and the structural inequalities that exist in the 
relationships between various actors who give and receive aid, as it means that 
these actors and inequalities become difficult to challenge.  
 
To be sure, the deliberative space for contesting the use and meaning of the 
idea of partnership, and therefore of existing relations of governance, is not 
completely closed off (Cornwall, 2007, p.481). There are always opportunities 
for actors to mobilise alternative understandings and for less powerful actors to 
attempt to retranslate and appropriate the idea of partnership for their own 
perceived ends. However, and as the next chapters of this thesis will go on to 
show, in the practice of aid this deliberative closure does appear to limit the 
ability of certain actors to contest or challenge the perspectives of dominant 
actors, to narrow the opportunities of actors „hitherto excluded‟ to gain access 
to resources, and to hold those in a position of power to account (Cornwall and 
Brock, 2005, p.17). In sum then, the idea of partnership serves to maintain what 
are, here, judged to be inherently unequal relationships, and the unfair system 
of governance that exist in relation to aid. It is to these topics that the thesis 
will shortly turn.   
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Conclusion 
 
Before moving on to discuss these issues however, it is perhaps useful to 
briefly summarise the key points that have been made in this chapter, and thus 
to emphasise how it has contributed to the first aspect of this thesis‟ substantive 
research question, namely: „Why is the idea of partnership a pervasive feature 
in contemporary aid policy?‟ The chapter has made a number of relevant points 
in relation to this question. Firstly, that the idea of partnership has come to be a 
pervasive feature in contemporary aid policy not through any preordained 
process – not through the intended or consciously planned actions of any one 
particular actor – but rather through a more complex and fragile set of 
historically-mediated circumstances and social interactions.  
 
More specifically, it seems that the idea of partnership rose to prominence in 
the midst of an apparent crisis in the legitimacy of the international system of 
aid, during which the need for, and governance of, aid was questioned by a 
variety of different actors. Secondly, the chapter shows that it was through a 
series of relatively elite-dominated and closed set of complex socio-relational 
processes that new narratives about aid were produced, which not only restated 
the case for aid (and the role of aid agencies), but also invoked the idea of 
partnership. Thirdly, partnership was strategically useful at this moment of 
apparent crisis due to its inherent ambiguity and malleability. Indeed, this 
pliability was (and, as we shall we, continues to be) particularly significant 
because of the way it serves as a „bridge‟ between multiple and competing 
perspectives (cf. Mosse, 2005a). While there may be different understandings 
and interpretations of partnership however, the chapter has shown that 
economic versions of the idea may come to prevail because of the power of 
particular donor actors, and their economic thinking, in the socio-political 
processes that produce aid policy; and thus its seemingly exclusionary nature. 
Finally, the chapter showed that partnership is now, to some extent, „accepted‟ 
into the „cognitive architecture of intelligibility‟ of a wide range of different 
agents involved in aid (Green, 2007); a necessary ideational motif by which 
any aid initiative was to be decorated and judged. The idea of partnership is not 
therefore the right policy and practice of aid; rather, it is just one, and moreover 
one strategically useful, way of describing and characterising aid relationships 
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and the organisation of action because of the multiple meanings and competing 
views and perspectives that it can shelter.   
 
The forthcoming chapters of this thesis will probe and explore some of these 
points and issues in further detail, including, for example, how and why 
partnership is included and strategically (re)used in other policies and practices 
about aid. In particular, these chapters will focus on the idea of partnership in 
policy and practice relating to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and malaria, 
and to health Sector-wide Approaches or SWAps. It is to these topics that the 
thesis now turns.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Partnership and Policy: The Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was established in 
January 2002 as a new organisation in the world of aid, whose official purpose 
is „to attract, manage and disburse additional resources‟ for AIDS, tuberculosis 
(TB) and malaria in „countries in need‟ (Global Fund, 2002, p.1). According to 
policy, the Global Fund seeks to make a „sustainable and significant‟ impact on 
these three diseases and, of particular significance here, seeks to govern the 
grants that it provides under the rubric of the idea of partnership (Global Fund, 
2002). Indeed, partnership is a pervasive feature in the Fund‟s official 
documentation. It not only features in a guiding „Framework Document‟ – the 
policy that sets out the organisation‟s purpose, principles and scope, and whose 
adoption at the first meeting of the governing Board made the Global Fund 
„officially operational‟ (Global Fund, 2010i) – but also in many other strategies, 
procedures and reports. It appears, for example, in various progress reports 
(Global Fund, 2007; 2009a; 2010h); the guidelines for Country Coordinating 
Mechanisms (the country-based structures through which grants are required to 
be overseen) (Global Fund, 2010c); and also a Monitoring and Evaluation 
Toolkit (Global Fund, 2009b). In other words, it is invoked to describe and 
Overview 
 The first of a couplet of chapters about the idea of partnership and the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
 Considers why the Global Fund was established as a new aid 
organisation under the policy idea of partnership 
 Discusses the (f)actors that contributed to use of the idea of 
partnership 
 Considers how these (f)actors help to explain  how partnership is used 
and framed in the Fund‟s official texts 
114 
 
justify every aspect of the Fund‟s aid operations. As the Global Fund (2009a, 
pp.6-11 italics added) itself has stated, „Partnership is at the heart of the Global 
Fund model… [it] is reflected at every level from the Global Fund Board 
through to countries… to the communities where programs are implemented‟.   
 
Yet why was the Global Fund established in January 2002 under the policy of 
partnership? What (f)actors contributed to the idea‟s pervasive use? And how 
does this help to explain how the idea of partnership is framed (and thus what it 
means) in the Global Fund‟s official texts? These are questions that have 
received relatively little attention in the limited (yet slowly expanding) body of 
scholarly literature that exists on the Global Fund. The central purpose of this 
chapter is therefore to consider and put forward some tentative answers to them. 
In so doing, the chapter probes and further explores many of the issues that 
were raised in Chapter Four and contributes to the first aspect of this thesis‟ 
substantive research question, namely: „Why is the idea of partnership a 
pervasive feature in contemporary aid policy?‟ Importantly, it should be read as 
the first part of a couplet of chapters on the Global Fund. While this chapter 
focuses on what partnership is and does in relation to Global Fund policy, the 
next chapter moves on to consider and compare what partnership is and does in 
practice, using the health sector in Zambia as a case study of focus.    
 
As with the other chapters of this thesis that explore aid policy,
47
 the chapter 
draws, methodologically, on an analysis of academic literature and also on a 
critical „backward‟ analysis of official texts (cf. Mosse, 2005a; see Chapter 
Three). More specifically, the chapter draws on academic literature on the 
„history‟ of the Global Fund – including, for example, aspects of the work of 
Nana Poku (2002); Alan Ingram (2009); Kelley Lee (2009); Greg Behrman 
(2004) and Garrett Wallace Brown (2007; 2010). This literature has been 
analysed through a critical-constructivist lens in order to understand how the 
dynamic interplay of different (f)actors (ideas, interests, relationships and the 
prevailing context) contributed to the Fund‟s establishment. To supplement this, 
the chapter also draws on an analysis of various, primary commentaries about 
international aid for health (from NGOs, UN organisations and the G8) from 
                                                 
47
  Both Chapter Four (on the rise of the idea of partnership) and Chapter Seven 
(on the health sector-wide approach) analyse aid policy in this way, where 
policy is defined here as texts/representations. In this Chapter, Global Fund 
aid policy is considered to include not only official written procedures and 
plans, but also written progress reports, evaluations and even online webpages.  
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around the time the Global Fund was created, and on a „backward‟ analysis (cf. 
Mosse, 2005a) of the Fund‟s aid policies (see Chapter Three).   
 
In line with the critical-constructivist approach of this research (which was set 
out in Chapter Two), this chapter shows that the establishment of the Global 
Fund under the policy of partnership did not come about as a rational response 
to objectively determined health needs, but was the emergent outcome of an 
historically-situated and complicated socio-political process; a product of the 
conduct of (and dynamic interaction between) different actors, the interplay 
between their ideas and interests, and the prevailing political and economic 
context within which they found themselves (Hacking, 1999, p.11; Hay, 2002, 
p.254; Long and van der Ploeg, 1994, p.65; Hay, 2002, p.208). The first section 
of the chapter discusses this process, drawing out three (f)actors that were 
particularly influential in the shaping of it. The second section then moves on 
to consider, more directly, how these three (f)actors influenced the way the idea 
of partnership is used and framed in the Fund‟s official texts.   
 
Essentially, the chapter argues that the Global Fund was established under the 
policy of partnership because of the way in which the prevailing international 
context for aid during the 1990s intersected with the conduct of different health 
advocates, eventually leading to the emergence of broad-based, yet uneasy, 
consensus that more priority attention and global funding was needed for AIDS, 
TB and malaria. On the one hand, there was broad-based agreement that the 
three diseases were priority problems and that more global funding was needed 
in order to combat them. On the other hand however, there was also 
considerable disagreement about why more resources were needed (that is, 
about why the diseases were problems) and about how aid-related action 
should be governed. The chapter argues that it was a result of this apparent 
clash of views and expectations about aid and health governance (cf. Williams 
and Rushton, 2009) that the Global Fund came to be established and, moreover, 
came to use the idea of partnership in its policies.   
 
While the chapter supports the arguments of Chapter Four by indicating that 
partnership is used in Global Fund policy because it has been „accepted‟ into 
the „cognitive architecture of intelligibility‟ (cf. Green, 2007, p.142) of a wide 
range of different agents involved in the world of aid; it is an expected 
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ideational or symbolic motif by which the Fund, as a new aid initiative, „has‟ to 
be decorated (see Chapter Four). It is also argued that the Fund‟s pervasive use 
of the idea and the particular ambiguous way in which it is framed in official 
texts reflects the uneasiness of the consensus that lead to the Fund‟s 
establishment. Indeed, it is argued that, because the idea of partnership can be 
easily reframed in a number of different ways (and thus be interpreted 
differently by different actors) (Cornwall, 2008), it appears to have been a 
strategically useful way to „bridge‟, and thus to conceal competing perspectives 
(cf. Mosse, 2005a) that had emerged about how AIDS, TB, and malaria should 
be governed as an aid priority. In consequence then, the way that the Global 
Fund uses the idea of partnership is interpreted as a persuasive bid, on the part 
of those actors who were (and are now) involved in developing the Fund‟s 
policies, to sell and market the organisation to a diverse potential constituency 
of support, to legitimise its existence and to secure its political future (cf. 
Mosse, 2005a). In line with this argument, the chapter shows however, how the 
dominance of a depoliticised, technical and economic, version of partnership 
seems to be an attempt to secure the support of donor governments (most 
notably the US), and therefore reflects the prevailing power of these actors, and 
the prevailing context of inequality in which aid for health is governed.   
 
Having set out the general framework for this chapter, it is to the substantive 
arguments that it will now turn. A brief reminder is however, first required: the 
discussion that follows should not be interpreted as an attempt to specify 
„causality in any generalizable way‟ (Cooper and Packard, 1997, p.16). Rather, 
it should be read as a „contingent and partial‟ narrative (Price and Reus-Smit, 
1998, p.272) about those (f)actors that have been judged as the most influential 
in explaining how and why partnership is used in Global Fund aid policy.  
 
Context and conduct: The foundations for the establishment of the Global 
Fund under the policy of partnership 
 
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter above, it seems that three 
(f)actors were particularly influential in shaping how and why the Global Fund 
was established under the policy of partnership.   
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1) Post-Cold War developments in aid: Crisis opens up political 
space for health issues (and the idea of partnership) 
  
The first important factor was the ending of the Cold War, which, as indicated 
in Chapter Four, shifted the prevailing environment for aid: from one of 
relative stability to one of apparent crisis during the 1990s. This moment of 
crisis not only provided ideal conditions for the rise of the idea of partnership, 
which, as we shall soon see, helps to explain why the Global Fund draws on 
this policy idea, but also conditioned a context in which it was possible for 
health issues to move up the international aid agenda.   
 
During much of the Cold War, issues of health were relatively neglected in the 
international system of aid (Fidler, 2007; Katz and Singer, 2007). Although 
there are various reasons for this, an important contributory factor seems to 
have been the way in which health tended to be understood by leading actors in 
multilateral agencies and in many donor governments. While there were many 
differing views, it seems clear that health was generally perceived as a 
technical (biomedical), humanitarian and domestic issue and, in consequence, 
was seen to be somewhat separate from, and therefore unimportant in relation 
to, dominant security and economic concerns at that particular moment in time 
(Fidler, 2005; Kickbusch, 2002; Behrman, 2004). As a consequence, when, for 
example, actors involved with the WHO or NGOs advocated for more aid to be 
provided for specific health issues, they did so in a relatively hostile political 
climate (see Fidler, 2006).  
 
This is not to suggest that aid for health was never provided, or that health was 
never seen as an economic or security issue during the Cold War (see, for 
example, Justice, 1989; Doyal, 1981; Packard, 1997).
48
 In the 1980s in 
particular, as the World Bank began to enter the arena of aid for health, a 
distinctly economic perspective was progressed through its co-funding of 
                                                 
48
  As Judith Justice (1989) shows, multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, and 
also foundations and voluntary groups, provided aid for health throughout the 
Cold War; influencing health systems in poorer countries (like Nepal) in 
various ways.  Influential actors in the US (and Europe) also apparently 
believed that health aid (for example, the WHO‟s malaria eradication 
campaign) could help usher in market-based economic growth and reduce the 
„security risk‟ of socialist revolutions in poorer countries (Packard, 1997; 
Doyal, 1981).   
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health sector programmes (see Harman, 2009c; Walt et. al., 2009).
49
 Despite 
this however, and what the above discussion seeks to suggest, is that health 
issues were generally relegated to a realm that can be called the lowest politics 
of aid (Fidler, 2005; Ingram, 2005).
50
  
 
This situation seemed to change when the Cold War came to an end. While the 
reasons for this are arguably still poorly understood, it seems that the collapse 
of the Cold War order shattered the prevailing ideational framework for aid (in 
which issues of health had been marginalised), creating an international 
political space in which it was now possible, and perhaps even necessary, for 
donor governments and aid agencies to rethink the purposes and priorities to 
which aid was put (Lancaster, 2007). In short, it became a possibility that 
issues of health could receive more priority attention.   
 
At first, international events (and domestic politics in the US in particular) 
certainly seemed to push against this possibility. As Chapter Four indicates, 
fiscal deficits in donor countries, combined with vocal criticisms about aid 
ineffectiveness (most particularly from New Right politicians in US Congress), 
meant that aid agencies started to lose their constituency of support, their 
budgets, and their legitimacy; there was a tangible sense that aid was in crisis 
(see Chapter Four).
51
 From the late-1990s onwards however, this sense of crisis 
seemed to dissipate. Not only did a public backlash against declines in aid 
demonstrate that there was „a broader acceptance... of the importance‟ of aid-
giving than had previously been thought,
52
 but the initiatives of various aid 
                                                 
49
  The Bank‟s co-funding of the health sector, combined with structural 
adjustment loan conditionality more broadly, tended to require decreases in 
public health expenditure, the introduction of user fees and thus the 
downsizing of public health systems – arguably, contributing to a decline in 
health outcomes in many poorer countries (see Perin and Attaran, 2003; 
Cornia et al., 1987).  
50
  To support this assertion, it is estimated that bilateral aid commitments for 
health from OECD/DAC members between 1980 and 1984 was only 5.3% of 
all aid (Piva and Dodd, 2009, p.932).  
51
  Indeed, as Lancaster (2007, p.44 italics added) suggests, „long-term 
observers… began to wonder whether they were watching the beginning of the 
end‟ for not only aid for health, but the system of aid more broadly.   
52
  In the US in particular, which had experienced the most drastic cuts in aid 
(due partly to the powerful influence of „New Right‟ Republicans such as 
Jesse Helms), there was a strong reaction, and a number of campaigns were 
launched (such as the „Just 1%‟ initiative) aimed at reversing the decline 
(Lancaster, 2007, pp.90-91). 
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agency actors also served to regalvanize aid‟s constituency of support 
(Lancaster, 2007, p.90; Riddell, 2007).   
 
Particularly significant for our understanding of the Global Fund were efforts 
to reconstruct policy narratives about aid. These narratives not only drew on 
the idea of partnership, which (through a somewhat complicated process) 
became a symbolic motif with which new aid initiatives, like the Global Fund, 
were expected to be decorated (see Chapter Four), but also allowed leading 
officials to „claim‟ that (through the partnership-oriented reforms that they 
were introducing – such as „new‟ poverty reduction strategy papers and the 
sector-wide approach) they were „much better positioned to manage aid more 
effectively and to handle substantially more aid as well‟ (Lancaster, 2007, p.56; 
see also Chapter Four). Given these reactions, by the end of the 1990s, aid 
levels began to rise (albeit modestly to start) (see Figure 2 in Chapter Four).   
 
While it became clear then, that aid would continue to have a „place in the 
world‟ in the post-Cold War era (cf. Finnemore, 1996), there was still some 
uncertainty as to which purposes and priorities aid should now be directed 
(Lancaster, 2007). A window of opportunity for the prioritisation of aid for 
health had it seems opened here – advocates just needed to find a way to move 
health issues through it. And this leads us to the second important factor for 
understanding the establishment of the Global Fund under the policy of 
partnership: the advocacy campaigns of NGOs. 
 
2) Advocacy campaigns of NGOs: Activism about access to 
medicines 
 
At around the same time as the above-mentioned window of opportunity began 
to open, many NGOs started to become much more active in lobbying on 
specific health issues, and to press for more international action and funding to 
address them (see Walt et. al., 2009). Their advocacy campaigns over 
improving access to medicines were highly influential in generating political 
priority to address AIDS, TB and malaria, and thus helped to raise these three 
diseases (albeit AIDS in particular) to the top of the aid agenda (Ingram, 2009; 
Walt et. al, 2009). Significantly, and as we shall soon see, the particular way in 
which these NGO „access campaigns‟ were conducted was influential in 
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shaping the way the Global Fund was established under the policy of 
partnership. It is therefore necessary to outline, in a little more detail, how they 
were carried out.    
 
Perhaps the first point to note here is that, when AIDS was first discovered in 
the 1980s, although various activist NGOs, scientists and medical professionals 
started to advocate about the disease, it received relatively little attention in the 
world of aid (see Goldberg, 1998; Berhman, 2004). While a WHO-backed 
global programme was certainly set up in 1986, under the seminal leadership of 
the late Jonathan Mann, it seems that the hostile Cold War climate (as 
described above); scientific contention (about biomedical and epidemiological 
aspects of the disease); denial and distortion (including by influential actors in 
Europe, the US and countries in Africa); and also „personal and bureaucratic 
tensions‟ over leadership and funding between Mann, the US government and 
WHO, all converged to inhibit a significant aid response (Ingram, 2009, p.87; 
Poku, 2002; see also Behrman, 2004). 
53
  
 
As the prevailing international context started to shift however in the 1990s (as 
described above), and as more information about the epidemic scale, impacts 
and possibilities for treating AIDS became known, this situation started to 
change. It is here that the conduct of NGOs starts to become important. A 
particularly key moment for NGO action was the 1996 International AIDS 
Conference in Vancouver, at which the efficacy of antiretroviral therapy (ART) 
in countering AIDS was reported (Ingram, 2009, p.88; see also Schwartländer 
et al., 2006 and Table 2). This announcement, whilst „groundbreaking‟ (EU, 
2006), revealed a stark inequity in the availability of newly patented anti-
retroviral drugs (ARVs): whilst they were relatively affordable in richer 
countries (like the US and European states), they were priced beyond the 
economic reach of poorer nations, where the disease was most acute (Ingram, 
2009, p.88; Williams and Rushton, 2009).
54
 As a consequence, a loose, yet 
transnational, alliance of activist NGOs was prompted into action;
 
who 
                                                 
53
  As Ingram (2009, p.87) indicates, this was arguably even as the „rise‟ of the 
disease was fuelled by the downsizing of many health systems in poorer 
countries due to the (neoliberal) „conditions‟ of World Bank structural 
adjustment programmes (see Chapter 4). 
54
  Laurie Garrett (2007) reports that ARVs were priced at around $14,000 per 
year and required an estimated additional $5,000 a year for tests and medical 
visits. 
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vociferously campaigned for equal access to AIDS medicines (and to 
medicines for co-infectious diseases like TB and malaria) and for more global 
funding from the G8 to realise this goal (ACT UP, 2000, 2010a; Garrett, 2007; 
see Figure 3). 
55
 
 
Figure 3. Examples of NGO access to medicines campaign material (from ACT UP, 
2010a). 
 
 
 
Importantly, because many NGOs believed that high prices and patents were 
being unduly defended by the pharmaceutical industry (and also the US 
government), the governance of the trade and intellectual property rights 
regime became a focal point for their campaigns and provided a resonant topic 
around which they could „connect with... and draw episodic strength from‟ the 
demands of a much wider group of actors – including lawyers; governments in 
poorer countries; anti-corporate activists; aid campaigners; and the media – 
who were simultaneously engaged in critiquing the adequacy, effectiveness and 
legitimacy of broader systems of global governance (Ingram, 2009, pp.88-89; 
see also Seckinelgin, 2008). Crucially, it seems that these actors were able to 
mobilise together (which gave visibility and thus an element of power to their 
arguments), because their campaigns tended to be underpinned by similar 
views about the appropriate governance of aid and health. Because these views 
considerably shaped the way the Global Fund was established under the policy 
of partnership, it is useful to be clear about them here.   
 
Many activists seemed to share, what can be called, a social justice or human 
rights perspective (cf. Lee, 2009). The key arguments underpinning this 
                                                 
55
  Examples of the activist NGOs involved in these „access campaigns‟ are: the 
Belgium-based Médecins Sans Frontières; Oxfam International; the US-based 
Consumer Project on Technology; the South African-based Treatment Action 
Campaign; Amsterdam-based Health Action International; the European 
Coalition of Positive People; and ACT UP. 
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normative position are: that people have the right to good health; that poor 
health is a result of inequalities and failures in prevailing (neoliberal) systems 
of governance (which give an unfair advantage to the private sector and the 
US); and that structural reforms are needed to create a more inclusive, socially 
just, and therefore more healthy world order (see also Katz, 2004). More 
specifically, it seems that the NGO access campaigns were underpinned by a 
belief that all people living with AIDS, regardless of their ability to pay, have a 
right to receive ARVs (and medicines that would also treat TB and malaria) 
and to participate in the systems of governance that affect their lives (indeed, it 
seems that participation was perceived here as a mode of accountability) (Lee, 
2009; see also ACT UP, 2000).  
 
Accordingly, the provision of more global funding for AIDS, TB and malaria 
was promoted as a type of legitimate right and indeed entitlement; a means to 
fairly redistribute global income in order to enable equal access to health. 
Importantly, and at the same time however, NGOs appeared to argue that more 
global funding was not the only answer – it needed to be provided as part of 
wider reforms to create more participatory, inclusive and legitimate systems of 
global (through to local) governance, including the system for organising aid. 
56
   
 
Significantly, drawing on this shared set of views there was what Ingram (2004, 
p.89) describes as „an intense cycle of protest‟ between 1997 and 2001, which 
was not only intentionally disruptive (with well-publicised acts of „civil 
disobedience‟), but also specifically targeted towards securing the attention, 
and resultant action of powerful G8 actors – politicians and bureaucrats in the 
US in particular (see Robins, 2004; Sell and Prakash, 2004). The visible 
disruption of the US election campaign in 1999 is a significant case in point 
(see Figure 4) and seems to have been grounded in the assumption that, if the 
US could be persuaded to prioritise and redistribute funding to improve access 
to medicines for AIDS (and also TB and malaria), they would galvanize the 
action of the international community more broadly (see Sell and Prakash, 
                                                 
56
  In particular, many activist NGOs appeared to draw on criticisms (that had 
been raised earlier in the 1990s) about the intrusive, coercive and ineffective 
way in which aid (structural adjustment and aid projects in particular) had 
previously been governed, and thus called for changes in the nature of aid 
relationships – an issue that many aid agencies seemed to be increasingly 
sensitive to (see Chapter 4). 
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2004). Put simply (and arguably quite rightly), it was believed that: „America 
makes a [disproportionate] difference‟ (Behrman, 2004, p.165).   
 
Figure 4. ACT UP protestors demonstrate at a presidential election campaign speech 
by US Vice-President Al Gore, 17 June 1999 (from ACT UP, 2010b). 
 
 
 
 
While the influence of NGOs is difficult to map, it certainly seems as though 
their campaigning tactics made a difference to the way in which funding for 
AIDS (and also TB and malaria) was prioritised internationally, and was also 
instrumental in influencing US participation in promoting this effort (Brown, 
2007; Ingram, 2009). Indeed, following a campaigning high point at the 
Durban International AIDS Conference in July 2000, at which thousands of 
NGO activists, scientists, government actors and patients coalesced and at 
which „the legitimacy of the global order was called fundamentally into 
question‟ (Ingram, 2004, p.89), the issue was added to the agenda (at times on 
the request of the US) of a series of high-level summits and meetings (Garrett, 
2007, see Table 2); reflecting, what appears to have been, broad-based 
agreement that AIDS, TB and malaria were priority problems and that more 
global funding was needed to combat them.   
 
Given the post-Cold War climate of crisis in which NGO campaigns occurred 
(see above and Chapter Four), it is perhaps unsurprising that the three diseases 
were repositioned in this way. It was, after all, a moment during which many of 
the most influential decision-makers – that is, politicians in donor governments, 
and also leading bureaucrats in multilateral (and bilateral) aid agencies – were 
more „receptive‟ towards arguments about the prioritisation of health funding. 
The agency of NGOs is, however, only part of the story. While their conduct 
was certainly influential in escalating the issue up the aid agenda, a third 
important factor to shape the establishment of the Global Fund was the action 
of other prominent health advocates, who (significantly for the way the idea of 
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partnership is used in Fund policy) pushed forward somewhat different views 
about global health funding.   
  
3) Prominent health advocates actively (re)construct AIDS, TB 
and malaria as exceptional economic and security issues 
 
At the same time as the above-mentioned NGO activism, in the late-1990s a 
number of prominent health advocates (including the former heads of WHO 
and UNAIDS and also key actors in the Clinton administration in the US) 
appear to have become increasingly frustrated about the lack of political 
priority and funding that was accorded to issues of health, and so decided to try 
and consciously reposition the way that health was perceived – so as to induce 
the G8 (and the US in particular) to act (Ingram, 2009; CFR, 2005). While 
many of these advocates certainly acknowledged that people had a right to 
health (as embodied in the NGO access campaigns described above), it seems 
that they did not think that human rights arguments were sufficiently powerful, 
on their own, to secure health as an aid priority; for arguments needed to 
resonate more strongly with the seemingly dominant interests and perspectives 
of the G8 (Ingram, 2009; Shiffman and Smith, 2007). In consequence, a 
number of efforts were initiated to promote a perceptive shift towards the 
proposition that poor health was an „exceptional‟ threat to economic growth 
and (inter)national security, and that investing in health was therefore a global 
imperative (Ingram, 2007 and 2009; CFR, 2005; Lee, 2009). As the former 
Executive Director of the WHO explains:  
 
…to reach the minds of those who hold sway over real financial and 
political power, we… have to communicate in a language that these 
decision makers understand. Good health is intrinsically important in its 
own right.  But we cannot ignore the fact that governments will take 
more notice when faced with robust evidence showing the true economic 
[and security] impact of avoidable illness (Brundtland, 2000 italics 
added; see also Lee, 2009).   
 
Although the World Bank had certainly been progressing an argument about 
the economic impact of poor health since the 1980s (and in particular since the 
publication of its 1993 World Development Report (WDR) „Investing in 
Health‟, see World Bank 1993), it seems that this had done little to increase the 
overall level of political priority and therefore funding for health more broadly. 
Not only had health remained a relatively marginal issue within the Bank itself, 
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but, given that (as indicated in Chapter Four) the Bank‟s approach was 
increasingly subject to questioning and critique, there was a level of broader 
scepticism (even within the Bank itself), as to whether its arguments could be 
relied upon (Hammond, 1993).   
 
One initiative that seems to have been particularly successful in changing this 
situation and in generating support for more global funding to address AIDS, 
TB and malaria was the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 
(CMH), which was set up by the Director-General in 1999.
57
 It seems that what 
the CMH did was to borrow some of the Bank‟s earlier arguments about health 
and economic growth, but then reformulate them in order to appeal more 
directly to the emerging post-Cold War sensibilities of leading political actors. 
While sharing much of the Bank‟s (neoliberal) economic rationale, the CMH 
promoted what Matthew Sparke (2009) calls a „market foster-care‟ perspective, 
within which a key argument is that poor health is not only an impediment to 
market-based economic growth within poor countries (as the 1993 WDR 
appeared to suggest), but that it is also a proven threat to global growth and 
(inter)national security (see CMH, 2001, pp.28-29). Accordingly, investing aid 
in service delivery interventions to address specific major diseases (namely 
AIDS, TB and malaria) is promoted as a reliable and cost-effective way to 
reduce these vulnerabilities (Ingram, 2009; p.89; Kickbusch, 2002; Brundtland, 
2000; Katz, 2004); it is a „market foster-care‟ intervention that will not only 
help countries to „help themselves‟ out of the „trap‟ of poor health and poor 
growth in which they are in, but will also make sure that the world is „safe and 
secure for economic globalisation‟ (Sparke, 2009, p.143).58   
 
Apparently appealing to the concerns of New Right aid critics in the US in 
particular, „a strong part of the argument‟ was just how „cheap‟ it would be for 
donor governments (and also business actors) to generate „enormous health 
benefits‟, and that „how great the contribution to global [and US] economic 
                                                 
57
  Gro Harlem Brundtland (2002 italics added) notes that: „In 1999, I asked 
leading economists and health experts from around the world, to come 
together and consider the links between health and economic development. I 
wanted them to change old dogmas.‟ 
58
  In short, providing aid is promoted as „an investment in the well-being of the 
rich countries as well as the poor‟ (CMH, 2001, p.28). 
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growth would be that follows‟ (Kickbusch, 2002, p.135).59 There was however, 
an important proviso: it was argued that aid must be governed on the basis of 
technical and economic rules, and so be practically relevant (that is, country- 
rather than donor- developed), targeted and measurable in order to be effective 
(Sachs, 2005). Indeed, it was suggested that this would prevent the culture of 
aid dependence that many New Right actors in the US (and also the World 
Bank) seem to have believed that aid caused (see also Chapter Four).    
 
Because the CMH was a high-profile undertaking by the WHO, and its 
members were all well-connected (both personally and professionally) into 
broader international networks about aid and health,
 60
 the „market foster-care‟ 
(cf. Sparke, 2009) perspective received a considerable degree of „exposure‟ 
internationally. The advocacy of the CMH‟s Chair – economist Jeffrey Sachs – 
seems to have been particularly important here. Not only had Sachs‟ 
appointment placed him as a „leading authority‟ on the relationship between 
health and economic growth, but it also gave him access (both publicly and 
privately) to an international audience (including G8 leaders, UN actors, 
businesses, African governments, medical professionals, and NGOs) through 
which he could try to generate agreement and support for more investments to 
fight AIDS, TB and malaria (Behrman, 2004). As we shall soon see, Sachs‟ 
actions appear to have considerably shaped the process through which the 
Global Fund was established under the policy of partnership.   
 
Sachs’ advocacy at the Durban AIDS Conference: An uneasy consensus 
starts to emerge 
 
A highly significant example of Sachs‟ advocacy was his talk at the Durban 
AIDS Conference in 2000, which (as suggested above) was a high-profile, 
well-attended and, therefore, important political space to promote a „market 
foster-care‟ view (cf. Sparke, 2009). Indeed, addressing a diverse audience of 
                                                 
59
  Indeed, as the CMH Report states: „We believe that the additional investments 
in health - requiring of donors roughly one-tenth of one percent of their 
national income - would be repaid many times over in millions of lives saved 
each year, enhanced economic development, and strengthened global security‟ 
(CMH, 2001, p.7 italics added). 
60
  Commissioner Eduardo Aninat was, for example, a Deputy Managing Director 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); Richard Feachem had links with 
the World Bank, International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, US Institute of 
Medicine and various academic institutions; and others had links to academia, 
various donor governments, ILO, UNDP and more (see CMH, 2001b). 
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thousands, Sachs put across the key aspects of this position: not only arguing 
that „the health crisis of the poorest countries‟ trapped them in low economic 
growth, but that „donor support‟ had been so „shockingly small‟ and 
ineffectively delivered that they were unable to escape (Sachs, 2000; Behrman, 
2004; Figure 5).
61
What was urgently needed, Sachs argued, was 
„approximately US$10 billion per year‟ from both government and corporate 
sector donors to address the priority diseases of AIDS, TB and malaria, and the 
establishment of a technical and economically governed „global fund‟ to realise 
this goal (Sachs, 2000; see also Figure 5).   
 
Figure 5. Selected slides from a talk by Jeffrey Sachs at the Durban AIDS Conference, 
13 July 2000 (Sachs, 2000).  
 
  
  
  
 
As Jeffrey Sachs (2005) recalls, this proposal „created a lot of excitement‟, 
especially on the part of NGOs. Not only was a high-profile and well-
                                                 
61
  Appealing to activists‟ criticisms, Sachs called the World Bank‟s (recently 
announced) $500 million multi-country AIDS programme (MAP) „peanuts‟, 
intimating that: „It will take 10 years to negotiate the conditions of the grant 
with the 40 recipient countries, and by then half the sum is used by salaries for 
World Bank consultants‟ (Veeken, 2000, p.1357).    
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connected economist apparently calling (at a high-level at least) for the same 
ends as their campaigns: namely, more political priority and more funding for 
AIDS, TB and malaria, but also (and crucially here) Sachs had provided 
quantified economic evidence to back up their demands, which appeared to 
show that more funding not only possible, but necessary. There was certainly a 
degree of difference in their underpinning arguments (which, as we shall soon 
see, is significant for the way in which the idea of partnership is used by the 
Global Fund): with Sachs‟ „market foster-care‟ perspective (cf. Sparke, 2009)  
intimating that poor health, and indeed aid ineffectiveness, was due to a lack of 
money for, and a lack of good (often government) behaviour and technical 
efficiency in the implementation of health programmes, rather than a result of 
structural inequalities, (neoliberal) governance failures, or the global 
distribution of power (Kickbusch, 2002, p.135; Waitzlan, 2003). However, it 
seems that a broad-based agreement was starting to emerge that more action 
was needed on the issue.   
 
Although this Durban Conference reportedly provoked some level of official 
consternation due to various criticisms that had been directed at donor 
governments and aid agencies (Sachs, 2005),
62
 as von Schoen Angerer et al. 
(2001) argue, it nevertheless marked a turning point. Sach‟s pronouncements 
had, it seems, consolidated an ongoing process of reframing health as an 
exceptional economic (and security) issue. And this, combined with a receptive 
climate for such arguments and the disruptive advocacy of NGOs, converged to 
lay the foundations for a growing, yet evidently uneasy, consensus that more 
global aid funding was needed to fight AIDS, TB and malaria. As we shall 
soon see, it was the uneasiness of this consensus that was to shape the Global 
Fund‟s use of the idea of partnership.   
 
From Durban to Okinawa to Abuja: Advocacy leads to agreement  
 
From this moment onwards, the notion of more global funding for AIDS, TB 
and malaria seemed to stick and the world‟s political leaders started to 
increasingly act (Sachs, 2005; Behrman, 2005). Indeed, as already intimated 
above, only shortly after the Durban Conference, the issue appeared on the 
                                                 
62
  As Sachs (2005) suggests: „Officialdom doesn't exactly hold up a sign that 
says, "We're doing nothing." And they're not so happy when anyone else holds 
up a sign, either‟. 
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agenda of a series of high-profile summits and meetings (see Table 2). At the 
G8 Summit in Okinawa in the same month, members acknowledged that more 
aid was needed to combat the three diseases. Apparently influenced by the 
„market foster-care‟ (cf. Sparke, 2009) advocacy described above, which 
demonstrates the power of this perspective in shaping global aid policy 
processes, the G8 concluded that:  
 
Health is the key to prosperity. Good health contributes directly to 
economic growth... Only through sustained action and coherent 
international co-operation to fully mobilise new and existing... resources, 
can we strengthen health delivery systems and reach beyond traditional 
approaches to break the vicious cycle of disease and poverty (G8, 2000 
italics added).  
 
Agreement on the issue was furthered through the efforts of the European 
Commission to organise round-table discussions in September 2000, a meeting 
of health experts in December 2000, and through ongoing activist campaigns 
aimed at influencing the continued commitment of the G8 (Barnes and Brown, 
2011).
63
 The emerging consensus on the need for more funding was 
subsequently consolidated at the African Summit in April 2001, when the UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan formally proposed „the creation of a global fund 
dedicated to the battle against AIDS and other infectious diseases‟ (Annan, 
2001; see Table 2). Again, seemingly influenced by the economic evidence put 
forward by Sachs, Annan indicated that this Fund should raise US$10 billion 
per year; a „war chest‟ in the fight against infectious disease (Annan, 2001). 
This proposal was immediately supported by many African leaders and, in the 
following two months, was also endorsed at the UN General Assembly „Special 
Session on AIDS‟ (UNGASS) and at the G8 Summit in Genoa (Barnes and 
Brown, 2011; see Table 2). This long and complicated process of consensus-
building subsequently culminated in August 2001, when a Global Fund 
Transitional Working Group (TWG) was set up and tasked with preparing the 
aid policy, including a guiding Framework Document, that would make Global 
Fund „officially operational‟ (Global Fund, 2010i; WHO, 2002). 
                                                 
63
  A particularly influential example of this advocacy was the Harvard 
University „Consensus Statement‟ on scaling up treatment for AIDS and other 
related diseases, because it provided more evidence on how a global fund 
could work (see Harvard University, 2001). Given that Jeffrey Sachs was a 
Professor at Harvard at the time, the preparation of this Statement appears to 
have been significantly influenced by the CMH‟s „market foster-care‟ (cf. 
Sparke, 2009) position, which favoured biomedical interventions, scientific 
measurement and cost-effectiveness analyses.  
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Table 2. A chronology of significant moments in the establishment of the Global Fund 
(prepared by the author using the sources noted in the table). 
 
Date Significant ‘moments’ leading up to the establishment of the Global Fund 
1996 
(Jul) 
HAART is announced: Treatment inequities are revealed  
At the 11th International AIDS Conference in Vancouver, researchers announce the 
effectiveness of a drug regimen called Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy 
(HAART), which offers (for the first time) the real possibility of treating those people 
living with the disease (Schwartländer et al., 2006).  
1998 
(Jun) 
 
Scale of AIDS epidemic becomes more clear: New data released 
At the International AIDS Conference in Geneva, UNAIDS publish the first, credible 
and „consensus-backed‟ country-specific estimates on AIDS prevalence and mortality.  
The estimates draw worldwide attention to the scale of the epidemic and provide a 
means for key individuals (including the former head of UNAIDS, Peter Piot) to call 
for more action (Behrman, 2004; Schwartländer et al., 2006).  
1999 African leaders start to (more openly) acknowledge HIV/AIDS 
During 1999, various different African leaders start to acknowledge/launch campaigns 
about AIDS; Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya, for example, declares it a „national 
disaster‟(Behrman, 2004). 
2000 WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health is set up: ‘Economic’ 
arguments about health grow 
WHO Director-General (Gro Harlem Brundtland) asks Jeffrey Sachs to Chair a WHO 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health – reflecting growing belief that health 
needs to be repositioned as an economic and security issue. The role of CMH Chair 
places Jeffrey Sachs in an „influential‟ role with access to an international audience 
(Behrman, 2004).   
2000 
(Jan) 
UN Security Council debates AIDS 
UN Security Council debates a health issue – AIDS – for the first time. The discussion 
includes calls for the mobilisation of more resources (see UN, 2000). The debate drew 
attention to and legitimised international attention on AIDS (McInnes, 2007). 
2000 
(Jul) 
13th International AIDS Conference in Durban: An intersection of activist 
campaigns and ‘economic’ arguments 
At the Conference a coalition of activists assert their right to receive ARV and call for 
more global financing (Schwartländer et al., 2006, p.543).  Leading economist Jeffrey 
Sachs gives a presentation (linked to CMH work) calling for a substantial increase in 
donor funding for AIDS, TB and malaria and for a „global fund‟ to be created. (The 
figures Sachs presents become widely used as reference points in later debates.)  
2000 
(Jul) 
G8 commit to provide more aid for health at the Okinawa Summit 
G8 leaders acknowledge that more action and funding is needed to combat AIDS, TB 
and malaria, and commit to provide additional resources. 
2000 
(Sep) 
EU maintains momentum on global funding 
The EU organises a Round Table meeting - an agreement is reached on the tiered 
pricing of patented drugs for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria to provide affordable 
prices for poorer countries.  
2001 
(Mar) 
Harvard University Consensus Statement maintains momentum 
Dissemination of a „Consensus Statement on Antiretroviral Treatment for AIDS in 
Poor Countries‟ maintains momentum about the need for more global funding for 
AIDS and other related diseases (Harvard University, 2001).    
2001 
(Mar) 
UN Secretary-General negotiates with US President 
Kofi Annan meets with President Bush at the White House and broaches the idea of 
establishing a Global Fund, to which Bush apparently agrees (Behrman, 2004). 
2001 
(Apr) 
Kofi Annan calls for the creation of a Global Fund at the Abuja Summit on 
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other Infectious Diseases  
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan formally proposes „the creation of a global fund‟ 
for AIDS, malaria and TB, to distribute an additional US$7-10 billion from the 
„widest possible range of donors‟ (Annan, 2001).   
2001 
(May) 
President Bush Announces First Contribution to Fund  
In a special ceremony at the White House, President Bush announced the first 
contribution to the Global Fund, pledging $200 million (Behrman, 2004, p.258). 
2001 
(Jun) 
Commitment to Fund at the United Nations General Assembly ‘Special Session 
on AIDS’ (UNGASS) 
The UNGASS concludes with a „Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS‟, which 
agrees that a „global HIV/AIDS and health fund‟ should be established (UNGASS, 
2001).  There was considerable debate at the Session as to how the fund should be 
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Date Significant ‘moments’ leading up to the establishment of the Global Fund 
governed and, in particular, whether a new institution should be created (Barnes and 
Brown, 2011).  
2001 
(Jul) 
Global Fund is endorsed by G8 at Genoa Summit 
The G8 endorses the decision to establish a global funding body and makes a funding 
commitment to it: „... we have launched with the UN Secretary-General a new Global 
Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. We are determined to make the 
Fund operational before the end of the year. We have committed $1.3 billion‟ (G8, 
2001). 
2001 
(Aug) 
Kofi Annan sets up Global Fund Transitional Working Group 
Kofi Annan sets a Transitional Working Group to work to negotiate the initial policies 
and consolidate the consensus that would make the Fund operational (WHO, 2002; 
Behrman, 2004).  
2001 
(Oct, 
Nov & 
Dec) 
Transitional Working Group holds consultations 
Regional consultations on the Global Fund are held in Africa, Asia, Latin America 
and Eastern Europe, along with thematic discussions with NGOs, civil society, the 
private sector, and academia.  
2002 
(Jan) 
 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria becomes operational 
The Global Fund Board meet for the first time, adopting the policies (including the 
Global Fund Framework Document), that make the Fund „fully operational‟ (Global 
Fund, 2010i) 
 
The Transitional Working Group has a ‘weighty policy agenda’: 64 
Addressing consensus and conflict? 
 
The Global Fund TWG had an unenviable and challenging task here, for 
although a broad agreement had certainly emerged that more funding was 
needed, as the discussion above suggests, there was also considerable 
disagreement about why more resources were needed, and this translated into 
divergent views and expectations about how the Global Fund‟s aid-related 
action should be governed (Bezanson, 2005; see also Ehmer, 2002; Health 
GAP, 2001a). Indeed, reflecting the different underpinning arguments of the 
foregoing NGO access campaigns and of „market foster-care‟ (cf. Sparke, 2009) 
advocacy (as outlined above), at the various meetings that the TWG held (and 
which informed the initial drafting of the Fund‟s aid policy), many NGOs 
argued that the organisation should have a socially inclusive and transparent 
system of governance, which would not only actively strengthen the 
participation of the most vulnerable groups in society, but would also limit the 
influence of pharmaceutical companies (given their perceived culpability in 
worsening the AIDS epidemic in particular) and the influence of donors (given 
the apparently coercive and paternalistic way in which they had previously 
governed aid) (Global Fund, 2001a; Health GAP, 2001b; Poku, 2002).
65
   
                                                 
64
  As explained later, this term is borrowed from David Mosse (2005a).  
65
  Perhaps driven by an interest in securing their own access to resources, some 
NGOs also questioned the role and capacity of government, suggesting that 
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While these suggestions did not seem to be contested by the leaders of 
countries in Africa and Asia (who also argued for equal participation in the 
high-level governance of the Fund and limits on donor influence, see Global 
Fund, 2001c), they clearly diverged with the views and expectations of some 
members of the G8. Indeed, apparently influenced by market-foster care 
arguments and by concerns to demonstrate aid‟s (economic) effectiveness, 
some G8 actors (and the US in particular) seem to have expected the Global 
Fund to be governed through technical and economic rules, and to involve non-
governmental actors (which here included private pharmaceutical companies) 
as legitimate and efficient decision-makers and implementers of health 
programmes and services. Many donor governments apparently expected the 
Global Fund not only to receive substantial new funding from pharmaceutical 
companies (something that many NGOs and African leaders were apparently 
content with), but also to incentivise the involvement of businesses in 
addressing AIDS, TB and malaria (a suggestion that was more contentious) 
(Behrman, 2004; Bezanson, 2005; EU, 2001).
66
  
 
Significantly, although many G8 actors appear to have been influenced by 
„market foster-care‟ (cf. Sparke, 2009) arguments, it is important to emphasise 
here that their views were far from homogenous. There was, for example, 
considerable conflict between them (and in particular in discussions at the UN 
„Special Session on AIDS‟ in June 2001) as to where the Fund should be 
located organisationally and geographically (Barnes and Brown, 2011; 
Behrman, 2004). The US government initially proposed that it should be 
managed by the World Bank, but this was quickly rejected by several other 
donor governments (who were apparently concerned about the Bank‟s (unequal) 
governance structure) (Bezanson, 2005; Barnes and Brown, 2010). Other G8 
members, various UN actors and also leaders of poorer countries were (for 
various different reasons) keen for the Fund to be managed through UNAIDS 
or WHO, but this was strongly rejected by the US (apparently reflecting 
                                                                                                                      
they themselves were better suited to „deal effectively‟ with the new funding 
(Bezanson, 2005, p.9).   
66
  Interestingly, it seems that corporate representatives who were consulted about 
the Fund expected businesses „to be part of all stages of the funding 
process‟,66 but were less sure about the extent of their financial contributions; 
they did not want to be seen „just as potential donors‟ (Global Fund, 2001b 
italics added).   
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historical scepticism about the ability of these multilateral organisations to 
efficiently manage aid relationships) (Barnes and Brown, 2011; Kickbusch, 
2002; Bartsch and Kohlmorgen, 2007).
67
  
 
Perhaps reflecting American hegemony at work, it was eventually decided that 
the Global Fund would be created as a separate entity that would only provide 
funding for programmes to combat the three diseases (not implement them as 
UN organisations often did) (Barnes and Brown, 2011; Kickbusch, 2002). The 
difficulty here was that the Fund needed the support of influential UN actors to 
become and remain operational; put simply, failure to secure their political 
backing risked resentment and the potential obstruction of Global Fund-
supported programmes in-country.   
 
In developing the Global Fund‟s official aid policies then, the TWG had to 
perform a delicate political balancing act and, to borrow the words of David 
Mosse (2005a, p.24), to fulfil a „weighty policy agenda‟. Indeed, to précis the 
above, the TWG not only had to: (1) demonstrate that the Fund represented a 
socially inclusive, transparent and participatory system of governance that 
would involve and be democratically accountable to the poorest in society 
(thereby satisfying the demands of NGOs and some governments of poorer 
countries); but also, and at the same time, (2) persuade the richest donor 
governments (and the US in particular) that the Fund was a financially 
accountable, economic and technical (read: efficient and cost-effective) way for 
them to invest aid for health. In so doing, they also needed to: (3) signal that the 
Global Fund was a positive move away from the inefficient multilateral system 
of the UN, whilst simultaneously enrolling the UN‟s support.  
 
Given that the items on this „weight policy agenda‟ (cf. Mosse, 2005a) were so 
divergent (and that not to fulfil them would have jeopardised the Global Fund‟s 
existence), how was it possible for the TWG, and the Fund‟s subsequent 
policy-makers, to produce a coherent set of policies that met all of these items 
simultaneously? Thereby potentially enrolling a diverse and critical 
                                                 
67
  Prominent New Right US aid critics had been particularly critical of the UN 
earlier in the 1990s, with Jesse Helms (1996) arguing that: „As it currently 
operates, the United Nations does not deserve continued American support.  
Its bureaucracy is proliferating, its costs are spiralling, and its mission is 
constantly expanding beyond its mandate – and beyond its capacities‟. 
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constituency of support? It is here that the idea of partnership becomes highly 
significant.    
 
The idea of partnership: A symbolic and malleable policy device 
 
As indicated a little earlier in the discussion above (and also in Chapter Four), 
by the time the TWG came to draft the Fund‟s first policies in late 2001, the 
idea of partnership had already been broadly „accepted‟ into the „cognitive 
architecture of intelligibility‟ of a wide range of different agents involved in the 
world of aid (Green, 2007, p.142). That is to say, it had become a relatively 
normalised component of the socio-political processes through which aid 
policy is produced, and thus a necessary symbolic motif by which a new 
initiative, like the Global Fund, was expected to be decorated and would also 
be judged. As such, there would arguably have been some kind of (implicit) 
expectation that the TWG should draw on the idea somehow as it developed 
the Fund‟s written texts. In short, referring to the idea was good for the Fund‟s 
„international image‟ (cf. Boas and McNeil, 2004, p.2).   
 
Significantly, the particular way in which the idea of partnership was to be 
drawn upon in the Fund‟s official texts was not however preordained. This is 
because, despite the apparent normalisation of the use of the idea of partnership 
in contemporary aid policy, its meaning has certainly not become standardised. 
Although partnership seems always to refer in some way to relationships or the 
organisation of action, it remains a polysemic and inherently malleable idea 
that can be easily reframed and thus interpreted in different ways by people, 
who may have competing views about appropriate modes of governance 
(Cornwall, 2008). It is because of this pliability then, that the idea of 
partnership seems to have been useful to the TWG; for while partnership had to 
be included in Global Fund policy, it could be strategically (re)used and 
(re)formulated to fulfil all of the items on the Global Fund‟s „weighty policy 
agenda‟; thus enabling the divergent views of, for example, activist NGOs and 
the G8 (and most particularly the US) about the governance of aid for health to 
be brought together (cf. Mosse, 2005a).   
 
Indeed, as it stands today, it seems that the idea of partnership has become a 
pervasive and „master‟ concept (cf. Mosse, 2005a) in Global Fund policy; a 
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central referent device through which the Fund attempts to inter-translate and 
justify all of its procedures, activities and actions (that is, its own mode of 
governance) to a broad range of actors who have disparate views about how 
and why AIDS, TB, and malaria should be governed as an aid priority. As such 
then, the particular way in which the Global Fund uses the idea of partnership 
is interpreted as part of a bid to sell and market the organisation to a diverse 
potential constituency of support, to legitimise its practices of aid and to secure 
its political future (cf. Mosse, 2005a). Selected examples are now taken from 
Global Fund aid policy in order to illustrate these points.    
 
1) Signalling that the Global Fund is a new and innovative solution 
for AIDS, TB and malaria 
 
Firstly, the idea of partnership seems to be used to help mark out the Global 
Fund as a kind of „new beginning‟ (cf. Mosse, 2005a) for the way the diseases 
of AIDS, TB and malaria are addressed internationally. The Fund‟s authorised 
texts seem to argue, for example, that the Global Fund is a „new‟ and „unique‟ 
partnership (Global Fund, 2010a) because of the way in which it brings 
together key partners at „every level‟ of its operations: „from the Global Fund 
Board through to countries… to the communities where programs are 
implemented‟ (Global Fund, 2009a, pp.6-11). Indeed, the novelty of 
partnership (cf. Mosse, 2005a) reverberates throughout the Fund‟s official texts 
with its „partnership approach‟ not only described as a „new way of doing 
business‟ (Global Fund, 2002, p.18), but also as „one of the most important 
innovations‟ in the fight against AIDS, TB and malaria (Global Fund, 2007a, 
p.17 italics added). In this way then, by referring to itself as a partnership the 
Global Fund seems to be implicitly arguing that it is a positive move away 
from the multilateral system of the UN, and this therefore seems to be some 
kind of attempt to appeal to those actors (namely donor governments – and 
most particularly the US) who have been (and still to some extent are) critical 
of the UN.  
 
Significantly, and at the same time however, the Global Fund seems to 
simultaneously draw on the idea of partnership to emphasise the importance of 
relationships with multilateral UN agencies, in order to try and enrol their 
support. The Global Fund notes, for example, that „development partners‟ like 
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the WHO, UNAIDS, UNDP and World Bank have an „important role‟ in 
providing „complementary support‟ to its grantees (Global Fund, 2010k). 
Indeed, „partnership‟ with these multilateral agencies seems to be framed as 
something of a necessity for the Global Fund because it only provides grant 
funding. As the Global Fund states, „The Global Fund is a partnership in the 
fullest sense. Its success relies on... collaboration with multilateral partners‟ 
(Global Fund, 2010h, p.10 italics added).   
 
In short then, the idea of partnership seems to be used here as a malleable 
policy device, which enables the Global Fund to symbolically exclude itself 
from the UN (thus satisfying actors from the US and EU in particular), whilst 
also, and simultaneously, symbolically including and justifying the UN‟s role 
in the governance of aid for health (potentially enrolling multilateral support).   
 
2) Demonstrating (to activist NGOs) that the Global Fund is 
committed to an inclusive and participatory mode of governance  
 
At the same time however, partnership also seems to be presented as a way for 
the Global Fund to achieve an equal, socially-inclusive, transparent and 
participatory system of governance, which evidently meshes with the human 
rights arguments and apparent expectations of many activist NGOs who were 
instrumental in the process that lead to the Fund‟s establishment. Indeed, it 
seems to be argued that, by operating as a partnership, the Global Fund will 
open up decision-making about the use of resources for health to those who are 
currently marginalised in existing (statutory) systems of governance and, in so 
doing, will mobilise and democratically engage a range of different actors in 
the fight against AIDS, TB and malaria, thereby ensuring that everyone can 
exert their rights to good health and wealth. As the Global Fund (2007, p.29) 
states, such partnership can be „a catalyst for democratic processes where 
vulnerable and marginalized groups acquire a key voice‟ (exactly how this is 
envisioned to occur however, is left rather vague). 
 
In particular, the country-level organisational structures that the Global Fund 
sets out to work with – which the Fund calls „Country Coordinating 
Mechanisms‟ – seem to be framed and justified as a particularly important way 
of practically achieving this. Often described as country-level „partnership 
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mechanisms‟, CCMs are presented as an „inclusive space‟ to influence national 
health programming (Global Fund, 2008a, p.1) and as a way to engage „all 
relevant partners in the fight against AIDS, TB and malaria, especially 
vulnerable and previously marginalized groups (Global Fund, 2002, p.10; 
Global Fund, 2010c). Indeed, it seems to be suggested that, by involving all 
key actors as „equal partners... with full rights to participation, expression and 
involvement in decision-making‟ in CCM activities (including the development 
and submission of grant proposals and the oversight of implementation) 
(Global Fund, 2010c pp.2-3), the unequal, donor-driven and unaccountable 
way in which aid has previously been governed will be addressed. This will 
create a more participatory and downward mode of accountability to country 
publics and those most affected by AIDS, TB and malaria. In fact, this type of 
equal and inclusive partnership seems to be framed as something of a health 
imperative: „The Global Fund recognizes that only through a country-driven, 
coordinated and multi-sector approach involving all relevant partners will 
additional resources have a significant impact on the reduction of infections, 
illness and death from the three diseases‟ (Global Fund, 2010c, p.1). 
 
In summary then, this particular reading of Global Fund aid policy seems to 
give the impression that the idea of partnership is about transforming (power) 
relationships between different actors in a positive and socially just way; with a 
highly unequal (and unhealthy) way of organising aid and health governance 
transformed into a new relationship of equality, in which previously 
marginalised groups are empowered to participate in, and actively control, the 
decisions that shape their lives. In other words, the idea of partnership seems to 
be presented as being about less marginality and exclusion, and about more 
power, access and voice; it is a type of new participatory democratic space and 
thus ends for governing aid and people‟s health. 
 
3) Persuading donors that the Global Fund is a technical and 
economic mode of governance 
 
Importantly (and in support of the arguments in Chapter Four), while the 
meaning of the idea of partnership can certainly be understood as described 
above, it is referred to in a sufficiently ambiguous way as to allow other 
interpretations. Rather than being about transformative power and marginalised 
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voices, the Fund‟s use of the policy idea of partnership can also be read as 
being about ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of aid for 
health, and thus as a way to satisfy the apparently dominant expectation of 
many donor governments that the Global Fund will promote a technical and 
economic mode of governance (as outlined above). Indeed, the Fund‟s 
authorised policies seem to work the idea of partnership into a coherent and 
depoliticised theoretical model of cause and effect, which explains and justifies 
how the grants that the Global Fund Board approves will lead to performance 
in health delivery and measurable results.  
 
In a model partnership, the Fund seems to suggest that there are fourteen 
causally-linked stages, which, if managed and implemented appropriately, will 
join the internationally-determined health priorities of AIDS, TB and malaria to 
efficient, effective  and responsible country-level action (cf. Green, 2007, p.143; 
Barnes and Brown, 2011). This theoretical model of partnership is illustrated in 
more detail in Figure 6 and Table 3. However, to summarise, it seems to be 
suggested that, if the Global Fund Board bases its funding decisions and 
ongoing disbursements on: 1) grant proposals that have been developed 
through country-level partnerships (CCMs) and which have been subject to 
expert technical review; and 2) the ongoing and standard monitoring and 
evaluation of performance against country-defined and time-bound health 
targets, then this will ensure that those partners who manage grant-funded 
health programmes, will do so responsibly and effectively.  
 
In fact, it is suggested that by using a range of, what can be perhaps be called, 
performance-based partnership techniques – including technical grant 
proposals, contractual agreements, targeting, measurement and monitoring of 
results, and standardised progress reporting and audit, which are all linked to 
ongoing funding disbursement (see Table 3) – country partners will be 
provided with a „sharp focus‟ and „powerful incentives‟ to use grant funds 
efficiently and effectively, thereby ensuring they „convert‟ the financing they 
receive „into results‟ (Global Fund, 2007b, p.28, p.32; Global Fund, 2010g).   
 
Drawing on the „market foster-care‟ (cf. Sparke, 2009) arguments described 
above then, and therefore reflecting the power of this perspective in the shaping 
of Global Fund policy (and the somewhat elite group of actors who promoted 
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and signed-up to it), in this reading of partnership it seems to be asserted that 
AIDS, TB and malaria are a problem because of a lack of resources and a lack 
of appropriate (economic and technical) behaviour during the implementation 
of health programmes. The solution is therefore to invest more resources and to 
deliver them through the Fund‟s model partnership, which will incentivise the 
right way of behaving during implementation. In other words, what is needed is 
more donor investment, more technical design and more financially 
accountable and technical behaviour and the global problems of AIDS, TB and 
malaria will be resolved; and it is the Global Fund‟s performance-based 
partnership that can bring this about.
68
 The apparent simplicity and correctness 
of this partnership model is reflected in the Global Fund mantra „Raise it, 
Invest it, Prove it‟ (see Figure 7), which provides a seemingly persuasive 
explanation and legitimation of how Global Fund operations will bring the 
solution and, moreover, accountable use of funds that donors (and the US in 
particular) have called for. 
 
Figure 6. The Global Fund grant process (modified from Global Fund, 2010l; Global 
Fund, 2010h, p.78). 
 
 
                                                 
68
  An argument that is strikingly similar to the pronouncements of Jeffrey Sachs 
mentioned earlier in the chapter. 
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Table 3. A description of the Global Fund‟s theoretical model of performance-based 
partnership (modified from Global Fund 2010h, p.103; Global Fund, 2010d; 2010e; 
2010f; 2010j). 
 
 
 
Step 1. Call for Proposals: Global Fund Secretariat in Geneva announces a „Call for 
Proposals‟. 
Step 2. Preparation: CCM partnership prepares a grant proposal based on priority 
needs and financing gaps (and according to the Funds‟ guidelines and procedures for 
proposals). In so doing, the CCM: 1) nominates one or more Principal Recipients 
(PRs) (and perhaps Sub-Recipients) who are responsible partners for implementing 
each grant; and 2) includes output targets and outcome and impact indicators, which 
form the basis for measuring grant performance if it is approved.   
Step 3. First Screening: The Global Fund Secretariat reviews proposals to ensure they 
meet standard eligibility criteria, forwarding eligible ones to the Fund‟s Technical 
Review Panel (TRP) – an „independent‟ panel of „experts‟ – for review.   
Step 4. Technical Review: TRP reviews all eligible proposals for technical merit and 
makes one of four recommendations to Global Fund Board: (1) fund; (2) fund if 
certain conditions are met; (3) encourage resubmission; and (4) do not fund. 
Step 5. Board Approval: Global Fund Board approves (or rejects) grants based on 
TRP recommendations and availability of funds. 
Step 6. Option for Appeals: There is an internal appeal mechanism for applicants who 
have had their proposal rejected in two successive funding rounds. 
Step 7. Local Fund Agent Selection: Secretariat „contracts‟ with a Local Fund Agent 
(LFA) to certify the financial management and administrative capacity of each 
nominated PR. Based on LFA assessment, the PR may require „technical assistance‟ to 
strengthen capacities before any disbursement of funds occurs. 
Step 8. Grant Agreement Negotiation: Secretariat and PRs negotiate a contractual 
„grant agreement‟, which identifies specific, measurable results to be tracked using a 
set of key indicators. 
Step 9. Signature and First Disbursement: Once grant agreement is signed, Secretariat 
makes an initial disbursement to PRs who may make disbursements to Sub-Recipients 
who are „partners‟ in implementing certain components of a program. 
Step 10. Programme Launch: Grant programme and services begin. CCM oversees 
and monitors progress during implementation. 
Step 11. Disbursement Requests: PRs regularly report to Global Fund on results 
achieved against targets, expenditures against budgets, and deviations from planned 
activities, making formal requests for disbursements for the next implementation 
period by submitting a „Progress Update/Disbursement Request‟ form. LFA verifies 
this, recommending disbursement if there is demonstrated progress. On receipt of LFA 
verification, Secretariat conducts a „performance evaluation‟, assigning each grant a 
performance rating. Lack of progress triggers request for corrective action. 
Step 12. Progress Report and Annual Audit: PRs submit a fiscal-year progress report 
and an annual audit of financial statements to Secretariat through LFA. 
Step 13. Disbursement Requests: Regular disbursement requests and program updates 
continue, with future disbursements tied to demonstrated progress.  
Step 14. Extension of Funding: CCM requests funding beyond the initially-approved 
two-year period. Global Fund Board will approve continued funding based on a 
detailed assessment of results against targets and funding availability. 
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Figure 7. A depiction of the Global Fund‟s mantra: „Raise it, Invest it, Prove it‟ (from 
Global Fund, 2010g). 
 
 
 
 
Here, the CCM and the Principal- and Sub-Recipient „partners‟ who receive 
and disburse global funds have key roles in this theoretical model of 
partnership but, in contrast to the reading above, they are presented in rather 
more technical terms: as one part of a partnership „production line‟ (cf. Stone, 
2002) that will bring about efficient and effective action against AIDS, TB and 
malaria (see Table 4 for an illustration of key differences in these readings of 
the CCM partnership).  
 
Table 4. Contrasts between opposed „readings‟ of the CCM partnership in Global Fund 
policy (prepared by the author). 
 
In the participatory reading of the 
CCM, partnership seems to be about: 
In the more technical reading of the 
CCM, partnership seems to be about: 
 Ensuring quality participation of 
marginalised actors 
 Opening-up decision-making 
 Inclusion and voice 
 Rights to be involved in decision-
making 
 Empowerment of groups previously 
excluded from statutory systems of 
governance 
 Ensuring downward accountability to 
those affected by AIDS, TB and 
malaria 
 Ensuring expert and technical design of 
grant proposals (through objective and 
harmonious determination of needs) 
 Involvement of different actors to bring 
greater awareness of local conditions 
(to improve implementation) 
 Manufacturing the right technical 
behaviour during implementation and 
thus optimal resource use 
 Ensuring upward financial 
accountability to donors for investments 
  
 
Indeed, an apparent emphasis on the incentivisation of partner performance, as 
described above, seems to reflect a type of business or manufacturing logic, in 
which it seems to be implicitly assumed that CCMs and Principal Recipient are 
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self-interested and autonomous utility maximisers, who can be enticed to 
respond in a technical and economic way to the Fund‟s partnership techniques 
as set out above (and in Table 3). For example, it seems to be suggested that the 
incentives that grant agreements, targeting, the linking of funding to targets, 
and standardised monitoring and audit procedures provide will instil (or 
perhaps discipline) these „country partners‟ with new norms of financially 
accountable conduct; not only ensuring that „government and other parts of 
society together take responsibility for the planning, coordination and 
implementation of [their own] health programs‟ (Global Fund, 2007b, p.17 
italics added), but also and in so doing ensuring that donors see results from 
their investments. In this way then, rather than the CCM partnership being 
about voice and downward accountability to poor and marginalised groups (as 
suggested above), in this reading the CCM‟s role is recast in terms of self-
responsibility, efficiency and delivering financial value from (and 
accountability for) donor investments (cf. Shore, 2008, p.281; see Table 4).   
 
The participation of partners in the CCM seems to be cast in terms of this 
manufacturing logic. The different partners who participate in a CCM are 
presented as somewhat naturally existing, unified and thus easily identifiable 
groups (cf. Yanow, 2003) – the academic / educational sector; government; 
NGOs / community-Based organizations; people living with HIV/AIDS, TB 
and/or malaria; key affected populations; private sector; religious / faith-based 
organizations; and multilateral and bilateral aid agencies (Global Fund, 2010c) 
– who have no history and no particular or special role in health. Indeed, the 
private sector, government, civic actors are all envisaged as equal actors, who 
will engage in a market-like and somewhat technical, harmonious and 
depoliticised process (rather than a complex and negotiated one that is shaped 
by social relationships and power relations); thus manufacturing technically-
sound grant proposals and facilitating the efficient and effective oversight of 
health interventions. The emphasis here is on participation as a market-like 
means to facilitate implementation and health impact, rather than as an end or 
fundamental political right (cf. Mathur et al. 2003 p.28). As the Global Fund 
Guidelines and Requirements for CCMs state: „Each constituency brings a 
unique and important perspective, thus increasing the probability of achieving 
measurable impact against the diseases‟ (Global Fund, 2010c, italics added).    
 
143 
 
Similarly, the process of developing grant proposals and the subsequent 
management of grants by Principal- and Sub- Recipients is also presented as a 
harmonious, simple and technical process. The proposal development stage of a 
model partnership is, for example, constructed as a stepwise series of 
manageable activities: the involvement of a wide range of partners; the 
solicitation and review of the submissions for integration into the proposal; the 
identification of financing gaps; the prioritization of needs; the identification of 
„comparative advantages of each proposed partner‟; and also the 
(unproblematic) transparent nomination of one more appropriate 
organization(s) to act as the Principal-Recipient(s) for a grant based on clear 
criteria (see Global Fund, 2003; 2010b; 2010c) (which, as we shall see in 
Chapter Six, actually misrepresents practice). 
 
This theoretical model of performance-based partnership seems to despatch 
with the existing polity and statutory systems, and with any wider political-
economic or historical-contextual factors that may shape the practice of aid and 
influence a countries‟ AIDS, TB and malaria problems. Where they are 
acknowledged they are rendered as technical impediments to partnership, rather 
than more fundamental, deeply embedded structural constraints (cf. Guljarani, 
2009). Indeed, following Craig and Porter (2003, p.61), it actually seems as 
though local relationships and political factors are implicitly seen as a „source 
of perverted priorities, corruption and malfeasance‟, rather than as a critical 
determinant of how resources are used for health-related action or, moreover, a 
critical determinant of poor health and the problems of AIDS, TB and malaria.    
 
In this way then, there is an impression that, if there are any perceived 
problems in the practice of implementing grants, they will not be down to the 
Fund or its partnership procedures, but the way country partners conduct 
themselves; which simultaneously legitimises the Fund‟s practice and absolves 
it from any culpability or responsibility. Indeed, if implementation is a separate 
and technical partnership „stage‟, it is easy to „blame‟ any problems on the 
„inappropriate behaviour‟ of „country partners‟ and thus insulate its own 
operations from any criticism (cf. Schaffer, 1984). As Bernard Schaffer (1984, 
p.157) puts it, „it contributes to the whole game of responsibility avoidance‟. 
This does well for the Fund‟s international image. Not only does the Fund‟s 
theoretical model of partnership then, ignore or despatch with the possibility 
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that socio-political relationships, or structural inequalities in the (international, 
national or local) political economy, could contribute to implementation 
problems or poor health (which, as the next chapter of this thesis shows, 
misrepresents country realities and local practice), but it also seems to be 
instrumentally useful for the Fund, serving as a type of  political shield or 
„escape route‟ from critical attack (cf. Clay and Shaffer, 1984). Put simply, if 
the Fund‟s technical partnership model is right, then it cannot easily be 
criticised.  
 
While it should certainly be emphasised here that the Global Fund actually 
appears to be rather open to criticism in practice, this observation (which is 
considered in more detail in Chapter Six) illustrates how partnership policy has 
the potential to insulate organisations like the Global Fund and their systems of 
(upwardly-oriented) aid and health governance from critical debate; and, 
moreover, as we shall see in Chapter Six, to produce ignorance about the socio-
political factors that shape local practice (cf. Mosse, 2005a). 
 
In summary then, and in contrast to the more participatory and downwardly 
accountable reading of the idea of partnership above, this discussion suggests 
that, rather than being about redressing inequalities and transforming power 
relationships in an equal and socially-just way, it is also possible to read 
partnership as being about the promotion of technical and economic changes in 
recipient behaviour; about efficiently reforming the way poorer countries 
govern aid and health; and therefore about encouraging poorer country actors 
to become politically responsible for their own health services (and economic 
growth) and for the accountable use of donor investments in health (and, by 
extension, the global economy) (Sparke, 2009); which, interestingly, does not 
appear to be all that different from the paternalistic way in which aid has 
previously been represented and practiced, as described in Chapter Four.  
 
The idea of partnership as enrolment: Inter-translation, bridging and the 
concealment of a fundamental governance tension  
 
What can be made of this foregoing discussion? Given that at least two 
readings of partnership are possible, it seems as though the idea is used 
pervasively in Global Fund aid policy as a symbolic technology to „bridge‟ (cf. 
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Mosse, 2004), inter-translate and justify its activities and actions to actors who 
have divergent perspectives about how and why AIDS, TB, and malaria should 
be governed as an aid priority (and which became apparent throughout the 
processes that established the Fund as described above): on the one hand, a 
socially-oriented or human rights perspective (pushed by activist NGOs) that is 
seemingly concerned with transforming unequal relationships in prevailing 
(neoliberal) system of governance and, on the other hand, a rather more 
„market foster-care‟ (cf. Sparke, 2009)  position (backed by Jeffrey Sachs and 
many donor governments of the G8) that is more concerned with rectifying a 
lack of appropriate (economic and technical) governance behaviour in health, 
and thus with incorporating poorer nations more fully into (rather than 
challenging) prevailing neoliberal systems of governance. It is the inherent 
malleability of the idea of partnership that has allowed Global Fund policy-
makers to strategically (re)use the idea in this way; permitting the creation of a 
set of seemingly coherent policy texts that actors – who have divergent views 
and expectations about how AIDS, TB and malaria should be governed as an 
aid priority – can read themselves into; thereby increasing the possibility that 
they will back (what is still) a relatively new organisation in the world of aid 
(Stone, 2002; Mosse, 2005a).   
 
The corollary of this however, is that Global Fund policy actually contains 
„mixed messages‟ (cf. Baaz, 2005), ambiguity and contradictions about the way 
that resources and Global Fund supported-programmes should be governed; 
with contradictions around the role of the CCM a key case in point (see above). 
While the Fund‟s policy-makers certainly seem to have constructed what 
appears on the surface to be a convincing and coherent narrative about the way 
that the Fund‟s action will be governed as an aid priority, as the discussion 
above shows, it builds in at least one necessary and significant tension in a bid 
to secure the endorsement of a range of different actors (Mosse, 2005a): 
namely, between a commitment to a deliberative, participatory and largely 
downwardly accountable system of democratic governance (to country publics 
and those affected by AIDS, TB and malaria), and a more hierarchical and 
upwardly accountable system of technical and economic governance (to 
donors). As Mosse (2005) and Deborah Stone (2002) indicate, the building-in 
of such ambiguity and tension is actually something of a common political 
strategy in policy-making precisely because it allows the masking of conflicts 
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and placation of different actors, and thus facilitates the aggregation of support. 
In short, without such ambiguity and tension, securing global funding and 
action to fight AIDS, TB and malaria would be difficult, if not impossible 
(Stone, 2002).  
 
The tension does not however appear to be an equal one. While different 
readings (and therefore interpreted meanings) of the idea of partnership are 
certainly possible, the technical and economic theoretical model of partnership 
certainly seems to dominate. This, arguably, reflects a privileging of satisfying 
the „market foster-care‟ (cf. Sparke, 2009) views and expectations of an elite 
group of donor actors (most particularly the US), rather than those of activist 
NGOs, African leaders, or those affected by AIDS, TB and malaria. Moreover, 
and in support of the arguments in Chapter Four about the way in which global 
policy is developed, it demonstrates that the production and negotiation of the 
Fund‟s global policy texts has not occurred between equals, but rather has been 
shaped by the prevailing context of inequality in which aid for health is 
governed.   
 
While the global policy processes that led to the establishment of the Fund, and 
which produced the organisation‟s aid policy (as described above), were 
certainly porous to other perspectives about how AIDS, TB and malaria should 
be governed (which explains why a participatory version of partnership is 
evident in the Fund‟s authorised texts), elite actors like Jeffrey Sachs who 
promoted (albeit benevolently) economic and technical arguments about aid for 
health were rather more influential. This reflects the power of technical and 
economic ways of thinking and argumentation, and the elite way in which aid 
policy processes are shaped more broadly. 
 
To be fair, the Global Fund does seem to implicitly acknowledge this tension in 
its global aid policy and the awkward political balancing act that it faces. On 
the Fund‟s website it is noted, for example, that „The proven performance of 
Global Fund grants is critical to raising additional funding from donors‟ 
(Global Fund, 2010g) and, moreover, in a recent Progress Report that „perhaps 
the biggest challenge is to ensure that external accountability [that is, 
accountability to donors] is implemented alongside country-owned objectives 
and targets. These two principles form the axes and tension in the Global 
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Fund‟s performance-based system‟ (Global Fund, 2005, p.24). What the Global 
Fund fails however to officially acknowledge, is that the tensions and 
contradictions in the Fund‟s presentation of partnership and the dominant 
„packaging‟ (cf. Petit and Wheeler, 2005) of the idea as a series of depoliticised, 
causal, expert-driven, and economically effective techniques has a number of 
rather significant social and political effects in the practice of aid for health; 
which fall far short of challenging dominant modes of governing and some of 
the structural inequalities that can lead to poor health. As the next chapter of 
this thesis will soon go on to show in relation to the health sector in Zambia, 
the Fund‟s socially and politically disembedded model partnership not only 
misrepresents and simplifies what happens in practice (cf. Schaffer, 1984), but 
the upward-orientation of the managerial techniques that this model seeks to 
legitimise also entrenches what is an already-existing „etiquette of hierarchy‟ in 
the country (Green, 2003, p.135), and acts to close-down options for the type of 
open qualitative reflection and inclusive, deliberative debate, which could 
challenge the broader social, political and economic structures that lead to poor 
health.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to provide a robust, yet inevitably partial, interpretive 
analysis of how and why the idea of partnership is used and framed in the 
official policy texts of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and malaria. In so 
doing, it has also sought to make a number of important contributions in 
answer to the first part of this thesis‟ substantive research question, which (as 
outlined in Chapter One and above) is namely: „Why is the idea of partnership 
a pervasive feature in contemporary global aid policy?‟  
 
Through a „backward analysis‟ of the Global Fund‟s aid policy texts, the 
chapter has shown that the idea of partnership features in Fund policy for a 
number of complicated reasons. Firstly, it argues that partnership features in 
Global Fund policy because it has been „accepted‟ into the „cognitive 
architecture of intelligibility‟ (cf. Green, 2007, p.142) of a wide range of 
different agents involved in the world of aid – it is an expected ideational or 
symbolic motif by which the Fund, as a new aid initiative, has to be decorated 
and is to some extent judged (see Chapter Four). Secondly, the chapter shows 
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that its pervasive use and the particular way in which it is framed – as an 
ambiguous and contradictory, yet dominantly technical and economic way to 
organise action – also reflects the uneasiness of a consensus that emerged in the 
late 1990s between a broad-based group of international actors – including 
activist NGOs, G8 leaders and elite policy advocates, such as Jeffrey Sachs – 
that more priority attention and global funding was needed for AIDS, TB and 
malaria.  
 
While this group of actors agreed that the three diseases were „priority 
problems‟ and that more global funding was needed in order to combat them, 
the chapter demonstrated that there was also considerable disagreement about 
why more resources were needed (that is, about why the diseases were 
problems) and about how aid-related action should be governed – with activist 
NGOs, on the one hand, advocating a socially-oriented or human rights 
perspective that is seemingly concerned with transforming unequal 
relationships in prevailing (neoliberal) system of governance, and on the other, 
G8 actors (the US in particular) advocating a „market foster-care‟ (cf. Sparke, 
2009) position that is more concerned with rectifying a lack of appropriate 
(technical and economic) governance behaviour in health, and thus with 
incorporating poorer nations more fully into (rather than challenging) 
prevailing neoliberal systems of governance. The chapter argues that it was a 
result of this apparent clash of views and expectations about how aid and health 
should be governed (cf. Williams and Rushton, 2009) that the Global Fund 
came to use the idea of partnership in its policies. Indeed, the chapter argues 
that the idea of partnership features in Global Fund policy because of its 
polysemic characteristics – that is to say, the fact that it has many possible 
meanings and can be easily reframed in a number of different ways (Cornwall, 
2008) and thus because it can be employed as a strategic technology to „bridge‟, 
inter-translate and conceal the existence of these competing perspectives, in 
order to sell and market the Global Fund to a diverse potential constituency of 
support, to legitimise its existence and to secure its political future (cf. Mosse, 
2005a).   
 
Although the Fund‟s use and framing of partnership might appear on the 
surface to be coherent, the analysis above has shown that tensions and 
ambiguities are embedded within it, with at least two readings of partnership 
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being possible: firstly, and dominantly, partnership is presented as a technical 
and economic way to ensure financial accountability for donor investments in 
global health; and secondly, and subordinately as a participatory and largely 
downwardly accountable system of democratic governance to country publics 
and those affected by AIDS, TB and malaria. While the embedding of tensions 
and ambiguities about partnership in Global Fund policy certainly seems to 
suggest that the landscape of aid for health is contested (cf. Williams and 
Rushton, 2009), and that the socio-political processes that produce global 
policy are porous to the perspectives of different actors, the fact that the 
technical and economic model of partnership seems to dominate, arguably, 
seems to suggest that there has been a privileging of satisfying the „market 
foster-care‟ (cf. Sparke, 2009) views and expectations of an elite group of 
donor (G8) governments (most particularly the US), rather than those of 
activist NGOs, African leaders, or those affected by AIDS, TB and malaria. In 
support of the arguments in Chapter Four then, the chapter demonstrates that 
the production of global aid policy does not occur between equals, but rather is 
shaped by a prevailing context of inequality in which aid for health is governed 
 
To emphasise, by highlighting the tensions within the Fund‟s official policy, 
and in demonstrating that the idea of partnership was produced through a socio-
political (rather than objective and linear) global process, this chapter serves to 
destabilise any notion that partnership is an inevitably right way to govern aid. 
Rather than being an inherent good, it has shown that the idea is used because it 
serves as a symbolic policy technology of inter-translation, which allows the 
bridging of disparate views about relationships and the organisation of action; 
that is, about governance. In terms of the broader academic significance of this 
analysis then, it suggests that if there is one crucial need in thinking about 
partnership, it is to search for and explore the contradictions and potentially 
divergent perspectives that the idea can apparently conceal and encode in 
global aid policy texts. 
 
Having emphasised what the idea of partnership is and does in relation to the 
Global Fund aid policy, the next chapter of this thesis (Chapter Six) will now 
move on to consider and explore how the Fund‟s ambiguous, yet dominantly 
technical and economic representation of partnership relates to action when it is 
150 
 
set to work in the practice of aid, and the practice of politics that this enjoins in 
the health sector in Zambia.  
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Chapter Six:  
Partnership and Practice: The Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in action in 
Zambia 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The last chapter of this thesis considered what the idea of partnership is and 
does in relation to Global Fund aid policy, arguing that it is presented in an 
ambiguous and contradictory, yet dominantly technical and economic way, in 
order to inter-translate and legitimise the Fund‟s activities to actors (G8 donors 
in particular) who have divergent views about how AIDS, tuberculosis (TB) 
and malaria should be governed as a global aid priority (cf. Mosse, 2005a). 
This current chapter addresses a related question about how the Fund‟s official 
representation of partnership relates to current practice, thus forming the 
second of a couplet of chapters on the Global Fund. It specifically seeks to 
answer the second aspect of the substantive research question, which, as 
indicated in Chapter One, is: „Why is the idea of partnership a pervasive feature 
in contemporary aid policy and how does this relate to and shape local practice, 
including the practice of politics that this enjoins?‟ The chapter addresses this 
by not only considering how the idea of partnership is understood, received and 
applied (how it is translated, consumed and / or appropriated) by different 
Overview 
 The second in a couplet of chapters about the idea of  partnership and 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
 Analyses how the Fund‟s official policy idea of partnership relates to 
practice, using the health sector in Zambia as a case study of focus 
 Considers how the idea of partnership is understood, received and 
applied (how it is translated, consumed and/or appropriated) by 
different actors involved with Global Fund in Zambia  
 Explores how the partnership techniques that the Fund‟s official policy 
seeks to legitimise shape, enable, contort and/or constrain local socio-
political action in relation to health 
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actors who are involved with the Global Fund in a specific contextual setting – 
the health sector in Zambia – but also by exploring how the partnership 
techniques that the Fund‟s official policy seeks to legitimise, seem to shape, 
enable, contort and / or constrain socio-political action in Zambia. To 
emphasise, the primary focus of the chapter is not whether partnership works – 
it does not evaluate or measure the Global Fund against a normative 
partnership ideal – but rather seeks to understand how the Fund‟s policy of 
partnership is understood and applied, and how it relates to and shapes action in 
the Zambian health sector.   
 
Understanding how the Global Fund‟s policy of partnership relates to current 
action in specific contexts is a pertinent issue given the volume of funding that 
the Fund provides to many different countries across the world, and thus the 
significant role that it now has in global health. As of December 2010, it was 
estimated, for example, that the Fund had approved nearly US$20 billion to 
support AIDS, TB and malaria programmes in 144 countries (Global Fund, 
2010a), which equates to nearly a quarter of all aid for AIDS, and almost half 
of all aid for TB and malaria (Ravishankar et al., 2009). 
69
 Despite this however, 
there has been little academic analysis of how the Global Fund operates or how 
it shapes socio-political practice. While there is certainly an emerging literature 
on this topic, much of this is in the form of unpublished reports (so-called „grey 
literature‟) (Schott et al. 2005; Banteyerga et al. 2006; Drew and Purvis, 2006; 
Mtonya and Chizimbi, 2006), rather than peer-reviewed academic articles 
(Brugha et al., 2004; van Kerkhoff and Szlezák, 2006; Brown, 2010). 
70
 In 
other words, the policy and practice of the Fund therefore „remains only 
partially explored‟ (Biesma et al. 2010, p.240); with no study (to date) having 
examined the idea of partnership in any detail. As a consequence, this chapter 
                                                 
69
  Global Fund reports suggest it provides different proportions of global funding 
for AIDS, TB and malaria. The Fund indicates, for example, that it provides a 
quarter of all aid for AIDS, two-thirds for TB and three quarters for malaria 
(see Global Fund, 2010a). Given that it is not clear where the data for this 
comes from, the estimates of aid volumes by Ravishankar et al. (2009) are 
used here, given that they are more transparent about data sources. There are 
inherent difficulties in generating reliable figures in relation to aid for health 
(see Sridhar and Batniji, 2008 and McCoy et al. 2009). 
70
  A number of recent papers in a special issue of Health Policy and Planning 
(see Desai et al. 2010; Mounier-Jack et al. 2010; Trägård and Shrestha, 2010) 
were commissioned by the Global Fund, which arguably raises questions 
about the academic robustness of the findings.  The grey literature referred to 
here also tends to be either funded by the Global Fund or other aid agencies. 
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seeks to try and address this gap, and so provide a basis for further research and 
critique.   
 
In order to do this, the chapter draws on an interpretive analysis of Global 
Fund-related practice in the Zambia health sector and is informed by two 
periods of qualitative (and ethnographically-sensitised) field work; the first in 
November/December 2008 and the second from March to July 2009 (see 
Chapter Three). More specifically, the chapter draws on an interpretive analysis 
of: scheduled informal visits to (and discussions and observations at) the sites 
of Global Fund-supported programmes in two provinces in Zambia; textual 
analysis of grant proposals, agreements and progress reports; and also semi-
structured interviews with actors who are involved with Global Fund-related 
activities in different ways – for example, as members of the Country 
Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) or its sub-Committees, or as Principal- or 
Sub-Recipients who can apply for and may (or may not) receive grant funds.
71
   
 
Given the constraints of a chapter such as this, it is not possible to analyse and 
discuss every facet of partnership in practice. However, drawing on the above-
mentioned interpretive analysis, and in line with the critical-constructivist 
approach of the research (see Chapter Two), the chapter puts forward three 
main points about how the Fund‟s ambiguous and contradictory, yet 
dominantly technical and economic, policy of partnership, is understood, 
received and applied (how it is translated, consumed and / or appropriated) by 
different actors in Zambia, and how the partnership techniques that the Fund‟s 
official policy seeks to legitimise, shape, enable, contort and / or constrain 
socio-political action.    
 
Firstly, the chapter shows how some of the ambiguity and contradictions within 
the Fund‟s official policy of partnership are „brought to life and replayed‟ (cf. 
Mosse, 2004, p.664) in the practice of aid in Zambia, particularly in relation to 
the way the Zambian CCM is understood by local actors in multiple and 
competing ways. At the same time however, the chapter highlights that there 
are certain „disjunctures‟ between global policy and local practice (Lewis and 
Mosse, 2006), which demonstrates that local actors make their own sense (their 
                                                 
71
  Further details about the semi-structured interviews are included in Chapter 
Three and at Appendix Five.  
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own translations) of partnership in practice. Given the existence of multiple 
local understandings of the CCM as a partnership, this first section of the 
chapter goes on to show how it is politics (with contests, disagreements and 
conflicts between differently-related actors who have different views, ideas and 
expectations) that characterises the practice of partnership in Zambia, rather 
than harmonious, technical and controllable interactions and decision-making, 
as the Fund‟s dominant policy model of partnership suggests (see Chapter 
Five).   
 
Secondly, the chapter shows how the politics of partnership comes to be 
tactically and indeed necessarily concealed in the practice of producing lower-
level policy texts that are submitted (upwards) to the Global Fund, including in 
the formulation of grant proposals, and in progress updates and reports. The 
chapter argues that the Fund‟s dominantly technical representation of 
partnership is, in effect, consumed and remanufactured in this practice of 
documentation, so that the disorderliness of local action is (re)presented as an 
orderly and model partnership. In this way, it is argued that local partnership 
practice is converted into a technical commodity that is used to market Zambia 
as a legitimate site to invest global health resources (cf. Rushton, 2008; 
Orlandini, 2003). In so doing however, the chapter shows how this 
remanufacturing practice not only validates and reinforces the Fund‟s technical 
model of partnership, but also, and significantly, produces ignorance of and 
obscures (cf. Mosse, 2005a) a number of socio-political effects that the Fund‟s 
partnership techniques seem to be having in the health sector in Zambia. 
Thirdly, and relatedly, the chapter gives examples and explains some of these 
socio-political effects, showing in particular how the Fund‟s emphasis on 
technical reporting and financial accounting (a managerial technique of a 
model partnership) is (re)shaping and contorting local socio-political action; 
not only structuring who is included and excluded from accessing global health 
resources, but also who is able to demand accountability in and lead the 
governance of health in Zambia.  
 
Before moving on to these substantive arguments, by way of an introduction, 
the chapter starts by setting out the way in which the Global Fund arrived in 
Zambia, how current practice is broadly organised (CCM membership, funding 
rounds, Principal Recipients), and the wider context into which Global Fund-
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related action has been layered. Having provided this background, the chapter 
moves on to set out and discuss the three main points that have been set out 
above.     
 
A brief background: The Global Fund arrives in Zambia 
 
It was sometime in mid- to late- 2001 that Global Fund-related activity started 
up in Zambia. As news of the Fund‟s imminent launch started to filter through 
to government officials, disease specialists and donor agency staff alike, 
discussions took place as to whether and how to apply for funding (Donoghue, 
et al., 2005). Despite apparent scepticism from some donors about the 
country‟s prospects of success, the Ministry of Health (MoH) was keen to go 
ahead, and so work started on drafting a proposal in October 2001 (Donoghue, 
et al., 2005). At this stage, those involved could only anticipate the Fund‟s 
official policy (it was still being developed by the TWG). However, as details 
emerged a series of meetings were organised to facilitate the writing process 
and a Country Coordination Mechanism (CCM) was hurriedly set up, in order 
to submit the proposal to the Global Fund Secretariat in March 2002 
(Donoghue, et al., 2005).   
 
Established as a new structure that is nominally (yet not statutorily) under the 
remit of the National AIDS Council (NAC), the Zambian CCM brought 
together a somewhat disparate mix of actors, including government ministries, 
donor agencies, businesses, and local health organisations; the latter of which 
were „invited‟ to attend by government (Donoghue, et al., 2005). While 
government (including the MoH) and donor agencies have a long history of 
interaction in Zambia and therefore had some kind of historical (though not 
altogether uncontested) basis for a working relationship on the CCM, there was 
less precedent for government to work directly alongside local „civil society‟ 
organisations in relation to health. During both the one-party regime of 
Kenneth Kaunda (from Independence in 1964 to 1991) and the subsequent 
administration of Frederick Chiluba‟s Movement for Multi-Party Democracy 
(MMD) (from 1991 onwards), there was a deep-seated sensitivity and 
intolerance towards many such organisations. Although church-led 
organisations have traditionally had an important service delivery role in the 
country, filling gaps in government health provision, particularly in rural areas, 
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they have little experience of directly and openly participating with 
governmental actors in deliberation, decision-making or debate (and indeed 
sometimes avoided it altogether) (Erdman and Simutanyi, 2003).
72
 When 
brought together on the CCM then, these actors were something of a 
complicated mix.   
 
Significantly, the wider socio-political context into which Global Fund activity 
was layered from 2002 was also highly complex and was actively being 
reshaped by a number of significant developments. Not only was there a shift 
in political power in early 2002 as a new MMD President (Levy Mwanawasa) 
came to power – which brought changes in Ministerial and civil service 
appointments, and altered the composition of individuals on the CCM – but 
new ways of governing development were also embedding locally as a result of 
the World Bank / IMF‟s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiative 
(which had started in 2000).  
 
When Zambia‟s first grant proposal was approved by the Global Fund Board in 
mid-2002 then, it was into this complicated and shifting socio-political mix that 
AIDS, TB and malaria programmes had to be worked-up, managed and 
implemented. Four main Principal Recipients (PRs) were selected to carry out 
this implementation role – the Ministry of Finance and National Planning 
(MoFNP), the Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ), the Zambian 
National AIDS Network (ZNAN) and the Central Board of Health (which was 
subsequently dissolved and incorporated into the Ministry of Health (MoH); a 
fallout from the political changes described above). These PRs have generally 
continued to be the main recipients of global funds to date, barring the MoH, 
whose role as PR was removed in 2011 and passed on to the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) due to allegations of corruption (see also 
Chapter Eight). The PRs either implement programmes directly, or sub-grant 
funding to a number of Sub-Recipients (SRs) who are located across the 
country. As of June 2011, Zambia had been successful in five grant funding 
rounds, securing a total programmatic budget of over US$ 1,018 million for 
projects that help to fight the three diseases (see Table 5).  
                                                 
72
  Excepting perhaps certain actors associated with the Catholic Church (such as 
sisters / nuns) who have been vocally critical of the government at times (see 
Komakoma, 2000; 2001).  
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Table 5. Global Fund-approved grants awarded to Zambia (as of 22 June 2011). 
 
Grant 
Round 
Disease 
Area 
Total 
Budgeted 
Amount 
(USD) 
Principal Recipient 
Total Grant 
Amount 
Committed 
(USD) 
1 AIDS 90,325,778 Ministry of Health  40,884,928 
   CHAZ 22,840,611 
   Ministry of Finance 6,395,758 
   ZNAN 20,204,481 
1 Malaria 39,273,800 Ministry of Health  35,891,300 
   CHAZ 3,382,500 
1 TB 47,337,256 Ministry of Health  35,807,890 
   CHAZ 10,364,690 
   ZNAN 1,164,676 
4 AIDS 205,198,428 UNDP 116,128,561 
   CHAZ 71,400,023 
   ZNAN 33,023,395 
   Ministry of Finance 15,766,759 
4 Malaria 37,439,655 UNDP 24,941,660 
   CHAZ 12,497,995 
7 Malaria 22,533,194 UNDP  12,489,971 
   CHAZ 5,225,953 
7 TB 24,729,563 UNDP  1,271,474 
   CHAZ 1,874,509 
   ZNAN 736,965 
8 AIDS 292,561,947 CHAZ 31,289,518 
   ZNAN 9,993,493 
      Ministry of Finance 13,777,956 
10 AIDS 259,216,608 tbc  
Sources: http://portfolio.theglobalfund.org/ and 
http://portfolio.theglobalfund.org/Grant/GrantList/ZAM (accessed 22-Jun-11) 
 
This funding, which must be managed according to the Fund‟s partnership 
policy and performance-based partnership techniques (see Chapter Five), 
actually forms part of a highly complicated system of resource management for 
health in Zambia, which includes the health sector-wide approach (SWAp) 
(itself the topic of Chapters Seven and Eight), many other stand-alone projects, 
and, more recently, many other global health initiatives, including the World 
Bank‟s Multi-Country AIDS Programme (MAP) and Malaria Booster 
Programme, and the U.S. President‟s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR).
73
 As a result then, the arrival and ongoing operation of the Global 
                                                 
73
  The ZANARA (Zambia National Response to HIV/AIDS) project was 
approved by the World Bank in Dec 2002 under the MAP (see also World 
Bank, 2010c and Harman, 2007; 2009a) and the Malaria Booster Program in 
Nov 2005 (World Bank, 2010d). PEPFAR was initiated in Zambia in 2006. 
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Fund in Zambia has therefore been a messy and complicated process, which 
perhaps sits in stark contrast to the way in which Global Fund policy suggests 
model partnership processes occur; a point that is discussed in more detail 
below as we move on to consider how partnership is currently understood, 
received and applied in practice.   
 
Exploring how the policy idea of partnership is understood, received and 
applied in practice 
 
Many different aspects of the Global Fund were explored during the field 
research in Zambia in order to understand how the official policy of partnership 
is understood, received and applied by actors in the health sector. This next 
section of the chapter however, focuses on how one particular facet of Global 
Fund policy – the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) – is understood as 
a partnership in local practice, given the important (yet arguably unclear) 
partnership role that it seems to be accorded in the Fund‟s official texts (see 
Chapter Five). Drawing on an analysis of interviews with people who were (or 
had previously been) involved with the Zambian CCM, it sets out how those 
most closely involved in the CCM currently interpret it as a partnership and 
considers how this relates to official representations.
74
 Mindful of possible 
„disjunctures‟ between policy and practice (Lewis and Mosse, 2006), is the 
CCM understood, for example, as a new participatory space (as one reading of 
the Fund‟s policy might suggest); as a technical and economic way to ensure 
efficient action for AIDS, TB and malaria (as Global Fund policy dominantly 
seems to suggest); or even as none or all of the above?   
 
The Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM): Multiple translations of 
partnership 
 
While all interviewees seemed satisfied to refer to the CCM as a partnership 
and to the various members of the CCM as their partners, discussions revealed 
that there were clear differences of opinion as to what the idea of partnership 
actually meant in relation to the CCM and, relatedly, as to how the CCM‟s role 
is and should be operationalised in practice. In other words, there were 
                                                 
74
  Those involved with the CCM included full or alternate members, or those 
who were part of CCM sub-committees or working groups.   
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conflicting views about how the CCM fits into the governance of health in 
Zambia. While it is not possible to characterise all of the perspectives that were 
expressed here, or to capture all of the nuances between them, examples are 
discussed below in order to illustrate this point. 
 
Some interviewees (who had an activist background and/or were working for 
„civil society‟75 organisations that had an advocacy role) expressed what can 
perhaps be called a participatory or voice view of the CCM as a partnership.  
They discussed it in terms of social inclusivity and, to borrow from Mathur et 
al. (2003, p.31), not only seemed to suggest that its role was to bring about 
„equality of standing and power‟ between actors in Zambia, but also to open-up 
decision-making about AIDS, TB and malaria (and indeed health more broadly) 
to those who have historically had only limited involvement and influence in 
local, statutory systems of health governance – themselves included (Int. 6 Apr 
2009, Int. 15 Apr 2009, Int. 3 Jun 2009 civil society representatives). 
Recounting their own organisation‟s difficulties in gaining access to fora such 
as the Sector Advisory Group, which is a biannual meeting associated with the 
health sector-wide approach (SWAp) in Zambia (see Chapters Seven and 
Eight), one CCM member noted, for example, that the type of partnership that 
the CCM brought meant that they were now „involved to sit as equal partners‟ 
and that they therefore now had some voice in decision-making: „Even when it 
comes to decision-making and consultation, [x] have managed to participate. 
We are not ignored. We are not sidelined in the CCM‟ (Int. 6 Apr 2009 civil 
society representative).   
 
Similarly, a number of other interviewees interpreted the partnership as being 
about creating a different forum for engagement, which was helping to change 
and equalise (what they suggested was) an unbalanced power relationship 
between the Zambian government and other actors in the governance of health 
(Int. 15 Apr 2009, Int. 2 Dec 2008 civil society representatives). Arguably 
reflecting wider, underlying and historical tensions in the relationship between 
certain „civil society‟ groups and the Zambian government (as referred to 
above), one interviewee indicated, for example, that the partnership was 
important because it meant that civil society could not now be „stepped on‟ (Int. 
                                                 
75
  The term „civil society‟ is used with quotes surrounding it in this chapter to 
recognise its contested nature. 
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9 Jun 2009 civil society representative). For those expressing this view then, it 
seemed that the CCM‟s role was interpreted as being about maximising 
inclusion in health governance, about transforming power relationships 
(especially the perceived dominance of government actors), and about 
increasing the levels of influence that previously marginalised groups have in 
decision-making about AIDS, TB and malaria. This perspective, arguably, 
resonates with the socially-oriented and participatory representation of the 
CCM that is written into official Global Fund policy.   
 
Significantly, for some of those that expressed this view, it was clear that they 
did not think that everybody on the CCM shared their own perspective, which 
seemed to reveal tensions and the existence of socio-political divides within the 
CCM as a partnership in practice. One CCM member noted, for example, that 
„For people who understand partnership, it works; some people don‟t see a role 
for others except themselves... it comes down to a philosophy‟ (Int. 9 Jun 2009 
civil society representative). 
 
It certainly seemed clear from interviews that other people involved with the 
CCM interpreted the partnership in different ways. Some interviewees who had 
a professional background in business or economics (which included some 
donor and also „civil society‟ representatives), seemed to interpret it as being 
primarily about facilitating the implementation or delivery of AIDS, TB and 
malaria programmes in Zambia (Int. 24 Apr 2009, Int. 22 June 2009 aid agency 
representatives; Int. 3 Jun 2009 civil society representative). Rather than 
emphasising voice in decision-making then, these interviewees saw the CCM 
partnership as being about ensuring that health interventions have an impact 
and that resources are managed efficiently and effectively, with some even 
equating the CCM to a „Board of Directors‟ of a commercial company (Int. 3 
Jun 2009 civil society representative); which is in stark contrast to the more 
social perspective expressed above.   
 
The Board of Directors analogy is interesting, and perhaps reveals something 
about how these particular interviewees saw their own organisation‟s and also 
the Global Fund‟s role in the governance of health in Zambia. While it is 
recognised that a Board of Directors can take different forms, in general it 
tends to involve a set of appointed Executives (technical specialists), who 
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supervise the affairs of a company on behalf of shareholders who have 
delegated them that role; in other words, they are responsible for „delivering 
shareholder value‟ (Madura, 2006, p.283). It seemed that those who expressed 
the above business view of the partnership saw the role of the CCM (and that 
of their own) in a similar way; that is to say, that the CCM‟s role was to bring 
together a group of appointed technical specialists, who were responsible for 
supervising the efficient and effective delivery of AIDS, TB and malaria 
programmes in Zambia on behalf of a set of shareholders – who, in this case, 
was perceived to be the Global Fund (in Geneva) and those donors who had 
invested their resources in it.  
 
This is not to say that there was no concern for those who receive the health 
interventions or services. One interviewee emphasised, for example, that it was 
important for the CCM to ensure that funding goes to those organisations that 
„are the best to implement for the communities‟ (Int. 3 Jun 2009 civil society 
representative). However, and as this quote emphasises, these actors seemed to 
see the role of the CCM as being about coordinating the delivery of 
programmes for the community with the resources available, rather than with 
them; an important difference in perspective, which, arguably, reflects an 
interpretation of the CCM as part of an economic, rather than social venture. 
Implicit to this view then, seemed to be the idea that it did not matter too much 
who delivered the AIDS, TB and malaria programmes supported by the Global 
Fund, rather what was important was that any implementing organisation was 
efficient and effective in delivery (though it was not altogether clear how 
efficiency and effectiveness were defined).   
 
In contrast to this, a number of other interviewees (including some donor 
representatives and others who currently, or had previously, worked for or 
closely with the government) interpreted the CCM as a partnership that was 
about external imposition, with some indicating that it was only set up to fulfil 
Fund requirements, and that this reflected an unequal relationship between the 
Fund on the one hand, and various actors in Zambia on the other (Int. 26 Nov 
2008, Int. 27 May 2009 ministry of health representatives; Int. 29 Apr 2009 aid 
agency representative). Indeed, some interviewees seemed to think that the 
CCM only existed because it was „required‟ to prepare funding proposals 
(which, they were keen to emphasise, was often at great local cost – in terms of 
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time and money) (Int. 26 Nov 2008 ministry of health representative; Int. 30 
Jun 2009 civil society representative). Recounting their understanding of 
partnership and the role of the CCM, one CCM member noted, for example, 
that the CCM „had to conform to Global Fund requirements‟ and that: „Our job 
is to prepare proposals for the Global Fund. We are the people responsible for 
that‟ (Int. 30 Jun 2009 civil society representative).   
 
Apparently reflecting on their own historical experience of working in the 
health sector in Zambia, some of these interviewees argued that, because the 
CCM partnership was a non-statutory body and had no formal legal standing, it 
was a confusing and „parallel‟ structure (Int. 12 Jun 2009 aid agency 
representative) that was „isolated and on its own‟ (Int. 29 Jun 2009 aid agency 
representative). Some thought that the CCM partnership actually undermined 
statutory modes of health governance and the time and effort that they 
themselves (as individuals or as organisations) had invested in developing 
statutory processes, including, for example, various planning activities 
associated with the health SWAp in Zambia (Int. 26 Nov 2008, Int. 26 Mar 
2009 ministry of health representatives; Int. 21 Apr 2009 aid agency 
representative). As one CCM member stated, „Partnership is very much host 
and rider; people that come with a pre-determined agenda. Global Fund, they 
come and expect you to write proposals after you have initiated a national 
health strategic plan, so it [the CCM] is a dicey partnership‟ (Int. 21 Apr 2009 
aid agency representative). 
 
Although this particular interviewee recognised that the Global Fund was 
moving towards accepting national strategy applications, whereby a country‟s 
national strategic plan could be reviewed and a funding decision was based on 
that rather than a specifically prepared grant proposal, there appeared to be 
little optimism that this would change the nature of the CCM partnership: „It is 
a positive move, but only if it is really a national strategic plan. If it is not 
encouraged along by people with the funds‟ (Int. 21 Apr 2009 aid agency 
representative emphasis added). Implicit to this type of external imposition 
view then was the notion that the Zambian government, and in particular the 
Ministry of Health, should be leading the governance of AIDS, TB and malaria 
programmes in Zambia – the steward of health in Zambia – and that Global 
Fund practice constrained and undermined this.   
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Indeed, following on from this, some interviewees seemed to equate the type of 
partnership that the Global Fund brought with „old‟ ways of working and 
paternalist thinking by aid donors (Int. 26 Nov 2008 ministry of health 
representative; Int. 16 Jun 2009, Int. 21 Apr 2009 aid agency representatives). 
Two aid agency representatives, for example, likened the CCM to the project 
era, during which donor agencies were perceived to impose their own priorities 
on recipient countries (see Chapter Four); with one noting somewhat 
dismissively that: „The CCM is just a project steering committee‟ (Int. 16 Jun 
2009 aid agency representative emphasis added). Perhaps also influenced by 
broader global paradigms of thought then, about the way aid should be seen to 
be managed, these interviewees were fairly critical of the CCM partnership.   
 
Given the largely negative interpretations of the CCM as a partnership by these 
actors, it is perhaps interesting to consider very briefly why they continue to 
engage with it in current practice? While there are likely to be a number of 
reasons for this, it seems apparent that they do so not only because it is required 
by the global head office of their organisation (it is a expected component of 
their jobs), but also because they believe that there is a clear need for resources 
to fight AIDS, TB and malaria in Zambia, judged by the country‟s overall 
disease burden, and that failing to be involved in this partnership could 
jeopardise the country‟s receipt of funding for health.  
 
Why are there multiple interpretations of the CCM as a partnership? 
 
The above discussion has clearly illustrated that there are currently multiple 
interpretations of the CCM as a partnership in Zambia by those who have been 
most closely involved in its work. Yet why might this be the case? Why is there 
no widely held partnership norm? Well, given the ambiguous way in which the 
CCM is presented in Global Fund policy (see Chapter Five), and also the 
somewhat disparate group of actors that the CCM brings together in Zambia (as 
outlined above), it is perhaps unsurprising that there are competing ways in 
which this partnership is interpreted in practice. Not only does the absence of 
any clear partnership norm in Global Fund policy (which, as argued in Chapter 
Five, was something of a strategic move on the part of the Fund‟s policy-
makers) contribute to this situation, providing an unclear „guide for action‟ (cf. 
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Mosse, 2005a), but also the hybrid nature of the CCM, which brings together 
actors who have, for example, different organisational affiliations; professional 
or disciplinary backgrounds; historical relationships with other actors in the 
health sector; experiences of other aid mechanisms, such as the SWAp; and 
even different material interests in accessing Global Fund resources, has clearly 
been important; leading, somewhat unsurprisingly, to the existence of different 
views about how this partnership fits into the governance of health in Zambia.   
 
Although the above discussion illustrates that there are certain parallels 
between the representations of partnership in global policy and how it is 
interpreted in local practice – with, for example, a participatory view of the 
CCM as a partnership, co-existing alongside a rather more technical and 
economic view, as it does in Fund policy (see Chapter Five) – which suggests 
that policy does reflect practice in Zambia in some way, it seems clear that the 
actors involved in the CCM have drawn on different ideas, relationships, 
experiences and expectations to make their own sense of the partnership.  
While the contradictions that are embedded in the Fund‟s official texts are to 
some extent „brought to life‟ in practice (cf. Mosse, 2005a, p.105), there are 
also certain „disjunctures‟ (cf. Lewis and Mosse, 2006) between the two; with 
the existence of the local external imposition view (as described above) a key 
case in point. This supports the assertion that the Fund‟s partnership policy is 
not simply internalised or transferred „as is‟, but rather is actively reinterpreted 
by actors in Zambia.   
 
A key question is perhaps whose perspective dominates? Yet this is actually 
somewhat difficult to answer (at least in any definitive way). As the next 
section will go on to show, there actually appears to be a constant struggle 
between different actors involved in the CCM for influence, control and 
visibility of their views, as they participate in what is a complex and moreover 
political community „of ideas and of people‟ (cf. Mosse, 2005a, p.107).   
 
The CCM in Zambia: A political rather than technical partnership? 
 
Indeed, as the different partners come together, it seems that their competing 
perspectives about this CCM partnership – its role and the way that it is, and 
should be, operationalised – manifest in various different contests, 
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disagreements and conflicts, which, contrary to the Global Fund‟s dominant 
representation of the CCM, reveal that it is not simply a harmonious technical 
body, but rather is highly political. The example of how different actors are 
seen to participate in CCM discussions about AIDS, TB and malaria 
programmes illustrates the politics of this partnership quite well. 
 
The politics of participation in the CCM partnership 
 
While many of those interviewed who were involved in the CCM were 
generally satisfied that many of the key partners in the fight against AIDS, TB 
and malaria were nominally represented and could participate in the CCM, 
there were clearly sensitivities and conflicts about the way different actors had 
been involved in, and shaped the nature of, discussions and decision-making at 
various points in time, which revealed political fractures in the partnership. 
These fractures were not only between some (though not all) government and 
„civil society‟ members, but also between some „civil society‟ and donor 
members, and between „civil society‟ members themselves. For example, and 
perhaps reflecting the expectation of certain „civil society‟ actors that the 
CCM‟s role was to transform power relationships (especially the perceived 
dominance of government actors) (see the discussion above), some „civil 
society‟ actors were it seems sensitive to, and somewhat critical of, the way in 
which the representatives of Zambian government ministries participated in the 
CCM (both now and in the past) (Int. 6 Apr 2009, Int. 15 Apr 2009, Int. 9 Jun 
2009, Int. 3 Jun 2009 civil society representatives). One civil society 
representative noted for example that the government, by virtue of its implicit 
authority, exerted an unequal level of influence over decision-making about 
Global Fund-related AIDS, TB and malaria programmes on the CCM: „But as 
government is government, you can only put so much. If a decision is made, it 
can bulldoze some others; people can speak though [sic]‟ (Int. 3 Jun 2009 civil 
society representative). 
 
Similarly, other „civil society‟ actors argued that the personality of specific 
actors within the Ministry of Health, combined with their high-ranking formal 
position in the civil service had (in the past) shaped the way CCM debates and 
decisions progressed (Int. 6 Apr 2009, Int. 15 Apr 2009, Int. 3 Jun 2009 civil 
society representatives). Recounting one particular incident (which cannot be 
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explicitly discussed here for reasons of anonymity), one „civil society‟ member 
argued for example that a particular Ministry of Health representative had tried 
to control the CCM‟s discussions about, and obstruct the submission of, a 
proposal for one particular grant funding round: „Ah, he was a bully... This is 
when it came to a head, and he was on the high and mighty here, “I am 
government”‟ (Int. 15 Apr 2009 civil society representative).   
 
Similarly, another „civil society‟ interviewee raised concerns about the 
participation of the Director-General of the NAC on the CCM. As they 
explained: 
 
…because the NAC hosts the CCM and the Director-General of NAC 
reports to the PS, to the PS of the Ministry of Health, a lot of practical 
decisions of the CCM are subject to their comments, as a partner of the 
NAC. The Chairperson could even be said to report to the Director-
General... When the NAC Director-General says something, and says a 
particular thing, it will stand, because they provide the Secretariat. In fact 
the Director-General is a very powerful man. The Chairman has to ask 
the Director-General for advice. If the Director-General has an issue with 
individuals and biases and on things, the Director-General can make 
some decisions fail to be minuted, because they prepare those 
documents, and can change content, and send documents late (Int. 6 Apr 
2009 civil society representative).  
 
In other words, this interviewee argued that, because of the formal status of the 
Director-General and because the NAC provides Secretariat support for the 
CCM, certain decisions that the CCM may collectively take, or the perspectives 
of certain actors, can be effectively silenced. While it should be emphasised 
that these assertions cannot be proved here (and should not therefore be taken 
as given), this discussion clearly highlights that there are tensions and struggles 
between the members of the CCM partnership over participation, and that, as 
argued above, in practice the CCM seems to be highly political.   
 
It is perhaps important to highlight that, while the above-noted politics 
surrounding participation may be reflective of wider, underlying and historical 
tensions in the relationship between „civil society‟ and government (as 
indicated above), the critical comments and scepticism expressed by certain 
„civil society‟ actors about the way that government Ministry representatives 
participate in and shape decision-making in the partnership may also be driven 
by more immediate material factors, given that they are all effectively eligible 
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to (and some of whom do) receive global funds – either as Principal- or Sub-
Recipients. In other words, there is a possibility that certain „civil society‟ 
members of the CCM may be critical of government representatives in order to 
show themselves in a more favourable light, and so attract resources. This 
assertion was supported by a number of other actors who were interviewed 
during the field research in Zambia, who suggested that both „civil society‟ and 
government representatives on the CCM brought their own vested material 
interests when they participated in discussions.   
 
On the government side, one aid agency member of the CCM suggested for 
example that certain Ministry officials formed silent coalitions in order to sway 
decisions about resource allocation in favour of government Principal 
Recipients: the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning; thereby influencing decision-making by keeping certain issues „off‟ 
the agenda: „There are a huge number of members who are civil servants and 
one wonders in agreeing they would be silent, when it would affect the 
government PRs negatively‟ (Int. 21 Apr 2009 aid agency representative). 
While the government PRs themselves are not supposed to be privy to 
discussions that relate to them (which as illustrated below in relation to a „civil 
society‟ PR may not always occur), what this suggests is that prevailing socio-
political relationships between Ministry representatives outside of the CCM, 
mean that they may be mutually enrolled in trying to secure government PR 
resources allocations through non-decision making. 
 
On the other hand, a number of consultants who had been involved with the 
CCM in various capacities were critical of „civil society‟ members for trying to 
influence the course of discussions so as to favour their own organisations. As 
one consultant noted: 
 
There hasn‟t been a great deal of capacity or satisfaction with their 
performance... Quite frankly, they have been bringing their own vested 
interests, to improve outcomes for their own organisations. There hasn't 
been a culture of broader representation of civil society positions or even 
knowing what these views may be (Int. 27 Nov 2008 consultant). 
 
The assertion that certain „civil society‟ members bring their own material 
interests to the CCM was also made by other „civil society‟ members of the 
CCM, which reveals that there are clear socio-political divides, and perhaps 
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even competition, between the „civil society‟ actors on the CCM (this notion of 
competition will be explored further later in the chapter when considering the 
effects of performance-based funding). Much criticism was, for example, 
directed at the Zambian National AIDS Network (ZNAN), which is the main 
Principal Recipient of global funds for non-faith-based „civil society‟ health 
organisations in Zambia. Recounting a particular incident when the CCM was 
discussing Principal Recipients, one interviewee was particularly critical, 
noting that the ZNAN representative stayed to participate in the discussion 
(which is contrary to the CCM‟s formal Conflict of Interest policy). They 
suggested that this reflected the exercise of power by this particular individual, 
their interest in protecting their own position and in securing their own 
resources:  
 
It is all about power. During that period, my affections for [x] just 
phased off. My expectations went down. We are discussing PRs and [x] 
is still in the room... I would have thought that this wouldn't happen. It is 
about politics (Int. 15 Apr 2009 civil society representative). 
  
Interestingly, these latter points clearly raise broader questions about „who‟ the 
partners on the CCM partnership actually represent? Are they representing their 
own organisational interests when they participate in the CCM, or a much 
broader Zambian constituency? As indicated above, when the Fund arrived in 
Zambia, the CCM was not formed through any open or democratically-elected 
selection process, but rather by government (largely Ministry of Health) 
appointment (Donoghue et al. 2005, p.14). Given that the CCM partners have 
changed little over time – the same organisations are present, albeit with 
„considerable turnover of individuals‟ (Donoghue et al. 2005, p.15) – there is 
clearly an issue and politics here around whose views can be shared within the 
CCM partnership? And therefore whose ideas end up shaping the health 
agenda? While there actually seems to be a constant battle within the CCM 
(with no actor or their view dominating), because the organisational 
membership of the CCM has changed little over time (despite the Global Fund 
requirement that there is a transparent selection process from each members‟ 
constituency), it seems that this battle itself is constrained to occur between 
something of an elite and now institutionalised group of actors in Zambia; with 
those who have historically been the most marginalised in society still excluded 
from decision-making processes that can affect their health – the issue of 
exclusion will be returned to a little later in the chapter.  
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It is perhaps important to highlight here that, while the above points may well 
be valid, some (though certainly not all) members of the CCM did express 
concerns about the quality of their participation and how they represented other 
groups, organisations or communities in the CCM; with some „civil society‟ 
actors critically reflecting on their ability to effectively represent their 
perceived constituency when they participated in this partnership. As two 
interviewees commented:    
 
The ability to consult our constituency widely is hindered... and when we 
make claim of representation, it makes us look, well, it is meaning that 
consultation is limited to very limited groups, urban-based... So those are 
serious challenges… to provide serious participation, which again 
comes back to tokenism because if you can‟t consult, it weakens the 
ability to meaningfully speak with the authority of your constituents (Int. 
6 Apr 2009 civil society representative emphasis added). 
 
How do I consult with those before I go? Sometimes these things do not 
come through the community.  This could be this person's personal 
perception. You have to go out there and see for yourself… What form 
should these dialogues should take? Community conversation, 
community dialogue, communities at the grass roots level, to the level 
that it should be.  We are not there yet (Int. 15 Apr 2009 civil society 
representative). 
 
It seems evident from the above discussion that participation in the CCM 
partnership is clearly a complicated, difficult and perhaps elite-driven process, 
which is characterised by conflict and sometimes confusion. While the above 
discussion has certainly not provided a detailed analysis of how different 
partners participate in, represent and shape decision-making about AIDS, TB 
and malaria, or why this may be so, what it does clearly demonstrate is that, 
rather than being a harmonious and technical process (as the Fund‟s dominant 
theoretical model of partnership seems to suggest, see Chapter Five), the 
practice of this partnership is actually highly complicated, contested and 
inherently messy and, moreover, is shaped and constrained by prevailing socio-
political relationships. 
 
The politics of proposal development 
 
Significantly, many other areas of Global Fund-related action in Zambia also 
seem to be complicated and highly political, which raises questions about the 
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way in which such practice is dominantly represented  in the Global Fund‟s 
official model of partnership; with the practice of proposal development a key 
case in point. During the development of the Round 8 proposal in 2008 to the 
Global Fund for example, it was politics that seemed to shape the progress of 
events, rather than „technical‟ and linear decision-making.   
 
Firstly, the generation of submissions for the Round 8 proposal was clearly not 
a simple or entirely-controllable process, involving, for example: the 
involvement of a wide range of partners; the solicitation and „objective‟ review 
of submissions for integration into the proposal; the objective identification of 
financing gaps and priority needs; the mutual agreement of the proposal; and 
the selection of one more appropriate organization(s) to act as the Principal- 
and/or Sub Recipient(s) based on objective criteria, as is suggested in the 
Fund‟s model partnership (see Chapter Five).  
 
Not only did advertisements about the proposal development process (which 
the CCM certainly published in newspapers and on local radio) never reach 
some sections of the population – for example, remote rural households and 
communities – or reached them too late, meaning that they were effectively 
excluded from being partners, and thus from sharing their views or ideas about 
local needs and gaps for integration into the proposal (Int. 21 Apr 2009 aid 
agency representative; 3 Jun 2009 civil society representative), but the sharing 
of ideas by those who were aware of the call for submissions was also shaped 
by local political dynamics. As one interviewee explained, the anticipation of 
having to undergo a selection process and to apply for funds from local „civil 
society‟ PRs, combined with previous negative experiences of being 
unsuccessful in this process, translated locally into suspicions (on the part of 
some local „civil society‟ health organisations in particular) about what will 
happen to their ideas if they are shared; so that some of these actors, who may 
have been well-placed to make suggestions about HIV/AIDS objectives, 
priorities, gaps and possible ways to prevent and treat the disease locally, 
consciously never contributed to the Round 8 proposal: „With proposal 
development, sometimes people don‟t respond, as they think that their idea will 
be used, and someone else will get the money‟ (Int. 30 Jun 2009 civil society 
representative). In other words, some actors self-excluded themselves from 
proposal development because they were unsure if their submissions would be 
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appropriated by more powerful actors, who would then receive the global 
health resources.  
 
The problem is that if a community or local health organisation does not share 
their ideas about priority AIDS activities at the proposal stage, then they 
themselves, or another organisation that could work on their behalf, may not 
subsequently be able to successfully apply for a grant from one of the Zambian 
„civil society‟ PRs (in this case CHAZ or ZNAN) in order to fulfil their local 
need, if that proposal is approved by the Global Fund, because their proposed 
activities may not match up to the objectives and priorities that were initially 
set. According to the Fund‟s partnership technique of performance-based 
funding, which will be considered in more detail below, only those activities 
that align with the initially-set objectives and priorities should be funded 
locally and there is some pressure for this to be carried through, given that 
additional funding will only be disbursed to a PR if there is ongoing, 
measurable results against the initial objectives and priorities that were set.   
 
Essentially, in any proposal, the Global Fund requires that a series of objectives 
are set out, a number of „service delivery areas‟ (SDA) are identified that detail 
the specific health services to be delivered, and indicators are identified to 
measure progress against these (which will trigger disbursement of funds). If 
the objectives and underlying SDAs do not match to activities that a local 
organisation may subsequently propose, then it is unlikely that they will be 
funded, as they will not be able to demonstrate measurable results against the 
proposal. Take for example the Round 8 proposal, in which a key objective was 
to strengthen communication and promotive activities to prevent and control 
HIV, under which a key SDA was mass media, and the key measureable 
indicator was the number of IEC (information education communication) 
materials printed / produced and distributed (see Global Fund, 2008b). If a 
local organisation has not shared their ideas at proposal stage, and subsequently 
applies for funding from a „civil society‟ PR to do something a little different 
from this, such as sports activities to communicate AIDS-based messages or 
social drama, then they are unlikely to be funded as these do not fit with the 
mass media SDA and materials printed indicator that were set. In such cases, 
this can result in disappointment and local resentment (Int. 5 May 2009 civil 
society representative). As one CCM member explained:   
172 
 
 
When we apply, we have to set priorities... and we have to align [funded 
activities] to these priorities.... to change them would take years. We get 
complaints to say “Why are we not funded?” And we say “You have a 
good programme, but it doesn‟t fit the priorities” (Int. 30 Jun 2009 civil 
society representative).   
 
Unfortunately, the resentment and disappointment that results from the above 
front-loaded process could deter those same organisations from subsequently 
becoming involved in the development of any future proposals to the Global 
Fund – with the same process repeating itself. In some respects then, the 
partnership technique of proposal development interlocks with local political 
dynamics and may contribute to a vicious political cycle of non-engagement in 
priority-setting for HIV/AIDS, along with conflict and resentment, and thus 
raises questions about the extent to which the Global Fund proposals and 
activities reflect broadly-defined Zambian HIV/AIDS needs and to which 
partnership in practice is a technical and harmonious process (as Fund policy 
dominantly seems to suggest). 
 
Secondly, and relatedly, there was political conflict around the pre-selection 
and listing of Sub-Recipients in the Round 8 proposal (to which PRs would 
directly sub-grant a proportion of the global funding that they received), which 
reveals the existence of considerable competition between „civil society‟ 
HIV/AIDS organisations in Zambia. Essentially, during the course of 
developing the Round 8 proposal, the possibility of explicitly pre-listing SRs – 
who would subsequently receive global funds through PRs – was raised; of 
which some CCM members (including those who were PRs) were in support 
and some were against (Int. 6 Apr 2009, Int. 15 Apr 2009 civil society 
representatives; Int. 21 Apr 2009, Int. 24 Apr 2009 aid agency representatives). 
In particular, it seems that the Zambian National AIDS Network (ZNAN) – the 
main PR for non-faith-based „civil society‟ health organisations (see above) – 
was largely against this, which caused ructions with some other members of the 
CCM.   
 
While ZNAN‟s opposition could have been for a number of reasons, including 
perhaps the somewhat self-interested logic that the organisation would lose 
control over the allocation of resources, and thus also their position and status, 
it seems that some of the CCM members who were in support of the listing 
173 
 
were also motivated by self-interest – that is to say, the prospect that their own 
organisations would be identified to receive global funds (which backs up the 
assertion above that some CCM members bring their own organisational 
interests to CCM discussions). It seems that the Global Fund provided little 
guidance on the matter and thus, through their silence, arguably contributed to 
what appears to have evolved into a tangible sense of frustration and confusion. 
As one interviewee recounted: 
 
But the question was, what if we name it and then don't give them the 
money? Ok, so we‟re not going to name them, we'll provide a list... But, 
so, if we put it in a proposal, are we not obliged to give them the money? 
Global Fund were silent on this (Int. 29 April 2009 aid agency 
representative).  
 
Despite the lack of clarity and clear existence of conflict, the proposal did list 
SRs to which it was suggested CHAZ and ZNAN would sub-grant funds. Yet 
this listing process, in itself, also seems to have been infused with politics; with 
behind the scenes negotiations between local actors apparently shaping the 
course of events. Indeed, getting the list of sub-recipients down to a 
manageable number does not appear to have been an easy or objective process. 
As one interviewee who was involved in one of three sub-committees that 
coordinated the development of the proposal recalled:  
 
There was a call for proposals from sub-recipients. We had many and 
needed to get the numbers down. The process was written down, but I 
don't know how the others did it. We went through systematically, then 
had to get the suggested sub-recipients down from the sub-committees. 
Getting that version down, some could have been left out and some came, 
parachuted in, and had not been listed at all (Int. 29 April 2009 aid 
agency representative). 
 
There were perceptions that donors tried to influence the listing process, which 
not only revealed sensitivity about the way that some donors are involved in 
proposal development, but also local tensions about the way international 
organisations are involved in governing AIDS, TB and malaria in Zambia. As 
one CCM member recounted:  
 
There are times when they [donors] do try to change things. I can give 
you one example and I was like, how dare they? In Round 8, with 
country system strengthening, it is about local no? And one member says 
to me, do you know that there is some discussion that Clinton 
Foundation should be a sub-recipient? Thankfully, those dramas were 
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held in the corridors. What type of organisation is this? (Int. 15 Apr 2009 
civil society representative). 
 
While the Clinton Foundation did not come to be listed as a SR in the proposal 
(and it is unclear whether it was ever being seriously mooted as a named SR of 
funds), a number of other organisations were, and so it seems that, when the 
grant was approved by the Global Fund Board in November 2008, the politics 
of this sub-recipient saga continued. Despite the listing of SRs in the proposal, 
a selection process was initiated by the ZNAN, in which local „civil society‟ 
health organisations were asked to submit a project proposal that would be 
reviewed by ZNAN before a sub-granting decision was made. By virtue of 
their local control of resource allocation processes then, it seems that ZNAN 
could effectively supersede the listing in the proposal; much to the apparent 
annoyance of other actors. As one donor representative commented:  
 
Some people are peeved, specifically [x], I tend to side with them, as that 
gives strength to the proposal. And then when you are successful and 
you turn around and are told you have to bid... I believe you need to 
build capacity. ZNAN was an organisation that had absolutely no 
capacity... As late as 2002, you would have difficulty with ZNAN 
finding, to even pick up a cheque... it is a different organisation now (Int. 
21 Apr 2009 aid agency representative).   
 
While this selection process recently came to a standstill due to the 
identification of financial irregularities in the management of grants by all 
Principal Recipients in Zambia during a recent audit by the Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) of the Global Fund (see OIG, 2010),
76
 it seems clear 
from this discussion that the process of pre-selection for the Round 8 proposal 
was highly political and revealed the existence of conflicts and divides between 
different actors involved in the Zambian health sector.  
 
Like the participation of partners in CCM partnership then, the local practice of 
proposal development is clearly not a simple, technical and apolitical process, 
but rather is shaped by prevailing relationships and embedded in local politics. 
Indeed to emphasise, the discussion above has illustrated that there is actually a 
clear disjuncture (cf. Lewis and Mosse, 2006) between the way in which 
                                                 
76
  The OIG was set up in July 2005 as an independent unit of the Global Fund, to 
audit and investigate various aspects of the programmes the Fund supports, 
including assessing allegations of fraud and misconduct. It reports directly to 
the Board (see OIG, 2010).  
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partnership is dominantly represented in official Global Fund policy (see 
Chapter Five), and the way it is translated and enacted in practice.   
 
Consuming and (re)manufacturing the Global Fund’s partnership model 
 
What is interesting, is that this disjuncture and dissonance does not seem to be 
openly acknowledged by the Global Fund or, for example, in the „lower order‟ 
(cf. Dar, 2008) policy texts that are produced to document local action in 
Zambia, including the grant proposals, progress reports and annual updates that 
are routinely written and submitted to the Global Fund by either the CCM or 
PRs (via the Local Fund Agent which, at the time of the field research, was 
PricewaterhouseCoopers). Although competing views clearly exist about the 
CCM as a partnership and there is clearly a politics around CCM participation 
and proposal development, it seems that this is tactically and, as we shall see 
below, necessarily concealed in local documentation practices (cf. Dar, 2008). 
In the Round 8 grant proposal for example, both the operation of the CCM and 
the proposal development are represented as technically-managed and 
depoliticised processes; with no mention of any of the politics described above.  
 
What seems to have happened here then in the practice of producing this „lower 
order‟ (cf. Dar, 2008) proposal document in Zambia? Apparently perceiving 
the importance of the way the Fund dominantly represents partnership in 
official global policy model – as a technical, economic and depoliticised 
process, as indicated above – it seems that the complexity and messiness of 
local events and interactions have been retranslated back into the logic of this 
model in order to request and secure global health resources (which they 
successfully did in November 2008); creating an orderly and technical 
documentary product (the proposal) that was used to „sell‟ Zambia as a 
legitimate for the Fund‟s global health resources (cf. Eyben, 2010; Mosse, 
2005a; Heyman, 1995).  
 
Indeed, it seems that the Fund‟s dominant model of partnership has been 
consumed here as a type of policy commodity, and this has then served as an 
input into a local process of (re)manufacturing, which converted partnership in 
practice into an orderly written product (the Round 8 grant proposal) (cf. 
Orlandini 2003; Rushton, 2008). This was then „traded‟ (cf. Orlandini 2003; 
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Rushton, 2008) to the Global Fund in order to secure access to resources. In 
this way then, the Fund‟s partnership technique of proposal development seems 
to have become locally in Zambia something of a (re)creative act and, 
moreover, as a way for Zambian actors to exercise their power in the arena of 
global health as they try to secure access to resources. 
 
Consultants: (Re)creative partnership brokers? 
 
Significantly, it seems that the technical consultants who are often hired by 
CCMs (funded by aid donors) to assist with proposal development have a key 
role in this (re)creative partnership practice. Consultants have been regularly 
involved in proposal writing in Zambia since the first round of global funding 
was announced in 2002 (see Donoghue et al., 2005). During Round 8 in 
particular, over ten consultants were provided by UNAIDS (at a cost of over 
$300,000), with additional consultancy support also provided by the UK 
Department for International Development (DfID) and UNICEF (Int. 29 Apr 
2009 aid agency representative). It seems that these consultants are valuable 
locally because of the interpretive work that they perform in the proposal 
process; being well-versed in the Fund‟s model of partnership, they have the 
understanding and thus skills to remanufacture and abstract practice „back into‟ 
the Fund‟s technical and linear partnership framework (Mosse, 2005a).  
 
Interestingly, the use of consultants in this way actually seems to be common to 
many other countries that apply for and receive global funds. As Lorrae van 
Kerkhoff and Nicole Szlezák (2006, p.630) indicate, „CCMs... commonly hire 
external consultants to advise on a range of issues, including technical matters, 
but particularly grant-writing and interpretation of the Global Fund's 
application form and requirements‟. In other words then, not only in Zambia, 
but also in many other countries across the world, technical consultants act as a 
type of aid broker, who „mediate[s] at the interface‟ between Global Fund 
partnership policy and local partnership practice, „interpreting each to the 
other‟ (Mosse, 2005a, p.134).  
 
Importantly, and following Mosse (2005a, p.162), „there is no suggestion of 
duplicity‟ here; no lies are told. Rather, what occurs is the selective editing of 
local events, experiences and interactions, so as to whisk the socio-political 
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parts of the (partnership) story „out of sight‟ (Dar, 2008; Eyben, 2010; 
Ferguson, 1990, p.xv; Marriage, 2006). It is a form of „self-censorship‟ (cf. 
Atkinson, 1999, p.67) based upon the anticipated reception of the grant 
application document by the Global Fund.  
 
Interestingly, insights from other studies reveal that it is common for politics 
and dissonance to be deliberately downplayed in this way, in order to give the 
impression that disorderly local practice is compliant with orderly policy 
models (Mosse, 2005a; Rushton, 2008). Yet why might this be case? The 
answer has much to do with the subaltern position of those who are involved in 
local aid practice, as compared with those who are involved in producing 
global policy models (which, in the case of the Global Fund, was a somewhat 
elite group of actors, see Chapter Five). As Mosse (2005a, p.235 italics in 
original) explains, „In the competitive market for success, it is difficult for 
dependent agencies not to portray their actions as achievements in terms of 
currently favoured models. The cost of breaking ranks is high and public 
disputes over meaning and interpretation are rare‟. In other words, and in 
relation to the Global Fund in particular, actors in Zambia necessarily 
(re)manufacture local practice back into the Fund‟s technical and managerial 
model of partnership when preparing grant proposals because not to do so 
would jeopardise their relationship with the Fund and the opportunity to access 
the resources that flow from it (cf. Eyben, 2010). In this way then, the local 
remanufacturing of partnership can be seen as a type of „weapon of the weak‟ 
(cf. Scott, 1985); a way for Zambian actors to exercise their agency and power 
in the arena of global health and to secure health resources in a context of 
scarcity. 
 
Unfortunately, by effectively complying with the dominant version of the 
Fund‟s partnership model in this way, these actions actually serve to validate, 
reinforce and sustain it (cf. Mosse, 2005a); which arguably perpetuates the 
view that local practice is and indeed should be technical and economic; 
depoliticised, managed and manageable. The problem is that by reinforcing this 
view: not only is attention diverted away from the real politics, dissonance, 
relationships and inequalities that (it is argued here) inevitably shape local 
practice (and by extension the problems of AIDS, TB and malaria in Zambia); 
but also, and in so doing, it effectively closes down opportunities for open 
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deliberation, critical thinking and reflective learning about these issues (Dar, 
2008; Eyben, 2010). In short, if such issues are not disclosed, how can they be 
learnt from and addressed?  
 
The Fund itself has little political incentive to fully expose these issues, 
because it insulates the organisation from critique; and fabricates the „fantasy‟ 
that its apolitical and managerial model will lead to results and performance 
(cf. Marriage, 2006). To openly acknowledge the political messiness of 
partnership in practice could destabilise its successful image and potentially 
delegitimize its operations in the eyes of its donors, who may refuse to buy into 
such contingent practice (cf. Eyben, 2010, p.13). Consciously or unconsciously 
then, the Fund will seek to sustain what Foucault (1980, p.131) might call its 
own „regime‟ of technical truth about partnership, in order to secure its own 
position, status and power in the global governance of health. 
 
Arguably then, the local reinforcement of the Fund‟s technical model of 
partnership results in the type of discursive or deliberative closure about health 
and development (cf. Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p.16) that was mentioned in 
Chapter Four, and moreover produces ignorance (cf. Mosse, 2004) about the 
way in which the Fund‟s partnership model, and the partnership techniques that 
the model seeks to legitimise (including proposal development, the use of 
targeting, the measurement and monitoring of performance against these targets, 
and the allocation of resources on the basis of performance results) intersect 
with, shape, contort and constrain socio-political action.  
 
As the next section of this chapter will now go on to show, the Fund‟s 
partnership techniques actually seem to having a number of rather significant 
socio-political effects as they become enmeshed in local health dynamics; 
shaping, contorting and constraining who is able to access global health 
resources, and, equally significantly, who is able to demand accountability in 
and lead the governance of health. While some of these effects have been 
implicitly mentioned in the discussion above (when, for example, discussing 
the partnership technique of proposal development), more explicit examples are 
given below before the chapter concludes.    
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Reshaping, contorting and constraining health governance  
 
Although there is little doubt that the resources provided by the Global Fund 
have resulted in a significant increase in funding for AIDS, TB and malaria 
activities in many areas across Zambia – for example, enabling people to start 
anti-retroviral therapy and to sleep under an insecticide treated bed nets – it 
was striking that almost all of those interviewed expressed some kind of 
apprehension about certain aspects of the Fund‟s partnership techniques 
(whether that included, for example, the use of targeting, standardised 
managerial reporting and audit procedures, or the linking of funding allocations 
to performance reports); with some discontent as to how these layer into and 
reshape health governance.  
 
There was considerable concern that the technical and managerial focus was 
resulting in the exclusion of some local actors from accessing global funding 
and thus from benefiting from AIDS, TB and malaria programmes. In order to 
comply with the Fund‟s partnership procedures, both CHAZ and ZNAN (the 
„civil society‟ PRs) have set up elaborate sub-granting systems in order to 
manage and control the local allocation and use of global funds by SRs. In 
order to access funds from these PRs, a „civil society‟ organisation must 
prepare and submit a costed and targeted project proposal, and demonstrate that 
they have the right management skills to complete and submit financial and 
performance reports on a quarterly basis.  
 
The problem is that many local actors, usually the smaller organisations that 
are located in the most remote rural areas, often do not know what a successful 
technical proposal looks like, are unused to communicating in a dialect of data 
and numbers, and therefore find it difficult to demonstrate that they have the 
requisite mastery of management skills to receive global funds. As a result, 
they often fail in attempts to apply for funding; regardless of whether they have 
the capacity to implement AIDS, TB or malaria programmes that meet local 
needs. In contrast, larger international NGOs are well-placed to demonstrate 
that they have the right management skills and, in practice, it is these „usual 
suspects‟ (cf. Harman, 2007) that therefore tend to be the main sub-recipients 
of global funds. As two civil society representatives succinctly explained:   
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How many organisations have received training in proposal 
development? We have very few technocrats that can do this... Only 
those with technical know-how, only those with the ability to engage a 
technical consultant can access resources. Unless those politics change, a 
lot of local organisations will not reach; not because they were not able 
to implement (Int. 6
th
 April 2009). 
 
I personally feel that the smaller organisations are disadvantaged. Their 
capacity to write proposals is limited; their capacity to have audited 
accounts is very limited... I'd like to think that community organisations 
can deliver in terms of health outcomes, capacity to implement. Do you 
think that there is a balance between looking at technical, written 
proposals and capacity to implement? No, no balance at all (Int. 21
st
 
April 2009 donor agency representative).   
 
Instead of being recognised for potentially innovative capabilities then, or for 
their local experience and understanding of health governance, there is a risk 
here that smaller „civil society‟ health organisations end up being seen as 
„actors to be “educated” and “supervised”‟ in the Global Fund‟s partnership 
„techniques‟ of financial and performance management (Sanz Corella et al., 
2006, p.42 italics added). Moreover, and as a result of all this, these actors, 
which may have a close and potentially accountable relationship to local people, 
may be left on the fringes of health governance feeling disappointed and 
frustrated. This creates a potentially more volatile political environment locally. 
 
Many civil society organisations do seem disaffected with the Global Fund 
process (Int. 27 Mar 2009; 17 Apr 2009; 4 May 2009; 31 May 2009; 6
 
June 
2009; 30 June 2009 civil society organisation representatives); a feeling that 
was entrenched by the funding delays that are somewhat endemic to this 
partnership in practice. The multiple checkpoints, performance management 
report, verifications and supervisory visits from PRs mean that if a local „civil 
society‟ health organisation does manage to secure global funding for a project, 
there are often considerable funding gaps which disrupts implementation (Int. 
17 Apr 2009; Int. 4 May 2009; Int. 4 June 2009; Int. 30 June 2009 civil society 
organisation representatives).  
 
In many cases, the delays actually led to perverse implementation schedules, 
with many interviewees indicating that the initiation, management, monitoring 
and evaluation of four-month projects often had to be condensed into one to 
three weeks (Int. 4 May 2009; Int. 4 Jun 2009; Int. 30 Jun 2009 civil society 
organisation representatives). The issues that this creates are eloquently 
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captured in an online diary entry of an overseas volunteer that was interviewed 
during the research; it is therefore reproduced here at length: 
 
[x] had delayed payment of its grant for three months. The 1.8 billion 
kwacha (US$360,000) that had been earmarked for the last quarter of 
2008 arrived in [x‟s] bank account in the middle of January 2009. These 
funds were to be [sub]granted a week later, spent the following week and 
then monitored in three weeks time... The original schedule was 
supposed to take almost four months. Instead... all had to be done within 
three weeks, while also hitting the same number of target beneficiaries.... 
Certain projects, regardless of the impact they would have on people's 
lives, were scrapped. Any project that took longer than two weeks to 
finish, like training new home-based caregivers (HBCs) for people living 
with HIV/AIDS, could not be considered. Re-training existing HBCs 
only takes a day, so any organization doing that got funding... It appears 
that the only criterion was if you could spend the money fast enough on 
things that can be easily counted. There was little attempt to assess 
whether the lives of „beneficiaries' had been improved, but how could 
you possibly expect to measure such an improvement a week after the 
funding arrived? (Crockett, 2009). 
 
Unfortunately, because there is no transparent disaggregation of the level or 
timing of receipt of funds, or performance data locally (the Global Fund only 
requires aggregated reports), and because local „civil society‟ organisations are 
effectively competing for funds from PRs and also SRs, there is considerable 
conflict and mutual suspicion locally (rather than collaboration) as to who and 
how different organisations are accessing and managing Global Fund resources 
(Int. 27 Mar 2009; Int. 15 Apr 2009; Int. 5 May 2009; Int. 4 May 2009 civil 
society organisation representatives). The endemic nature of delays compounds 
this, leading many to question the role and motivations of „civil society‟ PRs. 
There were, for example, conspiracy theories that global funding was 
temporarily stored in bank accounts in order to accrue interest for personal gain, 
before it was transferred on for programme implementation. It is not the 
purpose of this research to attest to the accuracy of such theories. What the 
above discussion does however clearly demonstrate is that as the Fund‟s 
partnership model is translated into local practice it layers into existing political 
dynamics; reshaping and fragmenting „civil society‟ organisation relations of 
health governance.  
 
Importantly, it is not only „civil society‟ relationships that the Global Fund is 
shifting. It also seems to be affecting the dynamics within the governmental 
sphere; not only contorting how different actors within the MoH interact, but 
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also how the MoH and MoFNP inter-relate. As with many other countries 
globally, the public health sector in Zambia has historically been highly 
centralised, with planning, budgeting and decision-making focused around the 
MoH headquarters in Lusaka (see also Chapter Eight). As a consequence of 
this historical set up, MoH actors at the provincial and district-levels tend to be 
disengaged in Global Fund proposal development processes and in decision-
making about resource use. This lack of engagement and communication is 
compounded by the difficulties that the MoH HQ has in assessing the level of 
Global Fund money that will come through in any given period, because the 
Fund‟s partnership techniques are not currently aligned with MoH planning 
cycles.
77
 In turn, provincial and district-level actors find it hard, if not 
impossible, to budget for Global Fund monies in their local plans (Int. 9
th
 June 
academic; Int. 26
th
 June 2009 MoH official). As one provincial health official 
commented: „For us, we just get sometimes‟ (Int. 18th June 2009 MoH official).  
 
In fact, because of the endemic delays associated with the Global Fund‟s 
partnership system in practice, resources often end up being pushed in to 
provinces and districts, with a MoH HQ requirement to spend and, moreover, 
to spend quickly, in order to meet the performance targets that were initially set. 
As one provincial health official indicated: „[We often] have to implement 
almost gun point‟ (Int. 7th May 2009 MoH official). These actors are also 
required to send additional monitoring reports up to the MoH HQ, so that the 
MoH (as PR) can itself report upwards to the Global Fund Secretariat on 
programmatic performance; and this all pressures provincial and district actors 
to neglect activities that they had originally planned for (Int. 7 May 2009, 
Int.12 June 2009, Int. 18 June 2009 MoH officials). As it works in local 
practice then, not only does the Fund‟s partnership model undermine the 
government‟s existing planning cycle, but it also distracts local government 
actors from pre-existing health priorities and activities, and reinforces what is 
an already existing „etiquette of hierarchy‟ (cf. Green, 2003, p.135) within the 
government health system; further constraining how provincial and district-
level actors are involved in health governance.  
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  It is recognised that this „could‟ change with the Fund‟s move towards 
national strategy applications. 
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Moreover, because Global Fund monies tend not to be budgeted for in local 
action plans and are often pushed in unexpectedly to provinces and districts, 
when annual financial reports are subsequently prepared by these areas Global 
Fund resources often end up showing up as over-expenditure against AIDS, TB 
or malaria budget lines (see Figure 8); as does funding from many other global 
health programmes (including GAVI and PEPFAR) (see also Sundewall et al., 
2009).
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 While Global Fund money appears as over-expenditure however 
(because it was not originally budgeted for), there may actually be deficits in 
other areas of health because these resources are clearly earmarked for AIDS, 
malaria or TB. This not only risks the lop-sided funding of the government 
health system, but also frustrates the relationship between the MoH and 
MoFNP because it looks, somewhat badly, as though district facilities and the 
MoH have over-spent (Int. 26 March 2009 MoH official; Int. 9 June 2009 
academic). At the same time, because performance reporting for the Global 
Fund occurs outside of statutory systems, and the information from non-
governmental PRs tends to bypass the MoH HQ, the Ministry is often unclear 
as to what is being done, by who and where in relation to the Global Fund 
across the country (this is also the case for other global health programmes).  
 
Even if reports were to be shared, the information is aggregated. While this is 
useful for the Global Fund, because the partnership results can be sold to donor 
governments, it is less relevant locally when trying to understand, respond to 
and be accountable for geographical challenges and inequalities in health. This 
information gap then, not only makes it difficult for the MoH HQ to fully 
understand and critique what is going on locally, but also makes it difficult for 
them to construct a persuasive political case to the MoFNP for an increase in 
the health budget, because they cannot be clear about the volume of resources 
already being spent – even if they wanted to (Int. 26 March 2009 MoH official; 
Int. 9 June 2009 academic). In these different ways then, because the Global 
Fund‟s particular partnership model of governance is layered over existing and 
statutory health sector practice, it actually undermines the MoH‟s stewardship 
and accountability role; and raises questions as to who is leading the 
governance of health locally?  
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  In the example from 2008, in Chipata in the Eastern Province of Zambia there 
was higher expenditure (278 million kwacha) on TB than had been budgeted 
for due to funds received from the Global Fund in the first quarter of the year. 
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Figure 8. The appearance of over-expenditure in district budgets in Zambia (from 
MoH Zambia, 2009c). 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the Global Fund clearly has an important role in global health 
governance, and provides much needed resources to combat AIDS, TB and 
malaria, this paper has questioned whether its partnership model is a technical, 
economic and, moreover, depoliticised way to ensure that those resources 
generate impact, as the dominant official „packaging‟ (cf. Petit and Wheeler, 
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2005) of partnership seems to suggest. While partnership certainly provides a 
seemingly persuasive argument and legitimation for how the Global Fund will 
bring the solution and, moreover, accountable use of funds that many donor 
governments called for (see Chapter Six), in practice in the health sector in 
Zambia it becomes enmeshed in local political dynamics; induces local actors 
to tactically and necessarily conceal politics, in order to demonstrate 
compliance with what seems to be a hegemonic depoliticised partnership 
(governing) mentality; and also (re)shapes, contorts and constrains local health 
governance; in particular because it layers a new technical governance model 
over the existing polity.  
 
The chapter has also shown that the managerial techniques that the Fund‟s 
model partnership seeks to legitimise have a number of (rather significant) 
social and political effects in health sector practice; which fall far short of 
challenging dominant actors and thus, ultimately, to some of the underlying 
structural inequalities that contribute to the prevalence of AIDS, TB and 
malaria. Global Fund partnership practice is then, clearly reconfiguring the 
political landscape and governance of health in Zambia; not only shifting who 
is included and excluded from accessing health resources, but also contributing 
to increasingly competitive relations between „civil society‟ health 
organisations, centralisation (towards an elite group of actors who are based 
largely in Lusaka) and the entrenchment of „etiquettes of hierarchy‟ (cf. Green, 
2003, p.135) within the MoH governmental sphere. At the same time, it is also, 
arguably, closing-down the type of qualitative reflection and critical 
deliberative debate that could challenge the social, political and economic 
structures that lead to poor health.  
 
Global Fund partnership activities are clearly not a technical, economic and 
depoliticised approach to governing aid and health, but rather are intimately 
caught up in the complexity, politics and power of local health sector action. 
While the idea of partnership clearly has something of a Zambian social and 
political life, the dominantly technical model of partnership does however, 
seem to shape local action as Zambian actors remanufacture practice back into 
a depoliticised logic. In other words, the depoliticisation of the policy of 
partnership seems to (re)shape health governing mentalities, though not 
necessarily in ways that are initially intended.  
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Chapter Seven 
Partnership and Policy: The sector-wide approach 
(SWAp) for health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The sector-wide approach or SWAp emerged as a component of aid policy 
during the late-1990s, and has subsequently become an increasingly common 
feature of the world of aid. Not only do many bilateral and multilateral 
agencies now have official guidelines on SWAps (see HLSP, 2005; OECD, 
2006; DGIS, 2004; NZAID, 2006; Schleimann et al., 2003), but so do the 
governments of a number of aid-recipient countries, and specifically in relation 
to health sector development (MoH Ghana, 2007; MoH Uganda, 2010; MoH 
Zambia, 2005). Indeed, SWAps have gained particular popularity in the arena 
of aid for health, having been promoted at various times by the World Bank, 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and key bilateral aid donors, and are now a 
feature of national health policy in more than twenty countries globally, 
including Bangladesh, Ghana, Mozambique, Pakistan, and Zambia (the country 
case study for this research) (Hill, 2002; Foster, 2000).  
 
According to official texts, a health SWAp is a way of managing and 
coordinating the health sector of a particular country, and is aimed at shifting 
the way in which aid is delivered and managed, away from a series of separate 
projects (Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006).
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 In other words, it is an 
approach to governing aid and health sector development, and official policy is 
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  As indicated earlier in the thesis, aid projects are activities that are funded for 
limited period of time, and may be managed in specific, donor-specified ways. 
Overview 
 The first of a couplet of chapters about the idea of partnership and 
health sector-wide approaches (SWAps) 
 Considers why policy about health SWAps was produced under the 
rubric of the idea of partnership 
 Discusses the (f)actors that contributed to use of partnership 
 Considers how these (f)actors help to explain how partnership is used 
and framed in official texts about health SWAps 
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clear how this should proceed: under the rubric of the idea of partnership. 
Indeed, partnership is a common feature of SWAp policy texts. Not only does 
it feature in the 1997 „Guide to sector-wide approaches for health‟ (Cassels, 
1997), which, as we shall see, was the first official text to refer to a SWAp, but 
also in many more recent national strategies, donor procedures and reports. As 
Kenneth King (1999, p.8 italics added) observes, „partnership is said to be at 
the heart of SWAps‟. 
 
Yet why did official policy about health SWAps emerge in the late-1990s 
incorporating the idea of partnership? What (f)actors contributed to the idea of 
partnership‟s pervasive use? And moreover, how does this help to explain how 
partnership is framed (and thus what it means) in official policy texts?  
 
These are questions that have not been addressed in the burgeoning body of 
academic and grey literature that has been published on health SWAps. While 
there are certainly a number of consultancy reports and donor evaluations on 
the general topic, and a selection of peer-reviewed articles, many of these focus 
somewhat narrowly on explaining what SWAp policy is (or what it is not). 
They identify a series of key features or desirable outcomes, including, for 
example, that all donor agencies support a shared strategy and use shared 
processes for implementing it. Then assess the extent to which these are (or 
might be) achieved (see Chansa, 2008; Peters and Chao, 1998; Foster, 2000; 
Walford, 2003; Mirzoev et al., 2010). Rather less work reflects critically on 
SWAp policy itself, how and why it was formulated and / or the wider practical 
implications in specific contexts (see Hill, 2002; Sundewall and Sahlin-
Andersson, 2006; Sundewall et al. 2006). In other words, many existing studies 
can be characterised as instrumental in the same way that the literature on 
partnership was in Chapter Two; in the sense that they are concerned to 
understand and suggest how apparently positive SWAp intentions can be 
realised (implemented) in practice through rational and manageable means (cf. 
Mosse, 2005a). It is also clear that, to date, no study has explored the idea of 
partnership in any detail. The central purpose of this chapter is therefore to 
address these gaps, and also to put forward answers to the questions set out 
above.  
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In so doing, the chapter probes and further explores issues that have been raised 
in Chapters Four and Five, and contributes to the first aspect of this thesis‟ 
substantive research question, namely: „Why is the idea of partnership a 
pervasive feature in contemporary aid policy?‟ As indicated in Chapters One 
and Three, this chapter should be read as the first part of a couplet on health 
SWAps: while this one focuses on what the idea of partnership is and does in 
relation to policy (texts) about health SWAps, the next chapter considers and 
compares what partnership is and does when it is set to work in practice, using 
Zambia as a case study of focus.    
 
Methodologically, the chapter draws on a critical constructivist analysis of 
academic literature on SWAps and also a „backward‟ analysis of official texts, 
in order to understand how the dynamic interplay of a range of different 
(f)actors contributed to the production of SWAp policy under the rubric of the 
idea of partnership (cf. Mosse, 2005a; see Chapter 3). It takes its cue from the 
more critical and indeed constructivist studies that have been published about 
health SWAps, which offer the insight that the meaning of ideas embedded 
within SWAp policy are not always clear, and that such policy is tailored to 
meet the needs, interests and expectations of a particular audience (Hill, 2002; 
Sundewall and Sahlin-Anderson, 2006; and Sundewall et al., 2006). The 
chapter is therefore sensitive to the potentially ambiguous meaning of the idea 
of partnership, and also implicitly considers who the intended audience of 
SWAp policy is and how this might have shaped how the idea is framed.  
 
In line with the arguments of Chapters Four and Five, the chapter shows that 
the production of policy about health SWAps under the rubric of the idea of 
partnership was the outcome of a complicated historical socio-political process 
during the 1990s; the product of the dynamic interaction between a range of 
different actors, and also of the interplay between their ideas, interests, and the 
prevailing context in which they found themselves (Hacking, 1999; Hay, 2002; 
Long and van der Ploeg, 1994; Hay, 2002). The first part of the chapter 
discusses this process, drawing out a number of inter-related (f)actors that were 
particularly influential in the shaping of it, including: the way in which the 
World Bank responded to critics and also how other donor agencies interpreted 
and reacted to the Bank‟s response (see below). The second part moves on to 
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consider how these (f)actors influenced the way the idea of partnership is 
framed.  
 
The chapter argues that policy about health SWAps was developed as part of a 
broader response by aid agencies to the post-Cold War climate of „crisis‟ in 
which they found themselves in the early-1990s, wherein the effectiveness and 
governance of aid was questioned by donor governments, academics and 
NGOs alike (see Chapter Four). It was in the context of this „crisis‟ that various 
aid agencies attempted to strategically restate the case for aid, and it seems that 
policy about SWAps was produced as part of these efforts. As the chapter 
explains, the work of the World Bank was particularly influential here, and 
considerably shaped the way in which the idea of partnership came to feature in 
SWAp texts. In order to respond to the crisis, the Bank promoted sectoral 
investment programmes (SIPs) as an effective way to govern aid for health 
sector development, experimenting with them in countries like Zambia. The 
Bank‟s SIP agenda however provoked unease among other aid agencies. While 
key bilateral agencies and multilaterals such as the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) agreed that aid should be provided to the health sector, there was some 
level of disagreement about how it should be governed and about the somewhat 
prescriptive, technical and (neoliberal) economic nature of the Bank‟s thinking 
(Walt and Buse, 2006; Cassels, 1997). The chapter argues that it was a result of 
this apparent clash of views about aid and health governance (cf. Williams and 
Rushton, 2009) that policy about health SWAps came to be produced; and 
moreover, came to feature the idea of partnership.   
 
While the chapter certainly emphasises that the idea of partnership features in 
SWAp policy because it had emerged as the „master‟ concept (cf. Mosse, 
2005a) within other key narratives about aid at the time; and was thus 
becoming „accepted‟ into the „cognitive architecture of intelligibility‟ (cf. 
Green, 2007, p.142) of various agents involved in the world of aid. It is also 
argued that the pervasive and ambiguous way in which the idea is framed in 
official SWAp texts reflects the existence of the conflicts referred to above. 
Indeed, in support of Chapters Four and Five, it is argued that because the idea 
of partnership is malleable – it can easily be reframed in different ways and 
thus be interpreted in different ways by different people (Cornwall, 2008) – it 
appears to have been strategically crafted into SWAp texts as a way to bridge 
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and enrol a range of different actors (the World Bank, other aid agencies, donor 
governments and also recipient actors), who all had somewhat different 
(though not necessarily mutually exclusive) views, values and expectations 
about the way in which aid for health should be governed (cf. Mosse, 2005a; 
Cornwall, 2008). Significantly the chapter shows however, how the dominance 
of a broadly technical, economic and, moreover, depoliticised version of 
partnership prevails in health SWAp texts, which perhaps reflects the power of 
the World Bank and neoliberal thinking more broadly, and thus the inherently 
unequal way in which aid policy processes are governed.   
 
As with the chapters that have gone before in this thesis, the current chapter 
(Chapter Seven) and also the next (Chapter Eight) are not the complete story; 
rather, they are a partial interpretation of those (f)actors that have been judged 
here as the most influential in explaining how and why partnership features in 
health SWAp policy and practice.   
 
The emergence of policy about health SWAps: The context for aid, the 
World Bank and ideas about (health sector) governance 
 
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter above, a number of inter-related 
(f)actors contributed to the development of policy about health SWAps under 
the rubric of the idea of partnership.  
 
An international context of crisis: Re-justifying the need for aid 
 
The first important factor was the prevailing context for aid during the early- to 
mid- 1990s which, as indicated in Chapter Four, was one of apparent crisis. 
The crisis emerged for a number of complicated reasons. Not only had the 
ending of the Cold War eliminated the perceived geo-strategic need for aid, but 
also ongoing critical attacks about its economic ineffectiveness (by right-
leaning actors in the US in particular) and the paternalistic way in which it was 
governed (by coalitions of NGOs), combined with fiscal deficits in aid-giving 
nations, meant that aid agencies were losing their budgets, their political status 
and their legitimacy. They „desperately needed a new story‟ (Fraser and 
Whitfield 2009, p.77); to construct a compelling new narrative about the need 
for (and economic effectiveness of) aid in a post-Cold War era so as to re-
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galvanise their constituency of support; and particularly where it mattered – in 
the highest echelons of decision-making in key donor governments. 
 
As Chapter Four argues, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) worked 
hard to this end; eventually publishing a new global strategy document in 1996 
entitled „Shaping the 21st Century‟. Significantly for our understanding here, 
the idea of partnership was the „master‟ concept in this text (cf. Mosse, 2005a) 
and, as we shall soon see, this helps to explain why the same idea was 
subsequently incorporated into policy about health SWAps. In short, it had 
became a symbolic motif by which any new aid policy was expected to be 
decorated and would be judged (see also Chapter Four). However, to explain 
why SWAp policy itself was produced, as well as how and why the idea of 
partnership came to be framed within SWAp texts, we need to look to a second 
important (f)actor; and specifically, to the World Bank.   
 
The role of the World Bank: Responding to criticisms of neoliberal 
thinking 
 
While aid agencies in general were the subject of criticism during the early 
1990s, the World Bank was a particular focus of attack due the way in which 
its structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were governed and impacting on 
poorer countries. As Chapter Four explains, SAPs were introduced by the Bank 
(and IMF) during the 1980s to respond to the rising levels of foreign debt, 
declining terms of trade and negative economic growth in many poorer 
countries at this time (which had been sparked by the global oil crisis in the 
1970s) (Lee and Zwi, 1996; Fraser, 2007). Grounded in the Bank‟s neoliberal 
thinking and, through the promise of various forms of credit or debt re-
scheduling, SAPs sought to buy a series of macro-economic policy reforms – 
including the tightening of fiscal discipline, financial and trade liberalisation 
and the reduction of public expenditure – that were believed necessary to roll 
back recipient states and bring about long-term market economic growth (and 
poverty reduction) (Harrison, 2010; Williamson, 1994; see Chapter Four). 
 
Despite their neo-liberal fervour however, right leaning actors (neo-
conservatives in the US in particular) criticised SAPs for being a form of 
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welfare aid that was economically ineffective (as evidenced by the continued 
debt crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular), and thus chastised the Bank for 
intervening in matters that were „better left to the free-market‟ (Ugalde and 
Jackson, 1995). Conversely, more progressive left-leaning academics and 
NGOs criticised SAPs for conveying the paternalistic view that „the Bank 
knows best‟ and for entailing considerable social cost (Cornia et al. 1987; 
Crewe and Harrison, 1998). Indeed, these critics were particularly derisive of 
the negative health effects of the public expenditure reforms embedded into 
lending conditionality; with some arguing that SAPs had, for example, 
contributed to an epidemic of nutritional diseases (including yaws and yellow 
fever), to a growth in other diseases of deprivation (such as gastroenteritis and 
tuberculosis), and to the erosion of (and exclusion of the poor from) an already 
limited health care infrastructure (Buse, 1994; Alubo, 1990; Loewenson, 1993; 
see also Kanji et al.,1991; Pfeiffer and Chapman, 2010). 
 
While the World Bank certainly tried to militate against these latter criticisms 
by financing a growing number of health and nutrition projects in the late-
1980s – areas not traditionally in the Bank‟s purview (see Buse, 1994) – by the 
early-1990s the Bank had a considerable problem. Not only were criticisms 
increasingly being raised by people outside the Bank, but also increasingly 
from within; as exemplified by the leaked internal Wapenhans Report in 1992, 
which reported high levels of aid project failure (according the Bank‟s own 
criteria) and also condemned the Bank‟s organisational culture (Weaver, 2008). 
Perhaps even more so than other aid agencies then, the World Bank needed to 
„represent itself to the outside world‟ (cf. Harrison, 2001b, p.529 italics added); 
to demonstrate that it was capable of changing the way that it governed aid; 
that it could deliver aid resources efficiently and effectively (and thus drive 
forward capitalist growth); and also, and crucially for our understanding of the 
development of health SWAps, that it could address the social, and specifically, 
the health sector costs of SAPs.  
 
The search to represent the Bank 
 
Yet how could the Bank go about representing itself in this way? It seems that 
the promotion of aid projects was not an option here. Not only had the 
Wapenhans Report produced a damning indictment of the Bank‟s own project 
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portfolio, but there were also growing concerns at the time on the part of a wide 
range of other actors about the use of aid projects; and specifically those 
involving the health sector.  
 
Although the overall volume and priority accorded to aid for health was still 
relatively low at this time (see Chapter Five), for various different reasons aid 
agencies were earmarking funding to a growing number of discrete health 
projects, often bringing parallel administrative systems, conflicting health 
priorities and even conflicting treatment regimes (see Buse and Walt, 1997; 
Walt et al. 1999). In consequence, by the early 1990s there were concerns on 
the part of a number of actors within recipient governments (including in 
Zambia), aid agencies, and NGOs alike that an „unruly mélange‟ (cf. Buse and 
Walt, 1997) of uncoordinated projects and donors was problematic: causing 
confusion, duplication of effort, fragmentation in health service provision, and 
inefficiencies in the use of scarce (domestic and donor) resources (Justice, 1989; 
Clift, 1988; Walt et al. 1999). While different actors certainly seem to have had 
different interests in and explanations for this apparent „coordination problem‟ 
(cf. Mosley and Eckhout, 2000), as David Peters and Shiyan Chao (1998, p.180) 
put it, there was a growing consensus that it was leaving a „mixed legacy‟ in 
the health sector of many poorer countries.  
 
Significantly, it seems that the World Bank was concerned about coordination, 
but its particular interest was the congruence between projects and structural 
adjustment lending (Mosley and Eckhout, 2000). As Kent Buse and Gill Walt 
(1997) indicate, the Bank was troubled by the way a proliferation of projects – 
some of which encouraged greater recurrent expenditure on public health – 
subverted the Bank‟s neoliberal reform agenda; which (as indicated above and 
in Chapter Four) aimed to limit public expenditure and roll back the state. 
Indeed, it seems that the Bank was concerned that a lack of coordination had an 
erosive effect on the institutional capacity of recipient governments to develop 
and implement (or in the Bank‟s words to own) the sectoral policies and 
budgetary management that the Bank saw as necessary to support a broader 
programme of macro-economic reform and market-based growth (Buse and 
Walt, 1997; Harrison, 2001b; 2005a). In other words, the Bank was concerned 
that projects encouraged inefficient and ineffective management of resources 
(both aid and domestic) at a sectoral level, and also a culture of passivity and 
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dependence; so much so that recipient governments were not responsible for 
their own market-based economic development (cf. Baaz, 2005).  
 
While the Bank therefore needed to demonstrate it was doing something to 
address problems in the health and social sectors (so as to represent itself to 
left-leaning critics), it was keen to promote activities that would coordinate 
with, rather than convert its broader (neoliberal) reform agenda. It seems to be 
for this reason then, that the Bank started to explore and promote other aid 
mechanisms, so as to simultaneously solve the „coordination problem‟ (cf. 
Mosley and Eckhout, 2000) and regalvanize its constituency of support. This 
work complemented wider efforts of the Bank to enhance its international 
image around this time, as discussed in Chapter Four. Of particular significance 
here however, was one specific aid approach that the Bank decided to 
experiment with and subsequently sell in the early 1990s: the Sector 
Investment Programme (or SIP). As we will now see, it was in these efforts that 
the foundations for health SWAps (and indeed the Zambian health SWAp in 
particular) started to be laid down.  
 
The exploration and marketing of Sector Investment Programmes (SIPs) 
 
It was staff within the Africa Region of the Bank that took the initiative to 
explore and then market SIPs as a way forward for the delivery and 
management of aid (Andersen, 2000). They were first pursued on something of 
an ad hoc basis in a select number of countries and a select range of sectors in 
Africa. Of particular significance here, one of the very first SIPs to be pursued 
by the Bank was in the health sector in Zambia – the case study for this 
research. It is therefore useful to consider what happened in Zambia in some 
detail. 
 
Learning from experiment: The health SIP in Zambia 
 
The trigger to explore a health SIP in Zambia was the electoral defeat of the 
country‟s liberation party (UNIP) in 1991, and the subsequent rise to power of 
Frederick Chiluba‟s Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). The 
election implied the ending of UNIP‟s one-party rule and a move towards 
democratisation – the earliest of this kind in the region – which marked Zambia 
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out internationally. At the same time, the MMD had risen to power with 
massive popular support and a strongly reform-oriented political agenda. In 
consequence, it was the hope of the World Bank that the country would provide 
an opportunity to explore how changes to health sector governance could be 
coordinated with a broader programme of neoliberal reform. Although the 
Bank had no previous projects or direct experience with lending for health in 
Zambia, the MMD had developed a particularly ambitious vision for health 
sector restructuring (see below). As a result, and in the Bank‟s own words, it 
sought to „jump on a moving train‟ (World Bank, 2001, p.84), so as to quickly 
provide a basis from which it could affirm the international success of a 
coordinated neoliberal approach to aid in the health sector (cf. Fraser, 2007). 
 
The possibility of demonstrating the success of this approach in Zambia was 
actually a particularly significant political opportunity for the Bank to represent 
itself to NGO and other left-leaning critics, due to the particularly devastating 
health effect that earlier SAPs had in the country (see Kanji et al., 1991).
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While the health situation was already serious given the country‟s economic 
decline in the 1970s, the reform measures embedded into World Bank (and 
IMFs) lending conditionality in the 1980s (including restrictions on health 
expenditure, public sector wage freezes, and the imposition of user fees) further 
eroded the health sector infrastructure, entrenched a human resources crisis; 
aggravated shortages of essential supplies; and also exacerbated inequitable 
social conditions, propelling tuberculosis, malaria and HIV/AIDS transmission 
(Freund, 1986; Lake and Musumali, 1999; Poku, 2005). In short, if the Bank 
could demonstrate that a SIP would address the „jungle of problems‟ that one 
senior government official described the health sector as experiencing (Gilson 
et al., 2003 p.36), this would go some way to re-galvanising the Bank‟s 
international constituency of support.  
 
The problem was that the values upon which the MMD‟s initial health reform 
proposals were based differed to those of the Bank. As Erik Blas and Me 
Limbambala (2001) indicate, the MMD‟s national health policy and strategies 
document (which had been inspired by the earlier work of academic Dr Katele 
Kalumba) reflected egalitarian or communitarian values (see MoH, 1992). As 
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  A SAP had been introduced to Zambia in the 1980s due to the economic crisis 
that had resulted from a collapse in copper prices in the 1970s – copper was 
(and still is) the backbone of the Zambian economy. 
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such, it focused on popular participation, the removal of health inequalities and 
the „radical devolution of power‟ to districts (Blas and Limbambala, 2001, p.38; 
Gilson, 2000). Indeed, it emphasised the need for Zambians to commit 
themselves to building a transformed health care system that guaranteed „equity 
of access to cost-effective, quality health care as close to the family as possible‟ 
(MoH, 1992). In contrast, the Bank was more concerned with promoting and 
funding activities (a „SIP‟) that would coordinate the rationing of public 
services, the investment of expenditure in specific critical health interventions, 
and building the institutional capacity to appropriately (in the Bank‟s view) 
manage sectoral resources, both aid and domestic, for  market-based economic 
growth.  
 
There was clearly an issue here because the Bank did not want to impose a SIP 
agenda. Instead, the Bank wanted and indeed needed SIPs to be perceived as a 
move away from structural adjustment, and therefore as a new and less Bank-
driven way of governing aid and development. As a consequence, SIP 
development had to be about influence rather than imposition. In the two 
missions that the Bank sent to the health sector in the second half of 1992 and 
the subsequent meetings that were scheduled with the Ministry of Health 
throughout 1993 and 1994, World Bank staff tried hard to show that they were 
working with the Zambian government and with other donors to effectively 
coordinate aid to support the government‟s own reforms. The Bank did this by 
engaging in a series of dialogues with the Ministry and other donor officials. 
 
Given the country‟s continued economic crisis, part of this dialogue was 
inevitably about the resourcing of the health sector and it was here that the 
World Bank could exert its influence about a coordinated SIP: during 
discussion the Bank suggested that Zambia could no longer afford the type of 
health system planned and therefore recommended (and indeed secured 
agreement for) moving towards a reform approach based on cost-effectiveness 
(Blas and Limbambala, 2001, p.38; Kalumba, 1997; Kalumba et al., 1994). 
This implied designing a completely new system based on the country‟s 
„economic reality‟ to which different aid donors would sign up to support 
(Kalumba, 1997). As Kalumba (1997, pp.20-21) explains: 
 
The Bank mission suggested that the Zambia health system could be 
likened to a Cadillac which was maintained by a relatively wealthy 
198 
 
family for years. But as the family‟s economic situation changed, it 
could no longer afford to maintain this gas-guzzling vehicle without 
seeking assistance from cousins and relatives... The team argued that 
Zambia had sufficient resources to maintain a more efficient system 
which could provide essential health care services for all, but the 
“Cadillac” would have to be retooled.  
 
This retooling or reform involved implementing a restricted package of health 
interventions, the withdrawal of the government from direct involvement in 
service provision, and the introduction of a new (efficient) planning framework 
– for example, a new and reliable accounting system, new indicators for 
monitoring, and new annual / quarterly reporting requirements – that would 
help the Ministry implement its reforms (Blas and Limbambala, 2001; World 
Bank, 2001). 
 
At the time, senior officials within the Ministry of Health were somewhat 
overwhelmed by the problems they were facing and it seems that they believed 
one way to get the health sector back on track was to do everything possible to 
please donors, so as to secure access to resources for health (Fraser, 2007; 
Chansa, 2006). Given Zambia‟s indebtedness, the government had few other 
options and so it seems they accepted the Bank‟s SIP agenda (Gould et al. 
1998). In consequence, the subsequent National Health Strategic Plan 1995-
1998 that the Ministry prepared reflected a changed perspective: while 
egalitarian principles were still there, there was a clear shift in prioritisation 
towards governance reform for efficient resource use and cost-effectiveness 
(Blas and Limbambala, 2001). 
 
For the Bank then, it seemed that this learning experiment with a health SIP 
was working – the Ministry of Health and indeed other aid donors had bought 
into the coordinated funding and restructuring of the health sector in a way that 
would work in concert with broader neoliberal reform. Although the Bank had 
actually been heavily involved in modifying the sectoral proposals, the way in 
which the Bank conducted itself made it possible to claim that the Ministry of 
Health had led the process, and that the Bank and other donors had only 
worked to support the government to fully develop its own programme of 
health governance reform.  
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The SIP experiment is sold more broadly 
 
Given the early apparent success of the Zambian experience, and other similar 
experiments in Mozambique and Tanzania (see Harrold et al. 1995), staff 
within the Africa region of the Bank decided to sell SIPs more broadly, so as to 
try and mobilise a wider constituency of support for the approach. The 
marketing process started in early 1994 with the presentation of a paper entitled 
„Program aid beyond structural adjustment‟ (italics added) by Stephen Denning 
(Director of the Southern Africa Department) at a workshop in Harare; during 
which the „defining characteristics‟ of a SIP were outlined (Denning, 1994). 
This was followed by the assembling of a small „Thematic Team‟ in early 1995 
– led by Peter Harrold (an economic advisor in the Africa Regional Office) – 
whose job was specifically to promote the approach. As Kevin Cleaver 
(Director of the Bank‟s Africa Technical Department) indicates, the team‟s 
purpose was specifically „to determine what was needed to popularise these 
operations‟ (Harrold et al. 1995, p.vii italics added). To this end, a report was 
drafted on the topic and discussed in Washington D.C. during the June meeting 
of the Special Program of Assistance for Africa (SPA) – the somewhat elite 
donor group that had been involved with SAPs in Africa (Hjertholm and White, 
2000; Harrold et al. 1995).
81
 From this, a formal discussion paper was 
published in August 1995 entitled „The Broad Sector Approach to Investment 
Lending‟ which was then marketed to an audience of World Bank staff, 
recipient government officials and the wider donor community (Harrold et al. 
1995). 
 
Nevertheless, before we move on to discuss how other actors – and particularly 
other donor agencies – engaged with the SIP approach, it is important to be 
more clear and specific about the what the Bank‟s SIP proposals involved 
because, as we shall soon see, this was influential in shaping the way in which 
policy about health SWAps was subsequently produced; and, moreover, the 
way in which it features the idea of partnership.  
 
                                                 
81
  The SPA (now known as „Strategic Partnership with Africa‟) was the 
somewhat elite donor group involved with SAPs in Africa (Hjertholm and 
White, 2000). 
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The Bank’s argument: Reconstructing82 rather than rolling back the state  
 
Articulated through a series of „confident declarations‟ (cf. Harrison, 2001b, 
p.529), the Bank‟s official discussion paper on the topic stated that there were 
„some perceived problems‟ with the way in which aid was delivered and 
managed (Harrold et al. 1995, p.xi, p.4). While perhaps implicitly 
acknowledging that the Bank had gone „too far‟ in its efforts to „roll back‟ the 
state, and that action was now needed to „soften‟ the social costs associated 
with structural adjustment lending (cf. Harrison, 2001b; Harrison, 2005b; 
Laurell and Arellano, 1996), in the main (and reflecting the discussion above) 
the diagnosis was that aid had not been fully effective because of a lack of 
coordination between different aid delivery instruments (projects and SAPs) 
and between different aid donors. This had undermined the institutional 
capacity of recipient governments (like Zambia) to develop, fully implement 
and responsibly own the sectoral policies and budgetary management processes 
that were necessary to ameliorate social problems (particularly those of the 
poor) and to facilitate long-term market-based economic growth (Buse and 
Walt, 1997; Harrison, 2001b; 2005a; Baaz, 2005).  
 
What was needed, the Bank argued, was SIPs: the investment of aid in a 
coordinated manner in specific sectors (including the health sector), along with 
the appropriate reorganisation of sectoral action to ensure that certain critical 
expenditures were efficiently and effectively allocated to support economic 
growth (Harrold et al. 1995, p.4; Harrison, 2005b). Indeed, the allocation of 
resources (both domestic and aid) was advocated for „essential‟ (pre-
determined) social sector interventions, and particularly interventions for health, 
because of the way in which this would lead to growth (Harrold et al., 1995; 
Harrison 2005b, p.1309; Koivusalo and Ollila, 1997). Apparently embedding 
and enmeshing parallel arguments of the Bank‟s recent health strategy 
Investing in Health (World Bank, 1993), it was suggested that coordinated 
investment (of aid and public resources) in such critical (cost-effective) health 
sector interventions, combined with the reorganisation of health sector 
governance was justified because it would not only support a wider (neoliberal) 
programme of reform (as it was apparently doing in Zambia), but also, by 
                                                 
82
  The notion of „reconstructing‟ the state is borrowed from Graham Harrison 
(2005b).  
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improving people‟s health, it would improve „human capital and productivity,‟ 
and thus serve as a means to efficiently achieve economic growth (Laurell and 
Arellano, 1996). In short, the Bank‟s argument was simple: better (technical 
and economic) governance of resources by recipient governments would result 
in aid effectiveness, more health and more growth.  
 
To this end, the Bank suggested that there were six new technical and 
managerial technologies associated with a SIP, which must be in place to bring 
about better sectoral governance. These included:  
 
1. A coherent sectoral policy framework – which sets out appropriate 
principles and priorities for sectoral reform (including the „respective 
roles‟ and „reorganisation‟ of the public and private sectors) and which 
has been led and prepared by, and is thus owned, by local stakeholders 
(the Bank drew on the Zambian experience to demonstrate this); and  
 
2. A single expenditure programme that links to and implements this 
sectoral policy – to which „all‟ donors are signed-on and within which 
new aid contracts, performance indicators and harmonised 
„methodologies‟ of budgetary and resource control are employed to 
oversee implementation (Harrold et al., 1995).  
 
 
While SIPs had been presented in countries like Zambia, and were now being 
globally promoted by the Bank through this formal discussion paper, as a 
relatively new innovation in aid – to show critics that it was capable of change 
and that aid could be effective (as indicated above) – few (if any) of the Bank‟s 
ideas were actually novel development thinking (cf. Peters and Chao, 1998). 
The problems with (and solutions to) ineffective aid, poor health and sectoral 
development were still understood through the Bank‟s neoliberal economics 
world view; with issues largely attributed to allocative and technical 
inefficiencies in the governance of resources by recipient governments (and 
indeed other donors) (Lee and Zwi, 1996); rather than the Bank‟s own 
approach to governing aid and development, or the wider international political 
economy. Indeed, the key premise was still that (neoliberal) structural reforms 
were relevant and necessary. However, rather than delivering aid to roll back 
the state, the pendulum had swung towards constructing a well-governed and 
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„capable‟ state from the social sectors up (Harrison, 2001b; 2005a; Walt et al. 
1999, p. 209); that is to say, one that was capable of taking responsibility for 
their own market-based economic growth.  
 
Seen in this way, the new managerial technologies that the Bank was 
promoting in countries like Zambia were apparently envisioned as a way to 
teach and embed in recipient governments the right capacities for growth 
including, for example, the right (neoliberal) ways to develop sectoral policy; 
the right ways to prioritise aid and public expenditure, and the right ways to 
manage and monitor sectoral performance. Interestingly, by coordinating other 
aid agencies, it also seems that SIPs were envisioned as an effective means to 
reform and discipline them to adhere to (what the Bank saw as) the right 
sectoral governance for market-based economic growth (Clift, 1988; Buse and 
Walt, 1996). Ultimately then, and as suggested above, SIPs were a way to 
represent the Bank‟s neoliberal approach to governing aid and development at 
a time of considerable criticism and crisis. 
 
Interestingly, and to return to the major theme of this thesis, there was no 
mention of the idea of partnership in the Bank‟s textual arguments about SIPs 
(see Harrold et al., 1995; Denning, 1994). As we will now see however, as 
other aid agencies, who had somewhat different views about the way aid and 
health should be governed, became exposed to and concerned about the Bank‟s 
health sector reform agenda in countries like Zambia, SIPs evolved into 
SWAps and the idea of partnership soon took centre-stage.  
 
Contesting SIPs: Different views about the governance of aid for health  
 
As indicated above, in the early 1990s SIPs were already being implemented in 
countries like Zambia, and being widely marketed to donor governments, 
World Bank staff and other members of the aid community. While it seems that 
the arguments resonated little with high-level actors within key donor 
governments – who remained sceptical about the need for aid at this time (see 
Chapter Four) and took limited action to re-prioritise aid for health (see 
Chapter Five) – the somewhat prescriptive nature of the Bank‟s approach, 
which linked the reform of health sector governance to (neoliberal) economic 
growth, and the active promotion of it in countries like Zambia, seemed to 
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invoke unease among some bilateral aid agencies and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO). While these actors were generally keen for there to be 
some kind of reform of, and coordinated international action in relation to, the 
governance of health, they had somewhat different perspectives on the issue. 
 
Although representatives from many bilateral agencies would have been 
involved in the process of SIP policy development, including the June meeting 
of the SPA in 1995 referred to above and were certainly involved in discussion 
at the country-level, some were concerned that SIPs were largely a „World 
Bank “product”‟ (Norton and Bird, 1998, p.8). There was unease about how 
SIPs could, and indeed already were, extending the Bank‟s role, ideas and 
(economic) influence into social sectors which, as indicated above, had not 
traditionally been within the Bank‟s purview (see Buse, 1994). The WHO in 
particular was sensitive to how the Bank‟s proposals challenged what was, for 
various reasons, its own waning leadership in relation to international health 
(Walt and Buse, 2006; Brown et al. 2006). Some of the so-called like-minded 
bilaterals (such as SIDA and Danida) seem also to have been concerned about 
having to adhere to the Bank‟s technical and primarily economic agenda in 
their country programming (Norton and Bird, 1998; WHO, 1996; Hill, 2002; 
Larsen, 2003). In Zambia for example, over time there was concern the Bank 
was pursuing „a self-imposed role of “midwife” to the reform process‟, which 
countermanded the work of other donors (Lake and Musumali, 1999, p.256; 
Gilson et al., 2000). In short, the advent of SIPs presented something of a 
challenge to other donors engaged with health.   
 
While the Bank‟s arguments about SIPs were certainly not completely rejected 
by these other actors, and indeed there were shared concerns about the need for 
some level of coordination and the effective use of aid, these actors had 
differing views about why this was so, and what this meant for aid and health 
governance. As indicated above, the Bank diagnosed the problems of aid 
ineffectiveness and poor health through the orthodox lens of neoliberal 
economics. Some other donor agencies had a more egalitarian (social 
democratic) perspective and therefore gave priority to other moral and ethical 
concerns (cf. Therien, 2002; Stokke, 1989). In the mid-1990s, SIDA officials 
had, for example, embarked upon a new initiative with the WHO on Equity in 
Health and, contrary to the contention of the World Bank, the key normative 
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argument here was: that access to health, and indeed access to aid, was a 
legitimate welfare right; that poor health and aid ineffectiveness were a result 
of inequalities and unfairness in prevailing systems of social, political and 
economic governance; and, more specifically, that there had been a lack of 
coordinated attention to issues of equity in the global distribution of resources 
(WHO/SIDA, 1996). It was not only argued that health projects (including 
donor projects) had been too narrowly focused, neglecting the social, economic 
and political barriers to health for all, but also, and apparently critiquing the 
Bank‟s economistic approach in particular, that the „unfortunate result‟ of 
neoliberal reforms „appears to be a shift in social values away from ensuring 
the good of all towards immediate economic opportunities for some, generally 
benefitting those socially positioned to profit most and most rapidly‟ 
(WHO/SIDA, 1996, p.13). 
 
What was needed according to the WHO and SIDA was a transformation in 
relations of governance, „equitable policies‟ and state intervention to ensure 
that there was a fair redistribution of resources. For the WHO and SIDA this 
would lead to aid effectiveness, the „fair sharing of progress‟ and „health for 
all‟ (WHO/SIDA, 1996, p.2, p.41). To this end then, it was argued that „donor 
support‟ must be coordinated to „reinforce, not undermine, more equitable 
policies‟ that address „local needs‟, and which have been reached through 
public (democratic) consensus (WHO/SIDA, 1996, p.27, p.40). Used in this 
way, aid would be an „effective instrument‟ for promoting international 
equality and solidarity (cf. Therien, 2002). In other words, this was a much 
more overtly political argument than that of the Bank, and the primary focus 
was on addressing health inequalities and social injustice, rather than economic 
growth. Given the differing orientation of the arguments then, there was a clash 
of perspectives here between the World Bank, certain bilaterals and the WHO 
about the way in which aid and health should be governed.  
 
While the views of different donor agencies were certainly not mutually 
exclusive of the Bank‟s at the country or global levels, the differences were 
problematic at this particular moment in time because, as indicated above, aid 
was in crisis. Donor agencies needed to narrate a convincing new story about 
the need for and effectiveness of aid if they were to regalvanize a constituency 
of support. The existence of ideational conflicts would not help in this pursuit. 
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If they could demonstrate however that there was a consensus this might re-
legitimise their operations to key donor governments and thus secure their 
political future.   
 
It seems to have been for this reason that moves were initiated to „further refine 
and adapt‟ SIPs into a more widely acceptable policy vision (Walt et al., 1999, 
p.216). A vision that would not only be agreeable to and thus enrol aid agencies 
who had somewhat different views and perspectives about the right way to 
govern aid for health, but would also be widely saleable to recipient country 
actors and donor governments, convincing them that aid was a beneficial and 
effective pursuit (Hill, 2002). As we will now see, it was in these particular 
efforts that policy about health SWAps came to be produced and, moreover, 
came to feature the idea of partnership. 
 
From SIPs to SWAps: The rise of the idea of partnership 
 
In January 1997, the Danish Government in association with the World Bank 
hosted an informal meeting of bilateral and multilateral agencies concerned 
with coming to a consensus on the SIP approach to health development (Hill, 
2002; Cassels, 1997). As Andrew Cassels (1997, p.1) indicates, the aim of the 
meeting was „to achieve a common understanding... and to discuss options for 
joint activities that [would] help take the agenda forward‟. While the meeting 
was a first step towards achieving this, it seems that more needed to be done. 
As a result, the European Commission (EC), WHO and UK Department for 
International Development (DfID) commissioned the production of a new 
guiding policy text on the topic, which would revise and rearticulate SIPs into a 
more consensual form. To this end, a series of draft documents were produced 
and subsequently considered at various international meetings and 
consultations (Cassels, 1997).  
 
While actors from recipient countries were informally involved here, it was 
primarily donor agencies who were engaged in discussions, including: staff 
from the Health, Nutrition and Population (HNP) team of the World Bank; the 
health group of the European Commission; various aid officials from France, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Spain, the US and UK; and a specially-
convened team of senior staff at the WHO (Hill, 2002; Cassels, 1997; King, 
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1999). It was via this somewhat elite group of aid agency actors then, that a 
final version was published in late-1997 entitled „A guide to sector-wide 
approaches for health development‟ (see Cassels, 1997). The Guide officially 
repositioned SIPs as SWAps and, of particular significance here, publicly 
promoted the approach under the rubric of the idea of partnership. As the 
Guide announced, „The notion of sector-wide approaches builds on earlier 
work on both health care reform and sector investment programmes... 
[reflecting] an interest in moving towards broad-based partnerships‟ (Cassels, 
1997, p.1, p.7).  
 
Why the idea of partnership?  
 
Significantly, and as indicated above, the idea of partnership had not featured 
in the World Bank‟s earlier policy about SIPs. So why was it now being 
incorporated into this reformulated official guide about health SWAps? It could 
be the case that partnership was somewhat randomly included in the drafting 
process through more or less unconscious acts. Given the prominent role that 
the idea plays in this SWAp policy text though, a rather more likely 
explanation is that drawing on the idea was strategically useful at that particular 
moment in time, as the discussion below will now show. 
 
The strategic crafting of a policy idea: Constructing consensus and 
political enrolment 
 
It seems that one reason why drawing on the idea of partnership was 
strategically useful was because of the „appearance of consensus‟ that using it 
constructed (cf. Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p.13) about the need for and 
effective governance of aid in a post-Cold War era. As indicated above and 
also in Chapter Four, at around the same time as SWAp policy was being 
produced, parallel efforts were being initiated by other actors within the aid 
community to develop a convincing new narrative about aid, so as to re-
galvanize support at a time of apparent crisis. Senior DAC officials had worked 
hard to this end, publishing and then widely marketing, a new strategy 
document in 1996 in which the idea of partnership had a „master‟ role (cf. 
Mosse, 2005a; see Chapter Four). The strategy was widely marketed because 
there was something of an implicit need for aid agencies to show that they 
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shared the same views (even if they did not). By doing so it would add weight 
to their arguments and might help persuade key actors (particularly those 
within donor governments) that there was a role for aid in a post-Cold War era.  
 
It seems that, because the idea of partnership was prominent in the „Shaping the 
21
st
 Century‟ text, it became central to these efforts due to the „apparent 
consensus‟ that drawing upon it constructed (cf. Cornwall, 2008). In short, if 
aid agency actors all referred to partnership it would create the powerful 
impression that they were in agreement and therefore that partnership was the 
right way to govern aid in a post-Cold War era. It was because of this that by 
late 1997 – the time around which the SWAp text was being drafted – 
partnership became something of a symbolic ideational motif by which other 
policy initiatives were expected to be decorated and would be judged (see 
Chapter Four). It was for this reason then that partnership was incorporated into 
the 1997 SWAp policy text: it was part of a wider strategic bid by aid agencies 
to construct the appearance that there was a global consensus about the future 
governance of aid.  
 
Significantly however, and as Chapter Four argues, while there may have been 
(and indeed still are) shared uses of the idea of partnership in various aid 
policies, this does not necessarily mean that everyone actually was or is in 
agreement. While partnership certainly always refers to relationships and the 
organisation of action, it remains a polysemic and inherently malleable idea, 
which can be strategically reframed in different ways and thus mean different 
things to different people (Cornwall, 2008). Indeed, to borrow the words of 
Andrea Cornwall (2008, p.269), it is an idea that „can easily be reframed to 
meet almost any [policy] demand made of it‟.  
 
What specific policy demands then, might those involved in drafting the 1997 
SWAp text want to have made of partnership? Well, as suggested in the course 
of the discussion above, there were at least three key issues that the authors of 
the SWAp text needed to address, namely: 1) to convince NGO and recipient 
critics of aid that a changed and moreover coordinated way of working for 
health was possible; 2) to satisfy the egalitarian concerns of like-minded 
bilaterals and the WHO (and also some recipient actors) that aid should 
effectively result in equality and health for all; and conversely 3) to satisfy the 
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(neoliberal) economic concerns of the World Bank (and also right-leaning 
critics within key donor governments – the US in particular) that aid and health 
should be effectively governed as a means to achieve global economic growth. 
It seems that the normative malleability of the idea of partnership was 
strategically useful here: it could be easily reused and reformulated to address 
everything on this policy agenda. 
 
Indeed, as the discussion below will now show, the idea of partnership seems 
to have served as a useful „bridge‟ between competing perspectives about the 
right way to govern aid and health, and therefore as a way to not only enrol 
different aid agencies, but also to convince recipient country actors and vocal 
critics within donor governments, that aid for health was a beneficial and 
effective pursuit (Hill, 2002; Mosse, 2005a; Star and Griesmer, 1989). Selected 
examples are now taken from the 1997 SWAp text in order to illustrate these 
points. 
 
1) Signalling that SWAps are a changed and coordinated way of 
working for health 
 
Firstly, the idea of partnership was used to help mark out SWAps as a changed 
and coordinated way of working for health sector development. It was argued, 
for example, that there was a pressing need „to achieve sustained improvements 
in people‟s health and well-being‟ and that a „fundamental change‟ was needed 
in the way donors acted in relation to aid for health (Cassels, 1997, pp.ix-x). 
Rather than donors pursuing „their own discrete‟ and „piecemeal projects‟, 
what was needed was a coordinated SWAp to health development: „a sustained 
partnership... for achieving improvements in people‟s health‟ (Cassels, 1997, 
pp.x, p.1, p.7, p.11). It seemed to be argued that through this partnership 
approach, there would be a significant and positive change to the way in which 
action for health was organised. As the SWAp text explained: 
 
This document is about changes in the way development agencies and 
governments work together to achieve improvements in health. The 
changes are exciting, promising and substantial. They entail new forms 
of partnership (Cassels, 1997, p.v). 
 
In other words, it was suggested that by working in partnership, a SWAp 
offered a „better prospect for success‟ in improving health sector development; 
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more so than any other (or indeed earlier) efforts in this area (Cassels, 1997, 
p.ix).  
 
2) Satisfying egalitarian concerns (of SIDA, WHO and recipient 
governments) that SWAps will effectively result in equality and 
health for all   
 
Secondly, and at the same time, the idea of partnership also seems to have been 
framed as a way to achieve an equal and socially-just governing relationship, 
and thus equitable health outcomes for all; which evidently meshes with the 
egalitarian concerns of SIDA and the WHO, as described above. Indeed, it 
seemed to be argued that by operating as a partnership a SWAp would open-up 
decision-making, mobilise and democratically engage national actors, and 
transform the (unequal and donor-driven) way in which aid and health were 
governed; thereby ensuring that the most marginalised were empowered as 
agents of their own health development. It was emphasised, for example, that a 
SWAp partnership would „create the conditions which allow a different form of 
interaction between governments and donors‟ (Cassels, 1997, p.12) and would 
support policies and strategies that have been „nationally defined‟ (Cassels, 
1997, p.ix); that is to say, policies that have been democratically deliberated 
through the participation of all relevant partners in health.  
 
Rather than a paternalistic aid relationship then, in which donors had exerted a 
„right to select which projects to finance‟ (Cassels, 1997, p.12) (and which had 
been criticised by SIDA, WHO and also many recipient governments and 
NGOs), here the inclusive and coordinated participation of a number of 
different partners was emphasised. As Andrew Cassels (1997, p.7, p.11) stated, 
a SWAp is „a broad-based partnership‟ that is „led by national authorities, 
involving different arms of government, groups in civil society, and one or 
more donor agencies‟. In other words, it is a way to bring together and engage 
all societal partners in health sector development. The ordering of the different 
partners is however interesting here because, being last in the list, it is possible 
to interpret that donors were presented as only one of many, more important, 
partners in health development.   
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Significantly and apparently embedding the arguments of SIDA and WHO 
described above, this particular reading of SWAp policy also gives the 
impression that partnership is an inherently political and principled undertaking; 
within which the primary focus is the coordination of action to address health 
inequalities, injustice and democratic rights. As the SWAp text variously 
indicates, the SWAp partnership involves „political battle‟ about the way 
resources are used and „will also have the effect of shifting power‟ (Cassels, 
p.39, p.30). It will act to „reduce poverty and inequity‟ and „address the 
multiple determinants of ill-health‟ (Cassels, 1997p.28, p20). It seems to be 
suggested that this could be achieved through „the involvement of the public‟ 
or „civil society‟ as key partners in health sector development: for this would 
not only „result in greater attention to the poor and the excluded‟, but also „help 
the poor articulate demand for better health care‟ (Cassels, 1997, p.13). In short 
then, in this reading a SWAp partnership seems to be about ensuring that the 
most vulnerable in society are empowered to participate in and influence the 
decisions that affect their health, and thus ultimately about ensuring greater 
health equity (Cassels, 1997 p.27). It is an end for governing aid and health 
sector development.  
 
3) Satisfying neoliberal concerns (of the World Bank and critics 
within key donor governments) that aid for health could be 
effectively governed as a means to achieve global economic growth  
 
Importantly, and in support of the foregoing chapters of this thesis, while the 
meaning of the idea of partnership can certainly be interpreted like this, it is 
referred to in a sufficiently ambiguous way as to allow other readings. Rather 
than being about politics, equity and the transformation of relations of 
governance then, it is also possible to read partnership as being about ensuring 
economic efficiency and effectiveness in the management of aid and other 
resources for health; and thus as a way to satisfy neoliberal concerns (of the 
World Bank and also right-leaning critics within key donor governments) that 
investing (aid) in health is an effective means to support global economic 
growth.  
 
Understood in this way, a SWAp partnership is about coordinating the 
investment of resources; reforming the (economically inefficient and 
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ineffective) way in which aid and health are currently governed; and thereby 
ensuring that recipient governments are capable of taking responsibility for 
their own health sector development. Indeed, the 1997 Guide emphasises for 
example: that „government ownership‟ is the „sine qua non‟ of a SWAp 
partnership (Cassels, 1997, p.xiv); that the primary focus of the partnership is 
the „better use of available funds‟ (Cassels, 1997, p.v); that it will involve  
„institutional reform and capacity building‟; and that, ultimately, this will 
„increase the likelihood that development assistance yields good [read: 
economic] results and that governments perform better in serving their own 
people‟ (Cassels, 1997, p.vi). 
 
There are a number of differences between (what is) this neoliberal reading of 
partnership, and the more egalitarian interpretation described above (see Table 
6). Firstly, rather than being broad-based and inclusive, here a SWAp 
partnership is much more narrowly defined: as a relationship between donors 
and governments, and moreover as a relationship that is about ensuring the 
responsible economic governance of development. As the 1997 Guide 
emphasises: „A sector-wide approach needs to be understood as a partnership 
between government and donors... in which all those involved have rights and 
responsibilities‟ (Cassels, 1997, p.13).  
 
Secondly, and relatedly, rather than being about transforming the relations of 
governance between donors and recipient governments (towards equality), it is 
about „tweaking‟ the status quo. Indeed, perhaps reflecting a concern that the 
selection by donors of aid projects for health had eroded the „institutional 
capacity‟ of recipient governments to develop, implement and responsibly own 
the sectoral policies and budgetary processes that the World Bank, for example, 
believed were necessary to ameliorate health problems, and facilitate long-term 
economic growth, a SWAp partnership can be understood as a modified way of 
relating. Here, instead of donors imposing their particular development project 
agenda, a partnership is about incentivising recipient behaviour and influencing 
how they act; for example: how they should properly prioritise (aid and public) 
expenditure and appropriately manage sectoral performance. As the 1997 text 
states:  
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Involvement in SWAps means that donors in the partnership will be 
concerned to influence overall spending decisions (Cassels, 1997, p.27 
italics added).  
 
[A SWAp partnership] ...does not preclude donors from identifying the 
steps needed to overcome key constraints to effective sectoral 
performance. Necessary actions will form part of a negotiated 
programme of work, rather than being imposed as unilateral 
conditionalities (Cassels, 1997, p.x italics added) 
 
 
In other words then, a SWAp partnership is about educating recipient 
governments to govern aid and their own health sector development in the right 
way; that is to say, it is about teaching them the right way of governing for 
growth (which does not appear to be all that different from the paternalistic 
way in which aid has previously been managed).  
 
Table 6. Different interpretations of a SWAp partnership (prepared by the author). 
 
In an egalitarian reading of a SWAp 
partnership, it is about: 
In a neoliberal reading of a  
SWAp partnership, it is about 
 Opening-up decision-making 
 Mobilising and democratically 
engaging national actors 
 Transforming the (unequal and 
donor-driven) way in which aid and 
health are governed 
 Empowering the most marginalised 
actors as agents of their own 
development 
 Ensuring health equity, power and 
voice 
 A relationship between donors and 
governments 
 Ensuring the responsible economic 
governance of development / 
coordinating the investment of 
resources 
 Reforming the (economically 
inefficient and ineffective) way in 
which aid and health are currently 
governed 
 Ensuring that recipient governments 
are capable of taking responsibility 
for their own health sector 
development 
 Influencing and incentivising 
efficient resource use for economic 
growth  
 
To this end, and apparently embedding the prescriptions of the World Bank‟s 
SIPs which were described above (and which also perhaps reflects the power of 
the Bank and its neoliberal thinking in the shaping of SWAp policy), a SWAp 
partnership is to be built around a number of managerial technologies – 
including a comprehensive health sector policy; a medium-term projection and 
plan of expenditure; and harmonised management systems (Cassels, 1997). 
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Indeed, these partnership technologies, which are now embedded in all other 
policies about health SWAps, seem to be worked into a depoliticised and linear 
theory of „cause and effect‟ of how change happens, which justifies how the 
technologies of a model partnership are a means to achieve effective aid and 
the right sectoral governance. 
 
While this theory is illustrated schematically in Figure 9, essentially it seems to 
be argued that a comprehensive health sector policy needs to be developed, led 
by government. This sets out „the roles of the public and private sector in 
relation to the financing and provision of services‟; provides „a basis for 
prioritising public expenditure‟; and is „jointly agreed‟ with (read: influenced 
by the agenda of) donor agencies (Cassels, 1997, p.11, p.36). This policy and 
its priorities are subsequently translated into a clear and rational budget 
allocation and medium-term spending plan, to which donor agencies contribute 
through various means (pooled funding, budget support), and which also 
provides a degree of coordination with broader public expenditure / macro-
economic policy (Craig and Porter, 2003).  
 
Figure 9. An example of the theoretical framework of a „model‟ SWAp partnership. 
(from Walford, 2003, p.6) 
 
 
 
The policy and its (aid and public) resources are subsequently implemented and 
accounted for through the use of government management systems – including 
financial management, performance monitoring and procurement procedures – 
214 
 
which have been developed (read: reformed) in order to appropriately structure 
and incentivise the right management behaviour and capacity in the public 
sector (Peters and Chao, 1998, p.183; Harrison, 2005a). In this technical way, 
all resources (both aid and domestic) will be efficiently and effectively 
converted into measurable health indicators, health outputs and (economic) 
impact (Boesen, 2007; Craig and Porter, 2003). It is from this technical 
performance data that decisions will be made about future disbursements of 
donor resources to the health sector; thus ensuring that aid is efficiently and 
effectively used. 
 
Interestingly, the use of a series of structures for managing dialogue (including 
formal negotiating meetings, joint appraisal and review missions and a lead 
donor), along with a series of partnership agreements between donor agencies 
and governments seem to be presented as key managerial technologies within a 
SWAp partnership. While these technologies could be interpreted in an 
egalitarian way (as described above), and therefore be understood as being 
about embedding equality, coordinated dialogue and mutual accountability in 
the partnering relationship, a more neoliberal reading suggests that they are a 
way to coordinate, influence, supervise and responsibilise recipient 
governments, so that they conduct themselves in the right (neoliberal) way for 
health and growth (Abrahamsen, 2004). For example, the proposal to establish 
a „detailed and formal‟ contractual agreement in the form of „Memorandum of 
Understanding between partners‟ (Cassels, 1997, p.52) can not only be 
interpreted as a way to formalise how donors will „become more explicitly 
involved in the scrutiny of public expenditure and the process of resource 
allocation‟ (including, for example, through formal meetings, audits and joint 
reviews), but also as a way to specify how recipient governments are expected 
to responsibly act if they are to receive aid; that is to say, how they should 
procure goods and services, prioritise expenditure, and monitor and account for 
resource use (Cassels, 1997, p.3 italics added; Hill, 2002).  
 
In summary then, the managerial technologies of a model partnership are 
presented as clear and simple, technical and harmonious means for aid agencies 
to successfully invest in and causally manufacture better policy, better 
governance, better health outcomes and better economic growth; as such they 
provide a compelling neoliberal argument (for actors within key donor 
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governments) about the need for and (economic) effectiveness of aid, and aid 
agencies, in a post-Cold War era.  
 
The significance of the idea of partnership: Bridging divergent views and 
mobilising support  
 
The foregoing discussion has clearly covered a lot of intellectual and practical 
ground. Yet, to return to the questions at hand, what does this all suggest about 
how and why policy about health SWAps emerged in 1997 and, moreover, how 
and why it incorporated the idea of partnership? Firstly, it seems that SWAp 
policy was produced as part of a wider strategic bid by aid agencies to restate 
the case for aid at a time of apparent crisis. As the discussion above shows, the 
World Bank took the lead in these efforts, exploring and promoting SIPs as an 
effective way to govern aid for health sector development. While bilateral 
agencies and also the WHO agreed that aid should be provided to the health 
sector, there was a level of disagreement about how it should be governed and 
about the somewhat prescriptive, technical and (neoliberal) economic nature of 
the Bank‟s thinking (Walt and Buse, 2006; Cassels, 1997). It was the result of 
an apparent clash of views about aid and health governance (cf. Williams and 
Rushton, 2009) at a time of crisis – when what was needed was to construct the 
impression that there was a global consensus about the future of aid – that SIPs 
were reformulated into SWAps and came to feature the idea of partnership.   
 
Following on from this and secondly, it seems that the idea of partnership was 
strategically useful here because of its malleability; that is, its ability to be 
reframed in different ways and thus be interpreted in different ways by 
different people (Cornwall, 2008). Multiple representations of partnership 
could be strategically crafted into the 1997 SWAp text, thus allowing different 
actors (the World Bank, other aid agencies, donor governments and also 
perhaps recipient actors) who all had somewhat different (though not 
necessarily mutually exclusive) views about the way in which aid for health 
should be governed to „read themselves into‟ and support the SWAp approach 
to aid; whilst simultaneously giving the symbolic impression that everyone was 
in agreement (cf. Mosse, 2005a; Cornwall, 2008; Stone, 2002).  
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Indeed, to reiterate the discussion above, consistently referring to the idea of 
partnership in the SWAp Guide gives the impression there is a consensus that 
partnership is the way forward for aid. However, and at the same time, the idea 
can be interpreted in at least two different ways: on the one hand, it can be 
interpreted in an egalitarian way, and so satisfy the concerns of like-minded 
bilaterals and the WHO (and perhaps some recipient governments) that aid 
should effectively result in equality and health for all; and on the other hand, it 
can be interpreted in technical and economic way, and so satisfy the neoliberal 
concerns of the World Bank (and also right-leaning critics within key donor 
governments – the US in particular) that aid and health can be effectively 
governed as a means to achieve global economic growth. In other words, 
partnership maintains and bridges a necessary tension about the way in which 
aid and health sector development should be governed, so as to mobilise action 
and political support for SWAps.  
 
Mobilising political support: From SIPs to SWAps in Zambia 
 
This mobilisation strategy certainly seems to have worked. Since the 1997 
guide was produced, a number of other actors have produced policy about 
health SWAps incorporating the idea of partnership, including for example: 
many bilateral and multilateral agencies (see HLSP, 2005; OECD, 2006; DGIS, 
2004; NZAID, 2006; Schleimann et al., 2003), and also governments in more 
than twenty countries globally, including Ghana, Uganda and Zambia (Foster, 
2000; see also MoH Ghana, 2007; MoH Uganda, 2010; MoH Zambia, 2006).  
 
Policy about a health SIP had of course been developed in the Zambian health 
sector in the early 1990s, as indicated above. What is interesting however is 
that, in line with the above-mentioned discussion about the re-presentation of 
SIPs, national-level policy in Zambia also seems to have been reformulated 
into a health SWAp. Indeed, contrary to what is suggested in other papers on 
the topic (Chansa, 2006, 2008), it is argued here that it was only when the 1997 
SWAp text had been published and began to be marketed globally (by the elite 
group of aid agencies who had developed it) that the SIP approach to aid and 
health sector development in Zambia was officially relabelled as a SWAp 
incorporating the guiding idea of partnership. What is perhaps particularly 
interesting here, and though not mentioned in the discussion above, is that 
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(unlike the Bank‟s SIP policy) the idea of partnership did actually feature in 
earlier health policy texts in Zambia, including in the initial MMD strategy 
about health sector reform (Kalumba, 1996). The way in which the idea of 
partnership was framed however began to shift as the MMD‟s initial policy was 
reformulated: first into the World Bank‟s health SIP approach, and secondly 
into a health SWAp.  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the points made in the discussion above, initially 
the idea of partnership was dominantly framed in an egalitarian way in the 
MMD‟s health policy. It seemed to be about transforming power relations in 
the health sector, and particularly about empowering districts and communities, 
increasing popular representation and democratising decision-making for 
health (Kalumba, 1997).
83
 Donors were framed as „cooperating partners‟ (CPs), 
but only one of many other (more important) actors in health (MoH, 1992). As 
this policy was reformulated to apparently reflect the Bank‟s health SIP 
approach and then the 1997 SWAp guide, a more technical version became 
apparent, which focused on the efficient and effective use of resources (and 
particularly the use of donor resources). While current national-level policy 
about the Zambian health SWAp can certainly still be read in an egalitarian 
way, as indicated above, the technical and managerial technologies of a model 
partnership are also now firmly embedded within it, including, for example:  
 
1. A hierarchy of formalised structures to coordinate government-donor 
dialogue (see Figure 10): 
a. An Annual Consultative Meeting – at which progress during 
the previous year is reported, and the budget and action plans 
for the next year are reviewed;  
b. A bi-annual Health Sector Advisory Group (or SAG) – where 
performance and management/releases of funds are reviewed; 
c. Monthly Policy Committee Meetings – which address general 
health sector-related issues; and  
d.  Weekly / fortnightly Technical Working Groups – which 
address day-to-day administration and focus on specific topical 
areas (Sundewall et al. 2010); 
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  This policy stated that districts are „the basic point of reference for the 
articulation of people‟s power in health care‟ (MoH Zambia, 1992, pp.28-29). 
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2. An MoU contractual agreement between the Government of Zambia / 
Ministry of Health and donor agencies (or „cooperating partners‟) that 
sets out the General Principles of Partnership, presents „jointly agreed 
terms and procedures‟ and also „serves as a coordinating framework for 
consultation between the MOH and the CPs, for joint reviews of 
performance, for various common management arrangements, for 
reporting and for audits‟ (MoH Zambia, 2006, p.1). 
 
Figure 10. A schematic representation of formal health SWAp structures for 
coordinating government-donor dialogue in Zambia (from Sundewall et al. 2010).  
 
 
 
As with the technical partnership model described above, it appears to be 
suggested that through these partnership structures and management 
technologies the governance of resources will be improved, resulting in 
measurable and better health service performance and health outcomes, and 
ultimately better growth. In other words then, Zambian policy about the health 
SWAp seems to closely resemble the 1997 SWAp policy text, with the 
managerial partnership technologies and also the ideational tension noted 
above (between an egalitarian and neoliberal interpretation of partnership) 
embedded within both.  
 
Significantly, this ideational tension does not however appear to be an equal 
one. While different interpretations of partnership are certainly possible in 
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Zambian SWAp policy, the Cassels 1997 guide and indeed, many other policy 
texts about health SWAps, it is the narrow, harmonious and technical version 
that is the dominant partnership logic; and thus the prevailing SWAp policy 
governing mentality (see for example OECD, 2006). Arguably, this reflects the 
power of the World Bank in the socio-political processes that produced SWAp 
policy, and also the privileging of what is an ongoing political need to persuade 
right-leaning critics within key donor governments that aid can be 
economically effective. Moreover, and in support of Chapters Four and Five, 
this demonstrates that aid policy processes do not occur between equals, but 
rather are shaped by the prevailing international context of inequality in which 
aid, and indeed aid for health continues to be governed.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to consider why policy about health SWAps was 
produced under the rubric of the idea of partnership, to discuss the (f)actors that 
contributed to use of the idea and to analyse how these (f)actors help to explain 
how partnership is used and framed in official health SWAp texts. In so doing, 
it aimed to contribute to the first aspect of this thesis‟ substantive research 
question, namely: „Why is the idea of partnership a pervasive feature in 
contemporary aid policy?‟  
 
Overall, and in support of the foregoing chapters of this thesis, it has been 
shown that the idea of partnership features in SWAp policy because it serves to 
politically mobilise different actors and bring them together in support of an 
apparently common approach to governing aid and health sector development. 
While the chapter certainly emphasises that the idea of partnership features in 
SWAp policy because it had emerged as the „master‟ concept (cf. Mosse, 
2005a) within other key narratives about aid at the time and was a key way to 
construct the impression that there was a global consensus about the future of 
aid at a time of apparent crisis. It is also argued that the way in which the idea 
was framed in the 1997 SWAp text, and indeed continues to be framed in 
national policy about SWAps in countries like Zambia, actually reflects the 
existence of ideational conflicts and tensions about the way in which aid and 
development should be governed.  
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Partnership serves, for example, as a strategic „bridge‟ (cf. Mosse, 2005a) 
between at least two different world views: on the one hand, it can be 
interpreted in an egalitarian way, and so satisfy the concerns of those actors 
who think aid should effectively result in equality and health for all; and on the 
other hand, it can be interpreted in a technical and economic way, and so 
satisfy ongoing neoliberal concerns that aid and health can be effectively 
governed as a means to achieve global economic growth. Partnership is „robust 
enough‟ to maintain a common narrative about aid, yet „plastic enough‟ to 
allow these different interpretations (Star and Griesemer, 1989, p.393).  
 
As the chapter argued however, while different readings are certainly possible, 
the technical version is the dominant partnership logic; and thus the hegemonic 
SWAp policy governing mentality (see also Chapter Five and Chapter Nine). 
The problem is that while this technical mentality may provide a persuasive 
argument (for donor governments in particular) as to how aid and health sector 
development can be governed for results and growth – and a clear justification 
for the use of the managerial technologies referred to above – in so doing (and 
perhaps necessarily) it despatches with how pre-existing social relationships 
and wider political-economic or historical factors may shape the way policy 
and procedures are implemented in practice (cf. Craig and Porter, 2003). Where 
such factors are acknowledged, they are simply rendered as technical 
impediments to be overcome through better governance of resources, rather 
than deeply-embedded structural constraints (cf. Guljarani, 2009). Indeed, 
supporting the argument of Chapter Five, it is as though the local social 
political economy is „an inconvenience to be skirted‟ (Craig and Porter, 2003, 
p.61); it is certainly not presented as an underlying determinant of how 
resources can acceptably be used, or of health or economic growth. In short, it 
is simply the good use of resources that equals good health and good growth. 
 
As we shall soon see however, this partnership model not only misrepresents 
and simplifies the realities of health sector practice, but also goes on to reshape 
and constrain it (Schaffer, 1984; Mowles, 2010; Li, 2007); though not 
necessarily in the ways that are suggested or idealised above. Indeed, as the 
next chapter (Chapter Eight) will now go on to show, the dominantly technical 
governing mentality that is embedded in the idea of a SWAp partnership not 
only creates unrealistic expectations about what countries like Zambia can 
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achieve (and how quickly) in relation to improvements in health outcomes (cf. 
Schaffer, 1984), but also leads to the public or „front-stage‟ performance of a 
technical version of partnership (see the section on the Sector Advisory Group‟ 
meeting in Chapter Eight), whilst simultaneously hiding or concealing a series 
of „back-stage‟ conflicts between government officials, donors and civil society 
actors who have different views about aid and health governance (cf. Cunliffe, 
2009a). In this way, it risks what Bernard Schaffer (1984, p.144) calls a 
„straightening‟ of opportunities for public debate and contest, and also the 
„narrowing‟ of opportunities for change. Having discussed what the idea of 
partnership is and does in relation to policy about health SWAps, it is to these 
latter topics that the thesis now turns in Chapter Eight – the final analytical 
chapter before the arguments of the research are brought together into an 
overarching conclusion in Chapter Nine. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Partnership and Practice: Translations of the 
health sector-wide approach (SWAp) in Zambia 
 
 
 
 
The last chapter considered what the idea of partnership is and does in relation 
to policy about sector-wide approaches (SWAps) for health, arguing that 
partnership is presented in a contradictory, yet dominantly technical and 
economic way, in order to inter-translate between, and legitimise a series of 
managerial partnership technologies to a range of actors who have different 
views, ideas and interests about how aid and health sector development should 
be governed. This current chapter addresses a related question about how such 
official representations of partnership relate to current practice, using the 
health SWAp in Zambia as a case of focus. In so doing, the chapter seeks to 
contribute to the second aspect of this thesis‟ substantive research question, 
which, as indicated in Chapter One, is: „Why is the idea of partnership a 
pervasive feature in contemporary aid policy and how does this relate to and 
shape local practice, including the practice of politics that this enjoins?‟ 
 
The chapter addresses this by considering whether and how the idea of 
partnership is translated, consumed and / or appropriated by actors who are 
involved with the health SWAp in Zambia, and also by exploring how some of 
the managerial partnership technologies that SWAp policy seeks to legitimise – 
Overview 
 The second in a couplet of chapters about the idea of  partnership and 
the health sector-wide approach (SWAp) 
 Analyses how the idea of partnership in official policy about health 
SWAps relates to practice, using the health sector in Zambia as a case 
study of focus 
 Considers how the idea of partnership is understood, received and 
applied (how it is translated, consumed and/or appropriated) by 
different actors involved with the health SWAp in Zambia  
 Explores how managerial partnership technologies that policy about 
health SWAps legitimise shape local action  
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such as formal structures for dialogue – shape, enable, contort and/or constrain 
local socio-political action. As with Chapter Six which also looked at practice, 
the primary focus of the chapter is not whether partnership works – it does not 
seek to evaluate or measure the Zambian health SWAp against a single, 
normative partnership ideal – but rather aims to understand how policy about 
SWAp partnerships is understood and applied by local actors, and how it 
relates to and shapes political action in the Zambian health sector.   
 
Given the ongoing official policy interest in SWAps for health sector 
development and the limited academic treatment of their wider practical 
implications in specific contexts (see Chapter Seven; Buse, 1999b; Hill, 2002; 
Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Sundewall et al. 2006; 2010 are 
exceptions), investigating current practice is an important focus of inquiry. 
While it is recognised that many of (the limited) studies that exist have focused 
on the health SWAp in Zambia, the volume of scholarship: 1) does not reflect 
the relatively long history of the SWAp in the country, which as indicated in 
Chapter Seven has its roots in World Bank Sector Investment Programmes 
(SIPs); 2) has largely been conducted by one researcher / research team (Jesper 
Sundewall / Karolinska Institutet); and 3) does not specifically consider the 
politics surrounding SWAp partnership. As a consequence, this current chapter 
seeks to build on this existing work, while also satiating these evident gaps; and 
so provide a basis for further, recommended research and critique.   
 
Like Chapter Six on the practice of the Global Fund, this chapter draws on an 
interpretive analysis of current SWAp-related practice in the health sector in 
Zambia and is largely informed by two periods of qualitative (and 
ethnographically-sensitised) field work; the first in November to December 
2008 and the second from March to July 2009 (see Chapter Three) – although 
follow-up communications with local actors also continued until early 2011. 
More specifically, the chapter draws on an interpretive analysis of: semi-
structured interviews with actors who were (or had previously been) involved 
with the SWAp in different ways – including, for example, as members of the 
Sector Advisory Group (SAG) or Technical Working Groups (TWGs); 
observations of day-to-day email conversations (by virtue of being included on 
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electronic distribution lists), formal meetings and informal interactions between 
actors who are involved in the health sector; and newspaper and field diaries.
84
   
 
Given the constraints of a chapter such as this, it is not possible to discuss 
every facet of the SWAp partnership in current practice. However, drawing on 
the above-mentioned analysis, and in line with the critical-constructivist 
approach of the research (see Chapter Two), the chapter makes three key 
points about how the contradictory, yet dominantly technical and economic, 
policy model of a SWAp partnership is translated, consumed and appropriated 
by different actors in Zambia, and how the managerial technologies that SWAp 
partnership policy seeks to legitimise shape, contort and constrain local socio-
political action.     
 
Firstly, the chapter shows how the contradictions embedded within official 
policy about partnership are „brought to life and replayed‟ (cf. Mosse, 2004, 
p.664) in the health sector in Zambia, as evidenced by the multiple and 
competing ways in which the SWAp is interpreted as a partnership by local 
actors. This reveals the SWAp partnership as highly political in local practice.  
 
Secondly, and interestingly, the chapter shows how the politics of partnership is 
somewhat tactically, necessarily and perhaps routinely concealed in certain 
„front-stage‟ (that is, publicly visible) (cf. Cunliffe, 2009a) SWAp arenas. 
Using the example of a Sector Advisory Group meeting (SAG) – which is 
defined in national policy as a key partnership technology for dialogue in a 
health SWAp (see Chapter Seven) – the chapter demonstrates how the 
dominantly technical, economic and harmonious version of partnership is 
consumed and publicly performed as a way to sell the Zambian health sector in 
what is a competitive global marketplace for aid.  
 
Thirdly, the chapter also shows how, at a time of apparent crisis in the health 
sector in May 2009 (following the discovery of (alleged) corruption in the 
Ministry of Health), this „hidden transcript‟ (cf. Scott, 1990) of political 
difference and conflict between partners (between donors and government, 
between donors themselves, and between civil society groups) was more 
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  Further details about the semi-structured interviews are included in Chapter 
Three and at Appendix Five.  
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publicly and openly revealed, which clearly demonstrates that there are 
disjunctures (cf. Lewis and Mosse, 2006) between the technical model of a 
SWAp partnership in policy and how it works in practice. It is to these 
substantive points that the chapter now turns.  
 
Understanding how the policy idea of partnership is understood, received 
and applied in the health SWAp in practice 
 
Many different aspects of the health sector were explored during the field 
research in Zambia in order to understand how official policy about the SWAp 
partnership (as introduced and discussed in Chapter Seven) is translated, 
consumed and / or appropriated by different actors in practice. Drawing on an 
analysis of interviews with a range of different people who are involved in the 
health sector in Zambia, this first section of the chapter sets out how the health 
SWAp is currently understood as a partnership and considers how this relates 
to the official representations that were discussed in Chapter Seven. Mindful of 
possible disjunctures between policy and practice (Lewis and Mosse, 2006), it 
considers, for example, whether the health SWAp is interpreted in a 
participatory and egalitarian way (as one reading of SWAp policy might 
suggest); as a technical and economic way to influence government behaviour 
and ensure efficient action (as SWAp policy dominantly seems to suggest); or 
as none or all of the above?   
 
The health SWAp as a partnership: Conflicting translations of a policy 
idea 
 
While all interviewees were apparently satisfied to refer to the health SWAp as 
a partnership and to various different Ministry of Health (MoH), donor and 
„civil society‟ or non-government organisation (NGO) actors as their partners 
in the health sector, discussions revealed that there were clear differences of 
opinion as to what the idea of partnership actually meant in relation to the 
Zambian SWAp; as to who is and should be a partner in the SWAp; and 
relatedly as to what the role of and relationship between different partners is 
and should be. In other words, there were conflicting views about how the 
SWAp partnership for health sector development was governed in Zambia. 
Although it is not possible to detail all of the perspectives that were expressed, 
227 
 
or to capture all of the nuances between them, examples are discussed below in 
order to illustrate this point. 
 
1) The idea of partnership: Participatory ideals? 
 
Some interviewees from the MoH and also local and international „civil 
society‟ organisations (many of which tended to have an activist background) 
expressed what can perhaps be termed a participatory or deliberative view of 
the health SWAp as a partnership. They discussed it in terms of equality and 
broad-based or multi-sectoral involvement, suggesting that it should be about 
different partners – that is, different government departments, civil society 
organisations, and also donors – working together towards a common and 
equitable health goal, about challenging existing power relations and breaking 
down barriers, and opening-up decision-making and dialogue about health (Int. 
26 Nov 2008 MoH official; Int. 2 Apr 2009 , Int. 7 Apr 2009, Int. 1 Jun 2009, 
Int. 11 Jun 2009 civil society organisation representatives). In short, they 
seemed to think that the SWAp was, or perhaps rather should be, about broad-
based and equal participation, empowerment and voice.  
 
While emphasising that multiple partners should participate in the SWAp, these 
interviewees seemed to express (what can perhaps be termed) a distinctly 
community- or district- focused perspective, in that they suggested that these 
were the most significant partners in health sector development. As one MoH 
official indicated, „The most important partners are communities... Until we 
understand communities, there will be no progress in health‟ (Int. MoH official 
26 Nov 2008). Here, it seemed to be suggested that the SWAp partnership 
should be about ensuring there is coordinated action to support the 
empowerment of communities and districts (which they believed were 
currently marginalised in the centralised way in which the health sector was 
governed), so that they can exert their right to equity in health (Int. 26 Nov 
2008 MoH official; Int. 1 Jun 2009 civil society organisation representative). 
Arguably then, this perspective resonates with (though perhaps does not 
completely reproduce) the egalitarian representation of partnership that is 
written into SWAp policy, as discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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Interestingly, while these interviewees certainly expressed the above view 
about how the health SWAp should operate as a partnership, many 
representatives from civil society organisations suggested that practical realities 
were in fact rather different. Instead of being actively engaged in deliberative 
dialogue and debate, it was suggested for example that districts and 
communities actually had limited involvement and influence as a partner in the 
SWAp; and therefore limited real influence over local or national decision-
making, priority-setting, resource planning and allocation: 
 
Always it is the top telling the bottom what to do. Here is the menu, and 
you can move around a little bit. It is happening at every level... You 
can‟t speak without the blessing from the top. Even if you complain you 
need to have the blessing (Int. 1 Jun 2009 civil society organisation 
representative).  
 
Rather than being broad-based and inclusive then, partnership in SWAp 
practice was seen to be highly centralised (towards MoH headquarters in 
Lusaka) and, moreover, centred around a more narrow relationship between the 
Ministry and donor agencies (which are referred to locally as cooperating 
partners or CPs) (Int. 20 Nov 2008; Int. 7 Apr 2009 civil society organisation 
representatives). As one interviewee succinctly put it: „It is government, CPs, 
government, CPs, government, CPs‟ (Int. 2 Apr 2009 civil society organisation 
representative). These interviewees were particularly critical of what they saw 
as the Ministry‟s (and by extension the current MMD government‟s) focus on 
CPs and funding, and its apparent pandering to donors to secure resources at 
the expense of local actors, whose views and ideas were effectively screened 
out of SWAp debates. As one interviewee explained: 
 
The attention is to donors. I had a meeting with one of the Directors at 
the Ministry, some guys from the World Bank showed up and they say 
“sorry, come another time”. They won‟t listen to an idea because they 
have money there. I have ideas, but they have no room for ideas. One on 
hand, they think they have ideas, but not ideas that are critical in the way 
they should be...You can be [x] or [x], they will not come to any 
dissemination. If donors call for a meeting everyone goes... I have 
nothing to threaten them with (Int. 1 Jun 2009 civil society organisation 
representative). 
 
In other words then, these interviewees were effectively suggesting that the 
MoH found it difficult to balance the needs and interests of local and also 
donor partners in the SWAp, and therefore to be mutually accountable to both. 
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In short, they thought government saw donor agencies as the most important 
partners in the health SWAp.  
 
Indeed, it actually seemed to be suggested that donor agencies now had more 
influence and therefore more power in the health sector than they had in the 
past due to the close donor-government relationship that the SWAp partnership 
currently brought (Int. 7 Apr 2009 civil society organisation representative; Int. 
1 Jun 2009 civil society organisation representative); a view that seemed to be 
implicitly shared by at least one MoH official, as reflected in the following 
quote: 
 
We are now partners. In the old days, it was just writing a cheque. They 
are now part of the system. We have to listen to the feelings of friends... 
If you think its not good then tells us and we will change it (Int. 26 Nov 
2008 MoH official emphasis added).  
 
For these above-mentioned interviewees then, the SWAp partnership was a 
somewhat elite-dominated and closed political arena that did not fulfil their 
participatory expectations about the way in which health sector development 
should be governed.  
 
2) Altogether different views: An efficient and effective service 
delivery partnership or a means for governance reform? 
 
Significantly, other interviewees had somewhat different expectations, views 
and ideas about the health SWAp than those described above, which (as we 
shall now see) reveals the complex, messy and politically contested nature of 
this partnership in action. Certain donor agencies and also some „civil society‟ 
(NGO) interviewees who had a predominantly service delivery role in the 
health sector, seemed to interpret it as being about facilitating the delivery and 
implementation of health services. Rather than emphasising the need to 
transform community dialogue and voice (as above), they thought that the 
SWAp should be about securing synergies in service delivery for communities, 
and ensuring that resources (largely financial ones) are allocated and managed 
efficiently and effectively (Int. 23 Apr 2009, Int. 9 Jun 2009, Int. 4 Jun 2009 
civil society organisation representatives). This view clearly differs in emphasis 
to the perspective discussed above and also demonstrates that there was some 
230 
 
divergence between different „civil society‟ actors about the way the health 
sector should be governed.  
 
Interestingly, there were also divergences between different donor agencies 
about how the SWAp should and actually did currently operate as a partnership. 
While one particular aid agency representative clearly had a service delivery 
view, in that they thought partnership should be about coordinating resources 
for efficient health care and service implementation, it seemed that there was 
inherent scepticism about the Zambian government‟s and MoH‟s capacity as a 
partner here. As a result, it was suggested that if being a partner in the SWAp 
meant delivering aid resources in a way that avoided the public health sector 
system (i.e. giving to the private sector or for what were essentially private 
NGOs projects) then this was acceptable, so long as the MoH as a partner was 
kept informed (Int. 12 Jun 2009 aid agency representative). Indeed, doing so 
would mean that there was effective internal control over expenditure and 
resource use, and would help fulfil that particular aid agency‟s own 
organisational constraints and reporting requirements to their headquarters.  
 
It was however, suggested that some level of coordination with the Ministry 
was necessary and could be achieved through the provision of a limited amount 
of direct government funding. As the representative somewhat candidly 
explained: „We do give to government... but it is very little... it buys us a seat at 
the table‟ (Int. 12 Jun 2009 aid agency representative). In some respects then, 
with this apparently sceptical view of the role of the MoH, this donor agency 
representative was advocating a somewhat neoliberal version of the SWAp 
partnership, in which what was important was efficiency and effectiveness in 
resource use for health service delivery, and the potential limiting or even 
rolling back of direct government involvement as a partner in health.  
 
Other representatives of donor agencies seemed to interpret the SWAp as a 
partnership in a slightly different way. Apparently rearticulating the dominant 
model of partnership in SWAp policy (see Chapter Seven), here the emphasis 
was on partnership acting to strengthen or rather reform the way aid and public 
resources for health are governed. These donor officials suggested, for example, 
that the SWAp partnership was about having a coordinated and technical 
process (rules and procedures) for efficiently and effectively allocating health 
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resources, and about strengthening the systems through which aid and public 
expenditure were managed; thereby helping recipient governments to capably 
„move forward‟ with their own health sector development (Int. 24 Jun 2009; Int. 
22 Apr 2009; Int. 16 Apr 2009; Int. 16 June 2009; Int. 27 Nov 2008 aid agency 
representatives).  
 
Rather than being broad-based and inclusive, here a SWAp partnership was 
much more narrowly discussed: as a coordinated relationship between donors 
and governments, and moreover as a relationship that was about monitoring the 
effective use of resources within a common planning and management 
framework. As one aid agency representative indicated: 
 
If I'm honest, the way we are currently working, our key partners and the 
bulk of our programme is the Ministry of Health and other CPs... Though 
there is an effort to engage with civil society through contacts... those 
two groups [MoH and CPs] are the key partners... A lot of what we call 
partnership is process management. It is also a common goal and 
objectives set. People really do try to go back to that core (Int. 16 June 
2009 aid agency representative).  
 
This is not to say that other actors were not seen as important, and indeed there 
was some level of sensitivity as to how, for example, „civil society‟ 
organisations/health NGOs were engaged in health sector development, but the 
primary concern was the relationship with and actions of government; and 
more specifically about how the government (MoH) efficiently, accountably 
and transparently used aid and public resources (Int. 29 Apr 2009, Int. 16 June 
2009, Int. 27 Nov 2008 aid agency representatives).  
 
Perhaps reflecting some sensitivity to broader criticisms about the way in 
which aid had been managed in the past (see Chapters Five and Seven), some 
officials emphasised that the partnership was not about donors imposing a 
health sector agenda on the government, yet (paradoxically) implied that 
decisions and resource allocation could be influenced indirectly, through 
coordinated dialogue (donors speaking in one voice) and managerial techniques 
– those same (neoliberal) managerial techniques that are legitimised through 
the dominant version of partnership in SWAp policy (see Chapter Seven). One 
official emphasised for example that: „The Ministry makes decisions, we 
advise‟ (Int. 16 Jun 2009 aid agency representatives); that is to say, they advise 
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the Zambian government to make (what they see as) the right neoliberal 
governing decisions for health (and ultimately economic growth).  
 
A number of other officials indicated that the partnership was built around a 
joint planning framework, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or contract, 
an agreed series of reports, formal meetings, and monitoring and performance 
targets, which had been devised as a means to bring about effective health 
governance (Int. 24 Apr 2009, Int. 22 Apr 2009, Int. 29 Apr 2009, Int. 26 May 
2009 aid agency representatives). As one aid agency representative indicated: 
 
To do so and really have a good partnership we have signed an MoU, 
where we have clarified roles and responsibilities, obligations. It is some 
kind of contract... and then in the partnership we are also active in all the 
meetings, the Working Groups... Its a partnership for transparency and 
openness (Int. 22 Apr 2009 aid agency representative). 
 
In other words then, implicit to this particular donor agency view was that the 
SWAp as a partnership was about advising and monitoring (teaching and 
supervising) good (responsible, neoliberal) governance of the health sector by 
the government (MoH) for Zambia‟s own (economic) development; which, 
interestingly, does not appear to be all that different from the paternalistic and 
unequal way in which aid has previously been managed. These particular 
interviewees then, seemed to be reproducing the dominant technical and 
economic model of partnership within SWAp policy. 
 
Importantly, and to be fair to many donor officials, many were critically 
reflective in interviews about the success of this version of partnership in 
practice; about the way in which the managerial partnership techniques referred 
to above were perceived by government and perhaps failed to operate (as 
intended) in practice; and, relatedly, about their own role as a partner in the 
health sector. One donor official questioned, for example, the potentially 
uneven nature of the partnering relationship with the government, noting that:  
„I don‟t know if it is an uneven friendship – one having money and one not‟ 
(Int. 22 Apr 2009 aid agency representative). Others expressed concern about 
the formal structures that were used for dialogue, questioning whether 
Technical Working Groups in particular were seen as a way to monitor and 
check up on government behaviour (as suggested above):  
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I get the sense that government do not think they are useful any more... 
Government see it as peering over their shoulder and we are seen as 
pointing the finger. The whole structure of the SWAp is quite onerous on 
the government... It needs some re-thinking [sic] (Int. 16 Jun 2009 aid 
agency representative).  
 
Despite an apparent normative commitment to some kind of partnership 
working then, and the need for a technical, efficient and effective mode of 
health governance, these donor officials were concerned about the politics of 
the SWAp partnership; about the practical effectiveness of neoliberal 
managerial partnership technologies; and about the possible inequality in the 
power relationship between themselves and the government (MoH). As we will 
now see, a number of government representatives also expressed similar 
concerns about the inequality and politics of partnership.  
 
3) Further translations of the SWAp: Partnership, government 
leadership and external influence   
 
A number of actors who currently, or had previously, worked at the MoH (Int. 
22 Apr 2009; Int. 31 Mar 2009; Int. 27 May 2009; Int. 8 Jun 2009; Int. 12 Jun 
2009 MoH representatives) and also a donor agency official (who had a close 
historical relationship to Ministry) (Int. 21 Apr 2009 aid agency representative) 
interpreted the SWAp as a partnership in a different way to the perspectives 
discussed above. They seemed to suggest that partnership should be about 
government leadership (perhaps even dominance) in decision-making, planning, 
resource allocation and management within the health sector, and involve all 
public and external funds supporting the Ministry‟s overarching plan. As one 
ex-MoH official explained, the SWAp partnership should involve MoH 
„...leadership to set, control parameters and offer both direction in terms of 
policy, and information, in terms of implementation about the health sector in 
the country [sic]‟ (ex-MoH official 31 Mar 2009). This is not to say that other 
actors were not seen to be important, but these interviewees seemed to express 
(what can perhaps be called) a nationalist and moreover government-centred 
view: that the MoH should direct and control local health action, with others in 
support. 
 
In practice however, these interviewees suggested that partnership and, by 
extension, government leadership was undermined by the way in which some 
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donor agencies acted and tried to shape health sector development (Int. 31 Mar 
2009; Int. 12 Jun 2009; Int. 26 March 2006 MoH officials). As one Ministry 
official succinctly stated: „Of course, if they put money in they want an 
influence‟ (Int. 12 Jun 2009 MoH official). This influence could be exerted in 
various indirect ways: through for example dialogue in planning and priority-
setting or „synchronisation‟ with managerial rules (Int. 22 Apr 2009 MoH 
official). In relation to priorities and planning, as one ex-MoH official 
explained:  
 
You may find that issues to do with [x] should not appear at all, but other 
donors may feel otherwise. You find that your strategic plan, what 
should be a coherent document, for priority concerns, gets watered down 
and they start questioning allocation and resource use... so it is a difficult 
task that the Ministry has... It is a reflection of the weakening 
stewardship role of the Ministry (Int. 31 Mar 2009 ex-MoH official).  
 
There was clear disaffection with some of managerial partnership technologies 
that are part of the Zambian health SWAp.  Certain Ministry officials saw them 
as donor-required instruments that were designed to micro-manage the health 
sector; which reinforces the same concern expressed by donors above. 
Referring to a lengthy financial report on Selected HMIS [Health Management 
Information System] Indicators for Districts, which is produced for and 
presented at Sector Advisory Group meetings (see Chapter Seven and later), 
one Ministry official indicated that: „This report is required by donors; if they 
had no influence we would just stick to government procedures‟ (Int. 12 Jun 
2009 MoH official emphasis added). Moreover, referring to the formal 
structures for dialogue that are set out in the SWAp MoU, one MoH official 
commented „We see them on the Technical Working Groups, after these other 
[policy] meetings, what more is there to go through?‟ (Int. 8 Jun 2009 MoH 
official).  
 
Interestingly, this same official (on a separate occasion) was keen to point out, 
that some donor agencies did not just exert an influence directly in and through 
the health sector, but could also indirectly shape spending priorities from 
outside by liaising with the Ministry of Finance and National Planning. By 
setting limits on public expenditure on personal emoluments (PE), donors 
constrained the financial context for health and thus limited human resources 
for health: „They say, the PE to GDP ration for health is too high, wage freeze 
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please... [X] were arguing that MoH had reached full employment‟ (Int. 27 May 
2009 MoH official emphasis added). The paradox here is that many rural 
health centres either have no staff or are staffed by untrained personnel and 
there are estimated to be over 10,000 less nurses and over 1,500 less doctors 
than is ideal, as based on government and WHO criteria (MoH Zambia, 2005, 
p.22). This supports the assertions of critics like Rick Rowden (2009) that 
donor influence on macro-economics is contorting and constraining the 
governance of public health in countries like Zambia (see also Unger et al. 
2010).  
 
Given this point, why might the MoH (and Zambian government more broadly) 
put up with such influence? Perhaps unsurprisingly, it seems that it is accepted 
in order to continue to access external aid funds; and all the other, potential 
material benefits (for example consultancy opportunities, promotions and so on) 
that the aid industry comes with. These points will be returned to later in the 
chapter when discussing the meeting of the Sector Advisory Group.   
 
Multiple and competing translations: The politics of partnership? 
 
The above discussion has clearly demonstrated that there are there are multiple 
and indeed competing translations of the idea of a health SWAp partnership in 
practice. Given that there are several ways in which the idea of partnership can 
be interpreted in SWAp policy (see Chapter Seven), it is perhaps unsurprising 
that there are also multiple interpretations of partnership in practice. The 
ambiguity in the way the idea of partnership is framed in SWAp policy, which 
is arguably necessary because it facilitates the enrolment of support for the 
approach, allows this to happen (see also Sundewall and Sahlin-Andersson, 
2006). While there are certainly parallels in the way in which the SWAp as a 
partnership is represented in official policy and how it is interpreted in local 
practice; with, for example, a participatory view, co-existing alongside a rather 
more technical and economic view (see Chapter Seven), which suggests that 
policy does reflect practice in Zambia in some way. It is also apparent that 
local actors have drawn on their ideas, interests, history, relationships, and 
organisational constraints to make their own sense of the partnership in action.  
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Indeed, while the partnership contradictions embedded in official SWAp texts 
are to some extent „brought to life‟ in practice (cf. Mosse, 2005a, p.105), there 
are also clear „disjunctures‟ (cf. Lewis and Mosse, 2006) between the two; with 
the existence of the nationalist or government-centred view a key case in point. 
This supports the earlier assertion made in Chapter Six that the meaning of the 
idea of partnership is not simply internalised and transferred into different 
health development contexts, but rather is actively reinterpreted by different 
actors, and has to be worked out in practice through interactions, 
communication and relationships; in other words, through politics and the 
everyday relations of governance. Rather than simply being a technical and 
economic practice then, as partnership seems to dominantly be portrayed in 
SWAp policy (see Chapter Seven), it seems that the SWAp partnership in 
action is actually a highly political, complicated and messy local arena, in 
which heterogeneous logics, interests and strategies come into „confrontation‟ 
(Olivier de Sardan, 2005, p.137).  
 
As with Chapter Six, a key political question is perhaps whose perspective ends 
up dominantly shaping the partnership in practice? While understandings of the 
SWAp partnership are clearly not differentiated along simple organisational or 
sectoral lines – with, for example, sometimes certain government and donor 
actors sharing a common view – as the next section of this chapter will now go 
on to show, in the politics that ensues over the different aid modalities that are 
used within the SWAp partnership, it seems clear that it is the views of certain 
donor partners that prevails. As we shall also see however, the Zambian 
government (MoH) is certainly not an entirely powerless partner here; there 
actually seems to be a constant struggle for influence and control in what is a 
„battlefield‟ of knowledge, of interests and of people (Long, 2001; Mosse, 
2005a, p.107).  
 
The politics of aid modalities: Projects, pooled funding and budget support  
 
The divergent understandings of partnership discussed above seem to manifest 
in tensions between different actors around specific aspects of the SWAp as it 
operates in practice. There was particular sensitivity, for example, around the 
particular aid modalities that different donor agencies use to deliver resources 
to the health sector. Many MoH officials expressed a preference for receiving 
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resources through the health sector basket or through sector budget support 
(SBS) – wherein donors respectively either use a common funding mechanism 
to pool aid directly for a set of MoH purposes (for example, district health care 
or drug procurement), or give earmarked health resources to the Ministry of 
Finance National Planning (MoFNP), which are then passed on to the MoH 
through government channels. Either way, these were apparently preferred by 
the MoH because it was believed that they supported the Ministry‟s leadership 
role in the SWAp partnership, and therefore in planning, decision-making and 
resource allocation, as indicated above (Int. 26 Nov 2008, Int. 31 Mar 2009, Int. 
7 May 2009, Int. 27 May 2009, Int. 8 Jun 2009 MoH officials).  
 
Perhaps reflecting historical sensitivities between the MoH and MoFNP, and, 
in particular, concerns about how health is prioritised in broader national 
budgetary debates, there were mixed views on the part of the MoH about the 
move by some donors (specifically DfID) towards General Budget Support 
(GBS), which some interviewees believed had occurred without their 
involvement as partners (Int. 8 Jun 2009; Int. 26 Nov 2008; Int. 26 March 2009 
MoH officials). For GBS, donor funding is channelled directly to the national 
budget without any earmarking for health, and there was a concern that this 
would result in health sector funding either not being received, or not being 
received on time – which is essential if it is to be relayed to support and 
maintain the MoH HQ‟s partnership with district-level facilities.  
 
While these concerns seemed to be unfounded at the time of the research – with 
a generally timely receipt of funding from MoFNP – the change in political 
leadership due to the unexpected death of President Mwanawasa in late 2008 
meant that there were concerns about how GBS would be relayed to the MoH 
in future. As one donor official who worked closely with the MoH explained, 
„There are things that have been going very well [with GBS]; except just the 
fear that Ministry of Finance might have other priorities when it comes to the 
health sector‟ (Int. 29 Apr 2009 donor agency official). 
 
Certain donor officials had different views to the MoH about GBS, by virtue of 
their different position in the health sector; their differing understanding of the 
SWAp as a partnership; and their own organisational constraints and 
commitments. For some, they emphasised that GBS was a modality that their 
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agency was committed to organisationally and that it was a systems approach, 
which enabled them to work alongside government and to provide them with 
advice; thereby strengthening the capacity of not only the Ministry of Health, 
but also the broader governmental apparatus for managing health and 
development (Int. 27 Nov 2008; Int. 26 May 2009; Int. 29 Jun 2009). In other 
words, it was a way to influence and reform developmental governance: from 
the inside of the government out.   
 
Despite the evident difference in focus here, many donor and Ministry officials 
shared a critical view of those bilateral and multilateral donors who chose to 
fund their own specific health projects and of certain global health initiatives, 
particularly the Global Fund (which is discussed in Chapter Six) because they 
thought it undermined their own efforts to work in partnership (Int. 26 Nov 
2008, Int. 26 Mar 2009, Int. 8 Jun 2009, Int. 26 Jun 2009 Ministry of Health 
officials; Int. 27 Nov 2008, Int. 4 Jun 2009, Int. 16 Jun 2009, Int. 21 Jun 2009, 
Int. 29 Jun 2009 aid agency officials); an observation that was also made by 
Sundewall et al. (2009). From the Ministry‟s perspective, the primary concern 
here seemed to be how the Global Fund‟s vertical funding of AIDS, TB and 
malaria, which was largely outside statutory systems, undermined their 
leadership role and ability to exert control in the governance of health – and, in 
particular, because it undermined their planning cycle and budgeting processes 
(see Chapter Six).  
 
While donors also expressed concern about this, they seemed to be particularly 
concerned about how focusing on specific diseases undermined their own 
efforts to coordinate the oversight and improvement of health governance (Int. 
27 Nov 2008, Int. 16 Jun 2009 Int. 29 Jun 2009 aid donor officials). As one aid 
agency official commented: „Quite frankly, this vertical funding is disgraceful‟ 
(Int. 4 Jun 2009 aid donor official). Although both Global Fund policy and 
official texts about SWAps refer to the idea of partnership then (as Chapters 
Four and Six show), it was clear that both these approaches to aid and health 
governance were regarded as different kinds of partnership in practice. 
 
Strategically concealing politics: The Sector Advisory Group (SAG) as 
depoliticised political theatre 
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Interestingly, despite the politics surrounding different aid modalities, and 
evident concerns about the way that the Global Fund and other global health 
initiatives were impacting on health governance in Zambia, this dissonance 
seemed to be strategically concealed in the public and formalised meetings that 
were held as part of the SWAp; and which are, according to SWAp policy, key 
managerial technologies for coordinating partner dialogue and investment in 
health (see Figure 10 in Chapter Seven). Despite a Global Fund representative 
being present at the Sector Advisory Group (SAG) meeting on 2 April 2009 for 
the first time, no comments or criticisms about the Fund were openly aired by 
MoH, donor or civil society officials that were present. Instead, the Global 
Fund representative was introduced by the MoH as a partner in health and was 
warmly welcomed by saying: „We are happy to have you on the team‟ (Observ. 
2 Apr 2009 MoH official) 
 
It seems that politics was strategically concealed throughout the whole of the 
SAG, with an apolitical and technical, positive and harmonious version of the 
partnership performed instead. Indeed, it was as though the SAG was a form of 
political theatre; with various plots and scenes during the (five-hour) meeting, 
different characters playing their partnership roles, and all working to a similar 
script, so as to successfully „stage-manage‟ a technical performance of the 
partnership in practice (cf. Cunliffe, 2009a). This was an interpretation that 
seemed to be shared by a number of interviewees, who commented on the lack 
of critical substance to discussions, the emphasis on „positives‟, and the SAG‟s 
role as a (somewhat unproductive) „talking shop‟ (Int. 29 June 2009, Int. 1 June 
2009 civil society organisation representatives; Int. 29 June 2009, Int. 1 June 
2009 aid agency representatives). In other words then, it seems that the SAG 
was a symbolic partnership display and, moreover, one that not insignificantly 
seemed to conform to the dominant way in which partnership is represented in 
SWAp policy (see Chapter Seven). While we will consider a little later in the 
chapter why this particular version of partnership was publicly performed, it is 
perhaps useful to give some examples from the SAG meeting, in order to 
support this point.  
 
1) Setting the scene and technical partnership scripts 
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First, the scene was set at an up-market hotel in the centre of Lusaka: there was 
an orderly layout of tables and chairs, the organised handout of reports and 
supporting papers, and a clear orientation towards a „front-stage‟ area, where 
leading characters in the SWAp partnership could execute their roles (see 
Figure 11). The plot was elaborated in a clear agenda and the performance then 
began with a series of opening remarks by leading actors; who followed a 
similar partnership script (cf. Cunliffe, 2009).  
 
The MoH representative spoke using a language of harmony and technical 
achievement, emphasising that: the SAG was a forum for strengthening 
accountability and performance monitoring; that there was some technical 
capacity challenges in scaling-up health interventions; that it was positive that 
plans to address these challenges were „more targeted and more results-based‟; 
and that government would „...undertake immediate measures to address the 
concerns of all partners‟ (Observ. 2 Apr 2009  MoH official SAG meeting). 
They noted that one character – the Churches Health Association of Zambia 
(CHAZ) – was a key partner in health and (un-problematically it seems) was 
now representing „the whole of civil society‟ (Observ. 2 Apr 2009  MoH 
official SAG meeting); though it is unclear how one actor can execute such an 
all-encompassing role. The MoH representative also „welcomed‟ a new 
character to the SWAp partnership – New Zealand aid – noting (again 
somewhat unproblematically despite the criticisms about verticality noted 
above) that „their focus was civil society and child health‟ (Observ. 2 Apr 2009 
MoH official). 
 
Figure 11. Field diary sketch of the scene of the SAG meeting, 2 April 2009.  
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The opening remarks of the „civil society‟ (CHAZ) representative followed a 
similar, harmonious and positive pattern. While indicating that there could be 
„more effective‟ civil society involvement in planning and budgeting, they 
emphasised positively that: „We are grateful for the partnership we are seeing‟ 
(Observ. 2 Apr 2009 CHAZ official). Similarly, the lead donor for the sector, 
which at the time was the UK Department for International Development 
(DfID), emphasised Zambia‟s commitment to and performance in health, 
noting that although there were still geographical challenges: „If we continue to 
work together in partnership we can make a real difference; lets make that our 
mission‟ (Observ. 2 Apr 2009 DfID official). 
 
2) Data, numbers and quantification: A dominant technical dialect 
 
Having established a positive and apolitical scene, throughout the rest of the 
SAG dissonance was consistently downplayed through the presentation of 
considerable volumes of technical health data; so much so that statistics, 
numbers and quantification came across as the dominant dialect of the meeting 
(cf. Bergamaschi, 2009). Lengthy statistical reports (around ninety pages in 
length) were distributed and discussed, which showed apparently positive 
progress towards achieving specified SWAp health targets; and a series of 
presentations emphasised favourable aggregated health sector performance data, 
as measured against last year‟s benchmarks and the National Health Strategic 
Plan. It was emphasised, for example, that malaria incidence had reduced in all 
provinces between 2006 and 2008 as a result of the SWAp partnership, as had 
the percentage of children who were underweight. Moreover, in terms of 
finances, one presentation showed a series of graphs that participants were 
informed showed the efficient total dispersal of funds from the health sector 
basket to districts (Observ. 2 Apr 2009  MoH official SAG meeting).  
 
There was little qualitative discussion or deliberative debate about this 
technical health and financial data, which reinforced the technical portrayal of 
the SWAp partnership in practice. There was, for example, no critical analysis 
of limitations in data quality; no explanation about how the figures had been 
achieved; no debate about whether the aggregation of technical health data 
might conceal underlying health inequalities; and no consideration, for example, 
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as to whether districts were receiving their total funding on time. Rather, it was 
all about proving efficiency, health outcomes and partnership results. 
 
While the positive introductions and dominantly technical dialect of the 
meeting provided a seemingly persuasive performance of the apolitical and 
successful nature of the SWAp partnership in practice, the public downplaying 
of politics in this way was clearly a symbolic construction, as evidenced by the 
discussion above about the different translations of partnership. Moreover, 
while the lengthy reports and presentations were presented as if they were 
technical and precise, this was also somewhat „illusory‟ for a number of 
reasons (cf. Bergamaschi, 2009). 
 
Firstly, and as Deborah Stone (2002) indicates, such data is never entirely 
neutral or value-free; it always reflects a political choice about what should be 
collected and presented, and will inevitably affect who gets what, when, where 
and how (cf. Lasswell, 1936). Secondly, collecting health data requires 
considerable infrastructural backup: it not only requires people who have the 
skills to assess and record the necessary information, and who have the time to 
do the form-filling that the process entails; but it also requires supportive 
resources to travel to and from more remote regions across the country, 
including during the seasonal rains, to obtain information from those areas 
which are rarely reached in everyday health sector practice (Int. 7 May 2009; 
Int. 10 June 2009 civil society organisation representatives). Given the 
historical evolution of the health sector in Zambia, including its progressive 
erosion through structural adjustment reforms in 1980s and 1990s, which have 
led among other things to a loss of human resources due to lay-offs and out-
migration (see Chapter Seven), the necessary people, skills and other resources 
are simply not present. It is therefore impossible (and unrealistic to expect) 
precise health data to be compiled. The technical dialect of the SAG meeting 
and the lack of open criticism seemed to strategically conceal these historical 
embedded difficulties, and the considerable political challenges in resolving 
them. 
 
Why was there a technical and apolitical performance of partnership? 
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Yet why would all actors involved in the SAG – government, donor and also 
civil society actors – be so apparently mutually enrolled in this technical 
performance? That is to say, in accepting a technical dialect, in downplaying 
politics, and in not openly criticising or questioning the SWAp partnership in 
practice? In other words, why did they all engage together in creating order 
where there is disorder; and thus in constructing the appearance of a technical 
partnership through political acts of „composition‟ (Latour, 2000; Mosse and 
Lewis, 2006). As the following examples will now show, it seems that this 
occurred because the ideas and interests of different actors are all, to some 
extent, tied-up in creating this orderly and depoliticised impression. 
 
On the Ministry of Health side, a technocratic and economic appearance is 
instrumentally useful because it demonstrates a level of compliance with (or 
conformance to) the dominantly technical way in which the idea of partnership 
is represented in SWAp policy, and is therefore a strategic way to try and 
access more aid resources. As indicated above and in Chapter Seven, according 
to official policy, forums like the SAG are intended to be a space for dialogue 
and, in particular, for reviewing the results and technical effectiveness of the 
SWAp partnership approach. Because these judgements (of apparent 
partnership success) are then linked to future disbursements of aid (including 
basket funding and GBS, as mentioned above), there is something of an 
incentive here for the MoH to construct a technical impression, to emphasise 
the way in which the SWAp has performed and achieved positive health 
outcomes; and to downplay politics and criticism. In other words, apparently 
perceiving the importance of the way partnership is dominantly represented in 
SWAp model – and therefore of being seen to govern technically and 
effectively – what seems to have happened is that the MoH has tried to 
retranslate local partnership events and interactions back into the logic of this 
model, so as to sell the health sector as a legitimate, responsibilised and 
effective site for aid. 
 
Indeed, in support of the argument of Chapter Six, it seems that what has 
happened is that the dominant (neoliberal) model of partnership has been 
consumed by the MoH as a type of policy commodity. This has then served as 
an input into a local process of (re)manufacturing, which sought to convert the 
complexity and politics of local practice into an orderly product (the SAG), 
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which was then publicly traded to local donor officials in order secure access to 
their resources (cf. Orlandini 2003; Rushton, 2008). Interestingly, this 
interpretation of the SAG was supported by one government official who noted 
that: „The Sector Advisory Group is a platform to market up the health sector‟ 
(Int. 18 June 2009 MoH official emphasis added).  
 
As with Chapter Six, there is no suggestion of duplicity here (cf. Mosse, 2005a); 
no lies were told; rather, what happens is that politics and dissonance are 
selectively edited out of public SWAp practice, so as to give the impression 
that disorderly local practice is compliant with orderly SWAp policy models 
(Rushton, 2008; Ferguson, 1990; Marriage, 2006). Indeed, this is something of 
a necessity: in what is effectively a competitive global market for aid, it is 
difficult for the Ministry not to portray the SWAp partnership as an 
achievement in terms of currently favoured models because the cost of 
„breaking ranks‟ is high (Mosse, 2005a, p.235). In short, it could jeopardise 
their relationships with aid donors and the opportunity to access their resources 
(cf. Eyben, 2010). 
 
Importantly, the MoH is not completely powerless here – this practice is 
actually in some senses an expression of their power in the SWAp partnership, 
because it helps them to secure access to aid. Indeed, the particular way in 
which the MoH tried to construct a technical governing appearance was 
perhaps an expression of resistance to dominant governing models, because of 
the way in which it gave the MoH a certain amount of room for manoeuvre in 
the partnership in practice. As indicated above, the MoH presented a 
considerable volume of technical health performance data in the SAG in order 
to demonstrate that it had achieved results and was worthy of future 
disbursements of aid. While this action demonstrated a level of compliance 
with expected managerial reporting procedures embedded in SWAp partnership 
policy, the voluminous and opaque way in which the reports were presented 
actually served to blur the dialogue in the SAG meeting and this was, it seems, 
a political strategy to quietly evade and deflect (what the Ministry sees as) 
donor surveillance, influence and control (cf. Bergamaschi, 2009). 
 
Interestingly, it seemed as though the above-mentioned marketing strategy was 
implicitly understood by other governmental actors who were present in the 
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SAG, who did not voice any criticisms throughout. Indeed, it was almost as 
though there was an unwritten rule that it was not acceptable to speak-up in the 
meeting. While this helped to construct the appearance of technical consensus 
and success, conversely it served to limit public deliberation about health 
governance issues; and this, significantly, meant that the factors shaping and 
barriers to health service delivery or health outcomes were not openly 
discussed. As one interviewee commented about the SAG:  
 
There is definitely sensitivity in terms of criticism.  There are strong 
[government] voices saying that Zambia has achieved all the 
harmonisation and worked with donors over a fifteen year period.  It is 
clear that that is the line to take... As a result, issues get brushed under 
the carpet (Int. 9 Jun 2009 civil society organisation representative). 
 
While some donor officials expressed private frustration in interviews about 
this lack of criticism and debate within the SAG, they did not openly express 
any criticisms themselves (and thus those views that were aired in interviews as 
described above). Instead, they seemed to be mutually enrolled in maintaining 
the public „fantasy‟ (cf. Marriage, 2006) that the SWAp was a technical and 
apolitical (a neoliberal) partnership. Yet why might this have been the case?  
 
On the one hand, donors may not want to destroy this appearance because to do 
so could damage their own image. Aid officials want Zambia and the SWAp to 
be seen as a successful neoliberal and technical partnership because it means 
they can themselves demonstrate results – to their colleagues, to their agency 
headquarters and to their donor governments – and it is also good for their 
status, promotion prospects and future career. On the other hand, another 
possible reason why criticisms were not openly aired could be because some 
donor officials are aware of and confused about the divergent ways in which 
the idea of partnership is represented in SWAp policy, and are therefore 
uncertain as to their own role in this partnership in practice. During interviews, 
for example, certain individuals expressed concern as to whether it was 
legitimate for donors to express criticism, whether this was actually an undue 
form of influence, and whether „civil society‟ or other government actors 
should be doing this instead (Int. 16 Apr 2009, Int. 22 Apr 2009, Int. 16 Jun 
2009 aid agency officials). As one interviewee commented: „The problem with 
me standing up and saying this, I am a cooperating partner... Government has 
got to say it‟ (Int. 16 Apr 2009 aid agency official). In other words, and as 
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Maria Erikksson Baaz (2005) notes, „mixed messages‟ within policy discourse 
about partnership give rise to donor agency insecurity and uncertainty in the 
SWAp partnership in practice.  
 
At the same time, and as indicated above, donor officials may not have openly 
critiqued the technical health performance reports that were presented by the 
MoH in the SAG (despite the fact that the meaning of this data was somewhat 
opaque) for more overtly instrumental reasons, because it gave them a degree 
of leverage over the MoH behind closed doors. While concealing 
dissatisfaction maintains the public facade of a technical and apolitical 
partnership, behind closed doors the opaque data can serve as a means of 
control: donor officials can say, for example, „You didn‟t write this‟ or „didn‟t 
present that in the right way‟ and therefore that „We are not going to disburse 
our aid funds until you do x, y and x‟ (Int. 8 June 2009 MoH official; pers. 
communication civil society organisation representative). As one civil society 
representative commented, the timing of disbursements is actually „...a key area 
of grievance by MoH. Donors use this to arm-twist MoH into doing what they 
want‟ (Pers. communication 12 Apr 2009).  
 
While the timing and delay of funding actually has a significant impact on the 
way the health sector is governed in Zambia – limiting the control the MoH HQ 
has over funding processes, eroding relationships with district facilities as their 
funding is delayed, and disrupting the procurement of drugs and sometimes 
payment of salaries – donors do not ever publicly report on this; despite the fact 
that, as Jeremy Gould (2005, p.72) indicates, „timing is perhaps the most 
effective instrument for controlling the operation of the aid domain‟. This 
above discussion therefore raises questions as to the extent to which donor 
agencies are held mutually accountable within the SWAp partnership, and to 
which this partnership in practice is (and indeed could ever) be an equal or 
technical mode of governance.  
 
Before moving on, it is perhaps useful to very briefly consider why „civil 
society‟ actors present in the SAG did not raise queries or criticisms, and thus 
why they are also mutually enrolled to some extent in the technical public 
performance of partnership. Very few „civil society‟ actors were present in the 
SAG meeting, and a brief analysis of the participant lists from previous 
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meetings shows that this is not unusual. Indeed, it is the same „usual suspects‟ 
who attend (cf. Harman, 2007), despite the fact that it is essentially an open 
forum for dialogue. While anyone can participate in the SAG in principle 
however, there is little history of „civil society‟ engagement in such structures, 
and indeed of direct engagement with the MoH; due to deep-seated 
„sensitivities‟ and state intolerance towards any form of dissent (see Erdman 
and Simutanyi, 2003). As a result, there are still suspicions on the part of many 
„civil society‟ and MoH actors as to their respective intentions and uncertainty 
as to how interactions can and should occur. Those „civil society‟ 
representatives that are present in SAGs are individuals or organisations that 
have managed to build up a trusted relationship with the MoH over an extended 
period of time. Yet, due to ongoing perceptions of sensitivity of government 
actors towards their open participation, they preferred to passively observe in 
public fora; raising health issues and concerns through more private and 
personalised channels (Int. 1 June 2009, Int. 9 June 2009 civil society 
organisation representatives). As one interviewee explained:  
 
You need to have the blessing to complain… [if] you are branded a 
trouble-maker, then they will perhaps not invite you here or here. If you 
are a noise-maker, that‟s how you are treated (Int. 1 June 2009 civil 
society representative). 
 
In short, it seems that many „civil society‟ actors are unequal actors in this 
partnership in practice; and, moreover, keep publicly quiet in order to maintain 
their (not altogether secure) seat at the SWAp partnership table. 
 
The problem here is that because actors involved in the SWAp partnership in 
practice seem to be mutually enrolled performing a technical and apolitical 
partnership attention is diverted away from the real politics, dissonance, 
relationships and inequalities that (it is argued here) inevitably shape local 
practice; and from any reflexive learning about the problems that face the 
health sector. Yet if issues are not openly disclosed, discussed and debated, 
how can they be effectively addressed? Arguably then, and in support of 
Chapter Six, the way in which partnership in apolitically practised in the health 
SWAp risks discursive closure about key health challenges (cf. Cornwall and 
Brock, 2005, p.16); and thus risks the production of ignorance (cf. Mosse, 
2005a) about the way that local action for health is organised (or rather is 
governed) and can be improved. 
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The public collapse of a harmonious and technical partnership  
 
Interestingly, this discursive closure may not be a permanent fixture in the 
Zambian health arena. Only shortly after the SAG meeting took place, the 
health SWAp moved into a period of apparent crisis due largely to the 
discovery of alleged corruption in the MoH (see, for example, The Post, 2009, 
Times of Zambia 2009); and this is a state that, according to recent personal 
communications with local actors, seems to persist to the present day. The 
discovery of corruption was significant because it lead to the public break-
down of the „facade of [technical] cohesion‟ (cf. Scott, 1985, p.56) in the 
SWAp partnership. Disagreements and conflict publicly played out in and 
through the local media, not only between donor agencies and the MoH, but 
also between donors themselves, and between different „civil society‟ 
organisations. Perhaps the most obvious fracture that became apparent in the 
partnership was between donor agencies, who all responded differently to the 
alleged corruption scandal; revealing that they have a range of different ideas 
and interests in the health sector.  
 
On the one hand, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) 
(along with the Dutch bilateral agency) responded by immediately announcing 
on its website that it was stopping planned disbursements to the MoH (which, 
interestingly, should have already been released in April) and this was 
apparently before the MoH was formally informed in writing (Int. 27 May 
2009 MoH official). Backing up their stance on the issue, local media reported 
one SIDA official as saying: „SIDA will not accept any abuse of development 
money‟ (The Post, 2009). Only a few days after this relatively public action 
had been taken, the USAID seemed to openly retort by formally pledging to 
continue its aid to health. In an apparently back-handed jibe at SIDA and the 
Dutch, a US official indicated in the local press that they had a responsibility to 
safeguard the health of the Zambian people (Times of Zambia, 2009). As one 
interviewee commented at the time, „[Some] donors are now competing to 
show what they are doing‟ (Int. 27 May 2009 MoH official).  
 
In contrast, other donors, including the DfID and also CIDA, responded 
differently again, remaining publicly silent. Instead of immediately stopping 
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aid disbursements, these donor agencies tried instead to interact closely with 
senior government officials (within the MoH and more broadly), so as to try 
and unpick the problem and to influence wider changes to health governance 
from within (Ints. 29 June 2009 aid agency officials). Interestingly, the 
existence of these different donor strategies and conflicts seems to be 
confirmed in an email written by a local CIDA official at the time, and which 
has recently been disclosed under Canadian Access to Information legislation: 
„I have to say, there are a lot of agendas and perspectives over here and there is 
also interest from outside the sector to leverage broader reforms. We are trying 
to balance all of these‟ (CIDA email 11 June 2009 – see CIDA, 2009). 
 
Before concluding this chapter and its argument about partnership in practice, it 
is perhaps important to highlight here that the above-mentioned disbursements 
from SIDA and Dutch, which were held back due to this corruption issue 
should, according to the SWAp MoU, already have been released to the MoH 
in April; given that the disbursement had been authorised at the earlier SAG 
meeting. The fact that funding was not disbursed on time not only reinforces 
the point made above that the timing of funding disbursements is an instrument 
of donor control over local actors; but also perhaps reveals that the MoU in 
practice is not a way to hold donors jointly to account in this partnership, but 
rather is a way for donor agencies to specify how the MoH is expected to 
responsibly act. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has made a number of points about how the idea of partnership, as 
represented in official policy about health SWAps, relates to local practice in 
Zambia. Firstly, the chapter argued that the partnership contradictions 
embedded within official policy (see Chapter Seven) are „brought to life and 
replayed‟ (cf. Mosse, 2004, p.664) in the health sector in Zambia, as evidenced 
by the multiple and competing ways in which the SWAp is interpreted as a 
partnership by local actors, which demonstrates that policy (as text) has an 
intimate relationship with practice. At the same time, and secondly however, 
the chapter argued that local actors make their own sense of partnership; with 
their ideas, interests and pre-existing relationships all shaping the way that they 
translate and enact it in practice. Thirdly, given the multiple and competing 
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ways in which the SWAp partnership is interpreted by actors involved in health, 
the chapter has shown that partnership is highly political, which contrasts to the 
way in which it is dominantly represented in policy (as a technical, economic 
and apolitical liberal mode of governance). Fourthly, and significantly, the 
chapter showed how the politics of this SWAp partnership is somewhat 
tactically and necessarily concealed by a range of actors in public SWAp 
arenas, in order to construct the appearance that there is local conformance to 
technical policy models.   
 
Indeed, the chapter showed how different actors are all mutually enrolled in 
this creative pursuit, because it is in their interests to do so. Unfortunately, 
because actors involved in the health SWAp construct the appearance that the 
SWAp is a technical and apolitical partnership, this reshapes the way politics 
plays out locally (cf. Gould, 2005a). In particular, it diverts attention away 
from the dissonance, relationships and inequalities that (it is argued here) 
inevitably shape local practice, and risks discursive and deliberative closure 
about key health challenges (cf. Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p.16) and about the 
way that local action for health is organised, or rather is governed. This is 
problematic because if issues are not openly disclosed, discussed and debated, 
how can they be learnt from, challenged and addressed? The implications of 
this apparent lack of critical reflexivity in aid and health practice are discussed 
in more detail in the concluding chapter (Chapter Nine). 
 
At the same time, the constructed appearance that the SWAp is a technical and 
apolitical partnership insulates donor agencies from overt criticism and 
ultimately from local accountability in Zambia. This is also problematic 
because, as the chapter showed, donor agencies continue to exert considerable 
power in the SWAp partnership in practice through their involvement in 
dialogue, through required performance management reports and the apparent 
linking of aid funding to these. Donors were shown to have considerable scope 
to amend the timing of their disbursements to the MoH, which is actually a 
highly effective means of control in the governance of health; and an issue that 
is not openly discussed or challenged by any actor in the health sector. While 
the MoH is clearly not entirely powerless here, and enacts strategies to try and 
sell the Zambian SWAp partnership to donors, so as to attract resources for 
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health, the process of apolitically marketing Zambia to donors is clearly 
reconfiguring local relationships and moreover relations of accountability.  
The focus of relations, information and discussion is increasingly, and narrowly, 
focused upwards towards donor agencies (and to donor governments and their 
tax payers), rather than downwards or outwards to Zambian citizens (Boesen 
and Dietvorst 2007); and so is limiting the political space for citizens to hold 
the MoH to account. Much like the observations made of the Global Fund in 
Chapter Six then, and indeed other recent work that has focused on the way the 
policy of donors and international organisations is practiced in health (see 
Harman, 2009a, 2009b), the hegemonic technical representations of partnership 
are clearly serving to reconfigure and erode the governance of the Zambian 
health sector and indeed the Zambian state more broadly; though not 
necessarily in ways that dominant actors intend.  
 
Interestingly, the corruption scandal that rocked the Zambian SWAp 
partnership in May 2009 reveals how the politics of practice can shift. 
According to recent reports and personal communication, the relational fall-out 
and visible conflict that resulted from this event are still to resettle. It remains 
to be seen whether this turn of events will serve to entrench the technical 
performance of partnership mentioned above, as local actors try harder to 
(re)demonstrate their conformance with dominant, depoliticised SWAp policy 
models; or whether it will act in reverse, creating new political space for actors 
involved in this partnership to discursively challenge the evidently unequal way 
that action for health is governed. In other words, whether crisis will open an 
opportunity for change. Further research is clearly needed, and indeed is 
recommended, to explore this highly political SWAp partnership in practice. 
 
Having considered in this chapter and the last how and why policy about health 
SWAps was produced under the rubric of the idea of partnership, and how this 
relates to local practice, it is to a conclusion that this thesis now turns in 
Chapter Nine. This final chapter not only reviews the arguments that have been 
made about the idea of partnership, but also reflects on how a comparative 
exploration of partnership in relation to the Global Fund and health SWAps 
furthers our academic understanding and destabilises the notion that 
partnership is inevitably the right way to govern aid, health and development 
(see Chapter One). 
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Overview 
 Revisits the substantive question of the research 
 Considers how the foregoing chapters of the thesis have answered 
this research question 
 Sets out and discusses a series of key conclusions of the research 
 Considers the implications of the research for academics and also 
aid, health and development practitioners 
Chapter Nine 
Conclusion: Partnership as an imperative?   
 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis set out to contribute to the limited body of literature that exists on 
the idea of partnership in aid policy and practice. More specifically, it aimed to 
answer the following question: Why is the idea of partnership a pervasive 
feature in contemporary aid policy and how does this relate to and shape local 
practice, including the practice of politics that this enjoins? In order to answer 
this question, a critical-constructivist research approach was taken, in which a 
key aim from the outset was to destabilise the ubiquity of partnership (see 
Chapter One). Relatedly, a key assumption was that the idea‟s omnipresence 
and meaning is socially constructed, in and through relations of power (see 
Chapter Two) (Hacking, 1999; Mosse, 2005a). The foregoing chapters have 
sought to show how this construction occurs and also how it shapes local action 
by using a series of case studies of aid policy and practice. Not only was the 
policy of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global 
Fund) and health Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) analysed, but so also was 
related practice in the health sector in Zambia. This concluding chapter reviews 
the arguments that have been made about the idea of partnership throughout the 
thesis, and draws out a series of key learning points from the research. It 
demonstrates how the research is of wider significance, both academically and 
practically, and also where a future research agenda aligned to this study might 
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begin. The chapter starts by providing a high-level review of the structure of 
the thesis, and then moves on to discuss a series of more substantive points. 
 
The thesis: A high-level review  
 
The initial chapters of the thesis (Chapters One to Three) introduced the reader 
to the idea of partnership and to the research methodology more broadly; not 
only justifying the intellectual focus on partnership by outlining a series of gaps 
in and the limitations of existing literature, but also justifying the way in which 
partnership has been investigated in this current work, and demonstrating the 
novel insight that it provides. The preliminary chapters showed how the 
embedding of a critical-constructivist approach potentially offers a new and 
detailed look at partnership. They illustrated how this type of analytical 
framework can shed light on the socio-political processes, multiple 
perspectives and competing interests that lie behind official policies about 
partnership and partnership in practice; how policy ideas like partnership can 
enrol, yet also exclude coalitions of actors; and how the local translation of 
policies about partnership may (or may not) offer different actors opportunities 
to engage with and reshape local development practice (cf. Mosse, 2005b). 
These novel insights will be emphasised in the course of the discussion below.  
 
Having introduced the research topic in the early chapters of the thesis, the 
substantive arguments began in Chapter Four, in which the history of the idea 
of partnership was traced. It discussed why partnership emerged as a prevailing 
component of contemporary aid policy in the mid-1990s. The later chapters 
(Chapters Five through to Eight) then moved on to show how and why the idea 
subsequently came to feature in other official aid policy texts, and how this 
relates to and shapes local action. These later chapters focused on two case 
study couplets of partnership in policy and in practice. The first couplet 
focused on Global Fund policy and practice in Zambia (Chapters Five and Six), 
and the second on how and why partnership features in SWAp policy and 
practice in the country (Chapters Seven and Eight).  
 
While the historical chapter and each policy and practice couplet detailed a 
specific argument about the idea of partnership on their own, together, they 
provided a coherent picture of how and why partnership is a pervasive feature 
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in contemporary aid policy, and how this relates to and shapes local practice in 
health. Although a number of specific conclusions are discussed in detail 
below, at a high-level the chapters collectively show the following. Firstly, they 
demonstrate how the idea of partnership began its contemporary life in aid 
policy in the socio-political relations of aid institutions, and in the context of a 
crisis in aid in the 1990s. Secondly, they show how the idea „travelled‟ (cf. 
Mosse, 2007 p.2) ideationally and also geographically (to the health sector in 
Zambia) through somewhat elite donor networks of actors, becoming 
embedded as a symbolic and, moreover, strategically useful norm of 
contemporary aid policy, including aid policy for health. And thirdly, they 
show how the idea is „unravelled‟ in practice in the health sector in Zambia, as 
it is translated in and through local political relations – according to the views, 
values and interests of different actors, and in ways that generate complex and 
unintended governing effects (cf. Mosse, 2007 p.2). These points will now be 
expanded upon in the discussion below and the implications emphasised. 
 
The contemporary policy life of partnership: Aid agencies in crisis  
 
As indicated above, a key conclusion of the research is that the idea of 
partnership began its contemporary life in the socio-political relations of aid 
institutions (cf. Mosse, 2007) and in the context of a crisis in aid in the 1990s. 
In Chapter Four it was shown, for example, that partnership rose to prominence 
in the midst of a tumultuous post-Cold War environment for aid, during which 
the need for, legitimacy and effective governance of aid was questioned by a 
variety of different actors, including right-leaning critics in the US government 
in particular. It was in the context of this apparent crisis that an elite group of 
representatives from bilateral aid agencies, who were members of the DAC of 
the OECD, met with concerns about the future of aid. Through a series of 
rather closed negotiations they produced a number of DAC policies, which not 
only restated the case for aid (Hulme, 2009a; de Renzio and Mulley, 2006), but 
also invoked the idea of partnership as a seemingly new way to govern aid and 
development relations.  
 
Chapter Four showed that it was through something of a „chaos‟ of both 
„purpose and accidents‟ (cf. Clay and Schafffer, 1984, p.192) that partnership 
came to be included in the DAC texts and was subsequently more widely 
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adopted; involving, for example, the strategic borrowing of the idea from the 
World Bank (who had used it around the same time for its own perceived ends) 
and the unexpected adoption of the idea by the UK DfID. This chapter also 
showed that the rise of the idea of partnership was part of a political bid (cf. 
Mosse, 2005a) by an elite group of aid agencies to resell the need for aid to a 
diverse constituency of support. Partnership was useful here because it 
provided a positive-sounding and apparently all-encompassing means to 
politically „claim‟ that aid was a necessary, effective and thus legitimate 
international undertaking (cf. Lancaster, 2007; see Chapter Four). In particular 
however, it allowed aid agencies to counter the critical perspectives of actors 
on the right of the political spectrum (and those in the US government in 
particular), who argued that aid was a type of government welfare subsidy, 
which encouraged a culture of dependence and inefficiency, and that market 
forces should instead be allowed to prevail (Degnbol-Martinussen and 
Engberg-Pedersen, 2005, p.23; Baaz, 2005; Watkins, 1995, p.520).  
 
Indeed, as Chapter Four illustrated, while partnership was promoted by aid 
agencies in a somewhat all-encompassing way, which played to the 
sensitivities, ideas and interests of a diverse range of critical actors at the time, 
it was specifically framed as a means to encourage the market economic values, 
motivations and relationships that neoliberal US actors believed were necessary 
to ensure that aid recipients (and recipient governments in particular) actively 
take „greater responsibility for their own [market-based economic] 
development‟ (DAC/OECD, 1996, p.13). In other words, partnership provided 
a useful ideational means for aid agencies to respond to powerful neoliberal 
critics, and thus to resolve the crisis of legitimacy that they were facing. The 
privileging of neoliberal, US government actors is insightful here, because it 
demonstrates the prevailing power of these actors and their way of thinking in 
the socio-political processes that produce aid policy, and thus the prevailing 
context of inequality in which aid is governed; a conclusion that is supported 
by numerous other academic studies of aid (both recently and historically), and 
some of those critical works that were reviewed in Chapter Two (for example, 
Baaz, 2005; Craig and Porter, 2003; 2004). This theme of inequality will be 
returned to later in the discussion below. 
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The pervasiveness of partnership in aid policy: Normalisation, the strategic 
crafting of consensus and political mobilisation 
 
Although the idea of partnership may have began its contemporary policy life 
in the socio-political relations of aid institutions (cf. Mosse, 2007), and in the 
context of a crisis in aid in the 1990s, this does not fully explain why 
partnership became and indeed continues to be so pervasive in aid policy texts. 
Chapter Four and the other chapters of the thesis provided relevant insights 
here, demonstrating that there are actually several reasons for this.  
 
Firstly, these foregoing chapters showed that the idea of partnership is 
pervasive not because it is unquestionably the right aid policy, but because it 
has become „accepted‟ into the „cognitive architecture of intelligibility‟ of 
actors involved in the world of aid (cf. Green, 2007, p.142). That is to say, it 
has become a somewhat normalised component of the socio-political processes 
through which aid policy is produced, and is thus a necessary ideational or 
symbolic motif by which aid initiatives are now to be decorated and will be 
judged. Chapter Four argued, for example, that by the late-1990s a threshold 
level of exposure was reached, from which point on a wealth of other policies 
were produced with the idea. Following on from this, Chapters Five and Seven 
showed how the Global Fund‟s Transitional Working Group (TWG) used the 
idea in early 2002, and how it was drawn upon by donor agencies in their 
refashioning of the World Bank‟s Sector Investment Programmes (SIPs) into 
SWAps, partly because it had been (somewhat unconsciously) acknowledged 
as a „master‟ policy concept (cf. Mosse, 2005a).  
 
While there is certainly an element of routine to the pervasive use of 
partnership in aid policy, this is clearly not the whole story. As the two policy 
chapters on the Global Fund and health SWAps also showed, aid policy actors 
are reflexive beings, who also have rather more conscious or strategic reasons 
to refer to the idea. A second reason for the pervasive use of the idea of 
partnership in aid policy then, is because of the apparent consensus that using it 
constructs and the legitimising effect that this has for aid agencies in particular 
(cf. Cornwall and Brock, 2005, p.13). It seems that, if aid agencies consistently 
refer to the same idea in their policy documentation (and indeed in the 
discussions that surround this), this gives the impression that everyone is in 
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agreement about the way in which the international system of aid is, and should 
be, governed („we all agree that partnership is the way to govern aid, health and 
development‟). This apparent agreement is strategically useful because it is 
politically persuasive. It adds weight to the arguments that aid agencies put 
forward and, ultimately, is politically expedient for their operations because it 
makes them hard to criticise and unpick (Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Mosse, 
2005a). As Andrea Cornwall and Karen Brock (2005, p.9, p.16) explain, „fine-
sounding‟ aid policy ideas like partnership that give the impression of little 
dissonance „do more than provide a sense of direction‟; they shield those who 
use them from attack and thus „lend the legitimacy‟ that aid agencies need in 
order to justify their operations. This is significant because it raises questions 
as to the extent to which aid agencies can be and are held to account for their 
policy initiatives and for the socio-political effects that they have in countries 
such as Zambia. This issue of aid agency accountability is returned to later in 
this concluding chapter.  
 
Nevertheless, while there may be shared uses of the idea of partnership in aid 
policy, as Chapters Five and Seven also demonstrated, this does not necessarily 
mean that there are shared understandings about its meaning. Despite the 
normalised use of the idea of partnership in contemporary aid policy, its 
meaning has certainly not become standardised between actors. Chapters Five 
and Seven both showed, for example, how Global Fund and health SWAp 
policy actually shelter multiple and contested meanings about partnership, and 
thus about appropriate modes of governance (cf. Cornwall and Brock, 2005). 
This leads us on to the third reason as to why it is a pervasive feature in aid 
policy: it is used because it can be constructed and framed in a variety of ways, 
and this is politically mobilising (cf. Mosse, 2005a).  
 
Indeed, as indicated throughout the thesis, the idea of partnership does not have 
one single or authentic meaning (cf. Freeden, 1998; Long, 2004; see Chapter 
One). While it does always refer, in some way, to relationships or the 
organisation of action, and is thus always about the relations of governance 
(see Chapter One), it is polysemic and inherently malleable; it can be easily 
reframed and interpreted in different ways by different people, who may have 
competing perspectives about the right way for aid and development to 
organised (cf. Cornwall, 2008). Because the idea of partnership can be 
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reframed in different ways, it can serve as a symbolic bridge between, and thus 
as a way to conceal, the competing perspectives that may exist in different 
contextual settings (cf. Mosse, 2005a; McNeill, 2004). To borrow from Star 
and Griesmer (1989, p.393), partnership is strategically useful in policy 
because it is „robust enough‟ to maintain a common narrative about aid and 
development, yet „plastic enough‟ to allow different interpretations. This 
malleability and ambiguity is politically mobilising because it serves to mask 
conflict and placate different actors, facilitating compromise and the enrolment 
of their support for policy proposals, aid agencies and / or the interventions that 
they seek to justify (cf. Stone, 2002; Mosse, 2005a). 
 
As Chapter Five demonstrated, the idea of partnership was incorporated and 
strategically framed within Global Fund policy for these reasons. While a 
broad-based consensus had emerged at the end of the 1990s about the need for 
more priority and global funding for AIDS, TB and malaria, this was an uneasy 
one. There was considerable disagreement about why more resources were 
needed and about how aid-related action to combat the diseases should be 
governed. On the one hand, activist NGOs pushed an overtly political, human 
rights perspective that was seemingly concerned with transforming unequal 
relationships in prevailing (neoliberal) system of governance. On the other 
hand, G8 actors advocated a more technical „market foster-care‟ position (cf. 
Sparke, 2009) that was concerned with rectifying a lack of good technical 
governance and economically accountable behaviour in health, and thus with 
incorporating poorer nations more fully into prevailing neoliberal systems of 
governance. It was as a result of this apparent clash of perspectives (cf. 
Williams and Rushton, 2009) about how aid and health should be governed that 
the idea of partnership was framed in at least two different ways within the 
Global Fund‟s policy texts, in order to inter-translate between these actor 
groups. 
 
Similarly, Chapter Seven showed how the idea of partnership was crafted into 
health SWAp texts as a way to bridge and enrol actors (the World Bank, other 
aid agencies, donor governments and also various aid recipients), who had 
somewhat different (though not necessarily mutually exclusive) views, values 
and expectations about the way in which aid for health should be governed in 
the mid- to late-1990s (cf. Mosse, 2005a; Cornwall, 2008). As Chapter Seven 
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argued, partnership was strategically reworked in SWAp policy so as to do the 
following three things: 1) convince NGO and recipient aid critics that this 
approach represented a changed and, moreover, coordinated way of working 
for health; 2) satisfy the egalitarian concerns of like-minded bilaterals and the 
WHO that SWAps could effectively result in equality and health for all; and 
conversely, 3) satisfy the (neoliberal) economic concerns of the World Bank 
(and also right-leaning critics within key donor governments – the US in 
particular) that aid and health should be technically and effectively governed as 
a means to achieve global economic growth.  
 
Because the meaning of the idea of partnership is ambiguous and can be 
moulded in these multiple ways, it is a powerful policy device. As Deborah 
Stone (2002, p.157) explains, ambiguity is essential in politics; it gives the 
impression that there will be no advantage or disadvantage to any particular 
group, allows different actors to „read themselves into‟ a particular proposal, 
and thus „enables the transformation of individual intentions and actions into 
collective results and purposes‟. By lending itself to multiple and ambiguous 
meanings, partnership fulfils these functions in aid policy, making international 
cooperation between a diverse set of donor and recipient actors possible (cf. 
Stone, 2002). The pervasive success and thus power of the idea of partnership 
then, seems to lie (at least in part) in this malleability and ambiguity. 
 
Aid policy about partnership: Contradictions, unresolved debates and 
inequality 
 
While this enrolling and mobilising function could of course be interpreted as a 
„good thing‟ because it facilitates international cooperation and prevents 
political stagnation, as Chapters Five and Seven illustrated the corollary is that 
aid policy about partnership ends up being „full of contradictions‟ (cf. Eyben, 
2006b) about who should be doing what, when, where and how in relation to 
aid and development. The foregoing chapters showed, for example, aid policy 
embeds both neoliberal ideas about governance in which the technical and 
economic efficiency of the market is promoted as the right way forward, and 
more overtly political perspectives, those that have a greater focus on social 
justice, human rights and the important regulatory and / or stewardship role of 
government; with which neoliberal views come into confrontation. While the 
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embedding of these contradictory views seems to represent a type of political 
compromise and is politically mobilising (as indicated above), it means that aid 
policy provides a confusing and poor guide for health-related action, which is 
unrealisable in practice; an observation that is also made by, for example, van 
Gastel and Nuijten (2005) and Mosse (2005a) in their own work on aid policy 
and practice. This point will be considered again, in more detail, below.  
 
Moreover, the fact that embedding contradictory views in aid policy occurs 
clearly suggests that there are unresolved debates between, for example, 
different aid agencies, recipient and donor governments, and also civic actors 
about the way in which aid, health and development processes should be 
organised; that is, about the right relations of governance. In other words, the 
clashes between the actors that hold or promote these different views are not 
openly addressed and therefore multiple meanings for partnership are built into 
in policy documentation. This suggests that the socio-political processes that 
produce such aid policy texts do not provide a democratic means to openly 
consider and deliberatively address contentious issues and perspectives. Indeed, 
a key conclusion of this thesis is that aid policy is not produced through open, 
broad-based or democratic processes, but through what is a donor-dominated 
and thus somewhat elite community of interests and ideas (cf. Mosse, 2005a). 
While the donor community itself is not a homogenous group (as Chapter 
Seven on the production of health SWAps clearly showed), donor actors are 
clearly in a different position to recipients (be they governments or NGOs) by 
virtue of the funding and resources they bestow; and it is those on the giving 
(rather than the receiving) side of aid that are able to more fully influence and 
shape the socio-political processes through which aid policy is produced; so 
much so that, to borrow from Ines Périn and Amir Attaran (2003, p.1216), aid 
policies and the constituent ideas that they embed seem to be constructed 
through „a monologue of donors‟, rather than a broad, open and deliberative 
dialogue involving recipients.  
 
Both the Global Fund and health SWAp policy chapters support this conclusion. 
They show how donor governments (most notably the US) and also aid 
agencies (particularly the World Bank), were highly influential in the shaping 
of aid policy in these health-related contexts. As indicated above, this reflects 
the prevailing power of these actors, and thus the prevailing context of 
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inequality in which aid for health, and aid for development more generally, 
continues to be delivered and managed. Partnership then, is not a new policy 
idea, but rather is reflective of (what is judged here to be) an ongoing, unequal 
and moreover unjust system of global governance.  
  
Before moving on to more fully emphasise why these points are significant and 
important, it is necessary to highlight one particular and tangible expression of 
the inequality in which aid for health is governed which has become apparent 
in this research, and this is the way in which the idea of partnership is 
dominantly framed in aid policy: as a technical, economic and, moreover, 
depoliticised way to organise action. 
 
The idea of partnership: A dominantly depoliticised way to govern aid, 
health and development 
 
Both Chapters Five and Seven illustrated that the idea of partnership is 
dominantly framed in Global Fund and health SWAp policy as a depoliticised 
mode of governance. These chapters argued that such depoliticisation seems to 
reflect a prevailing and powerful need to satisfy donor and moreover market-
economic perspectives about the right modes of aid and health governance, and 
to justify a range of managerial tools and techniques to achieve these goals.  
 
Interestingly, the depoliticisation of partnership was used in different ways in 
these two policy contexts however, to justify different sets of managerial 
interventions. Global Fund policy works the idea of partnership into a linear 
theory of cause and effect, which serves to justify a complicated system of 
performance-based funding and seeks to set up more market-like economic 
relations in relation to health. Indeed, Global Fund policy was shown to justify 
an entirely new technical and economic governance structure that largely 
operates outside statutory systems, and which, in essence, erases the existing 
polity, and any differentiation between civic actors / non-governmental 
organisations and the Zambian government‟s stewardship role in relation to 
health. In contrast, in policy about SWAps the idea of partnership justifies a 
different array of managerial techniques and thus a different model of health 
governance. Here, while partnership is still apolitically framed, and is also 
about ensuring the responsible technical and economic governance of health 
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and development, it is much more narrowly defined and focused on the 
relationship between aid donors and governments.  
 
More specifically, it seems to be dominantly framed and intended as a way to 
rework the state (via Ministries of Health) from the inside out (see also Harman, 
2009b, 2009c). As argued in Chapter Seven, the setting up of a series of 
structures for managing dialogue (including formal negotiating meetings, joint 
appraisal and review missions and a lead donor), along with a series of 
partnership agreements (such as a Memorandum of Understanding or MoU) 
between donor agencies and governments seem to be presented as ways to 
coordinate, influence, supervise and responsibilise recipient governments, so 
that they conduct themselves in the right (economic) way for health and growth 
(Abrahamsen, 2004). In Zambia, the Sector Advisory Group (SAG) and the 
MoU, for example, seem to be framed as ways to formalise how aid agencies 
will become more explicitly involved in the scrutiny of public expenditure and 
processes of decision-making and resource allocation, and as ways to specify 
how recipient governments are expected to responsibly act if they are to receive 
aid (Cassels, 1997; Hill, 2002). In other words then and to summarise the above, 
the depoliticised idea of partnership is used to refer to and justify different 
modes of neoliberal intervention and the manufacturing of good governance for 
health and economic growth. 
 
Problems with partnership in practice: Multiple translations, local 
appropriation and depoliticisation as a disciplinary regime  
 
While this may (or may not) reflect some kind of benevolent intention to 
improve health and well-being, the depoliticisation of partnership in aid policy 
in this way is problematic for a number of reasons. Not only does it serve to 
justify (what is judged here to be) a somewhat paternalistic attempt to socio-
politically engineer economic progress and health gains in developing countries 
like Zambia, but it also perpetuates what are unrealistic and therefore 
unrealisable policy models, which have a number of rather significant socio-
political effects in practice (Mosse, 2005a).  
 
As Chapters Six and Eight argued, depoliticised neoliberal models of cause and 
effect (described above) fundamentally misrepresent the realities of health 
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sector practice in countries such as Zambia. Everyday action is not simply a 
technical process in which particular forms of behaviour and health outcomes 
can be linearly manufactured, but rather is shaped by social relationships, 
structured hierarchies and the operation of power. The way in which 
partnership is framed in aid policy conceals this; whisking these „political 
realities out of sight‟ (cf. Ferguson, p.xv). Moreover, and as argued above, it 
gives the impression that there will no advantage or disadvantage to any 
particular group in the course of health and development practice. As the 
foregoing chapters showed, the problem is that there are always winners and 
losers in policy processes, and different modes of governance will always have 
different outcomes for differently positioned actors. The fact that this is not 
openly acknowledged in depoliticised aid policy models may usefully 
legitimise aid agencies and their neoliberal interventions in the health sector in 
countries like Zambia, but it also pushes technical and economic ways of 
thinking and doing into these settings, and serves to create local political arenas 
in which the unresolved debates and ideational confrontations embedded in aid 
policy must eventually play-out.  
 
As a result, and as indicated in other constructivist studies from the field of 
development ethnography / critical anthropology, there are „disjunctures‟ 
between depoliticised aid policy models and practice (see Mosse, 2004; Mosse 
and Lewis, 2006). Local actors translate, appropriate and, in the process, 
transform aid policy as they make their own sense of the ideas that it embeds; 
in some cases, exploiting what, it was argued above, is a dominantly 
depoliticised, economic and donor-led system of governance „from below‟ 
(Mosse, 2005a; Mosse and Lewis, 2006, p.17). Indeed, as the foregoing 
chapters of this thesis have shown, the effects of aid policy depend on the way 
in which it is translated locally, in and through relations of power, and the way 
in which local actors „reconstitute‟ themselves to manage this situation (cf. 
Harrison, 2008, p.186). Health, good governance and market-based economic 
growth are not and cannot simply be manufactured in countries such as Zambia 
through the right technical and economic conduct, as aid policies seem to 
suggest, but must be continuously worked out through social relationships, 
politics and power.  
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These points were all clearly illustrated in Chapters Six and Eight. While both 
chapters clearly showed that there are parallels in the way in which partnership 
is represented in official policy and how it is interpreted in local practice – with, 
for example, a participatory view of the health SWAp, co-existing (somewhat 
uncomfortably) alongside more technical and economic views, as it also does 
in SWAp policy (see Chapters Six and Seven) – various disjunctures were also 
highlighted. Indeed, the discussion showed how local actors draw on their own 
ideas, interests, history, relationships, and organisational constraints to make 
sense of partnership in action; with new understandings and meanings 
reflecting local circumstance. Aid policy interventions also have a range of 
diverse and unexpected socio-political effects, because they are shaped and 
reworked in practice by these same factors (see Chapters Seven and Nine, and 
also the discussion later in the chapter below). 
 
In some respects, local translations of partnership in aid policy necessarily have 
to occur because of the tensions that, it was argued above, are embedded within 
such texts. It simply would not be possible to linearly implement partnership in 
practice as there is ambiguity about what it means; a point that is also made by 
Jesper Sundewall (2009) in a recent study about coordination in the health 
sector in Zambia. In this work, Sundewall (2009) notes how the broad way in 
which the concept of coordination is defined leaves room for Zambian health 
sector actors to adapt it according to their own views, interests and 
organisational constraints.  
 
This local „room for manoeuvre‟ (cf. Clay and Schaffer, 1984) in the 
translation of aid policy is, however, constrained to a certain extent due to the 
dominantly depoliticised way in which ideas like partnership are framed. As 
Chapters Six and Eight showed, the depoliticisation of partnership in policy 
seems to constrict the way in which politics plays out in Zambia in relation to 
health. Dissonance is publicly and necessarily concealed by actors involved in 
health sector development in order to demonstrate compliance with, and thus 
construct the impression that there is, a disciplined implementation of 
depoliticised, and largely neoliberal, policy models about partnership (cf. 
Mosse, 2005a; Rossi, 2006). Indeed, these two chapters showed how local 
actors in Zambia seemed to be mutually enrolled in consuming and 
remanufacturing the policy of partnership in this way; and most particularly 
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because it is a way to sell the Zambian health sector in what is competitive 
international marketplace for aid (cf. Eyben, 2010; Mosse, 2005a; Heyman, 
1995). In the Global Fund chapter (Chapter Six), it was argued, for example, 
that the politics of practice is routinely concealed in the production of lower-
order policy texts (grant proposals, progress updates and reports) that are 
submitted upwards to Global Fund headquarters in Geneva, so as to create the 
impression that the Global Fund partnership is a technically successful and 
economically efficient mode of health governance in practice. Similarly, in 
Chapter Eight it was argued that the political messiness and disorder of health 
sector practice is somewhat tactically concealed by a range of actors in public 
SWAp arenas, such as the SAG, so as to feign compliance with ordered, 
technical policy models (cf. Lewis and Mosse, 2006).  
 
While actors in the Zambian health sector have some degree of freedom to act 
like this – they choose to conform to dominant models of partnership in order 
to gain some kind of benefit (whether this is securing access to resources, 
personal promotion, status and so on, see Chapter Seven) – the depoliticisation 
of partnership policy certainly seems to have a disciplinary power in practice, 
because it induces them to publicly render aid and health governance technical 
(cf. Li, 2007). In some respects then, and in line with James Ferguson (1990, 
p.xv), this thesis shows how aid policy operates as an „anti-politics machine‟, 
in which political realities are routinely whisked „out of sight‟ (see also Chapter 
Two). To be sure, and perhaps in contrast to Ferguson (1990), this thesis shows 
that the depoliticisation of partnership not „securely accomplished‟ in practice 
(cf. Li, 2007 italics added). Politics still occurs, but the way that it plays out 
shifts; so that contestation between, for example, different partners about who 
should be involved in and lead decision-making for health and / or the 
operation of health programmes is repressed and confined to less visible, „back-
stage‟ arenas (cf. Cunliffe, 2009).  
 
Depoliticisation and the ‘creative destruction’ of local politics for health  
 
This shifting of local politics around health sector development is problematic. 
Not only does it serve to validate, reinforce and perpetuate technical and 
apolitical models of partnership (which, as argued above, fundamentally 
misrepresent what happens in practice), but the feigned apolitical compliance 
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described above is also leading to frustrations, and consumes time and creative 
energy which could arguably be better spent in coming up with alternative, 
more realistically-designed processes to improve health and well-being (cf. 
Eyben, 2010, 2011). Perhaps more significantly, and as argued in the foregoing 
chapters of the thesis, the depoliticisation of partnership in aid policy and its 
necessary performance in practice seems to be resulting in discursive or 
deliberative closure (cf. Cornwall and Brock, 2005) about the nature of 
relationships and the way action is organised; in other words, about the way the 
world of aid is governed. In so doing, attention is being diverted away from, 
and thus ignorance produced about (cf. Mosse, 2004) the real politics, 
dissonance, relationships and „patterns of exclusion‟ (cf. Marsden, 2005, p.97) 
that inevitably shape local health governance and arguably lead to poor health 
in Zambia in practice. The problem is, if these issues are not openly disclosed, 
discussed and debated, how can they be learnt from, challenged and addressed? 
And therefore how can health be sustainably improved? 
 
In leading to deliberative closure then, opportunities to understand and learn 
from the realities of everyday practice, to understand how socio-political 
factors affect health, and to understand the diverse and unexpected effects of 
aid policies are being limited in countries like Zambia. Alternative and local 
perspectives, which differ from the dominant, technical and economic policy 
models, and which may offer new ideas for improving health, wealth and well-
being, tend to be sidelined or silenced, and this reduces the potential to 
discover and design locally-relevant and contextually-specific health 
programmes that could bring about the type of transformative change that, it is 
argued here, is needed to improve health and well-being in a sustainable way 
(cf. Eyben, 2010, 2011).  
 
As noted in the earlier chapters of the thesis, it is recognised that there is little 
history of such open learning and critique in the governing practice of the 
health sector in Zambia. The way in which aid policy manifests in local 
practice however, seems to entrench this; further limiting opportunities for 
those who are marginalised to become involved in local health governance, to 
hold those in a position of power and authority to account, to share their ideas 
and challenge the conditions that perpetuate poor health, and thus to exert their 
right to health. To be sure, the deliberative space for contesting the use and 
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meaning of the idea of partnership, and therefore of existing relations of 
governance, is certainly not completely closed off (Cornwall, 2007, p.481). As 
the chapters on Zambia showed, there are opportunities to mobilise alternative 
understandings and for less powerful actors to appropriate the practice of 
partnership for their own perceived needs (see Chapter Eight in particular). The 
way in which this occurs however, seems to „creatively destroy‟ (cf. Brenner 
and Theodore, 2002) relationships, interactions and opportunities for the 
marginalised to hold those in a position of power to account.  
 
To illustrate this, the Global Fund chapter showed, for example, how the 
operation of partnership in practice seems to be reconfiguring the governance 
of health in Zambia; not only shifting who is included and excluded from 
accessing health resources, but also contributing to increasingly competitive 
relations between „civil society‟ health organisations, to the centralisation of 
decision-making (towards an elite group of actors who are largely based in 
Lusaka), and to the entrenchment of „etiquettes of hierarchy‟ (cf. Green, 2003, 
p.135) within the MoH, while simultaneously undermining the government‟s 
stewardship role. Thus, raising questions about who is leading the Global Fund 
partnership and thus the governance of health locally.  
 
Operating in a different way, the health SWAp was shown to be setting up new 
governing habits in the health sector; reconfiguring local political relationships 
and moreover relations of accountability. The focus of relations, information 
and discussion within this partnership is increasingly and narrowly focused 
upwards towards aid agencies (to donor governments and their tax payers), 
rather than downwards or outwards to Zambian citizens (Boesen and Dietvorst 
2007). Aid agencies have considerable leverage in budgetary processes in the 
health sector in Zambia, and, in support of Gould (2005c, p.143), have 
considerable power to „define the tempo‟ and sequencing of events through 
their control of the release of aid funding. As a result, local MoH attention 
tends to be diverted towards aid agencies in the governance of health, which 
limits the space for citizens to hold the MoH and aid agencies themselves to 
account. At the moment, these socio-political effects associated with the Global 
Fund and SWAp partnerships do not seem to be openly learnt from, challenged 
or publicly addressed.  
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Arguably, this situation may be creating an environment in Zambia which is 
increasingly volatile politically, because, as the views of various actors are 
necessarily suppressed, this leads to frustrations, which may eventually end up 
being antagonistically and destructively, rather than agonistically and 
productively expressed (cf. Mouffe 2005). Many of the health sector actors 
who were interviewed in Zambia as part of the field work for this research were 
clearly perturbed by the current health governance situation, and by the 
apparent lack of opportunities to change the status quo. While only limited 
evidence of this potential volatility has been presented in this current research, 
this could be an area for future investigation.  
 
There is a surprising level of continuity in the aid and development domain, 
with technical, (market) economic and apolitical models clearly continuing to 
dominate the way in which aid policy is produced. For all the „creative 
destruction‟ of health governance that occurs in countries like Zambia then, the 
system of aid actually continues to maintain what are, here, judged to be 
inherently unequal relationships and an unfair system of governance that exists 
in relation to aid, health and development internationally. 
 
Implications of the research 
 
What does this suggest then, for academics, or for practitioners who are 
involved in working in partnership in aid, health and development, either in the 
Zambian health sector or beyond? And moreover, as Maria-Eriksson Baaz 
(2005, p.173) asks in her own study about partnership, is there a possibility that 
this above-described situation could change? It is clear from this research that, 
as Cornwall and Brock (2005, p.18) put it: „The terms we use are never 
neutral‟. We give meaning to them as they are constructed into aid policy, and 
as they are retranslated in the course of everyday interactions, in and through 
relations of power (Mosse, 2004; 2005a). Different people may use the same 
idea in different ways, to reflect or push their own perspectives, views and / or 
interests, yet often ideas like partnership can serve the needs of already more 
powerful donor or recipient actors. This further excludes marginalised voices 
from discussion and debate, and therefore limits opportunities for them to 
change the prevailing environment that affects their life, and their health.  
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To make any difference here, what seems to be needed is more „clarity through 
specificity‟ (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980); the making visible of the multiple 
frames of reference that are embedded and reflected in both policy and 
practical health and development contexts (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). That is 
to say, the „spelling out‟ (cf. Cornwall, 2008) of what exactly different people 
mean when they refer to partnership; who they are talking about as a partner; 
what they envision as their appropriate partnership role, and why; and who is 
supposed to benefit from partnership – partnership by and for whom? (cf. 
Cohen and Uphoff, 1980). Doing so would help to make clear exactly what is 
being discussed when partnership is advocated, what might be at stake, who 
this might exclude, and how the roles of, for example, government, aid donors, 
and civic actors may be supported or undermined (cf. Cornwall, 2008). In 
short, it means finding ways to be clear about what modes of governance are 
being discussed and envisioned, and why. 
 
Academically, this can be perhaps be achieved through more future research 
into the ideas and perspectives that are embedded and reflected in aid policy 
and practice in a diversity of contexts. This study has only focused on a limited 
number of case studies to explore the idea of partnership, but this could be 
expanded to, and contrasted with, other health sector and country contexts, or 
other policy arenas, such as agriculture, education or trade. Indeed, it is argued 
that what is needed is more research to show, what Katy Gardner and David 
Lewis (2000, p.16) describe as, the „fluidity and heterogeneity‟ of ideas like 
partnership in aid policy and practice. While this thesis has argued that the 
world of aid and international development is a hegemonic and unjust 
governing system that is heavily shaped by donor nations and their agents, it is 
not entirely homogenous, monolithic or static. Future studies could seek to 
reveal and understand its complexity and inherent messiness, and how 
marginalised actors can appropriate and transform this system „from below‟ 
(Mosse, 2005a; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). It is perhaps by revealing and 
understanding the apparently hidden diversity of ideas, people and interests, 
and therefore the complex politics that lies behind aid policy and practice that 
more open and deliberative conflict about the right relations of governance can 
be encouraged and learnt from. This might provide opportunities for 
overturning, what have been judged here as, largely donor-driven and 
depoliticised policy models which „creatively destroy‟ (cf. Brenner and 
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Theodore, 2002) the governance of health and development in countries such 
as Zambia.   
 
For policy makers, aid advisors, government officials, and public health 
managers, greater „clarity through specificity‟ (Cohen and Uphoff, 1980) can 
perhaps be achieved through a personal commitment to become a critically 
reflexive practitioner; that is to say, committing to consciously question their 
own motivations and views, and their own relationship with aid and to other 
partners who they come into confrontation with. In other words, it involves 
trying to understand and reflect on different ways of being, relating and acting 
and the implications that this might have (Cunliffe, 2009a, 2009b). To do so 
requires that practitioners routinely question their role, relationships, and the 
context within which they operate, and how they might actively shape, exclude 
or not „hear‟ the „multiplicity of meanings and voices‟ that inevitably 
characterise what are everyday political interactions with others (Cunliffe, 
2009a, p.45). As Ann Cunliffe (2009a; 2009b) explains, this type of reflexive 
practice is important because it helps to encourage openness to a diverse 
dialogue that could not only further challenge the taken-for-granted or 
hegemonic status of ideas like partnership, and the inequalities that result from 
the way in which such ideas come to be practised, but also, and in so doing, 
reveal alternative, more realistic and more politically-attuned perspectives on 
how to improve health. As Rosalind Eyben (2010) has recently stated: 
 
„Stuff happens. Power, history and culture shape the multiplicity of 
relationships and actors influencing any aid [and developmental] 
intervention. It makes more sense to design aid [and local health 
programmes] to recognize this‟. 
 
Unfortunately, it seems that, without doing so, the prospects for aid 
effectiveness or for wider improvements in health, wealth and well-being will 
be limited.  
 
Ultimately, and to bring this discussion to a close, it is clear that this thesis has 
provided a number of original insights about the politics of partnership. As 
indicated in the introductory chapter and in the literature review in Chapter 
Two, there is very little critical scholarship about the meaning of this aid policy 
idea. Many existing studies tend to assume that partnership is about equality 
and, as such, that it is an inherent and universal good. This thesis challenges 
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that prevailing view. It argues that partnership is not simply the right idea for 
aid policy and practice. Rather, it is just one, and moreover, one symbolically 
useful way of describing and characterising relationships and the organisation 
of action because of the multiple meanings that it can shelter. Indeed, the thesis 
has shown that, more often than not, the idea of partnership is actually a potent 
symbolic device to refer to and conceal what are actually inherently political 
and unequal relations of governance. In this way then, the thesis makes an 
original contribution to the existing literature on partnership. 
 
The thesis also makes an original contribution to literature on aid for health, 
and on aid policy and practice more generally. Few existing studies seek to 
unpick the „real worlds‟ of aid; that is to say, to understand the socio-political 
processes through which aid is delivered and managed, or to investigate 
empirically how global policy logics manifest in local practice (Mosse, 2005b; 
Sridhar and Craig, 2011). Through the use of documentary analysis in 
combination with ethnographically sensitised field work in the health sector in 
Zambia, the thesis provides a unique insight into selected „real worlds‟ of 
partnership, and as to how prevailing partnership logics shape local practice. In 
particular, the thesis showed how the dominantly depoliticised way in which 
the idea of partnership is represented in aid policy – as a technical and 
economic way to organise action – serves to obscure the prevailing power of 
donor governments in the socio-political processes that produce aid policy and 
the structural context of inequality in which aid tends to be governed (cf. 
Mosse, 2005a).  
 
While other critical works that do exist on the idea of partnership in aid policy 
have also certainly emphasised such inequality in aid governance, through the 
alternative, critical-constructivist approach that this thesis embeds (which 
seeks to illuminate the complex relationship between structures and human 
agency), it has shown that recipient actors are certainly not completely silenced 
here, and may in fact „unravel‟ the policy of partnership as it translated locally, 
in and through the politics of collaboration, contestation, and compromise 
(Mosse, 2005a p.645, 2007, p.2; Rossi, 2006; Bending and Rosendo, 2006). 
The thesis showed uniquely however, that the response of local agent‟s to 
depoliticised policy models is actually leading to the entrenchment of already-
existing „etiquettes of hierarchy‟ (cf. Green, 2003, p.135) and to deliberative 
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closure about the nature of relationships and the way action is organized for 
health and development; in other words, it is closing down opportunities to 
learn from and to challenge prevailing relations of governance (Eyben, 2010, 
2011).  
 
There is clearly more still to learn and understand about the „real worlds‟ of 
partnership in aid policy and practice. This thesis has however, successfully 
started to satiate the gap in knowledge that exists on the topic. It has shown that 
partnership is clearly not a panacea for improving health and development 
internationally. In fact, and to borrow from Cornwall and Brock (2005, pp.18-
19), it has shown instead how the dominance of depoliticised, technical and 
economic aid policy models, which are apparently „stripped‟ of values, 
relationships, history, politics and power, may actually „do violence‟ to the 
hope of a world with less inequality, better health and less poverty. This 
important insight, which has been gleaned and backed up by empirical analysis, 
should be explored and considered as a fundamental component of future work 
on the politics of aid policy processes.  
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Appendix One 
 
Key points in and criticisms of existing literature 
on partnership in aid policy and practice 
 
 
Note: Points highlighted in bold resonate with the critical-constructivist approach 
advocated in this research. 
 
Type of 
literature 
Overview / key 
points about 
partnership 
Key criticisms 
Examples of 
academic works 
Pragmatic-
instrumental 
 The „mainstream‟ 
perspective on 
partnership 
 Interpreted as an 
inherently 
progressive policy 
idea, that aims to 
achieve equality 
and/mutuality 
between all actors in 
society 
 A moral imperative 
(necessary to 
address previously 
unequal / paternal 
relationships) and 
an instrumental 
necessity (to ensure 
efficiency and 
effectiveness of aid) 
 Tends to 
conceptualise 
relationship 
between policy and 
practice as linearly 
organized „stages‟ 
of cause and effect 
 Notes that there can 
be unequal relations 
of power in the 
practice of 
partnership 
 Focuses on way 
partnership can be 
reformed „in 
practice‟ and 
provides managerial 
solutions to 
implementation 
problems – e.g. 
create appropriate 
incentives for 
engagement and use 
the right 
 Concedes 
theoretically to 
specific aspects of 
„official‟ policy 
narratives  
 Reflects a 
managerialist 
perspective that 
renders structural 
environment / 
political-economic 
factors as 
„technical‟ 
impediments to 
achieving 
partnership in 
practice 
 Relative silence on 
the „ideas‟ that 
underpin policy of 
partnership (and 
that may shape the 
way it is 
implemented in 
practice) 
 Fails to fully 
consider how 
context, historical 
relationships, 
experience and 
memories shape 
policy and practice 
of partnership 
 The linear 
representation of 
policy-practice 
limits conceptual 
space for „contests‟ 
over partnership 
and implicitly 
supports the role of 
„experts‟, who 
understand the 
„technical‟ stages 
Abbott (2008) 
Axelrod (2001) 
Brinkerhoff 
(2002) 
Conway et al. 
(2006) 
Druce and 
Harmer (2006) 
Maxwell and 
Riddell (1998) 
Rochlin et al 
(2008) 
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Type of 
literature 
Overview / key 
points about 
partnership 
Key criticisms 
Examples of 
academic works 
institutional design 
and technical tools / 
procedures. 
 
of partnership 
Critical-
ideological 
 
 
 Generally 
associated with the 
discipline of 
International 
Political Economy 
and other neo-
marxist/dependency 
schools of thought. 
 The failure of 
partnership is taken 
to be somewhat 
self-evident – it is 
either an 
instrumental/rhetori
cal disguise to 
nullify opposition to 
dominant (neo-
liberal) interests or 
it is seen more as an 
overt expression of 
„inclusive‟ liberal 
ideology 
 A key argument is 
that the idea of 
partnership is 
presented in 
‘apolitical’ terms, 
which conceals 
underlying 
political ideologies 
and the economic 
interests of 
dominant actors.  
This is achieved 
through the use of 
a persuasive, 
management ‘tool 
box’ language, and 
also through the 
use of management 
and measurement 
techniques 
 The policy idea of 
partnership has an 
important 
legitimizing role 
for some actors – 
donors and NGOs 
in particular. 
 Highlights the 
significance of 
‘liberal thinking’ 
 Fails to recognize 
the potentially 
„multiple‟ 
meanings and 
interpretations of 
partnership in 
policy and practice 
 Gives too much 
coherence to the 
way either 
neoliberal or 
inclusive liberal 
ideas shape the 
policy and practice 
of partnership 
 Tends to equate the 
political ideas 
underpinning 
partnership to fixed 
/ given (economic) 
interests and thus 
under-theorizes the 
role of social 
interaction in 
shaping these 
 Implicitly 
conceptualizes the 
relationship 
between policy and 
practice as linear 
chain of cause-
effect, which 
neglects the 
possibility that 
there may be a 
disjuncture 
between the two or 
negotiations and 
translations of the 
idea of partnership 
in practice 
 Excluding 
„emergent‟ works, 
it tends to attribute 
agency largely only 
to  donors 
 Tends to emphasise 
a narrow view of 
power „as control‟ 
Crawford (2003) 
Fowler (2002) 
 
Emergent works: 
Harrison (2001, 
2004) 
Whitfield and 
Fraser (2009a, 
2009b) 
Fraser (2009) 
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Type of 
literature 
Overview / key 
points about 
partnership 
Key criticisms 
Examples of 
academic works 
to the way in 
which the idea of 
partnership is 
understood and 
practiced 
 Argues that the 
practice of 
partnership 
undermines formal 
democratic 
institutions (taking 
decision-making 
away from them) 
and limits political 
contests due to the 
emphasis on 
consensual 
decision-making 
 An ‘emergent’ 
body of critical-
ideological work 
emphasizes the 
‘interpenetration’ 
of donors and 
recipients in 
understanding 
partnership and 
the role of, for 
example, elites, in 
negotiations over 
aid policy 
Critical-
governmental
ity 
 Claims intellectual 
inspiration from 
Michel Foucault 
 The policy idea of 
partnership is a seen 
as a form of 
governmentality – 
„the conduct of 
conduct‟ 
 The idea of 
partnership is seen 
as part of a 
broader neo-
liberal rationality  
that works 
through 
cooperation and 
inclusion 
 Such a political 
rationality may not 
be coherent, but 
formed from an 
‘assemblage’ of 
knowledge 
 There are 
 Lack of theoretical 
space for human 
agency – conscious 
thought in 
reshaping 
particular ways of 
thinking/styles of 
thought – i.e. space 
for ways in which 
„mentalities of 
rule‟ may be 
challenged, 
transformed or 
resisted in 
particular contexts 
or encounters 
 Lack of conceptual 
attention to the 
relationship 
between the policy 
of partnership 
(seen as a „project 
of rule‟) and what 
happens in practice  
Abrahamsen 
(2004) 
Gould (2005b) 
Ferguson (1990) 
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Type of 
literature 
Overview / key 
points about 
partnership 
Key criticisms 
Examples of 
academic works 
prevailing ‘liberal’ 
ways of thinking 
about the world 
(mentalities of 
rule)  
 Calculated 
techniques and the 
rendering of action 
in ‘technical’ 
terms is central to 
the policy and 
practice of 
partnership as 
they encourage 
particular (neo-
liberal) behaviours 
– examples include 
MoUs, auditing, 
performance 
indicators  
 Emphasises that 
power may be 
hierarchical and 
unequal but it is 
not always zero-
sum – it can also 
be productive 
 Focus is mostly on 
the policy of 
partnership as a 
„project of rule‟ 
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Appendix Three  
Zambian ethics approval 
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Appendix Four  
Ministry of Health approval 
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Appendix Five 
Details of semi-structured interviews  
 
This appendix provides details about the seventy semi-structured interviews 
that were conducted as part of the research for this thesis. Most of the 
interviews were conducted during the two periods of field research in Zambia: 
an initial visit in November to December 2008 and a longer period from March 
to July 2009 (see Chapter Three for more details). The identities of 
interviewees are not disclosed here for reasons of political sensitivity. This 
appendix does however provide a list of the types of people who were 
interviewed (by virtue of their broad organisational role) and by date. The 
categorizations used here are of course simplifications of each interviewee‟s 
background, knowledge and experience, but hopefully provide a degree of 
confidence in the breadth and volume of interviews from which the arguments 
of the thesis were subsequently constructed. The appendix also includes 
examples of the organizations to which interviewees were affiliated. It does not 
include the details of the numerous other management consultants, doctors, 
government and donor representatives, and people who were met during day-
to-day life in Zambia, who were generous enough to share their time and views 
about the research topic on a more informal basis.  
    
1) List of people interviewed by date and type of interviewee  
 
 26-November-2008, Consultant 
 26-Novemver-2008, Academic 
 26-November-2008, Government representative 
 27-November-2008, Aid agency representative 
 27-November-2008, Consultant 
 1-December-2008, Academic 
 1-December-2008, Academic 
 2-December-2008, „Civil society‟ representative  
 2-December-2008, Aid agency representative 
 26-March-2009, Ministry of Health representative  
 26-March-2009, Archivist  
 27-March-2009, Aid agency representative 
 27-March-2009, Journalist  
 31-March-2009, ex-representative Ministry of Health 
 31-March-2009, Academic  
 31-March-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 6-April-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 7-April-2009, „Civil society‟ representative  
 14-April-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 15-April-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 16-April-2009, Aid agency representative 
 17-April-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 17-April-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 17-April-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 21-April-2009, Aid agency representative 
 22-April-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 22-April-2009, Aid agency representative 
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 23-April-2009, Aid agency representative 
 23-April-2009, Aid agency representative 
 24-April-2009, Aid agency representative 
 27-April-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 28-April-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 29-April-2009, Aid agency representative 
 29-April-2009, Aid agency representative 
 2-May-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 4-May-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 4-May-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 5-May-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 7-May-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 7-May-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 18-May-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 26-May-2009, Aid agency representative 
 27-May-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 1-June-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 3-June-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 3-June-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 4-June-2009, Aid agency representative 
 4-June-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 8-June-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 9-June-2009, Academic 
 9-June-2009, „Civil society‟ representative  
 9-June-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 9-June-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 11-June-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 12-June-2009, Aid agency representative 
 12-June-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 16-June-2009, Aid agency representative 
 16-June-2009, Aid agency representative 
 18-June-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 22-June-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 22-June-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 22-June-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 26-June-2009, Ministry of Health representative 
 26-June-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 29-June-2009, Aid agency representative 
 29-June-2009, Aid agency representative 
 30-June-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 30-June-2009,„Civil society‟ representative 
 01-July-2009, „Civil society‟ representative 
 
2) Examples of organisations from which interviewees were affiliated 
 
 Canadian High Commission 
 Canadian International Development Agency  
 Centre for Health, Science & Social Research (CHESSORE) 
 Central Board of Health (now dissolved) 
 Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ) 
 Civil Society for Poverty Research (CSPR) 
309 
 
 Department for International Development (DfID) 
 Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia  (EFZ) 
 European Union (EU) 
 Forum for Youth Organisations  (FYOZ) 
 Health Journal  
 HLSP 
 Infotainment Movement 
 Institute of Social and Economic Research  
 International Labour Office  (ILO) 
 Jesuit Centre for Theological Research  (JCTR) 
 Karolinska Instituet  
 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
 Malaria Control and Evaluation Partnership in Africa (MACEPA) 
 Ministry of Health (Headquarters) 
 Ministry of Health (Provincial Health Office) 
 Ministry of Health (Hospital) 
 Ministry of Health (Specialist Institute/Centre) 
 Ministry of Health (Clinic) 
 Ministry of Finance  
 National AIDS Council (NAC) 
 National Archives of Zambia  
 Network of Zambian People Living with HIV/AIDS (NZP+) 
 Oxfam GB Zambia 
 PMTC Zambia / Harewelle International 
 Reaching HIV-Affected People with Integrated Development and 
Support (RAPIDS) 
 Schistosomiasis Control Initiative (SCI) 
 Sheffield Hallam University 
 Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) 
 Thandizani Community-based HV Prevention and Care  
 Traditional Healers Association of Zambia (THPAZ) 
 Treatment Action Literacy Campaign (TALC) 
 UNAIDS 
 University of Zambia 
 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
 World Bank  
 World Health Organisation (WHO) 
 Youth Alive 
 Zambian National AIDS Network (ZNAN) 
